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FOREWORD 
Dr. Ying-Jeou Ma was one of my most diligent students, and 
this book is an excellent example of his ability to master the complex 
problems of boundary delimitation in the East China Sea and to col-
lect the widely scattered and not easily obtainable documentation on 
this subject. 
In order to make the situation more understandable, Dr. Ma 
provides first a description of the geography, geology, and geomor-
phology of the region. As any careful reader of decisions of the In-
ternational Court of Justice soon discovers, even when the Court 
officially discards most of these factors in a particular case, some of 
them are taken by the Court into account. The author, therefore, in 
his discussion of the claims of various coastal States, pays close at-
tention to the particular problems faced by each State in defending 
its position, emphasizing one factor in one situation, and a different 
factor in another. 
Dr. Ma analyzes also the existing conflicts between the various 
pairs of States, first in general and then in relation to the undersea 
oil deposits. He points out that some extraneous factors need also be 
considered, such as the territorial dispute between Japan and China 
concerning the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islands. After such factors 
have been eliminated (or assuming that they have been settled by 
agreements), the question still remains: What are the "relevant cir-
cumstances" that need to be considered? To what extent should se-
curity and defense interests be taken into account? Are there any 
historical rights, and how can they be proven? Are the unity of oil 
deposits and the need for their effective management important? 
What effect should be given to fishery interests, and should the conti-
nental shelf delimitation follow the. boundary of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ), or to the contrary, should the delimitation of the 
EEZ be related to the continental shelf delimitation? (It was the lat-
ter issue that led the Court in the recent Gu!f of Maine Case to a 
decision to use factors other than those that have been devised pri-
marily for the continental shelf or for the EEZ.) 
The author had to struggle also with the hotly disputed issue 
whether the delimitation should be based on the equidistance princi-
ple or some equitable principle such as proportionality. Returning 
finally to the various geological and geomorphological factors, the 
author explores how they would apply to such situations as the Oki-
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nawa Trough which is an important factor in the Sino-Japanese 
dispute. 
In the last part of his book, Dr. Ma considers in depth the spe-
cial problems caused by the Peiping-Taipei rivalry. Assuming that 
an oil deposit is being exploited that is situated in a zone claimed by 
both governments and the oil is brought to a foreign port, how 
should a foreign court determine who is the real owner of that de-
posit and who is the trespasser? 
This short overview of the issues discussed in the book shows its 
importance not only for those who are interested in oil exploration 
and exploitation in the East China Sea, but also to all of those who 
are likely to encounter similar problems in other areas of the world. 
As the deposits close to the shore, which are situated clearly in an 
area under the jurisdiction of the neighboring coastal state, are ex-
hausted, the oil explorers will have to venture further into the trou-
bled waters where conflicts of jurisdiction already have arisen or are 
likely to arise. Dr. Ma's careful analysis of precedents and their ap-
plicability to various situations should be of inestimable value to all 
who may become involved in these conflicts. 
Athens, Georgia 
November 1, 1984 
Louis B. Sohn 
Woodruff Professor of 
International Law 
University of Georgia 
Bemis Professor of 
International Law, Emeritus 
Harvard Law School 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Shortly after dawn in the East China Sea on April 13, 1978, 100 
Chinese fishing vessels emerged from the horizon and quietly assem-
bled around Tiao-yu Island. The island is the largest of the eight 
uninhabited islets of a group situated 102 miles northeast of Taiwan 
and 240 miles southeast of Okinawa and claimed by both Japan and 
China (Peking and Taipei).2 At 10 a.m., 32 of them, some armed 
with machine guns, entered the island's 12-mile territorial sea newly 
declared by Japan, the country which actually controlled the islets.3 
The crew on board the fishing vessels wielded signs and yelled slo-
gans, claiming Chinese sovereignty over the islets as the fleet repeat-
edly circled the island. They vehemently defied demands of 
Japanese cutters and planes dispatched to the scene to leave the area. 
Puzzling over Peking's real intentions, Tokyo reacted with cau-
tion to avoid complicating the pending negotiation of a friendship 
treaty with Peking.4 It lodged a protest with the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) and demanded an explanation. The PRC simply re-
peated its position, made public in late 1971,5 that the islets belonged 
I. Unless otherwise indicated, the factual account of the fishing-boat incident 
related below is based on the following sources: New York Times, April 14, 1978, p. A3; 
"Japanese-Chinese Dispute on Isles Threatens to Delay Peace Treaty," ibid., April 15, 
1978, p. I; ibid., April 16, 1978, p. 8, col. 1; Susumu Awanohara, "An Ill Wind from the 
Senkakus," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 23, 1978, p.IO; William Glenn, "Cool 
Line on the Senkaku 'Bandits'," ibid., May 5, 1978, p. 33; David Bonavia, "The Peking-
Tokyo Minuet of Diplomacy is Inane," ibid., June 23, 1978, p. 79; Tracy Dahl by, "Peace, 
Friendship. . and Some Uncertainty," ibid., August 25, 1978, p. II. 
A detailed chronicle of events appears in Po-shih-tuen T'ung-hsun (Free Chinese 
Monthly), Vol. 7, No. 77 (May 1978), pp. 4-8. The periodical is published in Cambridge, 
Massachusettes. 
2. "Tiao-yu-t'ai" is the Chinese name for the islet group as a whole and for the 
largest island in the group as well. The Japanese call them "Senkaku Gunto." Subse-
quent references to them as Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands instead of Senkaku Gunto suggest no 
preference for the claim of China (Peking and Taipei) or Japan. For detailed descrip-
tions of the group, see Chapter 4 infra and Table 3. 
Throughout this writing, the "People's Republic of China" (PRC) refers to the Com-
munist Chinese Government in the Chinese mainland whereas "Republic of China" 
(ROC) refers to the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan. "China" and "Taiwan" 
are used in their geographical sense only, unless otherwise indicated. 
3. Japan declared a 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile fishing zone on July I, 1977. 
For the enabling legislation, see UNLS/19, pp. 56, 215, 218. 
4. For an in-depth political analysis, see Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-Japanese Treaty 
of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude," Asian Survey, Vol. 18 (1978), p. 1235. 
5. Peking Review, January 7, 1972, p. 12. 
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to it, and expressed concern over the incident's impact on the treaty 
negotiations. In addition, the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, 
the third claimant to the islets, declared that its sovereignty over the 
group would not be affected by claims of "any other parties."6 Sub-
sequently, while PRC leaders tried apologetically to explain away 
the "accident" to the Japanese/ the fishing boats doubled their 
number to 200. The flotilla cruised in and out of the 12-rnile zone 
before it finally left on April26. On the next day, the Japanese fur-
ther were assured that henceforth Chinese fishermen would refrain 
from fishing around the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands.8 
The incident not only dramatically suspended the PRC-Japan 
friendship treaty negotiations, which had been going on since the 
previous February,9 but also revived a territorial dispute between the 
two countries. The sovereignty issue was the focus of much attention 
in the early 1970s by Japan, the ROC, the PRC, and the United 
States. 10 Japan insisted that the islets were a part of the Ryukyu 
Islands returned to Japan in 1972 by the U.S. under the 1971 Oki-
nawa Reversion Treaty, 11 whereas both Chinese governments con-
tested that view on historical, geographical, and legal grounds. 12 
The issue was understandably shelved when the PRC and Japan es-
tablished diplomatic ties in September 1972 and had remained dor-
mant until the incident occurred. 13 
6. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), April 14, 1978, p. I. The Central 
Daily News is a Kuomintang-owned Chinese-language newspaper based in Taipei. 
7. This was what Keng Piao, a PRC vice premier, told Hideo Den, leader of Japan's 
Democratic Socialist Union Party, in Peking. New York Times, April 16, 1978, p. 8. 
8. This was the statement of Liao Ch'eng-chih, Deputy Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress (the PRC's nominal parliament), and the 
President of the Sino-Japanese People's Friendship Association, to Utsunomiya Tokuma, 
a visiting member of the Japanese Diet (parliament), in Peking. Mainichi Daily News, 
April 29, 1978, p. I. 
9. Tretiak, supra note 4, pp. 1241-46. 
10. For the body of legal literature relating to the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands, see Ch. 4 
infra, at note I. 
II. For the official Japanese position, see Statement of Foreign Ministry of Japan, 
March 8, 1972. English translation appears in Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, 
People's China and International Law, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974, 
pp. 351-52 [hereinafter cited as Cohen & Chiu). 
12. For the official position of the ROC, see Chung-yang Jih-pao, June 12, 1971, p. I, 
and for that of the PRC, see supra note 5. 
13. New York Times, September 30, 1972, p. I. The joint communique issued in 
Peking by Chou En-lai, the PRC's premier, and Tanaka, the Japanese premier, made no 
mention of the islands. Chou reportedly said to Tanaka that "[l)et's not dispute [the 
islands). After all, they are little dots hardly noticeable in a map. The question arose 
merely because oil is believed to lie around them." Ming Pao (Ming Daily), October 2. 
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In retrospect, the PRC's "fishing-boat diplomacy" seems to h~ve 
been intended to prod the Japanese to expedite the treaty negotia-
tions, which were losing momentum at the time. 14 Peking's interest 
in the early conclusion of the treaty apparently outweighed its terri-
torial claim to the Tiao-yu-t'ais. 15 Both Peking and Tokyo have ex-
pressed interests in jointly developing resources around the islets, 
leaving aside the vexing territorial issue. 16 No agreement has thus 
far materialized, however. 17 
Apart from the political dimension, there are complicated legal 
1972, p. 4. Ming Pao is an independent Chinese-language newspaper published in Hong 
Kong. The Peking correspondent of Japan's Mainichi Shimbun reported that shelving 
the Tiao-yu-t'ais issue was agreed upon by Japan and the PRC as a precondition for 
establishing diplomatic ties. Since the islands were in actual control of Japan at the time, 
the report continued, the PRC's consent to shelve the issue amount to waiver of its claim. 
Chung-yang Jih-pao, April 18, 1978, p. I; New York Times, April 15, 1978, p. I. 
14. Tretiak, supra note 4, p. 1246. 
15. The PRC's senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing reportedly told Japanese For-
eign Minister Sonoda in Peking before signing the treaty in mid-August that "there 
would be no recurrence of the Senkaku incident." Washington Post, August 13, 1978, p. 
A26. Peking also reacted mildly when Japan was constructing a heliport on the Tiao-yu 
Island. New York Times, May 23, 1979, p. A7. A photograph of the heliport by the 
Associated Press appeared in Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), May 25, 1979, p. I. 
(The United Daily News is an independent Chinese-language newspaper based in 
Taipei.) The PRC stated that the Japanese government should be "prudent" less the 
friendship between the two countries be damaged. Hua-chiao Jih-pao (China Daily 
News), May 28, 1979, p. I. (The China Daily News is a pro-Peking Chinese-language 
newspaper published in New York). 
On July 22, 1981, the PRC's Foreign Ministry expressed regrets about a survey of 
fishing resources in the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands and nearby waters conducted by Japan's 
Okinawa Prefecture and demanded the incident not happen again. Statement on Japa-
nese Fishery Resources Survey on Our Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands by Spokesman of the Infor-
mation Department, Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. Chung-kuo 
kuo-chi:fa nien-k'an 1982 [Chinese Yearbook of International Law 1982], p. 465. 
16. The PRC was reported to have taken the initiative in bringing up the idea 
through its ambassador to Japan Fu Hao, while he was visiting Okinawa. Lien-ho Pao, 
May 13, 1979, p. 1, citing a May 12 report by Mainichi Shimbun from Tokyo. Japan 
reportedly reacted favorably. Lien-ho Pao, July II, 1979, p. I. As of late 1980, govern-
mental negotiations have continued between Peking and Tokyo. Jen-min Jih-pao (Peo-
ple's Daily), Nov. 29, 1980, p. 4. (People's Daily is the official Chinese-language 
newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.) 
17. In effect, both sides approached the joint development idea under the assumption 
that the islands were their own territory. This was why no agreement had been reached. 
George Lauriat and Melinda Liu, "Pouring Trouble on Oily Waters," Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, September 28, 1979, pp. 19, 20-21. In April 1983, Peking again an-
nounced, through its vice premier Yao Yi-ling who was visiting Tokyo, that it favored an 
international program to jointly develop the oil riches of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands while 
leaving the sovereignty dispute to be settled later. Lien-ho Pao, April9, 1983, p. 1 (citing 
a UPI dispatch from Tokyo). 
4 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
issues involved. During the 1970s, a number of studies were done on 
these issues. These studies invariably concluded that the territorial 
and the seabed issues were inseparable; settlement of the former was 
a conditio sine qua non to that of the latter. 18 As nationalistic feelings 
ran high in both China and Japan, these commentators seemed pes-
simistic about the likelihood of a pacific settlement. Their pessimism 
was reinforced by the existing vague rules of international law on 
continental shelf delimitation and the regime of islands. The latter 
half of the 1970s witnessed, however, a revolution of the legal regime 
of the ocean, primarily as a result of deliberations at the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
beginning in 1974. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinaf-
ter the LOS Convention), which was signed at Montego Bay, Ja-
maica, on December 10, 1982, 19 reflecting the general consensus of 
more than 120 signatory states, has substantially altered some of the 
assumptions on which previous studies were based. Indeed, the 
changing law of the sea calls for a fresh look at the present dispute. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2 infra, the continental shelf 
claims of the coastal states in the East China Sea, namely, China (the 
ROC and the PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan (the 
Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) has no coastal front in the 
East China Sea) are vague. While the ROC has declared a 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Japan a 200-mile fishing zone, 
the PRC and the ROK have declared neither.20 Moreover, all of 
18. See Chapter 4 infra. 
19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 
August 1982; New York Times, December II, 1982, p. I. There were 117 states that 
signed the Convention on December 10, 1982. The number of signatory states has ex-
ceeded 130 as of this writing in August 1984. 
20. Japan extended its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12 miles and declared a 200-
mile fishing zone in 1977. See note 3 supra. The ROC also extended its 3-mile territorial 
sea to 12 miles and declared a 200-mile EEZ on September 6, 1979. The declaration 
states: 
I. The territorial sea of the Republic of China shall be measured from the 
baselines and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of twelve 
nautical miles from such baselines. 
2. The exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China shall be measured 
from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured and shall ex-
tend to the outer limits of the water area of two hundred nautical miles 
from such baselines. 
(I) The Republic of China shall have in the exclusive economic zone sov-
ereign rights for purposes of exploration and exploitation. conserva-
tion and utilization of the natural resources, and such jurisdiction the 
exercise of which is recognized under international law. 
(2) Where the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China extends 
over any part of the exclusive economic zones as proclaimed by other 
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them have signed21 the LOS convention of 1982 ~xcept the ROC 
whose participation in UNCLOS III has been effectively blocked by 
the PRC since 1973 as a result of the expulsion of the ROC from the 
United Nations in 197I.22 In view of the practically identical bound-
ary delimitation provisions for the continental shelf (Article 83) and 
the EEZ (Article 74) in the LOS Convention and the recent trend 
toward delimiting a single boundary that would serve both pur-
poses, 23 one might wonder if a single boundary could be delimited in 
the East China Sea. There are essentially two reasons why a single 
boundary would be infeasible. First, among the coastal states only 
the ROC has thus far declared an EEZ. Before other states follow 
suit, 24 no necessity for EEZ delimitations exist. Second, there lies in 
the East China Sea such a prominent undersea geological feature as 
the 2,000-meter-deep Okinawa Trough, which constitutes a distinct 
break in the essential continuity of the continental shelf and is less 
relevant to the geographical, distance-oriented concept of the EEZ. 25 
Even if all the coastal states had delineated their own EEZs, a single 
boundary would hardly accommodate the different considerations 
states, the boundaries shall be determined by agreement between the 
states concerned or in accordance with generally accepted principles of 
international law on delimitation. 
(3) Other states may enjoy in the exclusive economic zone of the Republic 
of China the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying 
of submarine cables and pipelines, and engage in such other activities 
with respect to navigation and communication as permitted by inter-
national law. 
3. The sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the continental 
shelf contiguous to its coast as recognized by the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of international law shall 
not be prejudiced in any manner by the proclamation of the present exclu-
sive economic zone or the establishment of such zones by any other state. 
Chung-yang Jih-pao, September 7, 1979, p. I; English translation appeared in Hungdah 
Chiu, Rong-jye Chen and Tzu-wen Lee, "Contemporary Practices and Judicial Decisions 
of the Republic of China Relating to International Law," Chinese Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law and Affairs, Vol. I (1981), pp. 151-152. 
21. The PRC, the ROK and the DPRK signed the LOS Convention on December 10, 
1982. United Nations Press Release, SEA/MB/ 13 (December I 0, 1982), p. A2. Japan did 
not sign at the time, but later signed it in early 1983. 
22. For details, see Chapter 4, note 82 and accompanying text. 
23. See generally Edward Collins, Jr. and Martin A. Rogoff, "The International Law 
of Maritime Boundary Delimitation," Maine Law Review, Vol. 34 (1982), pp. 4-24. 
24. There is no urgency for the PRC, the ROK, and Japan to declare an EEZ which, 
they fear, might complicate the already intractable continental shelf boundary problems. 
For a concise discussion see Choon-ho Park, "Maritime Claims in the China Seas: Cur-
rent State Practices," San Diego Law Review, Vol. 18 (1981), pp. 445-48. 
25. For an elaborate discussion on questions relating to the Okinawa Trough, see 
text accompanying notes 223-300 of Chapter 5 infra. 
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underlying the EEZ and the continental shelf boundaries. Thus, 
only the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary in the East 
China Sea is examined in this study. 
Given the fact all the East China Sea's coastal states except the 
ROC have signed the LOS Convention, one might also wonder why 
it is necessary to study the claims and moves of the coastal states, as 
will be done in Chapter 2 infra. The delimitation of continental 
shelf and the EEZ have been one of the most intractable issues nego-
tiated in UNCLOS III. The rivalry between the "equidistance prin-
ciple" school and the "equitable principles" school had reached such 
a magnitude that a compromise formula tolerable to all was finally 
adopted to avert a hopeless deadlock. 26 The compromise was Article 
83 of the LOS Convention, the key provision of which states that 
"[t]he delimitation of the continental shelf between States with oppo-
site or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of 
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.'027 As Article 38 of ICJ's Statute refers to various sources 
of internationallaw,28 it is of little practical help in identifying spe-
cific criteria for delimitation. One therefore has to examine the 
coastal states' claims and moves qua state practice which is poten-
tially capable of becoming customary law. 
Part I of this study sets forth, in three chapters, the geophysical, 
political, and economic backgrounds of the East China Sea oil con-
troversy, reviews the conflicting claims and overlapping concessions 
of the coastal states, and defines the issues to be pursued in subse-
quent chapters. Part II deals with the question of title to oil in three 
aspects. Chapter 4 examines, in light of various sources of interna-
26. For an account of the negotiating process, see Bernard H. Oxman, "The United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981)," American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 76 (1982), pp. 14-15. 
27. Article 83 is quoted in toto in text accompanying note I of Chapter 5 infra. 
28. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: 
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex 
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
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tionallaw, including the LOS Convention, the relevance of the Tiao-
yu-t'ai territorial dispute to the seabed boundary issue. Chapter 5 
takes a fresh look at the decade-old seabed boundary problem, 
drawing upon recent developments during and after UNCLOS III. 
A solution is proposed on the basis of this legal analysis. Chapter 6 
analyzes a unique dimension of the present controversy-the rele-
vance of the Peking-Taipei rivalry to the seabed dispute. Questions 
of recognition of governments in divided states are considered in the 
context of a hypothetical legal battle fought in a third-country court 
over the title to oil produced from the disputed seabed. 

PART I THE SETTING: THE EAST CHINA 
·sEA OIL DISPUTE 
CHAPTER 1 EAST CHINA 
SEA: GEOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR HYDROCARBONS 
In the present study, 1 "geography" refers to physical surface 
features of the earth; "geomorphology" denotes the topography and 
relief features of the earth; "geology" refers to the underlying rock 
structure of land or submarine relief features; and "bathymetry" al-
ludes to the measurement of water depth. 
A. Geography 
The East China Sea is a marginal, semi-enclosed sea of the Pa-
cific Ocean surrounded by China's mainland and Taiwan, Japan's 
Ryukyu Islands and Kyushu, and Korea's Cheju Island (Map 1). 
According to the International Hydrographic Bureau,2 two imagi-
nary lines delimit the northern frontier of the East China Sea: one 
runs at a latitude of 33°17 North from the Chinese mainland to 
Cheju Island (which is also the East China Sea/Yellow Sea bound-
ary); the other extends from Cheju Island to the Japanese island of 
Fukue. The East China Sea's eastern boundary largely follows the 
outer limits of the R yukyu Islands which separate it from the Philip-
pine Sea. In the south, the boundary is a line connecting the Hai-
t'an Island of China's Fukien Province and the northern tip of Tai-
wan. South of this line is the Taiwan Strait. The line extends east-
erly until it reaches the Yonagami Island of the Ryukyu group. 
The East China Sea has an area of 752,000 square kilometers 
(sq. km) (or 290,348 square miles (sq. mi))3 and is 300 to 400 miles 
I. Usage of the terms "geography", "geomorphology", "geology", and "bathyme-
try", in this study is based on Webster's New World Dictionary of the English Language 
Unabridged, 1976. 
2. See International Hydrographic Bureau, Limits of the Oceans and Seas, Special 
Publication No. 23, 3rd ed., Monte-Carlo: lmprimerie Monegasque, 1953, p. 31. But if. 
Su-yu Yeh and Hsiang-tien Liu, Chung-kuo Tsu-jan Ti-li Tsung-lun (A General Treatise 
on the Physical Geography of China), Peking: Commercial Press, 1959, p. 37 (the north-
ern limit of the East China Sea is defined as a line connecting the northern bank of the 
Yangtze River to Cheju Island, and the East China Sea is defined to include the Taiwan 
Strait). 
3. Rhodes W. Fairbridge, ed., The Encyclopedia of Geomorphology, Encyclopedia of 
Earth Science Series, Vol. 3, New York: Reinhold Book Corporation, 1968, p. 184 (Ta-
ble 13) [hereinafter cited as Encyclopedia of Geomorphology). Unless otherwise indi-
(9) 
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long (north-south) and 140-280 miles wide (east-west). Two seaward 
curving arcs, formed by the Chinese mainland coast and the Kyu-
shu-Ryukyu islands chain, nearly converge at the southern frontier 
of the East China Sea near Taiwan. These two arcs respectively de-
lineate the general configuration of Chinese and Japanese coastlines 
in the East China Sea. Although fringes of islands abound along the 
coasts of the Chinese mainland4 and K yushu, the East China Sea is 
virtually devoid of midway islands other than the R yukyus. The 
only exceptions are the disputed Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands in the south 
and the Japanese islands of Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima in the 
north, off K yushu. 
B. Geomorphology 
The seabed of the East China Sea slopes gently seaward from 
the mainland Chinese coast (Map 2). The 40- to 60-meter isobaths 
are far from shore. The smooth shelf extends in certain localities 
more than 250 miles seaward. Two-thirds of the East China Sea is 
supported by the continental shelf in waters of less than two hundred 
meters. At the 120-meter isobath the flat seabed abruptly plunges 
into the Okinawa Trough which has a maximum depth of2,717 me-
ters5 at its deepest part near Taiwan. The Trough, extending from 
Taiwan to Kyushu along the inner side of the Ryukyus, has more 
than half of its area deeper than 1,000 meters and one-fifth deeper 
than 2,000 meters.6 East of the Ryukyus the seabed steeply slides 
cated, "square mile" (sq. mi) refers to square statute mile whereas "mile" refers to 
nautical mile. One nautical mile (6,076 feet) equals 1.15 statute miles (5,280 feet) or 1.85 
km. One sq. mi equals 2.59 sq. km. Abbreviated forms of these words will be used 
hereinafter in texts and notes. 
4. According to one early study, 2,252 islands fringe along the Chinese coast in the 
East China Sea, which are about two-thirds of China's total islands, i.e., 3,338 islands 
excluding Taiwan and nearby islands. See Ch'ing-yuan Li, "Chung-kuo Y en-hai San-
ch'ien-san-pai-san-shih-pa Tao-yu Mien-chi Tsu-pu Chi-suan (A Preliminary Areal Cal-
culation of 3,338 islands along China's coast), Ti-Li Hsueh-pao (Journal of Geography). 
Vol. 2 (1935), pp. 88-91. Recent geographical publications in the PRC put the figure at 
more than 2,500. Editing Group, Shanghai Teacher's College, Chien-ming Chung-kuo Ti-
Li (A Concise Textbook on China's Geography), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Pub-
lisher, 197 4, p. 82. 
5. Rhodes W. Fairbridge, ed., The Encyclopedia of Oceanography, Encyclopedia of 
Earth Sciences Series, Vol. l, New York: Rhinhold Book Corporation, 1966, pp. 238, 240 
[hereinafter cited as Encyclopedia of Oceanography]. 
6. See T. Chase, H. Menard & J. Mammerickx, Bathymetry of the North Pacific, 
Chart No. 5, La Jolla: Scripps Institution of Oceanography and Institute of Marine Re-
sources, 1970. This chart and Map 2 in the Appendix are based on largely the same 
information. 
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again into the R yukyu Trench which, with most of its floor between 
Japan and Taiwan deeper than 6,500 meters,7 is the deepest part_ of 
the region. It is in fact part of the marginal trenches of the Pacific 
Ocean, including the Aleutian Trench, Kuril Trench, Japan Trench, 
and the Philippine Trench. 
Parallel to the Ryukyu Trench, the Okinawa Trough is sepa-
rated from it by the R yukyu ridge, the peaks of which rise above 
water surface to form the R yukyu Islands. The Trough, however, is 
connected with the Trench by numerous submarine sills cutting 
across the Ryukyu ridge8 ranging in depth from 500 to 1,000 meters. 
North of 30°N latitude, the water depth in the Trough drops to less 
than 900 meters. It further shoals up to less than 500 meters before 
the Trough reaches the vicinity of Kyushu, leaving a modestly wide 
belt of shelf along the coast. The Trough, the ridge, and the Trench 
stand out as one of the two geomorphological provinces in the East 
China Sea, the other being the vast shelf to its west.9 The Trough 
therefore separates the geological shelf of the East China Sea on its 
western part from the R yukyu Islands on its eastern part. 
C. Geology 
1. Introduction 
Before discussing the regional geology and oil prospects of the 
East China Sea, one must have an elementary understanding of 
marine geology, petroleum geology, and offshore oil exploration. 10 
7. Ibid. See also K.O. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Charac-
teristics of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea," UNECAFE/CCOP Technical Bulle-
tin, Vol. 2 (1969), pp. 26-27. This is the well-known "Emery Report." It was revised in 
John M. Wageman, Thomas W.C. Hilde, and K.O. Emery, "Structural Framework of 
East China Sea and Yellow Sea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 54, (1970), p. 1611. 
8. A submarine sill is a submarine barrier that separates two or more depressions 
such as undersea canyons, troughs, or basins. Encyclopedia of Geomorphology, supra 
note 3, p. I 081. 
9. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 13. 
10. The introduction to marine geology is based on the following sources: Encyclope-
dia of Geomorphology, supra note 3, pp. 1079-97; K.O. Emery, "An Oceanographer's 
View of the Law of the Sea," in Symposium on the International Regime of the Seabed, ed. 
by Jerzy Sztucki, Rome: Accadernia national dei Lincei, 1969, p. 47; Hollis D. Hedberg 
"Continental Margin from Viewpoint of the Petrokum Geologist," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 
54 (1970), p. 3 [hereinafter cited as Hedberg (1970)]; Hollis D. Hedberg, "Ocean Floor 
Boundaries," Science, Vol. 204, No. 4389 (1979), p. 135. 
The introduction to petroleum geology and oil exploration is based on entries on 
geophysical exploration (or prospecting) in Encyclopedia Americana, int'l ed., Vol. 17 
(1974), pp. 504-08; Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10 (1973), pp. 197-202; and articles on 
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(a) Marine Geology 
To the layman, geologists like to compare the earth to a soft-
boiled egg-the yolk being the earth's liquid core, the white its man-
tle, and the shell its crust. The major features of the earth's surface, 
continents and oceans, overlie the continental crust and the oceanic 
crust, respectively. Generally speaking, the oceanic crust, more 
mafic in composition, is thin (5 km) and dense (2.9 gram/cubic centi-
meter) and has a high seismic velocity (6.7 km/second). In contrast, 
the continental crust contains rocks of a more sialic composition 
with a lower density (2.6-2.7 gram/cubic centimeter) and a lower 
seismic velocity (6.0 km/second), but with a much greater thickness 
(35 km). 
The oceanic crust, all covered by the oceans, constitutes about 
60 percent of the earth's surface. Approximately a quarter of the 
continental crust (i.e., the remaining 40 percent of the earth's sur-
face) is submerged below sea level but still fundamentally is a part of 
the continent standing above the general level of the oceanic crust. 
This submerged part of the continental crust, mostly overlain by sed-
iments of various depths deposited from continental origin, is known 
as the continental margin (See figure). The term "continental mar-
gin" suffers from a variety of usage but usually includes: 
(1) the continental shelf, which gently slopes from the 
shore (gradient: 1 :600); 
(2) the continental slope, which begins from the edge of 
continental shelf where a marked increase of declivity 
occurs (gradient: 1: 14) and continues into great 
depths; and 
(3) the continental rise, which extends from the base or 
foot of the continental slope (gradient: 1:40 to 1: 1 ,000) 
petroleum in Encyclopedia Americana, int'l ed., Vol. 21 (1974), pp. 677-78, 681-82; Ency-
clopedia Britannica, Vol. 17 (1973), pp. 758-62. 
Information about offshore operation is based on the following sources: Commis-
sion on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources: Report of the Panel on Marine Engi-
neering and Technology VI-1, VI-164-169 ( 1969), reprinted in H. Gary Knight, The Law of 
the Sea: Cases, Documents and Readings, 1980 ed., Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Claitor's 
Law Books and Publishing Division, 1980, pp. 9-12 to 9-16; "Panel Discusses Trends in 
Offshore Drilling," Ocean Industry, January 1979, p. 35; P.W.J. Wood, "New Slant on 
Potential World Petroleum Resources," ibid, April1979, p. 59; Darryl R. Smith, "Tech-
niques Involved in Drilling in Deepest Water," ibid, June 1979, p. 37 and Roger Lowen-
stein, "Oil Fims to Drill Deep off Atlantic Coast," Asian Wall Street Journal, February 
24, 1983, p. 9. 
Land 
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and merges imperceptibly with the abyssal plain on 
the ocean floor. 
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The base of the continental slope, one of the most extensive and dis-
tinctive geomorphological features of the earth, is generally regarded 
as the approximate boundary between continental and oceanic 
crusts. The boundary, however, may not be a clearly marked line, 
but a zone covering parts of the slope as well as the rise. In some 
localities, the crustal structure shows intermediary character in thick-
ness, density, and seismic velocity. 
The continental shelf ranges in width from one to 650 miles, 
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averaging about 37 miles, and in depth from 50 to 550 meters, aver-
aging about 133 meters. The conventional assumption that that 
outer limit of the geological continental shelf coincides with an arbi-
trary isobath variously phrased as 200 meters or 100 fathoms (183 
meters or 600 feet) is plainly at variance with geological reality. The 
continental slope has an average widtn of 9 to 18 miles and an aver-
age depth of 1,830 meters within the range of 1,000 to 5,000 meters. 
The continental rise has a width of up to 540 miles, a depth of up to 
5,000 meters and a thickness of up to 10 km. Since many continental 
margins of the world's continents, including those of East Asia, have 
not been thoroughly studied, current knowledge about their geology 
is rather limited. 
(b) Petroleum Geology 
Most petroleum is found in porous sedimentary rocks several 
thousand feet under the surface where organic material deposited 
millions of years ago is transformed into oil through long, slow, and 
complex chemical changes. The high porosity of sedimentary rocks 
(such as sandstone) allows the oil and gas thus formed to migrate 
freely until they collect in natural traps sealed by impervious rocks 
(such as igneous rock) as a result of crustal movement. Petroleum 
traps are of three main types: anticline, fault, and stratigraphic traps. 
An oil field is the accumulation of many such traps. The thicker the 
sedimentary rock, the greater the potential yield of oil. The most 
favorable habitat of petroleum offshore, as onshore, is sedimentary 
basins where layers of sediments acquire a thickness of over one km. 
Such basins are concentrated along the continental margin, namely, 
the shelf, the slope, and the rise. 
Past drilling data show that rocks of certain geologic ages are 
far more oil-bearing than those of other ages. More than half of the 
oil in the world, in fact, is found in rocks of the Cenozoic Era (70 
million years ago to the present time), the youngest age in the earth's 
history, and especially in rocks of the Tertiary Period (65 to 2 million 
years ago). In the Tertiary Period, rocks of the Neogene Epoch (25 
to 2 million years ago) account for a large proportion of the world 
petroleum production. In general, sedimentary basins of the Terti-
ary Period are one of the most promising geological environments 
for oil. 
(c) Offshore Oil Operation 
Petroleum lies hidden under the earth. Except for natural seep-
age, it cannot be detected from the surface by its physical or chemi-
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cal property. Three scientific methods are currently employed to 
prospect for oil from the surface: geological, geophysical, and g~o­
chemical methods. The geophysical techniques, such as gravity, 
magnetic, and seismic surveys, are the most popular ones. Among 
them, the seismic survey, the most expensive and laborious method, 
produces the most precise information about the petroleum geology 
of the area prospected. Whether oil deposits actually exist, however, 
can only be learned by drilling. Offshore oil exploration and pro-
duction are far more arduous, costly, and risky than those onshore, 
the result of the more hostile environment and the ocean engineering 
work required. Offshore drilling rigs are supported and/or carried 
by fixed or mobile platforms, depending on the water depth at the 
drilling site. Drillships, jack-ups, submersibles and semi-submer-
sibles are the commonly used rigs operating throughout the world 
today. Current drilling capability may reach more than 6,000 feet 
(2, 100 meters) of water, and production capability 980 feet (300 me-
ters). The bulk of offshore drilling and production in the next dec-
ade, however, will still take place in waters less than 600 feet deep 
(180 meters), the U.S. offshore industry sources predict, unless the 
price of crude oil gets to $60 a barrel. 
2. State of Research on East Asia's Seabed 
Unlike those of the Persian Gulf and North Sea, the seabed of 
the East China Sea was largely neglected in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Lack of geological knowledge and regional political stability account 
for the inattention. The earliest study was published in 1949 by 
American geologists Shepard, Emery, and Gould. 11 Their work was 
less useful because it was largely a compilation of data derived from 
bottom-sediment notations on navigational chartsP A 1958 study 
by Klenova, a Soviet marine geologist who had access to geological 
information on the north China seabed prior to the Sino-Soviet rift, 
again contained only general discussions.D Not until 1961 did a 
II. F.P. Shepard, K.O. Emery, and H.R. Gould, "Distribution of Sediments on East 
Asiatic Continental Shelf," Occasional Paper, No. 9, Allan Hancock Fundation, 1949 
cited in Hiroshi Niino and K.O. Emery, "Sediments of Shallow Portions of East China 
and South China Sea," American Geological Society Bulletin (1961), pp. 731-32, 742-43. 
12. This criticism appeared in Yang-chih Huang et al, "Tiao-yu-t'ai Ch'ien-wan 
Tiou-pu-teh," (Tens of Thousands of "Noes" to Forsaking the Tiao-yu-t'ais), Ming-pao 
Yueh·k'an (Ming-pao Monthly), Vol. 16 (May 1971), pp. 17, 18 [hereinafter cited as 
Huang et al (1971)). Mr. Huang got his Ph.D. in geography from Columbia University 
in the mid-1970s. Ming-pao Yueh-k'an is a Hong Kong-based, Chinese-language 
monthly periodical associated with Ming Pao. 
13. M.B. Klenova, "Hai-yang Ti-chih-t'u," (Ocean Bottom Character Chart), Hai-
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more elaborate study come out. This was done by Emery and geolo-
gist Niino of Japan. 14 It focused largely on distribution of sediments 
of the East China Sea instead of its geological structure and pros-
pects for oil. Only six years later did another effort by them begin to 
touch upon petroleum geologyY In 1968, the newly formed Com-
mittee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources 
in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP [the official acronym]) sponsored, 
under the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE), a shipbome research program. It was a six-
week geophysical survey in the East China Sea and the Yell ow Sea 
on board the U.S. R/V R.F. Hunt provided by the U.S. Naval 
Oceanographic Office. Its report, written by Emery and scientists 
from CCOP member countries, was published in 1969 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Emery Report). It contained the most comprehen-
sive data at the time about the East China Sea's geology. Given the 
limited time used, the Report has nevertheless to be confirmed by 
further seismic surveys and drillings. 16 Its optimistic prediction of 
oil deposits in the region 17 has, however, triggered off what one com-
mentator termed the "oil war" in East Asia. 18 Since the Report, 
published geological information on the East China Sea has been 
scarce. 
3. Regional Geology 
A series of parallel northeast-southwest-trending ridges and 
sediment-filled depressions outline the East China Sea's regional ge-
ology19 (Map 3). Functionally, the ridges serve as tectonic dams to 
yang Yu Hu-chao (Oceanologia et Limnologia Sinica), Vol. I (1958), pp. 243-51 (S. Fan 
& C. Hsu trans. from Russian). 
14. See note II supra. 
15. K.O. Emery and Hiroshi Niino, "Stratigraphy and Petroleum Prospects of Korea 
Strait and the East China Sea," UNECAFE/CCOP Technical Bulletin, Vol. I (1968), p. 
13. 
16. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 41. 
17. For details, see note 38 infra and accompanying text. 
18. Choon-ho Park, Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow-Sea and East China Sea, 
Occasional Paper, No. 15, Kingston, Rhode Island: Law of the Sea Institute, University 
of Rhode Island, 1972, pp. 3-4, 51 note I [hereinafter cited as Park (1972)]. Dr. Park has 
written extensively on problems of East Asian ocean resources, including the seabed con-
troversy under study. The author benefits substantially from his pioneer research in this 
area. Part of his analysis remains valid and will be referred to in its place. Part of his 
analysis, however, suffers from several drawbacks to be discussed in Chapter 4 infra. In 
any event, drastic changes in events and the law of the sea require an updated treatment 
of the seabed issues in the East China Sea. 
19. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 40 (Fig. 17), reproduced as Map 3. 
I~ 
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trap sediments20 derived mostly from China, drained by the Yellow, 
Yangtze, and other rivers.21 In the region, the northwesternmost 
ridge is the Fukien-Reinan Massif, a folded zone uplifted during the 
Middle to Late Mesozoic Eras (160 to 70 million years ago).22 It lies 
south to the Yellow sea, trapping, in the Yellow Sea Basin, at least 
200,000 cubic km. of sediments23 of Neogene origin. Further down 
southeast, the Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone coincides with the outer 
edge of the vast continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan.24 The 
Zone was formed during the later part of the Tertiary Period25 (60 to 
10 million years ago). By damming sediments from the Chinese 
mainland the Zone has helped build the present continental shelf 
known among geologists as the "Taiwan Basin." Sediments land-
ward of the Zone are estimated at one million cubic km., mostly 
Neogene in age.26 Beyond the Taiwan·Sinzi Folded Zone lies the 
R yukyu Folded Zone with outcropping volcanic islands such as the 
Ryukyus. This Zone, believed to have been formed during the Neo-
gene age, 27 has also dammed a continuous belt of sediments in the 
Okinawa Trough,28 the structural depression between the Taiwan· 
Sinzi Folded Zone and the Ryukyu Zone. Seaward of the Ryukyu 
Folded Zone the seabed slopes downward to a terrace, with thick 
sediment, and on to the floor of the Ryukyu Trench, averaging more 
than 6,000 meters below sea levei.29 Since the Emery Report made 
no mention of the crustal origin of the Okinawa Trough, however, it 
is still unclear whether the Trough is a continental or oceanic 
structure. 
20. For a discussion on how a tectonic dam works, see K.O. Emery, "The Continen-
tal Shelves," Scientific American, September 1969, pp. 106, 109-11. 
21. The volume of sediments annually discharged from the Yellow and Yangtze riv-
ers is 2,080 and 550 million tons respectively. The two rivers are the first and the fourth 
largest contributors of sediments to the ocean in the entire world. See J.N. Holeman, 
"The Sediment Yield of Major Rivers of the World," Water Resources Research, Vol. 4 
(1968), pp. 737-47, cited in K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 31. 
22. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 39. All the geologic times referred to in paren-
thesis based on Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10 (1973), pp. 161-76; Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana, int'l ed., Vol. 12 (1974), pp. 462-63; Webster's New World Dictionary of the English 
Language Unabridged, 1976, p. 949. 
23. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 31. 
24. /hid.. p. 33. 
25. /hid. 
26. /hid. 
27. /hid. p. 38. 
28. /hid. p. 35. 
29. /hid. p. 38. 
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4. .Distribution of Sediments 
Mud, sand, and their mixture constitute the majority of surface 
sediments of the East China Sea. 30 Mud bottom lies close to shore, 
followed by sand or mud-and-sand bottoms. Beneath this blanket of 
sediment lie the oil-bearing Tertiary strata of the Neogene age.31 
The surface strata are again underlain by Mesozoic and Paleozoic 
sedimentary rocks32 (70 to 620 million years ago). These low-
porosity strata often serve as the floor of oil traps. 33 
The Neogene strata thicken southwesterly from Tsushima Strait 
(between Japan and Korea) to Taiwan. Being less than 200 meters 
in thickness in the Strait, the strata's thickness exceeds 2 km. in an 
area several times the size of Taiwan (13,948 sq. mi.) located north-
east of that island.34 According to the Emery Report, potential oil-
bearing features such as anticlines, faults, and unconformities were 
found in the Neogene strata.35 Since sediments landwards of the 
Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone have filled up the Taiwan Basin and then 
surmounted the dam along most of its length, the western slope of 
the Okinawa Trough adjacent to the Zone is also rich in sediments 
of hydrocarbon potential. The sediments in the Trough exceed 1.2 
km. in thickness. 36 
D. Potential for Hydrocarbons 
In their 1967 study Emery and Niino concluded that "consid-
ered most favorable is the cross-hatch area between Kyushu and 
Taiwan, having one reported seep, probably folds.'m In the 1969 
Emery Report, they and the others became more specific in the as-
sessment of oil prospects: 
The most favorable part of the region for oil and gas is 
the 200,000 sq. km. area mostly northeast of Taiwan. Sedi-
ment thickness exceeds 2 km., and on Taiwan they reach 9 
km., including 5 km. of Neogene sediment. Most of the 
sediment fill beneath the continental shelf is believed to be 
30. Hiroshi Niino and K.O. Emery, supra note II, pp. 744 (Fig. II), 746 (Fig. 12). 
31. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 33. 
32. K.O. Emery and Hiroshi Niino, supra note 15, p. 19. 
33. Petroleum traps such as anticline usually have rocks of low porosity as their 
"floor" as well as "ceiling" between which oil, gas, and water collect. See note 10 supra 
and the accompanying text. 
34. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, pp. 33, 35. 
35. Ibid, p. 41. 
36. Ibid , p. 35. 
37. K.O. Emery and Hiroshi Niino, supra note 15, p. 25. 
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Neogene in age, ... Nearly all of the oil and gas that is 
produced on land in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan comes 
from Neogene Strata. A high probability exists that the con-
tinental she!f between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the 
most prol!fic oil reservoirs in the world. It is also one of the 
few large continental shelves of the world that has re-
mained untested by the drill, owing to military and polit-
ical factors .... 38 (emphasis added) 
19 
The optimism was shared by some geologists, but challenged by 
others?9 The general consensus seems to support the Emery Report's 
appraisal, however. In any event, the Emery Report is, by its own 
admission,40 but the first step toward understanding the oil pros-
pects. No drilling, which would have yielded the most direct infor-
mation about the undersea petroleum geology, was done in the 
survey. Despite this weakness, the Emery Report has generated 
much euphoria in capitals of the coastal states. Since then, a number 
of Western companies associated with the ROC and the ROK, as 
well as the PRC itself, have conducted limited drillings in the Tai-
wan Strait, southern and northern parts of the East China Sea, and 
the eastern section of the Yellow Sea.41 The results have been care-
fully guarded by the companies or governments involved. The loca-
tions of these drillings suggest, however, that the bulk of the East 
China Sea shelf has remained untapped42 due to political factors. 
38. Emery eta/., supra note 7, pp. 39, 41. Writing in 1979, Emery still stood by what 
he said a decade earlier: 
The best prospect for large new petroleum discoveries are [sic] believed to be 
the mature and youthful continental margins off eastern Asia and off northern 
Asia. 
K.O. Emery, "Continental Margins-Classification and Petroleum Prospects," AAPG 
Bulletin, Vol. 64 (1980) pp. 297, 309. 
39. For a discussion of geologists' reactions to the Emery Report, see Selig S. Harri-
son, China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 
pp. 48-52 [hereinafter cited as Harrison]. 
40. K.O. Emery eta/., supra note 7, p. 51. 
41. See Chapter 2 infra. 
42. The drilling sites off Taiwan coasts rarely went more than 50 miles offshore. On 
the other hand, the PRC's Geology Ministry drilled two exploratory wells in the middle 
of the northern part of the East China Sea in February 1981 (Longjing-1), and April 
1982 (Longjing-11). The PRC's China National Offshore Oil Company drilled the third 
exploration well, Dongtai-1, in 1982 in the same area (Map 10). These were the first wells 
the PRC has ever drilled in the East China Sea. Longjing-1 was reported to have tested 
2,628 barrels of petroleum per day (BOPD) of high-quality crude. There has been no 
confirmation of this, however. Statement of David S. Holland, senior vice president of 
Pennzoil, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1982. United 
States-China Economic Relations: A Reappraisal, Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
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The limited understanding of the region's petroleum geology 
has not deterred geologists, businessmen, journalists, and even politi-
cians from making estimates of the offshore oil potential of China's 
marginal seas. Some figures can be several times larger than others. 
For instance, a Japanese Government survey estimated that the oil 
deposits in an unidentified area surrounding the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands 
may be as high as 15 billion tons (109.5 billion barrels)43 which alone 
exceeds estimates for China's total potential given by others. Here 
are some samples of this numbers game: 
Estimates of China's 
Recoverable Offshore 
Reserves (billion Estimator's Own 
Estimator (year) barrels) Remarks 
Soviet geologist F. 
Salmanov (1974)44 7.5-11.2 
U.S. Major oil 
companies (1975-
76)45 10.0-45 
Prof. A.A. Meyerhoff 
& Dr. J.O. Willums 
(1975, 1979, 1983)46 30-32 "pure speculation" 
Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) "a subject of 
(1977)47 39 conjecture" 
Former U.S. 
Secretary of Energy 
Schlesinger ( 197 8)48 50 
PRC Government 
(1981, 1982)49 73.7-157.4 
(1) 
ing Office, April 1982, p. 92; Selig S. Harrison, "Oil Rush in East Asian Waters, Part II: 
Claims in Conflict," Asia, July-August, 1982, pp. 8-11; G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas De-
velopments in Far East in 1982: The People's Republic of China," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 
67 (1983), pp. 1896-97. 
43. Jan -Olaf Will urns, Prospects for Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the People's 
Republic of China, Paper No. 2186, Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, May 
1974, 542, cited in Harrison, supra note 39, p. 43. 
44. Oil & Gas Journal, October 7, 1974, p. 53. 
45. This information was based on interviews conducted by Selig S. Harrison and a 
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Here4B,49 
These are the total quantities of China's offshore reserves with-
out, except for the Meyerhoff/Willums estimate, a geographical 
breakdown. None of them provided the methodology of their esti-
mations, except again the Meyerhoff/Willums estimate. Both the 
CIA and Schlesinger estimates were in fact onshore figures adapted 
for offshore estimation. 
According to Meyerhoff and Willums, the total volume of "eco-
nomic sediments," i.e., "deposits in which petroleum accumulations 
are geologically possible,"50 can be estimated from the information 
gathered by companies shooting seismic lines in the East China Sea. 
They then compared these data, using a computer simulation model 
developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to those 
from similar sedimentary basins elsewhere where drilling and oil 
production were taking place. The range of hydrocarbon potential 
thus could be assessed "within the limits of probability theory."51 
Some of their estimates were as follows. 52 
study by Randall W. Hardy (China's Oil Potential). Harrison, supra note 39, pp. 265, 275 
n.6. 
46. Jan-Olaf Willums, "China's Offshore Petroleum," China Business Review, July-
August 1977, pp. 6-14; A.A. Meyerhoff and Jan-OlafWillums, "China's Potential Still A 
Guessing Game," Offshore, January 1979, pp. 54, 55-56; A.A. Meyerhoff, "Petroleum in 
China's Offshore," Asian Profile, Vol. II, No. I, February, 1983, p. I. 
47. Central Intelligency Agency, China: Oil Production Prospects, ER 77-1003 OU, 
Arlington, Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency, 1977, p. I. 
48. Leonard LeBlanc, "Chinese Officials Ponder Next Move" Offshore, January 
1979, pp. 53, 56. 
49. Clarence Rivers, "China's 10-billion-tonne Offshore Oil Bananza," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, October 2, 1981, p. 57; China Daily, April 10, 1982, p. I. (China Dm{v 
is the official English-language newspaper in the PRC); Richard Pascoe, "Foreign Oil 
Firms Expecting Long Delays on Bids to China," International Herald Tribune, Novem-
ber 23, 1983, p. 10. 
50. Williams, supra note 46, p. 7. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid., p. 12 (Table 3). 
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Total Recoverable Total In Place 
Hydrocarbon Hydrocarbon 
Potential (billions Potential (billions of 
of barrels) barrels) 
Area Pess. Middle Opt. Pess. Middle Opt. 
East China Sea 
shallow section 0.1 2.1 60.0 0.4 8.5 240.0 
East China Sea 
deep section 3.7 10.4 175.0 14.8 41.6 700.0 
Formosa [Taiwan] 
Strait and Taiwan Area 0.8 3.4 7.6 3.2 13.5 30.4 
TOTAL 4.6 15.9 242.6 18.4 63.6 970.4 
China's total 8.7 29.0 283.6 34.8 115.9 1134.9 
(emphasis added) 
The hydrocarbon potentials of the East China Sea, the Taiwan 
Strait and the Taiwan area combined account for slightly more than 
half of China's total potential, if the middle figures are used. By far 
the most specific assessment of China's oil potential, the Meyerhoff/ 
Willums estimate may have been refuted by information from the 
PRC's massive geophysical surveys that have taken place since late 
1978.53 But, since drillings in the East China Sea are relatively few, 
these figures at least give one a preliminary picture, however sketchy, 
of hydrocarbon potentials of the East China Sea. 54 
53. Information gathered from these surveys are carefully guarded by the PRC and 
the participating Western oil firms. But since the East China Sea is not included in these 
massive surveys, the Meyerhoff/Willums estimate will continue to be relevant for the 
near future. For a brief discussion of these surveys, see Chapter 2 infra. 
54. There have been French, Japanese, and American reports that in view of the 
geology of the East China Sea shelf, natural gas is more likely to be found than oil. 
Harrison, supra note 39, pp. 53-54. 
CHAPTER 2 CLAIMS AND MOVES OF 
THE COASTAL STATES 
The continental shelf as a geological concept was first used in 
1887.1 Only recently did modem technology permit the exploitation 
of seabed petroleum and lawyers begin to pay attention to this vast 
submerged land. Prior to 1945, a few states had made continental 
shelf claims based on jurisdiction over living resources2 (free swim-
ming or sedentary) or the contiguity principle associated with the 
territorial acquisition of islands. 3 None had ever staked out a gen-
eral claim to the shelf itself and its living and non-living resources. 
One monumental development in the evolution of the continental 
shelf as a legal concept was President Truman's 1945 proclamation 
on the continental shelF whereby the U.S. asserted 'Jurisdiction and 
control" over the natural resources in its adjacent continental shelf 
without specifying the seaward extent of such a claim. The procla-
mation inspired widespread unilateral claims by states over maritime 
I. Martinus W. Mouton, The Continental She!f, The Hague: Martinus Nijhotf, 
1952, p. 6. But if. Abu Dhabi Arbitral Award (Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh 
Dhabi), International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. I (1952), pp. 247, 253 (Lord 
Asquith of Bishopstone, the umpire, stated that the term was first used by a geographer 
in 1898). 
2. In 1910 Portugal issued a decree regulating deep trawling of free-swimming spe-
cies within the limits of the continental shelf by steam vessels. UNLS/1, p.l9. Ceylon 
(now Sri Lanka) promulgated an ordinance in 1925 regulating pearl fisheries (sedentary) 
in its adjacent continental shelf, ibid., p. 59. For a discussion, see Edwin J. Cosford, "The 
Continental Shelf, 1910-1945," McGill Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1958), pp. 245, 246-53. 
3. E.g., Imperial Russia made such a claim in 1916 to islands situated on the "Sibe-
rian Continental Upland". The text of the claim appears in W. Lakhtine, Rights over the 
Arctic (Moscow, 1928), referred to in W. Lakhtine, "Rights Over the Arctic," American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 24 (1930), pp. 703, 708. For a discussion, see Cosford, 
supra note 2, p. 249. In 1942, Great Britain and Venezuela divided and annexed the 
submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria by a treaty. See UNLS/1, p. 44. The treaty simply 
divided the seabed in the Gulf beyond the parties' territorial seas with no general claim 
to these areas or the natural resources contained therein. 
4. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, September 28, 1945, Federal Register, Vol. 
10, p. 12302; Code of Federal Regulations, Vol. 3 (1943-48), p. 67; United States Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (1945), p. 485. Due to its novelty, the Truman Proclama-
tion was not considered to have been based on any recognized or established rules of 
international law; neither was it counter to any such rules. Rather, as its preamble 
showed, it was prompted simply by practical economic considerations. See F.A. Vallat, 
"Continental Shelf," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23 (1946), pp. 333, 334; 
Edwin Borchard, "Resources of the Continental Shelf," American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 40 (1946), pp. 53, 59, 60; Joseph W. Bingham, "The Continental Shelf and the 
Marginal Belt," ibid., Vol. 42, pp. 173, 174, 177. 
(23) 
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areas of various depths, distances from shore, and legal characters. 5 
The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in 
1949 began to consider the question of the continental shelf.6 Two 
years later, it adopted, in its third session, a draft on the regime of 
the continental shelf with a commentary which was then circulated 
to member states for comment.7 Upon the ILC's recommendation, 
the U.N. General Assembly convened the first United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva in 1958, with 
86 states represented.8 The Conference adopted four conventions,9 
including the Convention on the Continental Shelf (hereinafter the 
Shelf Convention) based on the ILC's draft. Among the coastal 
states in the East China Sea, the ROC, Japan, and the ROK at-
tended the Conference, but only the ROC signed the Shelf Conven-
tion.10 No shelf claim was made by any of the coastal states, except 
5. For national claims made prior to 1951, see UNLS/l, pp. 3-38. 
6. Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1949, pp. 235-237 [hereinafter cited 
as YBILC]. 
7. For the draft articles on the continental shelf, see ILC Report to the General 
Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. 6, Supplement No.9, UN Doc. A/1858 (1951), p. 17, re-
printed in YBILC (1951), Vol. 2, p. 141. UN Doc. A/CN 4/SER. A/1951/Add. I. For 
the comments of governments, see ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, 
Vol. 8, Supplement No. 9, UN Doc. A/2456 (1953), p. 42, reprinted in YBILC (1953), 
Vol. 2, p. 241, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1953/Add. I. 
8. For the General Assembly resolution concerning the Conference, see UNCLOS 
I, Official Records, Vol. 2, p. xi, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 (1958). The list of delegations 
appears in ibid , p. xiii. 
9. The four conventions are: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone, UST, Vol. 15, p. 1606; TIAS, No. 5639; UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 205, the Conven-
tion on the High Seas, UST, Vol. 13, p. 2312; TIAS, No. 5200; UNTS, Vol. 450, p. 82, the 
Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 
UST, Vol. 17, p. 138; TIAS, No. 5960; UNTS, Vol. 559, p. 285, and the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, UST, Vol. 15, p. 471; TIAS, No. 5578; UNTS, Vol. 449, p. 311. 
10. Supra note 8, pp. xv, xix. The ROC ratified the Shelf Convention 12 years later. 
See text accompanying notes 89-91 infra. On October 25, 1971, the PRC took over the 
ROC's seat at the U.N. under General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI). In a commu-
nication to the U.N. Secretary-General who performs depository functions for multilat-
eral treaties including the Shelf Convention, the PRC denounced as illegal and null and 
void all the ROC's signatures and ratifications of and accessions to these multilateral 
treaties. The PRC further stated that it would study these treaties before deciding 
whether to accede to them. United Nations Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of 
Which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions, List of Signatures, Ratifica-
tions, Accessions, etc. As at December 31, 1978, pp. iii, iv, UN Doc. ST /LEG/SER.D/12 
( 1979) (hereinafter cited as UN Multilateral Treaties]. Since none of the other coastal 
states are parties to the Shelf Convention, the question whether the ROC may invoke its 
provisions as against Japan or the ROK, despite the PRC's denunciation, is moot. 
SEABED BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 25 
the ROK, 11 until 1969, when the Emery Report came out. 
None of the coastal states in the East China Sea, except the 
PRC, produces enough oil to meet its energy demands. But Japan, 
the ROK, and the ROC all fuel their booming economies with oil, 
more than 98 rercent of which has to be imported from abroad for 
each of them. 2 Against this background, the wave of conflicting 
claims and actions by them following the publication of the Emery 
Report came as no surprise. The soaring oil prices since the early 
1970s helped intensify the competition. 
In a strict legal sense, all coastal states but Japan have made 
formal continental shelf claims. 13 They have also granted conces-
sions14 to domestic or foreign oil companies for surveys, exploration, 
II. On January 18, 1952, the ROK asserted, in a presidential proclamation, its sover-
eignty over the "shelf adjacent to the peninsular and insular coasts of the national terri-
tory, no matter how deep it may be," and the natural resources contained therein. The 
proclamation also delineated, subject to future changes, a zone of "control and protec-
tion" of natural resources under the ROK's sovereignty. The zone included the seabed 
off North Korean coasts in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. The ROK obviously 
acted as if it had sovereignty over all Korea in making this claim. In the East China Sea 
(Map 5), the zone (area within the broken line) is much smaller than the zone delineated 
18 years later. Text of the proclamation appears in UNLS/6, p. 30, reprinted in UNLS/8, 
p. 14. 
The claim has not been formally repealed. Neither was it alluded to in later legisla-
tion dealing with the same subject, however. Infra, text accompanying notes 17-19. 
While Dr. Park made no mention of it in his 1972 article, supra Chapter I, note 18, Oda, 
a Japanese writer and now judge of the International Court of Justice, was unsure of its 
validity. Shigeru Oda, "The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in Southeast Asia and 
the Far East," Ocean Management, Vol. I (1973), pp. 327, 346 [hereinafter cited as Oda 
(1973)]. 
12. Producing no oil at all, the ROK depends 100 percent on imports. G.L. Fletcher, 
"Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1979: South Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 64 
( 1980), pp. 1893, 1896 (Table I). 
In 1979, Japan produced 9,836 barrels of petroleum per day (BOPD). roughly 0.2 
percent of its oil demands. Ibid, p. 1896. The ROC's oil production (3,980 BOPD) is 
about 1.2 percent of its needs. Ibid; Lien-ho Pao, August 21, 1979, p.l. 
13. Coastal states in disputed areas are often reluctant to spell out their claims in 
detail. The South China Sea and the Aegean Sea are good examples. For the former, see 
Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park," Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands," 
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 3 (1974), p. 3, and Hungdah 
Chiu, "South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future 
Shipping Routes," China Quarterly, No. 72 (December 1978), p. 742. 
For the latter, see Ying-jeou Ma et al, Greek-Turkish Conflict over the Continental 
She!f of the Aegean Sea: An Analysis of the Problem and a Proposed Solution (May 1978) 
(unpublished paper written under the supervision of the late Prof. R.R. Baxter of the 
Harvard Law School). The ROK's present concessions are not necessarily its maximum 
claim. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, p. 46 (Fig. 7). 
14. The distinction between a claim and a concession is worth noting. As used here, a 
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and exploitation. For the purpose of this study, the Japanese conces-
sion areas are regarded as the extent of its continental shelf claim. 
Presented below is an examination of these unilateral claims and ac-
tions. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), better 
known as North Korea, has no coastal front in the East China Sea 
and only will be referred to when necessary. 
A. The Republic of Korea 
1. Claims and Concession Areas 
The ROK was quick in translating euphoria into action. Five 
months after the CCOP survey ended, but before the Emery Report 
came out, Gulf oil obtained two offshore concessions 15 (Map 4). 
Shell, Socal/Texaco (Caltex), and Wendell Phillips followed in line 
within 17 months}6 Of the seven concessions, Blocks K-4, K-5, and 
K-7 are in the East China Sea and of primary interest. The ROK 
concluded the oil contracts with foreign oil firms in such haste that 
its governing laws came out only after the contracts had been signed. 
The Submarine Mineral Resources Development Law took effect in 
January 1970 in which a general claim was made to the continental 
shelf "adjacent to the coasts of the Korean Peninsula and its ancil-
claim denotes a state's assertion of exclusive sovereign rights over the natural resources 
in its adjacent continental shelf. A concession means a grant, made by a government to a 
concessionaire, typically a private or state-owned company, to explore a portion of the 
continental shelf and/or exploit its natural resources. The legal mechanism for explora-
tion and production of oil takes various contractual forms ranging from traditional con-
cessions, joint ventures and production sharing contracts, to service contracts. The 
seabed under a concession is referred to as a "concession area (block or zone)" A state 
may not grant an area larger than its claimed continental shelf to concessionaires 
whereas a concession granted implies that a claim exists at least to the extent of the 
concession. A claim may be implicit and has to be ascertained by concessions actually 
granted. As used here, the terms "seabed", "shelf', and "continental shelf' are 
interchangeable. 
15. The concession areas of Gulf and others in 1970 were as follows: 
Operator 
Gulf 
Shell 
Caltex 
Wendell 
Block(s) 
K-2,K-4 
K-3,K-6 
K-l,K-5 
Area (km2jmi.2) 
70,000/27,000 
70,000/27,000 
80,000/30,000 
Date Granted 
4-15-69 
1-28-70 
2-27-70 
Phillips K-7 59,000/23,000 9-24-70 
J.J. Tanner and W.E. Kennett, "Petroleum Development in Far East in 1971: South 
Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 1823, 1845 (Table II). Slight changes have 
been made from the original table. For the status of these concession blocks as of De-
cember 31, 1982, see Map 5 and Table in the Appendix. 
16. Ibid 
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lary islands." 17 A Presidential Decree delineating the seven blocks 
was promulgated in May 1970. 18 Finally, an enforcement regulation 
came into effect a year later. 19 
2. Principles of International Law Employed 
Just a few months before the ROK acted, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague handed down the decision of the 
North Sea Continental She!f Cases ,20 the first of the only three judi-
cial decisions to date on seabed delimitation. The equidistance prin-
ciple, a cornerstone of Article 6 of the Shelf Convention,2 1 was not 
regarded as a mandatory rule of customary international law in con-
tinental shelf delimitation, particularly between adjacent states.Z2 
The Court considered the principle inequitable because of the dis-
torting effect it might give to individual geographical features. 23 
Rather, the Court stressed that a 
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance 
with equitable principles and taking account of all the rele-
vant circumstances in such a way as to leave as much as 
possible to each party all those parts of the continental 
shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land terri-
tory into and under the sea without encroachment on the 
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other . . . 
(emphasis added)24 
The significance of this new principle of "natural prolongation 
of land territory" was certainly not lost in the ROK. The geomor-
phology of the East China Sea was such that application of this prin-
ciple would be advantageous to the ROK vis-a-vis Japan.25 The 
17. Korean Petroleum Industry Development Center, The Law for Development of 
Submarine Mineral Resources, Seoul, 1971, p. 55 (Korean-English bilingual pamphlet in 
the author's possession). 
18. Ibid, p. 70. The geographical coordinates of the area delineated in the Presiden-
tial Decree were quoted in toto in Oda (1973), supra note II, p. 327. 
19. Korean Petroleum Industry Development Center, supra note 17, p. 80. 
20. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3. 
21. Article 6 of the Shelf Convention is quoted in Chapter 4 infra. 
22. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 41, 45, 46. 
23. Ibid, p. 17. 
24. Ibid, p. 53. 
25. The ICJ noted, without pronouncing the status of the Norwegian Trough, that 
the shelf areas in the North Sea separated from the Norwegian coast by the 80-
100 kilometres of the Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be adja-
cent to it, nor to be its natural prolongation. (emphasis added) 
Ibid, p. 32. 
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ROK can justifiably argue that Japan's continental shelf jurisdiction 
ends at the Okinawa Trough so that Japan may not "jump" over the 
Trough to claim the vast shelf on the other side. The ROK has, in 
fact, officially advocated this legal position at UNCLOS IIP6 On 
the other hand, the flat and uninterrupted bottom of the Yell ow Sea 
(Map 1) neutralized the thrust of this principle because the seabed 
may be regarded as the natural prolongation of China's as well as 
Korea's territories. An equidistance (median-line) boundary seems 
justified by the predominantly opposite-coast situation. 27 
Against this background lies the legal rationale of the ROK's 
claim and concessions. For Blocks K-1 to K-4 (Map 4) facing 
China, the equidistance principle must have been the governing rule. 
Cheju and other islands along the coast apparently have been used 
as basepoints. This presumably is justified in view of their proximity 
to shore and the ROK's straight baseline system declared in 1978.28 
While Block K-5 needs no international delimitation (Map 4), Block 
K-6 seems also to have entailed the equidistance principle. 
Block K-7 is far more complex in delineation. Geographically, 
it stretches far south into the East China Sea; its southern tip lies 330 
miles from Cheju, the nearest ROK basepoint. In the north, a 12-
mile zone is allowed for Japan's Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima.29 
Geomorphologically, the block goes beyond the 200-meter isobath 
(dotted line in Map 5), which bisects the block, all the way to the 
middle of the Okinawa Trough where the water averages 900 meters 
26. Statement of Mr. Song (ROK). UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. I (1975), p. 
90. 
27. The ICJ said in dictum that: 
The continental shelf area off, and dividing opposite states, can be claimed by 
each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations 
meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a median line 
.. (emphasis added) 
I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36. 
28. The ROK declared a 12-mile territorial sea in April 1978 and promulgated a 
system of straight baselines in September that year. "Straight Baselines: Republic of 
Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 82 (January 23, 1979), p. 3. Cheju Island is 48 miles off 
the nearest Korean mainland shore but less than 20 miles from the nearest point (Point 
13) on the straight baselines (Map 5). The whole Cheju Strait, the water body between 
Cheju Island and the Korean mainland, thus has come under the ROK's territorial juris-
diction. Treating Cheju Island as part of the Korean Peninsula in determining the 
ROK's continental shelf seems to present a strong case. For an earlier study on the 
ROK's islands, see Donald R. Allen and Patrick H. Mitchell, "The Legal Status of the 
Continental Shelf of East China Sea," Oregon Law Review, Vol. 51 (1972), pp. 789, 801-
02 [hereinafter cited as Allen & Mitchell (1972)). 
29. At the time Japan only claimed a 3-mile territorial sea. "National Claims to 
Maritime Jurisdictions," Limits in the Seas, No. 36 (December 23, 1975), p. 109. 
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in depth (Map 1). The block thus sits on two distinct geomorph~lo.g­
ical provinces: the shelf and the Trough. Apparently, the eqmdts-
tance principle fails to explain the block's location. To go beyond 
the geological shelf into an area on the Japanese side of a hypotheti-
cal median line drawn regardless of the Okinawa Trough, the Natu-
ral prolongation principle must have been employed. Two questions 
arise. First, as the block's eastern side largely follows the mid-chan-
nel line of the Okinawa Trough, did the ROK apply the thalweg 
principle30 by analogy? There seems to be no obvious answer. Sec-
ond, the block enters an area where the maritime boundaries of 
China, Japan, and Korea would converge. The area lies off rather 
than between the coasts of China and Korea, to paraphrase the 
words of the United Kingdom's counsel in the 1977 Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf Arbitration 31 (Map 14) where an analogous situa-
tion existed. 32 Are the coasts opposite or adjacent to each other? Or 
neither? The ROK seemed to have treated it, as the Anglo-French 
Court of Arbitration has done, as an "opposite" situation and ap-
plied the equidistance principle accordingly in delineating Block K-7 
and, perhaps, part of Block K-4 as well. 
In sum, given disparate geophysical environments, the ROK has 
relied on the natural prolongation principle vis-a-vis Japan and the 
equidistance principle in relation to China. Coastal islands have 
been used as basepoints whereas uninhabited mid-ocean islets were 
only accorded a 12-mile zone. 
3. Offshore Exploration 
Wendell Phillips, a large independent oil firm, 33 "farmed out,"34 
30. Under the principle the mid-channel line of a navigable boundary river is the 
international boundary between two riparian states. See generally L. Oppenheim, Inter-
national Law, 8th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, p. 
484. 
31. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French 
Republic Delimitation of the Continental She(( Arbitration of 10 July 1975; Decision of 30 
June 1977 and Decision of 14 March 1978 (Interpretation of the 1977 Decision), Cmd. 
7439, March 1979, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 18 (1979), p. 494 
[Judge Waldock's separate opinion and Judge Briggs' dissenting opinion on the second 
decision excluded in the reprint] [hereinafter cited as the Anglo-French Award]. 
32. The analogous area referred to is the "Atlantic region" Anglo-French Award, 
para. 89-98. For details, see Chapter 5 infra. 
33. In world oil business, the seven giant oil companies, or the "Seven Sisters" are 
usually referred to as "majors" whereas smaller companies are known as "independ-
ents". The "Seven Sisters" are: Exxon (U.S.), Royal Dutch/Shell (U.K. and the Nether-
lands), Mobil (U.S.), BP (U.K.), Texaco (U.S.), and Gulf (U.S.). For a historical 
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at an early stage, 90 percent of its interest to Korean American Oil 
(Koam), a Korean-U.S. joint venture newly established to explore 
Block K-7. That block was wholly included in the Japan-ROK Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ) to be discussed infra. Caltex (Block K-1 
and K-5) conducted seismic surveys in both blocks but was pre-
vented by the State Department from drilling in the politically sensi-
tive Block K-1.35 Hostility which Gulf and others actually 
encountered in the same region served as a further deterrent. 36 
Caltex drilled a dry hole in Block K-5 before relinquishing to the 
ROK all but part of Block K-5 of its concessions in 1976.37 Gulfs 
two blocks (K-2 and K-4), said to be promising in the Emery Report, 
were all in the sensitive area opposite the PRC. Gulf has exper-
ienced extensive sabotage by Peking's "fishing" vessels, in addition 
to repeated warnings. The company drilled three dry holes during 
1972-73 before relinquishing its concessions in 1975; part of Block 
K-4 was later granted in August 1981 to Zapata Oil which did some 
drillings in 1983.38 
account, see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the 
World They Shaped, New York: Viking Press, 1975, pp. 5-17, 32-42. 
34. To "farm out", in American oil business jargon, means to assign the whole or a 
part of a lease (here the concession) by the lessee (here the concessionaire) not interested 
in drilling at the time to another operator or operators who are. R.D. Langenkemp, 
Handbook of Oil Industry Terms and Phrases, Tulsa, Okla.: The Petroleum Publishing 
Company, 1974, p. 47. 
35. Harrison writes, 
(T]he State Department was instructed to inform oil company representatives in 
Washington and U.S. embassies throughout Asia that the American posture in 
disputes relating to oil survey operations would thereafter not only be one of 
scrupulous noninvolvement but of active discouragement. If American compa-
nies nonetheless conducted survey operations in disputed areas they would do 
so at their own risk. They were not to use U.S.-ftag survey vessels or drilling 
rigs; not to employ U.S. citizens in the crews of such vessels; not to use classified 
U.S. technical equipment that might fall into the hands of other military forces; 
and not to expect cooperation in using U.S. satellites for navigation purposes. 
Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, pp. 5-6. This policy was made public in a formal 
State Department announcement. Murray Marder, "U.S. Cautions Oil Seekers near 
China," Washington Post, April 10, 1971, p. I. 
36. Since 1971, floating tracer cables used in surveys in the Yellow Sea have been 
systematically cut by armed PRC fishing vessels. Gulf in March encountered PRC mis-
sile gunboats which remained nearby for three days. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, 
p. 130. 
37. William R. Scheidecker, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1976: South 
Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 61 (1977), p. 1837. The part of Block K-5 that was not 
relinquished is in part covered by the JDZ. 
38. William R. Scheidecker, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1975: Republic 
of Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 60 (1976), p. 1912; G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Develop-
ments in Far East in 1981: South Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), pp. 1897-98. 
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4. Joint Development with Japan 
Frustrated by its experience with the U.S. oil companies that 
were vulnerable to political pressure, the ROK became enthusiastic 
about joint development with Japan in the area claimed by both 
countries. Negotiation with Japan began in late 1972 and was con-
summated, despite protests from China (the PRC and the ROC)39 
and North Korea,40 in January 1974, with the signing of two agree-
ments. The first dealt with delimitation of the continental shelf 
boundary in the Korea Strait.41 The other was the Japan-ROK Joint 
Development Agreement under which the JDZ was established and 
the seabed dispute was shelved.42 While the ROK parliament 
quickly approved the treaty in December 1974, it took the Japanese 
Diet more than three years to do the same, mainly due to domestic 
political infighting.43 The PRC protested again,44 accusing Japan 
and the ROK of infringing upon China's sovereignty. Seoul and To-
kyo exchanged instruments of ratification in June 1978.45 Despite its 
expected third protest,46 the PRC took no retaliatory action against 
Japan nor linked the issue with the pending friendship treaty.47 
The JDZ, located entirely on the Japanese side of the Japan-
ROK hypothetical median line (Map 1), was divided fm1her, under 
39. Peking Review, February 8, 1974, p. 3. The ROC also made it clear on February 
14, 1974 that it reserved all its rights in the continental shelf of the East China Sea. 
"Continental Shelf Rights Reserved," Free China Weekly, February 17, 1984, p. I. For a 
discussion, see infra Chapter 3. 
40. Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), February 3, 1974. 
41. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Boundary 
in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, February 
5, 1974, NDLOS, Vol. 4 (1975), p. 113; "Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Develop-
ment Zone: Japan-Republic of Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977, 
pp. 1-3. 
42. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Devel-
opment of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, 
February 5, 1974, NDLOS Vol. 4 (1975), pp. 117-33; Limits in the Seas, No. 75, Septem-
ber 2, 1977, pp. 12-33. 
43. For the pros and cons in Japan, see Susumu Awanohara, "Oil Pact Delay Upsets 
Seoul," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 13, 1977, p. 25; Sarn-O Kim, "The Resentful 
Land of the (Not So) Morning Calm," ibid., June 4, 1977, pp. 55-56. 
44. The PRC first warned, on May 27, 1977, the Japanese not to ratify the agreement, 
Peking Review, June 3, 1977, p. 7, and then lodged a "serious protest" with Tokyo after 
the agreement was ratified, declaring the agreement "entirely illegal and null and void", 
ibid., June 17, 1977, pp. 16-17. 
45. Junnosuke Ofusa, "Japan-South Korea Oil Treaty Ratified," New York Times, 
June 15, 1978, p. Dll. 
46. Peking Review, June 30, 1978, p. 25. 
47. Junnosuke Ofusa, supra note 45. 
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the agreement, into nine subzones along the boundaries of existing 
Korean and Japanese concession blocks (Map 6).48 Subzones 5, 6, 7, 
8, and 9 overlap with areas claimed by the ROC and the PRC. The 
Western oil firms which left reluctantly in 1976 or earlier came back, 
applying anew for mining rights in the JDZ.49 So did Japanese firms 
which had concessions there.50 Thus far, the exploration right to 
Subzone 7, the largest, has been awarded to Koam on behalf of the 
ROK whereas exploitation rights, upon commercial discovery, will 
be exercised by Nippon Oil, representing Japan.51 The Japan-ROK 
Joint Commission, an overseeing body set up under the agreement, 
has worked out similar arrangements in Subzones 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 
(Map 6).52 These opposite combinations of oil companies represent-
ing the interests of the ROK and Japan are intended to balance con-
flicting national interests in an intergovernmental joint venture. 
Regardless of these arrangements, all natural resources extracted 
and all costs incurred are to be equally divided. 53 Full-scale explo-
ration was begun in September 1979.54 By mid-1983, two explora-
tory wells had been spudded in Subzone 7, again over the PRC's 
protest. 55 
B. Japan 
Japan was the first in East Asia to appreciate the potential of 
seabed oit.56 The Ryukyu Islands' return to Japan by the U.S. in 
1972 was reportedly accelerated under Japanese pressure due in part 
to the islands' strategic location.57 The hitherto little known Tiao-
48. See Article III and the Appendix of the Agreement, supra note 42. 
49. Junnosuke Ofusa, supra note 45. The Western majors in fact pushed the conclu-
sion of the agreement so that they could go ahead with drilling. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ron Richardson, "South Korea Poised to Drill," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 14, 1979, p. 63. 
52. Art. XXIV of the Agreement. 
53. Art. IX. 
54. Ron Richardson, supra note 51. 
55. Petroleum Economist, August 1980, p. 357; G.L. Fletcher, supra note 38, p. 2373; 
G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East in 1982: South Korea," AAPG 
Bulletin, Vol. 67 ( 1983 ), pp. 1897-98. The PRC's protest appeared in Beijing Review, May 
19, 1980, pp. 6-7. 
56. The Japanese conducted preliminary drilling near the Tiao-yu-t'ais and almost 
found gas during World War II. Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, p. 174. 
57. See Tao Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) 
Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition," Virginia Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 221, 242 note 67 [hereinafter cited as Cheng (1974)]. Japan was vested 
with so-called "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands. For details of the back-
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yu-t'ais, sitting atop the oil-rich shelf, became the focus of a bitter 
territorial dispute between Japan and China (the ROC and the 
PRC). Japan also found itself unable to accept the ROK's extensive 
offshore claims. The year 1972 witnessed certain significant changes. 
Japan and the ROK began negotiating a joint development program 
in the disputed area. Meanwhile, Tokyo's establishment of diplo-
matic ties with Peking in September 1972 not only shelved the explo-
sive territorial issue but also paved the way for oil imports from the 
PRC.58 It was thereafter politically undesirable and economically 
unnecessary for Japan to continue an ambitious oil hunt in the trou-
bled East China Sea. 
1. Claims and Concession Areas 
Japan thus far has made no official seabed claim to the East 
China Sea. The Japanese Government, however, has asserted or de-
fended its de facto claims and concessions in a variety of ways. For 
instance, in a diplomatic note to the ROC on July 18, 1970,59 ten 
days before Gulf signed the oil exploration contract with CPC,60 Ja-
pan stated that the ROC's concession zones located between Japan 
(including the Tiao-yu-t'ais, according to the Japanese) and Taiwan 
were unilateral and invalid under international law. The position 
was made public in August of that year by Japanese Foreign Minis-
ter Aichi in the Diet.61 In October, talks were held between the 
ROC's acting Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador.62 
The latter reportedly defended Japanese concessions in the disputed 
area63 and proposed a transitional arrangement pending formal ne-
ground, see generally Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty: Hearing on Exec. J 92-1 (The Agreement between the United Stales of America 
and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Dailo Island), 92nd Cong., 1st Session, 
1971. 
58. Japan began importing crude oil from the PRC in May 1973. A long-term trade 
agreement concluded in 1978 called for importation of 47.1 million tons (344 million 
barrels) of oil during 1978-85, New York Times, February 17, 1978, p. 8. The agreement 
was later extended to 1990. 
59. See Hungdah Chiu, "Tiao-yu-t'ai Lieh-yu Wen-t'i Yen-chiu'· (A Study of the 
Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands Problem], Cheng-la Fa-hsueh P'ing-lun, (Chengchi Law Review), 
Vol. 6 (1972), pp. I, 3 [hereinafter cited as Chiu (1972)]. This article was the definitive 
work on the Tiao-yu-t'ais dispute at the time. The source of this particular information 
was identified as "reliable sources", ibid, p. 3, n.l8. 
60. Infra text accompanying notes 112. 
61. Chung-yang Jih-pao, August II, 1970, p. I. 
62. Chiu (1972), supra note 59, pp. 4, 21-22. 
63. See Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 13. 
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gotiation.64 Japan reiterated this flexible stand later in December 
1971.65 As if to show that flexibility did not mean weakness. Japan 
was firm in preventing Gulfs planned survey near the Tiao-yu-t'ais 
in mid-1972.66 Japan's reactions to the ROK's claims ran along sim-
ilar lines,67 except for the added complication of a territorial dispute 
with the ROC and the PRC. By concluding the Joint Development 
Agreement, Japan and the ROK did not fail to stress that their re-
spective sovereign rights in the JDZ remained unaffected.68 
West Japan Oil, a Shell/Mitsubishi joint venture, filed the first 
concession application in 1967 (J-4 in Maps 4, 7, and 8).69 The block 
was only marginally relevant here (Map 4). West Japan obtained 
more concessions in the Okinawa Trough (J-3c in Maps 7 and 8) and 
beyond, the bulk of which were assigned in 1977 to New West Japan 
oil (Map 8), a joint venture of Mitsubishi, Shell, and the govern-
ment-owned Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC, 
renamed Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) in June 1978).70 
Part of the West Japan blocks (J-4 and J-3c) was later included in 
the JDZ (Subzones 1 and 9 in Map 6). The second concession appli-
cation was made by Nippon Oil in 1968 for a block (J-3 in Maps 4, 7, 
and 8) of 50,312 sq. km. immediately south of the West Japan 
block.71 The bulk of the Nippon block later became Subzones 4, 5, 
and 7 of the JDZ (Map 6). 
In 1969, Teikoku Oil applied for a concession block (J-2 in 
Maps 4, 7, and 8) south of the Nippon zone (Map 7).72 Subse-
quently, Teikoku, joined by Gulf, applied for vast areas along the 
64. Chiu (1972), supra note 59, pp. 25-26. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, pp. 178-79. 
67. Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 20. 
68. Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement, supra note 42, Art. XXVIII. 
69. Howard W. Dalton, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1967: Japan,'' 
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 52 (1968), pp. 1585, 1587. 
70. New West Japan Petroleum Development Company was formed to accommo-
date financing by the Japanese Government through JPDC. Japan Petroleum Consul-
tants, Ltd., Japan Petroleum and Energy Yearbook 1978, (Tokyo, 1978), pp. T-Ill, T-112 
[hereinafter cited as Japan Petroleum Yearbook (1978)). For the renaming of JPDC to 
JNOC, see the Japanese National Committee of the World Petroleum Congress, The 
Petroleum Industry in Japan 1978, (Tokyo, 1979), p. 2. 
71. Howard D. Dalton, "Petroleum Development in the Far East in 1968: Japan,'' 
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 53 (1969), p. 1801. But Nippon Oil claimed that it first applied for a 
permit as early as 1958. Japan Petroleum Yearbook, supra note 70, p. T -107. The acre-
age figures in these sources (and within the same source) are also slightly different. Here 
the figure in the September 1972 issue of AAPG Bulletin is adopted. 
72. Wilson Humphrey, "Petroleum Development in Far East [in 1969): Japan," 
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Okinawa Trough and around the Ryukyus. Teikoku's block J-3 was 
later covered by the JDZ. Among Japanese firms, Teikoku has the 
largest concession area in the East China Sea. Also in 1969, JPDC 
approached the Ryukyu authorities, then under U.S. administration, 
for leasing 25,000 sq. km. of seabed (J-1 in Map 4) 180 miles west of 
the Ryukyus and 108 miles from Taiwan (Map 4).73 The JPDC zone 
was later enlarged and divided among Uruma (J-1a), Japan Petro-
leum Exploration Company (Japex, J-lb), and Alaska (J-1c) (Maps 
7 and 8). 
The status of some of these concession blocks remains unclear. 74 
For the purpose of this study, they are treated as representing the de 
facto Japanese claim to the East China Sea. 
2. Principles of International Law Employed 
Despite the absence of an official seabed claim to the East 
China Sea, Japan nevertheless made public its positions on continen-
tal shelf issues in general. In 1973, Japan submitted to the U.N. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor 
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (hereinafter the Seabed 
Committee) a preliminary proposal on "Principles on the Delimita-
tion of the Coastal Seabed Area."75 Revised Draft Articles on the 
same subject were proposed during the second session of UNCLOS 
III at Caracas. The Draft Articles, in which Japan's adherence to the 
equidistance principle was obvious, provided, inter alia: 
2. The outer limit of the continental shelf (the coastal sea-
bed area) shall not exceed a maximum distance of 200 nauti-
cal miles from the baseline for measuring the breadth of 
the territorial sea as set out in . . . 
3. (a) Where the coasts of two or more States are adja-
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 54 (1970), p. 1561; Wilson Humphrey, "Petroleum Development in 
Far East in 1970: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 55 (1971), pp. 1647, 1648. 
73. Wilson Humphrey, "Petroleum Developments in Far East [in 1969]: Japan," 
supra note 72, p. 1561. 
74. Before 1972, all the concessions had been regarded as "under application" Park 
(1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 13; J.J. Tanner and W.E. Kennett, "Petroleum Devel-
opments in Far East in 1971: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 1828, 1843 
(Table 5). But as late as 1977, the Japex sector, for instance, was referred to as "provi-
sional" whereas the Teikoku and Uruma blocks were marked "letter of intent area" in 
Map 8. This author's inquiries to JNOC (Washington office) and the Japanese embassy 
in Washington in late 1979 got nowhere. The information black-out was obviously 
prompted by the sensitivity of the matter. 
75. Japan: Principles on the delimitation of the coastal sea-bed area, UN Doc. A/ 
AC.l38/SC.II/L.56 (1973), Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), p. Ill. 
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cent or opposite to each other, the delimitation of the 
boundary of the continental shelf (the coastal seabed area) 
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agree-
ment between them, taking into account the principle of 
equidistance. 
(b) Failing such agreement, no State is entitled to ex-
tend its sovereign rights over the continental she!f (the coastal 
seabed area) beyond the median line, every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines, conti-
nental or insular, from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea of each State is measured. (emphasis added).76 
Another important element in seabed delimitation is the selec-
tion of basepoints. It is not uncommon for two opposite states ad-
hering to the same equidistance principle to disagree considerably on 
the basepoints from which the equidistance line is to be drawn. 77 
Tiny islands situated midway or on the "wrong" side of the hypo-
thetical median line are one of the best examples. The regime of 
islands (i.e., definition and status) was debated at length in the Ca-
racas session of UNCLOS III, where Japan declared that it favored, 
in principle, an equal treatment of islands, islets, and continents re-
garding their entitlement to seabed rights. 78 Article 3(b) of the Draft 
Articles quoted above indicated the same position of Japan. 
Delimitation of the West Japan blocks in the Korea Strait (J-4) 
and Okinawa Trough (J-3c) clearly relied, in relation to Korea and 
China, on the equidistance principle. All the islands (Tsushima, 
Osumi, Tokara, Amami, etc) were used as basepoints. The Nippon 
block (J-3a) seems to have followed the same principle vis-a-vis Ko-
rea and China, using as basepoints not only the Japanese continental 
territory (Kyushu), and nearby islands (Goto Retto), but also tiny 
76. Japan: Revised draft articles on the continental shelf, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/ 
C.2/L.3/Rev.l (1974), UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 3 (1975), p. 211. 
77. For instance, judging from their claims and concessions, both Greece and Turkey 
seemed to adhere to the equidistance principle. Yet the Greeks would use the Greek 
Aegean Islands as basepoints for measuring the median line, including those only a few 
miles from the Turkish coast. This would leave the Turks with nothing but a narrow belt 
of continental shelf not much different from its territorial sea. On the contrary, the Turks 
would disregard the Greek islands in drawing the median line between the mainland 
coasts of the two countries so that Turkey would get a substantial share of the Aegean 
continental shelf. The Aegean Sea shelf dispute underscores the significance of basepoint 
selection. See Ying-jeou Ma el a/., supra note 13. This is also true in the Anglo-French 
arbitration, supra note 31. 
78. Statement of Mr. Ogiso (Japan), UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 2 (1975), p. 
148. 
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islets (Tokara Gunto) and barren rocks (Tori Shima and Danjo 
Gunto). Delineation of the Teikoku blocks also entailed the equidis-
tance principle. As two of the blocks (J-2 and J-3b) stretch over 200 
miles, the basepoints employed vary. Kyushu, Tokara Gunto, and 
Amami Gunto may all have been used as basepoints for Block J-3b 
and the eastern part of Block J-2 whereas the southern part of Block 
J-2 must have engaged the disputed Tiao-yu-t'ais as basepoints. 
Questions concerning tiny, uninhabited islets would arise. More-
over, all basepoints selected (except the Tiao-yu-t'ais) are in areas 
geomorphologically unrelated to the continental shelf on which the 
concession blocks sit, due to the presence of the intervening Okinawa 
Trough. Much the same can be said of the concession blocks of 
Japex, Uruma, and Alaska which used the Tiao-yu-t'ais as the sole 
basepoints. Analyses of the legal status of tiny islands and undersea 
trough in relation to continental shelf delimitation are reserved for 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
To summarize, despite the unclear status of some concession 
blocks, Japan has consistently followed the equidistance principle in 
delimiting its continental shelf, with islands being accorded the same 
seabed rights as is continental territory, regardless of their size and 
economic value. 
3. O.ffshore Exploration 
As noted earlier, Japanese geologist Niino coauthored, with 
Emery, two important geological studies in 1961 and 1967 on the 
East China Sea and participated in the 1968 CCOP survey. Niino 
was so fascinated by the oil potential that he personally organized, 
with substantial support from the Japanese Government and univer-
sities, three geophysical surveys in 1968, 1969, and 1970 in areas 
around the Tiao-yu-t'ais.79 The first two produced inconclusive find-
ings;80 the result of the third, said to be more encouraging, led to 
79. For an account of these surveys, see Daisuke Takaoka, "Senkaku Retto Shuhen 
Kaiiki no Gakujyutsu Chosa ni Sanka Shite" (I participated in the Academic Surveys in 
Offshore Areas Surrounding the Senkaku Islands), Okinawa (in Japanese), No. 56 
(March, 1971), pp. 42-65, cited in Yang-chih Huang et al, "Jih-jen Wei Mou-tuo wuo 
Tiao-yu-t'ai Cho-lt-hsieh Sht-mo Shou-chiao?" [What Tricks Have the Japanese Played 
in Attempting to Plunder Our Tiao-yu-t'ais?], Ming-pao Yueh-k'an, Vol. 7 (October 
1972), pp. 6, 7, 20 note 16 [hereinafter cited as Huang et al (1972)]; Harrison, supra 
Chapter I, note 39, p. 175. For the result of the second survey, see UNECAFE/CCOP 
Technical Advisory Group, "Marine Geologic Investigations of the Offshore Area 
around the Senkaku Islands, Southern Ryukyu Islands," Report of the Seventh Session 
ofCCOP (Agenda Item 4(b)), UN Doc. E/CN.ll/L.278 (1970), pp. 99, 111. 
80. Harrison, supra chapter l, note 39, p. 175. 
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Japan's planning of a "five-year crash program" to search for oil in 
that area. 81 Troubled by the boundary dispute, however, Japanese 
companies except West Japan did minimal exploration before Sep-
tember 1972.82 Since then, the Japanese Government has under-
taken cautiously a few surveys in the East China Sea where private 
companies were not permitted to do so. All these surveys and one 
drilling (by Gulf) took place in the Okinawa Trough or east of the 
R yukyus, outside the disputed area. 83 
4. Joint Development with the ROK 
The background ofthe Japan-ROKjoint development program 
has been noted earlier. Japanese concession blocks included in the 
JDZ are those of Nippon (J-3a), Teikoku (J-3b), and West Japan (J-
3c & J -4) (Map 6). 
C. The Republic of China 
In terms of population and territory under effective control, the 
ROC is the smallest coastal state in the East China Sea. 84 Otherwise 
resource-poor, the island of Taiwan has had a century-long history 
81. Ibid But see Huang et al (1972), supra note 79, p. 9. 
82. In 1969, both West Japan and Nippon conducted magnetometer and seismic 
surveys in their respective concession areas. Wilson Humphrey, supra note 73, p. 1562. 
No survey was ever conducted by either Teikoku or Japex in 1970. Wilson Humphrey, 
"Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1970: Japan," supra note 72, pp. 1647-49. 
83. See W.E. Kennett, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1972: Japan," AAPG 
Bulletin, Vol. 57 (1973), pp. 2090, 2091 (Table 2); Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, pp. 
172-73; William R. Scheidecker, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1976: Japan," 
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 61 (1977), pp. 1837, 1843 (Table 3), 1870 (Fig. 9); G.L. Fletcher, 
"Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1977: Japan," ibid, Vol. 62, (1978), pp. 1985, 
2005 (Table 5); G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1978: Japan," 
ibid, Vol. 63 (1979), pp. 1822-23, 1864 (Fig. 13), 1865 (Fig. 14); G.L. Fletcher, "Petro-
leum Developmentsin Far East, 1979: Japan," ibid, Vol. 64 (1980), pp. 1888, 1940 (Fig. 
15), 1941 (Fig. 16); G.L. Fletcher, "World Energy Developments, 1980-Foreign Oil and 
Gas Developments, Far East: Japan,'' ibid, Vol. 65 (1981), pp. 2168, 2193 (Fig. 19), 2194 
(Fig. 20); and G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East in 1981: Japan," 
ibid, Vol. 66 (1982), pp. 2367, 2394 (Fig. 19), 2395 (Fig. 20). G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas 
Developments in Far East in 1982: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), pp. 1893-94. 
In late May 1979, Tokyo sent two research vessels to the Tiao-yu-t'ai waters for a ten-day 
multipurpose survey. A day earlier, a heliport was completed on the main island of the 
group. Hua-chiao Jih-pao, May 28, 1979, p. I. For details, see Introduction, note IS and 
accompanying text. 
84. Population and land area as of December 3 I, I 982 are as follows: 
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of onshore oil and gas development dating back to 1877.85 Offshore 
oil operation did not begin, however, until the late 1960s. Like the 
ROK, the ROC was quick to capitalize on the Emery Report; unlike 
the ROK, the ROC has, since 1946, had a relatively sophisticated 
state oil enterprise-the China Petroleum Corporation (CPC). CPC 
has engaged not only in such "downstream" operations as transpor-
tation, refining, marketing, and petrochemicals, but also in such "up-
stream" operations as geological survey and oil prospecting. 86 
During 1969-1970, the ROC systematically made seabed claims, en-
acted relevant legislation, delineated offshore zones, and engaged six 
U.S. oil companies for offshore oil development. All this occurred 
amid the simmering political atmosphere among coastal states in the 
East China Sea, the offshore claims of which hopelessly overlapped 
with one and other. To becloud matters further, the U.S. quietly 
reversed its China policy in 1970, culminating in President Nixon's 
visit to the PRC in February 1972. To the oil companies associated 
with CPC, Washington's voltej'ace eroded their confidence in the 
ROC's future. Moreover, State Department interventions against 
operations by U.S.-fiag vessels in sensitive waters made offshore op-
erations even more difficult. Eventually, two firms gave up; the 
other four decided to wait and see. 
I. Claims and Concession Areas 
"Continental shelf' as a legal concept was alien to the ROC 
prior to the 1958 UNCLOS I, except to a few U.N.-related legal ex-
perts. After the ROC signed the Shelf Convention, neither the ROC 
Government nor the academic community paid much attention to 
the new regime or the Convention's ratification by the ROC until the 
Emery Report brought the issue into the limelight. 87 The ROC Gov-
Population 
(millions) 
Land area 
Japan 
118 
ROK 
40 
(est.) 
PRC 
1,004 
(est.) 
China 
ROC 
18 
('000 Jun2) 378 99 9,561 36 
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1983, New York: Newspaper Enterprise Associa-
tion, 1983, pp. 509, 511, 535, 537. 
85. Chinese Petroleum Corporation, A Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, Taipei: 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation, 1976, pp. 905-09 [hereinafter cited as Petroleum History 
of China]. 
86. ibid, Vol. 2, p. 1521 et seq. See also Chinese Petroleum Corporation, (A Brief 
Introduction], Taipei, 1979. 
87. Kang Huang, "Chung-hua-min-kuo Yu Ta-lu-chiao-ch'en Chih-tu (The Repub-
40 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
ernment, urged by its Economic Affairs Ministry (CPC's parent min-
istry), declared on July 17, 1969: 
The Republic of China is a State signatory to the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf which was adopted by the 
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. For the 
purposes of exploring and exploiting natural resources and 
in accordance with the principles embodied in the said 
Convention, the Government of the Republic of China de-
clares that it may exercise its sovereign rights over all the 
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to its 
coast outside its territorial sea. 88 
To strengthen the declaration's legal basis, the ROC ratified the 
Shelf Convention on August 21, 197089 with two reservations made 
to Article 6 of the Convention: 
(1) that the boundary of the continental shelf appertain-
ing to two or more States whose coasts are adjacent to and/ 
or opposite each other shall be determined in accordance 
with the principle of the natural prolongation of their land 
territories; and 
(2) that in determining the boundary of the continental 
shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall 
lie of China and the Regime of the Continental Shelf)," Jen Yu She-hui (Man and Soci-
ety], Vol. l, No. 3, (August l, 1973), p. 50. 
88. Chung-yang Jih-pao, July 18, 1969, p. I; Free China Weekly, July 20, 1969, p. 4. 
This declaration was simply a restatement of Article 2, Paragraph I and part of Article I 
of the Shelf Convention. Can the ROC, merely a signatory but not a party to the Con-
vention, nevertheless invoke its provisions to claim shelf rights? International law re-
quires a state "to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty" when that state has signed the treaty subject to ratification unless and until that 
state "shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.'' Article 18, 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. United Nations Conferences on the Law of 
Treaties, Official Records, 1970, p. 289, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/ll/ Add. 2; American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 ( 1969), p. 875. The ROC's exercise of rights under 
Article 2 certainly would not defeat the object and purpose of the Convention since 
neither Japan nor the ROK was a party to the Convention. Further, a coastal state's 
shelf rights have been so established by state practice since 1945 that it has become cus-
tomary international law. The Convention is no longer needed to justify such a claim. 
Thirdly, the fact that the Convention had already entered into force for five years when 
the ROC made the declaration also militates against possible illegality, if any, of the 
ROC's action. 
89. Li-fo-yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan], No. 64, (August 22, 
1970), pp. 2, 14. 
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not be taken into account. 90 (emphasis added) 
The ROC thus became the forty-third party to the Shelf Convention 
when the instrument of ratification was deposited with the U.N. Sec-
retariat on October 14, 1970.91 
The next step was to get offshore operation going. Though com-
petent onshore, CPC needed the technology to "go offshore." From 
mid-1970 to mid-1972, CPC entered into joint ventures with seven 
North American oil companies (later reduced to six)92 to develop a 
total of 194,000 sq. km. of seabed in the Taiwan Strait and the East 
China Sea. To regulate offshore activities, a Statute for Exploration 
and Exploitation of Petroleum in Offshore Areas was belatedly 
promulgated in September 197093 after three of CPC's joint venture 
contracts had been signed.94 The Enforcement Rules issued in July 
1974 further spelled out details of implementation.95 To give sub-
stance to the 1969 continental shelf declaration, the ROC announced 
on October 15, 1970 the delineation of five "Reserved Offshore Pe-
troleum Zones"96 (hereinafter the Offshore Zones) stretching from 
the Taiwan Strait (22°N latitude) to the East China Sea (30°N lati-
tude) (Map 9). The zones are separated from one another by latitu-
dinal lines, using the mainland Chinese coasts invariably as their 
western limits and the west coast of Taiwan (for Zone 1), the mid-
90. Ibid., p. 14; For the English translation, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 10 
(1971), p. 452. 
91. International Legal Materials, Vol. 10 (1971), p. 452. Nine years later, by ex-
tending the breadth of its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12 miles and by declaring a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on September 6, 1979, the ROC did not forget to 
stress in the declaration that 
[t]he sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the continental 
shelf contiguous to its coast as recognized by the Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of international law shall not be 
prejudiced in any manner by the proclamation of the present exclusive eco-
nomic zone or the establishment of such zones by any other state. 
See supra Introduction, note 20. 
92. They were: Amoco (Standard Oil of Indiana), Gulf, Oceanic, Clinton, Conoco, 
Texfel, and Viking. Viking's relationship with CPC was too brief to deserve attention 
here. See A Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1177-83 and Table 7 in 
the Appendix of this study. 
93. English text of the statute appears in Investment Laws of the World, Vol. 8 (1974), 
p. 201. 
94. The haste with which the new law was acted upon belied its alleged three-year 
preparation and one-year drafting. Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, p. 
1172. 
95. Chinese and English texts of the Statute and the Enforcement Rules also appear 
in a pamphlet published by CPC in July 1976. 
96. Chung-yang Jih-pao, October 16, 1970, p. I. 
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channel line of the Okinawa Trough (for Zone II, III and IV), and 
the outer edge of East China Sea continental shelf (for Zone V) as 
their eastern limits.97 The ROC did not fail to stress the preliminary 
nature of these offshore zones, envisaging that more zones would be 
announced in the future. 
Steps taken. by the ROC were the most specific and systematic 
among those of the coastal states in the East China Sea. However 
extravagant and, perhaps, unrealistic in words, the ROC has been 
prudent and realistic in deeds. Concessions granted to CPC to be 
shared with the U.S. oil companies occupy only one half of the five 
Offshore Zones (Map 9). All the concession areas lie in the eastern 
half of the Offshore Zones, leaving unallocated the western half ad-
jacent to the Chinese mainland coast. Moreover, the eastern limit of 
concession areas actually granted follows the 200-meter isobath in-
stead ofthe mid-channel line of the Okinawa Trough as stated in the 
ROC's official announcement (Map 7). The former is farther than 
the latter from the Japanese coast. 
2. Principles of International Law Employed 
Unlike the ROK and Japan, the ROC has declared the princi-
ples of international law on which it based its seabed claims. Zone I 
in the Taiwan Strait requires no international delimitation since the 
ROC and the PRC are not foreign states inter se. There is presuma-
bly no room for applying international law. Despite the ROC's 
nominal claim, the western limit of its concession blocks in Zone I 
largely centers around a de facto median line,98 zigzag in shape, 
leaving open the area west of that line. Were international law to 
govern, the result would probably be the same, given the flat and 
continuous shelf shared by the mainland and Taiwan. 
Zones II, III, and IV extend from the Chinese mainland coast 
all the way to the middle of the Okinawa Trough. The ROC's claim, 
as the 1970 announcement indicated, does not stop at the 200-meter 
isobath-the conventional limit of the continental shelf; rather, it 
continues through the slope and the rise until it reaches the deep 
bottom of the Okinawa Trough. This sweeping claim, using the 
coasts of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan as basepoints, could not 
have been based on anything other than the natural prolongation 
97. Ibid 
98. All the blocks allegedly lie within the ROC's naval patrol lines which largely 
coincide with or parallel to the median line in the Taiwan Strait. Interview with a CPC 
official in Taipei (July 29, 1978). This official preferred to remain anonymous. 
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principle. The explicit designation of the median line of the Oki-
nawa Trough as these zones' eastern limit also suggests that the 
thalweg principle might have had some role to play. As in the case 
of the ROK's Block K-7, there exists a number oflegal questions to 
be analyzed in Chapter 5. Zone V, the northernmost zone, is 290 to 
415 miles from Taiwan (See Table 7). Under the 1970 announce-
ment, the zone's eastern limit coincides with the edge of the conti-
nental shelf, namely, the 200-meter isobath. Applying the same 
analysis for Zones II to IV, one finds that the natural prolongation 
principle has been employed again. It is unclear, however, why 
Zones II, III and IV have the mid-trough line as the outer limit 
whereas Zone V has the shelf edge as its limit. In effect, the depres-
sion, which the 400-fathom (724-meter) isobath encircles near Kyu-
shu, is still part of the Okinawa Trough. This means that the ROC 
could have designated the mid-trough line as the outer limit of Zone 
Vas well. 
Another significant feature is the selection of basepoints. Ex-
cept for Zone I and part of Zone III, the ROC must have used the 
mainland Chinese coast as basepoints to claim such far-off shelves in 
the East China Sea hundreds of miles from Taiwan. The ROC's 
designation of the mainland Chinese coast as the outer limit of its 
five Offshore Zones attests to this observation. By so doing, the 
ROC has apparently intended to speak for all China, including the 
mainland.99 Realistic or not, this position further complicates the 
East China Sea oil controversy. 
3. O.ifshore Exploration 
CPC's first offshore seismic survey took place in 1965 in the Tai-
wan Strait off the onshore producing wells in northern Taiwan. 100 
The year 1968 saw three airborne geomagnetic surveys in the Tai-
wan Strait and the East China Sea: one by CCOP, the other two by 
a U.S. firm associated with Amoco. 101 The results indicated seaward 
99. This position has been upheld by the ROC Government since its retreat from the 
mainland to Taiwan. Taipei has made no change of its position regarding the offshore 
zones as delineated in the October 15, 1970 announcement. CPC officials vigorously 
demanded correction by editors of O..lfshore magazine in 1975 when a map in its October 
1974 issue showed overlapping claims made by Japan, the ROK and the ROC in the East 
China Sea. O..lfshore, March 1975, p. 19. In September 1979 when the ROC proclaimed 
a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, it did not fail to empha-
size that its previous continental shelf claims were not thereby affected. Chung-yang Jih-
pao, September 7, 1979, p. 1. 
100. Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1037-61. 
101. Ibid., p. 1169. 
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extension of an onshore anti-clinal structure into the Taiwan Strait 
and the thick sedimentary strata of the Neogene Age. 102 The 
shipborne CCOP survey that produced the optimistic Emery Report 
also took place later in that year. Short of needed offshore technol-
ogy, CPC engaged six U.S. oil companies whose explorations in 
Zone I to Zone V are related below. 
(a) Amoco 103 
Amoco (Standard Oil oflndiana) approached CPC in 1967 and 
conducted an aeromagnetic survey for CPC in 1968. A firm joint 
venture contract was finally signed in July 1970 and approved in 
September by the ROC Government. Amoco's 8,200-sq. km. con-
cession lies in the northern part of Zone I in the Taiwan Strait (Map 
9). From 1970 to 1973, Amoco shot 1,500 miles of seismic lines and 
drilled one dry hole. Having done nothing in its blocks since 1974, 
Amoco withdrew temporarily in early 1977. When the contract ex-
pired in September 1978, Amoco relinquished all its concession 
blocks to CPC which struck oil there only a year later. 104 
(b) Conoco105 
Continental Oil Company (Conoco), a large "independent" 
based in Stamford, Connecticut, obtained a joint venture contract 
with CPC in July 1971. Conoco had four blocks in Zone I totaling 
20,000 sq. km. (Map 9). In May 1973 Conoco farmed out 50 percent 
interest to Amoco to fully utilize Amoco's establishment in Taiwan. 
Conoco carried out, from 1972 to 1975, 4,500 miles of seismic 
surveys. One of the drillings done by Amoco as operator for the 
partnership struck natural gas in June 1974, 60 miles off southern 
102. Ibid 
103. Information about Amoco is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1179, 1188; Wilson 
Humphrey, "Petroleum Developments in Far East [in 1970]: China (Taiwan)," AAPG 
Bulletin, Vol. 55 (1971), pp. 1635, 1641; Standard Oil Company (Indiana), Annual Report 
(1971), p. 121; ibid, (1972), p. 8; ibid, (1974), p. 10; Shih-Yu T'ung-hsun [CPC Monthly), 
No. 307 (March I, 1977), p. 40. Shih-Yu T'ung-hsun is a monthly newsletter published by 
CPC. 
104. "Hai-yu Tan-yu Chih Shu-kuang (The Dawn of [Taiwan's) Offshore Oil Explo-
ration)," Shih-yu T'ung-hsun, No. 339 (November I, 1979), p. 5. 
105. Information about Conoco is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1188-89. 1197; 
Continental Oil Company, Annual Report, (1974) p. 24. 
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Taiwan. 106 The estimated probable reserve was large enough 
(300,000 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) 107 to sustain Taiwan's 
then natural gas supply for more than four years. 108 But both com-
panies consider this find still too small to justify further investment 
in view of price re§ulation of natural gas in Taiwan and the ROC's 
uncertain future. 10 Conoco's confidence was further eroded when 
the U.S. Government reportedly refused to insure its investment in 
Taiwan and strenuously intervened to thwart its planned drilling in 
early 1976 by a U.S.-flag rig. 110 Like Amoco, Conoco completely 
disengaged in September 1978. 111 
(c) Gulf112 
Though the smallest among the "Seven Sisters", Gulf is CPC's 
largest foreign partner. It has had a quarter-century relationship of 
crude sale, financing, and investment with CPC. Its joint venture 
contract with CPC entered into force in September 1970. Gulfs 11 
concession blocks in Zone II (Map 9) also had the largest acreage-
55,000 sq. km. Gulf shot 7,500 miles of seismic lines and drilled four 
unsuccessful wells, one of which was less than 40 miles from the dis-
puted Tiao-yu-t'ais. Gulf relinquished 73 percent of its original 
acreage before 1976. This was intended in part to minimize conflict 
with Japan where Gulf had a larger stake, including a joint venture 
with Teikoku whose block slightly overlapped with Gulfs (Map 7). 
106. Continental Oil Company, Annual Report ( 1974), p. 24; 01/ & Gas Journal, Sep-
tember 2, 1974, p. 28. 
107. Harrison, supra Chapter 1, note 39, p. 98. Amoco and Conoco stated a daily flow 
of 25 MMCFD of gas and 250 barrels of condensate. Standard Oil Company (Indiana) 
Annual Report (1974), p. 10; Continental Oil Company, Annual Report (1974), p. 24; Oil 
& Gas Journal, September 2, 1974, p. 28. AAPG Bulletin reported 24 MMCFD of gas. 
R.D. Caldwell, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1974: Taiwan," AAPG Bulletin, 
Vol. 59 (1975), pp. 1983, 1984. 
108. Taiwan's daily production of natural gas was put at 201,210 MMCFD by Liu Ke-
shu, Chairman of CPC. Shih-yu T'ung-hsun, No. 286 (June l, 1975), p. 14. 
109. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, p. 98. 
110. Ibid., p. 99; Jeffrey Segal, "Taiwan: Reality Intrudes into Oil Plans," Petroleum 
Economist, May 1979, p. 185. 
Ill. Actions of Amoco and Conoco were concerted since each held 37.5 percent inter-
est in their joint venture with CPC. 
112. Information about Gulf is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. l, supra note 85, p. 394; ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 1181, 
1190, 1198, 1264, 1356-57; Harrison, supra Chapter l, note 39, pp. 95-97; Gulf Oil 
Corporation, Annual Report, (1970), p. 22; ibid., (1972), p. 5; ibid., (1973), p. 6; ibid., 
(1974), p. 12; ibid., (1975), p. 9; G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 
1982: Taiwan,'' AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), p. 1898. 
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Earlier, Gulf extended the exploration period under the contract 
with CPC to March 1980 but has suspended operation since the mid-
1970s under the force majeure clause of the contract; it was said to 
have dropped all its holdings in 1982. 113 
(d) Oceanic114 
Oceanic Exploration Company was a small but active in-
dependent based in Denver, Colorado. It came to Taiwan in 1968 
and concluded a joint venture contract with CPC in September 1970. 
Oceanic lost Zone II to Gulf but won Zone III over Clinton. Its 
concession area, 110 miles from Taiwan at the closest point (Map 9; 
Table 7), had 40,000 sq. km. in eight blocks. From 1970 to 1974, 
Oceanic shot 5,500 miles of seismic lines and found five promising 
structures before relinquishing to CPC 62.5 percent of its original 
acreage. Despite CPC's constant prodding and extension of drilling 
deadline, Oceanic failed to drill, due primarily to State Department 
intervention 115 and the departure of its drilling partner. Oceanic 
113. There were intensive debates in 1975 among ROC officials on whether to let the 
foreign concessionaires extend the exploration deadline by invoking the force majeure 
clause. Opponents alleged that invoking that clause would delay the companies' opera-
tions indefinitely while CPC could not take the block back because the foreign compa-
nies would remain the operator under the contract. This would vitiate the policy reason 
for inviting foreign operators, namely, to accelerate the offshore oil hunt. Proponents 
argued, on the other hand, that the only alternative for CPC to invoking the force 
majeure clause would be to terminate the joint venture contract on the ground of non-
performance. But CPC may be unable to find a substitute operator to do the exploration. 
Should CPC be momentarily unable to take over the exploration itself, Peking might 
take advantage of this vacuum. Moreover, the contract would remain intact with the 
force majeure clause being invoked. Interview with an official in the ROC's Ministry of 
Economic Affairs in Taipei (November 21, 1978). The official preferred to remain anon-
ymous. 
What actually came out of the debates seemed to be a combination of the two views: 
extension of the exploration deadline was first granted; when performance still could not 
be secured, then came the force majeure clause. Ibid See also Jeffrey Segal, supra note 
110, p. 185. 
114. Information about Oceanic is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, pp. 1179-80, 1191, 1194, 1198; Harrison, 
supra Chapter I, note 39, p. 110; Jeffrey Segal, supra note 110; Oceanic Exploration 
Company, Annual Report (1973), p. II; ibid, (1974), pp. 7, 8; Interim Report (1974); 
Annual Report (1975), p. 5; ibid, (1976), p. 9; ibid, (1979), p. 7. 
115. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, p. 113. The State Department's warning was 
allegedly prompted in part by the Mayaguez incident earlier that year where a U.S. 
container ship was seized by Khmer Rouge forces for violating Khmer territorial waters. 
Interview (November 21, 1978) supra note 113. 
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since then has invoked the force majeure clause to excuse its non-
performance of contractual obligations owed CPC. 
(e) Clinton116 
Clinton International Corporation, the overseas arm of Energy 
Reserve Group, a Wichita, Kansas company, concluded a joint ven-
ture contract with CPC in September 1970. The Clinton sector, 250 
miles from Taiwan, had seven blocks with a total area of 35,000 sq. 
km. (Map 9; Table 7). Clinton shot only 1,700 miles of seismic lines 
and relinquished four blocks in March 1972. Promising prospects 
shown in the surveys helped induce Superior Oil of Houston to join 
Clinton in 1974 as a drilling operator. The State Department vigor-
ously blocked Superior's planned drilling in early 1975 (Map 9), 
however. Superior subsequently pulled out of the partnership with 
Clinton which in tum suspended all operations under the force 
majeure clause in the contract with CPC. In July 1979, Clinton ac-
quired a 10 percent interest from CPC in an ex-Gulf block, with 
CPC as operator. 117 Though the well drilled was dry, the move 
demonstrated Clinton's desire to operate in safer areas closer to 
Taiwan. 
(f) TexfeP 18 
Texfel Pacific Corporation is the exploration outfit of Texfel Pe-
troleum Company, a small independent based in Los Angeles. Sign-
ing a joint venture contract with CPC in June 1972, Texfel was only 
able to obtain a 28,000-sq. km. triangular-shaped block in Zone V, 
the farthest from Taiwan (more than 300 miles) (Map 9; Table 7). 
Texfel has done nothing whatsoever in its concession zone because 
of the zone's conspicuously sensitive location. Like Clinton, Texfel 
has been looking for safer blocks closer to the island. 119 No new 
agreement with CPC has materialized so far. 
116. Information about Clinton is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1181, 1198; Harrison, 
supra Chapter 1, note 39, pp. 105-09; Oil & Gas Journal, May 13, 1974, p. 34. Annual 
reports of Clinton in the 1970's had no information in this respect. 
117. Lien-ho Pao, July 27, 1979, p. I. 
118. Information about Texfel is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, p. 1198; Harrison, supra 
Chapter I, note 39, pp. 115-17. 
119. Perhaps to show their goodwill, two senior executives of Texfel came to Taipei 
four days after President Carter announced in December 1978 his sudden decision to 
recognize Peking. Shih-Yu T'ung·hsun, No. 330 (February I, 1979), p. 34. 
48 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
(g) CPC'2o 
CPC's explorations had concentrated in close-in areas offshore 
Taiwan (Map 10). In Zone I, CPC had shot, as of December 1975, 
7,860 miles of seismic lines, more than those of its foreign partners 
combined. In Zone II (ex-Gulf blocks), CPC's seismic work (6,500 
miles) was about half of what Gulf, Oceanic, and Clinton combined 
did before 1976. The seven wells spudded by CPC in Zone I before 
1976 were all unsuccessful. In view of the U.S. companies vulnera-
bility to political pressure from Washington, CPC decided in 1975 to 
carry out, on its own, explorations in all the unallocated and relin-
quished areas (Map 10). A seven-year intensive program, with a 
capital outlay of $1.8 billion, was begun in July 1976. More than a 
hundred wells were projected for that period. From 1976 to 1984, 60 
wells had been drilled, in contrast to 16 wells (seven by CPC alone) 
before 1976. CPC made a modest discovery in October 1979, 11 
miles off northern Taiwan in an ex-Amoco block. 121 The four wells 
yielded altogether, during testing, 3,300 barrels of petroleum per day 
(BOPD) and 1,519 MMCFD of natural gas, with a 20,000 BOPD 
potential estimated by CPC. 122 The oil strike did more to boost 
CPC's morale than to reduce the ROC's dependence on foreign oil 
since the estimated output amounted to only six percent of the 
ROC's daily oil imports. Only when a second commercial gas dis-
covery was made in September 1984 in the same area did CPC de-
cide to develop this so-called CBK structure. 123 
D. The People's Republic of China 
The PRC has been active since the 1960s in such dispute-free 
waters as the Pohai Bay, the Pearl River estuary near Hong Kong, 
and close-in areas in the South China Sea. However, in the Yellow 
Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, the PRC had, since 
the Emery Report, only made strong but vague claims and done vir-
120. Information about CPC is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following 
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1191-97; Chinese 
Petroleum Corporation, Annual Report ( 1976), p. 4; ibid, ( 1977), p. 4; ibid, ( 1978), p. 4; 
ibid ' ( 1979), p. 4; ibid ' ( 1980), p. 4; ibid ' (1981 ), p. 4; ibid' ( 1982), p. 4; ibid, ( 1983 ). p. 4. 
Asia Letter, December 16, 1975, pp. 3-41;Asia Research Bulletin, January 31, 1976, pp. 
156-66 cited in Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, pp. 118, 290 n.41; Lien-ho Pao, 
November II, 1980, p. I; September 15, 1984, p. I. 
121. Lien-ho Pao, October 27, 1979, p. I. 
122. Jung-hua Hsu, "Chung-yu Tzuan-t'an Ch'i-nien Hai-yu T'an-yu Ch'en Kung 
(After Seven Years of Offshore Drilling and Exploration, CPC Strikes Oil)," ibid 
123. Lien-ho Pao, September 30, 1984. 
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tually no exploration before 1979. In the wake of Peki~g's '_'grand 
opening" to the West beginning in 1978, it has forsaken 1ts ~1therto 
sacred "self-reliance" doctrine in the petroleum industry, whtch was 
formerly a national "self-reliance" model. 124 Foreign, especially 
American, offshore technology was vigorously sought since Sino-for-
eign joint ventures began. From late 1978 to July, 1979, the PRC 
engaged as operators large American, British, French, Italian, and 
Japanese oil companies to conduct geophysical surveys to be com-
pleted in one year in the Pohai Bay, the Yellow Sea, and the South 
China Sea (Map 11). 125 The surveys covered 448,000 sq. km. of sea-
bed and eventually 46 international oil firms from 13 nations, in-
cluding all the Seven Sisters except Gulf, participated in the bidding 
during 1982. 126 As of this writing in August 1984, among the 33 
companies which have completed bidding for 43 blocks that cover 
150,000 sq. km. of seabed, twenty-three joint venture contracts have 
been signed with Peking's China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) to explore the Pearl River estuary and the Yellow Sea. 127 
124. "In Industry, Learn from Taching" has been a national campaign slogan for 
many years until 1980. Taching oil field in northeastern China has been the PRC's 
number one oil field since the early 1960s. Stephanie Green, "Taching/Pohai Journal," 
China Business Review, November-December 1978, p. 10. The ·•self-reliance" rigidity 
slackened during 1977-78 when Hong Kong businessman made joint venture deals with 
PRC enterprises in Canton. China Business Review, March-April, 1979, pp. 15, 16. The 
new trend culminated on July 8, 1979 when the PRC made public its Sino-Foreign Joint 
Venture Law. New York Times, July 9, 1979, p. AI. The new law's official English 
translation appears in China Business Review, July-August, 1979, pp. 46-47. 
125. New York Times, August 24, 1979, p. I; China Business Review, July-August 1979, 
p. 62 (with map); United States-China Economic Relations: A Reappraisal, supra Chapter 
I, note 42, p. 87 (Geophysical Surveys Map) and p. 92 (Offshore China Exploration 
Activity Map). Both maps are reproduced as Map II in the Appendix of this book. 
126. The first round of bidding is in two stages. Stage one, covering an area of 
150,000 sq. km. in the north Yellow Sea and Pearl River basin in the South China Sea, 
began February 16, 1982. The second stage, which covers 42,700 sq. km. in the south 
Yellow Sea and the Tokin Gulf, started March 15, 1982. Hong Kong Standard, February 
18, 1982, p. I; Asian Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1982, p. 3. 
127. See, e.g., Amanda Bennett, "BP Signs Accord for Oil Rights Offshore China,'· 
Asian Wall Street Journal, May II, 1983, p. I; "U.S. Company Gets Rights to Search for 
Oil Off China," New York Times, August 7, 1983, p. I; Dinah Lee, "Exxon, China Ex-
pected to Reach Oil Accord," International Herald Tribune, August 17, 1983, p. 9; Teresa 
Ma, "Foreigners Too Would Like Some Offshoot Business;· Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, August 25, 1983, pp. 61-63; Amanda Bennett, "China Awards Two More Contracts 
for Drilling in the South China Sea," Asian Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1983, p. I; 
"Foreign Oil Companies Sign China Contracts," ibid., November 16, 1983, p. 7; Vigor 
Keung Fung, "China Limits Foreign Role in Oil Support," ibid, November 23, 1983, p. 
I; Jing Wei, "Oil Exploitation in the South China Sea;· (1)-(3), Beijing Review, April 9, 
1984, p. 19; Aprillo, 1984, p. 25; April23, 1984, p. 22; Nancy Langston, "Wells ofUncer-
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Conspicuously missing from the long chain of survey sectors are 
those in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait where the ROC 
has laid extensive claims. 
1. Claims and Concession Areas 
Neither the PRC's official statement nor academic literature has 
ever mentioned "continental shelf' as a legal concept prior to the 
1970s. 128 The Emery Report and its aftermath certainly did not es-
cape the attention of the PRC, however. 129 The PRC's first reaction 
was to denounce the establishment in November 1970 of a non-gov-
ernmental ROC-ROK-Japan Liaison Committee by businessmen 
from the three countries for research and development of resources 
of the East China Sea. The Committee proposed that the three gov-
ernments involved freeze the seabed disputes and let their private 
enterprises proceed with oil exploration. 130 The PRC's denunciation 
appeared in the official People's Daily in an article by a "commenta-
tor" (a pen name reserved for high officials) instead of a formal gov-
ernmental statement. The article attacked the committee proposal as 
representing the real intentions of the respective governments, but 
stopped short of stating the PRC's own claim. The term "continental 
shelf' was absent, however. 
The Liaison Committee decided in late December 1970 to take 
more concrete actions. Infuriated, Peking attacked again on Decem-
ber 29 through the People's Daily's commentator. 131 The article con-
taining Peking's first continental shelf claim is worth quoting at 
length: 
Taiwan Province and the islands appertaining thereto in-
tainty: The Hunt for China's Offshore Oil is not all plain sailing," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, June 28, 1984, p. 50. 
128. Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward Continental She!f and Its Implication on 
IJelimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia, No. I, Baltimore, University of Maryland Law 
School: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. 1977, p. 16 
[hereinafter cited as Chiu (1977)). 
129. Mention was made of exploration and other developments in East Asia in Pe-
king's December 4, 1970 statement. Peking Review, December II, 1970, pp. 15-16; Wash-
ington Post, December 5, 1970, p. A I. 
130. Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 21. But see Chung-yang Jih-pao, March 
6, 1971, p. I; Ibid, April 9, 1971, p. I. The ROC's chief delegate to the conference, Mr. 
C.K. Ku, flatly denied any attempt by the conference to even touch the issue of sover-
eignty over seabed resources. Minutes of the two sessions of the conference appeared in 
ibid 
131. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 29, 1970, p. I; English translation in Peking Review. 
January I, 1971, p. 22. 
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eluding the Tiaoyu, Huangwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, Pei-
hsiao and other islands, are China's sacred territories. The 
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas around these 
islands and of the shallow seas adjacent to other parts of 
China all belong to China, their owner, and we will never 
permit others to lay their hands on them. The People's Re-
public of China has the right to explore and exploit the re-
sources of the sea-bed and subsoil of these areas ... All 
agreements and contracts concerning the exploration and 
exploitation of China's sea-bed and subsoil resources 
[which] the Chiang Kai-shek gang concluded with any 
country, any international organization or any foreign pub-
lic or private enterprise under the signboard of joint devel-
opment' or anything else are illegal and null and void 
(emphasis added). 132 
51 
The PRC's position was reaffirmed in a communique issued on 
March 1, 1970 by the annual, unofficial PRC-Japan Memorandum 
Trade Talks: 
The newly established Japan-Chiang-Park 'liaison commit-
tee' has gone so far as to decide on the 'joint exploration' of 
the resources of the shallow seas adjacent to China's coasts. 
This is a flagrant encroachment of China's sovereignty. The 
Chinese people will not tolerate this. 133 (emphasis added) 
This was the first time that the PRC asserted its "sovereignty" over 
the "shallow seas adjacent to China's coasts." This formulation was 
employed repeatedly later in 1974 and 1977 in the PRC's protests 
against the Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement and in 1980 
against their exploratory drilling in the JDZ. 134 
In February 1981 and April 1982, respectively, Peking's Minis-
132. Ibid. The PRC learned about the ROC's offshore gas strike in late 1974. (Gas 
was found in June but news was not broken until October.) Peking made a critical com-
ment through a People's Liberation Army radio in Fukien facing Taiwan across the Tai-
wan Strait. It accused the CPC of being "an unfilial son who stole the family fortune by 
colluding with outsiders," referring to CPC's joint ventures, and of "selling out the natu-
ral resources of the motherland in the name of China." The broadcast, relying 
allegedly on a UPI dispatch, erroneously reported that the CPC was a "joint organization 
of six U.S. petroleum companies." The accusation was based on this information. Yang 
Ping, "Such is the Chinese Petroleum Corporation," Foreign Broadcast Information Serv-
ice Daily Report, November 4, 1974, p.Cl. 
133. Communique on Talks between Representatives of China-Japan Memorandum 
Trade Office of China and Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office Of Japan, Peking 
Review. March 12, 1971, pp. 24, 25. 
134. See notes 39, 44, 46, 55 and accompanying text supra. 
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try of Geology drilled two exploratory wells, Longjing-1 and Long-
jing-11 (Longjing means "dragon well"), and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation drilled the third, Dongtai-I, all in the 
northern East China Sea right in the ROC's Zone V and very close 
to the Japan-ROK JDZ. 135 As the southwestern edge of the JDZ 
coincides with the southwestern edge of the ROK's Block K-7 (Maps 
5 and 6) which in turn is the extension of the hypothetical median 
line suggested by Seoul between the ROK and the PRC in the Yel-
low Sea, the two wells are located on the west (Chinese) side of the 
hypothetical median line. This by no means indicates Peking's tacit 
acceptance of that line, however. Quite to the contrary, these sym-
bolic moves obviously serve as a reminder to other claimants of Pe-
king's claim to the East China Sea, regardless of the allegedly 
favorable but unconfirmed test results of the drillings. Meanwhile, 
Peking promulgated, in February 1982, the Regulation of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum 
Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises, 136laying down 
for the first time rules for international joint ventures and offshore 
operations. This new law presumably covers the East China Sea, 
should any concession be granted in that area. As of this writing 
(August 1984), though, no concession has been granted either in the 
East China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait. 
2. Principles of International Law Employed 
Since the PRC has neither specified its seabed claims nor 
granted exploration or development concessions in the East China 
Sea, it is difficult to infer any international legal principle from the 
vague statements made thus far. Peking did, however, make known 
its positions on law of the sea issues in general. In July 1973, the 
PRC submitted a working paper to Subcommittee II of the Seabed 
Committee. 137 On the seaward extent of a coastal state's continental 
shelf jurisdiction, it provided: 
( l) By virtue of the principle that the continental shelf is 
the natural prolongation of the continental territory, a coastal 
State may reasonably define, according to its specific geo-
135. Supra Chapter I, note 42. 
136. Jen-min Jih-pao, February II, 1982, p. 4. English text appears in Beijing Re~iew, 
February 22, 1982, p. 14. 
137. Working paper submitted by the Chinese Delegation: Sea area within the limits 
of national jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/ AC.l38/SC.II/L.34 ( 1973 ), Seabed Committee Re-
port, Vol. 3 (1973), supra note 75, p. 71, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 
(1973), p. 1231. 
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graphical conditions, the limits of the continental shelf 
under its exclusive jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea or 
economic zone. The maximum limits of such continental 
shelf may be determined among states through consulta-
tions .138 (emphasis added) 
On the method of boundary delimitation, it continued: 
(5) States adjacent or opposite to each other, the conti-
nental shelf of which connects together, shall jointly deter-
mine the delimitation of the limits of jurisdiction of the 
continental shelf through consultation on an equal foot-
ing. 139 (emphasis added) 
53 
The working paper did not directly address the question of is-
lands' seabed rights. But the language seemed to imply that only 
continental territory was entitled to a legal continental shelf. 140 It is 
also worth noting that on the seaward delimitation of the EEZ, the 
working paper specified four considerations, one of which was the 
geological conditions of the coastal state. 141 As an EEZ embraces 
the water surface and column as well as the seabed and the sub-
soil, 142 geological conditions which no other state has mentioned in 
connection with EEZ delimitation, are relevant nevertheless. The 
PRC's inclusion of the geological factor in EEZ delimitation could 
be intended for the Okinawa Trough. Implications of this provision 
are discussed in Chapter 5. 
In substantive sessions of UNCLOS III since 1974, Peking indi-
cated in only a few occasions its position on the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the EEZ. At the Resumed Ninth Session (July 
28-August 29, 1980), the PRC took the position that delimitation 
questions should be determined through negotiations between the 
parties concerned on the basis of equity, taking into account all fac-
138. Seabed Commillee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), supra note 75, p. 74; International Legal 
Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1233. 
139. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1913),supra note 75, p. 14;/nternational Legal 
Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1233. 
140. According to the PRC Working Paper, islands are entitled to a territorial sea 
regardless of their sizes. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), supra note 75, p. 72; 
International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1232. The key term "continental terri-
tory" was later replaced by "land territory", thereby eliminating previous discrimination 
against islands. See, e.g., the PRC's protest against exploratory drilling in the Japan-
ROK JDZ, supra note 55. 
141. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973),supra note 75, p. 13;/nternational Legal 
Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1232. 
142. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, para. l(a). 
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tors concerned; the median line approach is acceptable only when in 
accordance with equitable principles. 143 In late 1981, Peking again 
submitted its opposition, together with a group of developing and 
East European states, to the Conference president's giving special 
consideration to the employment of the equidistance line in conti-
nental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) delimitations through 
negotiations under equitable principles. 144 
To summarize, the PRC, like the ROC, adheres to the natural 
prolongation principle in seaward delimitation of the continental 
shelf. Islands are accorded a territorial sea. Beyond that, it is less 
clear. While implicitly limiting continental shelf jurisdiction to a 
coastal state's continental territory, the PRC has claimed the "shal-
low seas" around disputed, mid-ocean islets in the East China Sea 
and the South China Sea. On seabed boundary delimitation, the 
PRC prefers multistate consultation to third-party process. In the 
East China Sea, the political reality has prevented any multistate 
consultation from taking place. 145 
3. 0./fthore Exploration 
Before the recent mass engagement of foreign oil companies, the 
PRC had done little prospecting in the East China Sea other than 
rudimentary bottom sedimentation studies, according to published 
sources. 146 Since September 1980, a West German team has been 
143. Statement of PRC delegate Shen Wei-liang at the plenary meeting held on Au-
gust 25, 1980, UN Press Release (Geneva) SEA/128 (1980), p. 4. 
144. UN Press Release SEA/425 (1981), p. 24. 
145. When the oil controversy first arose, seven governments were involved: Japan, 
the ROK, the DPRK, the PRC, the ROC, the Ryukyus, and the U.S. (as administrative 
authority of the Ryukyus). Since the return ofthe Ryukyus to Japan in 1972, the number 
of contenders has been reduced to four: Japan, the ROK, the ROC, and the PRC. (The 
DPRK is excluded here since it has no coastal front in the East China Sea.) The number 
of governments involved poses less of a problem than do the relationships of these gov-
ernments inter se. Both China and Korea are divided; while the PRC and the DPRK are 
"socialist brother states", the ROC and the ROK are no less friendly. Mutual non-recog-
nition between rival regimes within the same state naturally extends to the ally of its 
rival. Any official contact by one government with the ally of its rival regime could be 
interpreted as de facto recognition thereof and would seriously offend the ally. This is 
why Peking remained cool towards the ROK's overtures made in March 1973 to negoti-
ate a settlement with the PRC on the seabed issue, even at the expense of Seoul-Taipei 
ties. Peking understood well that any positive reaction would alienate Pyongyang and 
only benefit Moscow which had been seeking to expand its influence in the Korean Pe-
ninsula. For the ROK's overtures, see Harrison, supra, Chapter I, note 39, pp. 130, 137. 
146. E.g., M.B. Klenova, supra Chapter I, note 13; Shih-ching Fang and Yun-shan 
Ch'in, "Chung-kuo Tung-hai Ho Huang-hai Nan-pu Ti-chih Ti Ch'u-pu Yen-chiu (A 
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conducting geochemical and geophysical surveys in the western part 
of the W enchou basin off the coast of Chekiang Province, using a 
Communist Chinese vessel. 147 No drilling had been done until the 
sinking of Longjing-1 and Longjing II in February 1981 and April 
1982, respectively and Tongtai-1 in 1982 (Map 10). Given the sensi-
tivity of the East China Sea, large-scale exploration probably will 
not commence until production begins in other dispute-free areas of 
the China seas, which will be in the late 1980s. 148 
Preliminary Study of Submarine Geology of China's East China Sea and Southern Y el-
low Sea)." Hai-yang Yu Hu-chao [Oceanologia et Limnologia Sinica], Vol. 2 (1959), p. 
82; Yun-shan Ch'in, "Tung-hai Ta-lu-chia Ti Ch'i-fu Ho Ti-chih Ch'en-Chi-wu Ti Ch'u-
pu Yen-chiu (An Initial Study of the Relief and Botton Sediment of the Continental 
Shelf of the East China Sea)," ibid, Vol. 5 (1963), p. 35. 
147. Jeffrey Segal, "Need for More Oil Exploration," Petroleum Economist, Novem-
ber, 1981, p. 498. 
148. Kevin Fountain, "The Development of China's Offshore Oil: Prospects for the 
80s," China Business Review, January-February 1980, p. 23. 

CHAPTER 3 CONFLICTS OF CLAIMS AND 
CONCESSION AREAS 
This chapter examines conflicts resulting from the coastal states' 
unilateral claims and overlapping concession areas and defines the 
issues to be pursued further in Part II. Table 11 illustrat~s the ma~­
nitude of these conflicts. Apart from political consideratiOns, appli-
cation by the East China Sea's coastal states of seminal and unc~ear 
rules of international law then prevailing to the complex geophysical 
environment also accounts for the conflicts. Legal implications of 
these geophysical features vary depending on the interpreting coastal 
states. Based on discussions in Chapter 2, Table 2 summarizes the 
respective positions of the coastal governments on relevant law of 
the sea issues. 
In the East China Sea, claims of all the coastal states (but not 
necessarily their concession areas) conflict with one another. While 
their claims may be extravagant, they are more prudent in granting 
concessions. In fact, certain concession blocks were granted clear of 
overlaps.2 This is because claims exclusively involve governments 
but concessions concern oil companies as well. Unrealistic claims 
may be good for domestic consumption or as a bargaining position 
for future negotiations. Unreasonably high political/jurisdictional 
risks3 associated with legally untenable concessions, however, only 
scare away potential concessionaires. Analyzed below are conflicts 
between pairs of disputants. 
I. In the Chart, to preserve the numbering system for Japanese concessions used in 
Map 4, the former "J-1" is broken down to "J-la", "J-Ib", and "J-lc", representing three 
smaller blocks shared by Japex (Block J-l's original holder), Uruma, and Alaska. By the 
same token, the former "J-3" is re-numbered "J-3a", "J-3b", and "J-3c" In fact, blocks 
like J-2 and J-3b are merely a part of the vast Teikoku concession area. The division is, 
of course, artificial. In both the J-1 and J-3 cases, the newly-numbered blocks put to-
gether have a larger area than the original J-1 or J-3 blocks. The numbering system is 
unofficial and used simply for the convenience of discussion. 
2. For instance, Texfel Pacific's block in the ROC's Zone V, text accompanying 
note 12 infra. 
3. This author has defined "jurisdiction risk" as the risk or probability of occur-
rence of adverse political and/or legal events arising from a potential jurisdictional dis-
pute that will affect the profit prospect or operation of a given foreign direct investment. 
For an elaborate discussion of jurisdictional risk and foreign oil investment in the East 
Asian context, see Ying-jeou Ma, "Foreign Investment in the Troubled Waters of the 
East China Sea," Chinese Yearbook of lnlemational Law and Affairs, Vol. I (1981), pp. 
35-73. 
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A. The ROK and Japan 
As Table 1 shows, all of the eight concession blocks of Japan 
and the ROK that overlapped each other before 1974 are now either 
re-delineated through boundary delimitation (Blocks J-4 and K-6 in 
the Korea Strait) or included in the Japan-ROK JDZ (the rest of the 
blocks in the East China Sea).4 The Joint Development Agreement 
left unsettled the seabed dispute, 5 yet it has defused the controversy 
by shelving the sovereignty question indefinitely and replacing con-
frontation with cooperation. Advocated by commentators6 and the 
ICJ/ the idea of joint development of offshore oil in disputed waters 
between claimants has found only modest support in state practice.8 
4. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 41, 42. 
5. Article XXVIII of the Agreement provides: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be regarded as determining the question of 
sovereign rights over all or any portion of the Joint Development Zone or as 
prejudicing the positions of the respective Parties with respect to the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf. 
For a competent and comprehensive analysis of the legal issues of the ROK-Japan sea-
bed dispute, see Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, pp. 29-36. 
6. E.g., Note, "The 'Distance plus Joint Development Zone,' Formula: A Proposal 
for the Speedy and Practical Resolution of the East China and Yellow Seas Continental 
Shelf Oil Controversy," Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 7 (1973), pp. 49, 63-70 
[hereinafter cited as Cornell Note (1973)]. 
7. The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, l.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52. 
8. Supplementary Agreement to the Ems-Dollart Treaty, the Netherlands-Federal 
Republic of Germany, AprilS, 1960 UNTS, Vol. 509, p. 140; Agreement Relating to the 
Partition of the Neutral Zone, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, July 7, 1965, UNLS/15, p. 760; 
International Legal Materials, Vol. 4 ( 1965), p. 1134; American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 40 ( 1966), p. 744; Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and 
Sovereign Rights over Islands Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, March 20, 1969, UNLS/ 
16, p. 403; Limits in the Seas, No. 18, May 29, 1970; and Agreement Between Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia Relating to the Joint Exploration of the Natural Resources of the Seabed 
and Subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, May 16, 1974, UNLS/18, p. 452. 
Joint development of oil in disputed seabeds is not to be confused with joint ex-
ploitation of common oil or gas deposits between states across their borders (sometimes 
referred to as "unitization" arrangements). The former has several distinctive features: 
First, a boundary dispute must exist; second, the hydrocarbon deposit has not been previ-
ously discovered; and third, the sovereignty issue is either unresolved but shelved or the 
sovereignty itself is equally shared by the parties. On the other hand, a unitization ar-
rangement is usually dictated by the geological conditions of a previously discovered oil 
or gas field. Normally no dispute exists over the boundary across which the deposit lies. 
Hence no sovereignty issue. The only feature shared by both is the existence of a consul-
tation or joint management body. In state practice, unitization arrangements are quite 
common whereas joint development mechanisms are rare. In fact, a number of seabed 
boundary agreements contain unitization clauses. For a good discussion, see Rainer 
Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers," American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, Vol. 73 (1979), p. 215 [hereinafter cited as Lagoni (1979)]. 
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Issues of joint management and distribution of petroleum l?r~du~ed, 
just to name a few, are no easier than seabed boundary dehrrutatwn. 
Although these problems are well handled by the Japan-ROK Joint 
Development Agreement, it remains to be seen how effectively this 
pioneer arrangement will work,9 since exploration has just gotten 
under way. Furthermore, other claimants to the same seabed have 
not stayed idle. The agreement was signed, ratified, and imple-
mented over vigorous protests from the PRC and the DPRK. The 
sinking by Peking of three exploratory wells (Longjing I and II and 
Dongtai-1) in the East China Sea only a few miles from the JDZ 
(Map 10) highlights the intensity of the conflict. Further complica-
tions could emerge upon commercial discovery of petroleum. 
B. The ROK and China (the ROC and the PRC) 
The ROC and the PRC assert identical claims to the East China 
Sea's shelf but have been exploring in different parts of China's mar-
ginal seas. Their relationships with the ROK vary accordingly. 
1. The ROK and the ROC 
The ROC granted no concession block in the Yellow Sea where 
the ROK's four blocks are located, but the ROC's Zone V overlaps 
with the ROK's Blocks K-4, K-5, and K-7. The ROK had in fact 
asserted claims to what is now the ROC's Zone V ten months before 
the ROC did; yet the ROK has made no protest, at least in public, to 
the ROC when the ROC announced its five Offshore Zones in Octo-
ber 1970. When the ROK and Japan signed the Joint Development 
Agreement in early 1974, however, the ROC issued a statement to 
reserve its rights: 
In connection with certain statements recently made 
by some States concerning the development of submarine 
resources in the East China Sea and the illegal claims made 
by the Chinese Communist regime, the Government of the 
Republic of China reserves all her rights over the continen-
tal shelf extending from her coast including the right to ex-
9. The Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement is unprecedented in terms of the 
size of the JDZ, the national economic interests at stake, and the often abrasive relations 
between Tokyo and Seoul. In fact, the ROK officials took pride in the agreement for 
being a pioneer work. Conversation with Mr. Sang-Myon Rhee, S.J.D. candidate at 
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts (December 27, 1979). Mr. Rhee 
worked for the ROK Foreign Ministry at the time the agreement was negotiated and 
signed. Mr. Rhee got his S.J.D. and returned to Korea to teach law. 
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plore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural 
resources. 
The continental shelf in question is adjacent to, and is a 
natural prolongation of, the territory of the Republic of 
China ... 
. . . The activities for the exploration and exploitation in 
these areas have begun for several years and are going on 
extensively. 10 (emphasis added) 
The tone was mild; Japan and the ROK were not even men-
tioned by name. The allegation of extensive exploration seems to 
refer to the ROC's concession areas other than Zone V, since no re-
ported exploration has been conducted there by either Texfel, 11 the 
concessionaire, or CPC. In fact, the eastern half of Zone V that 
overlaps extensively with the ROK's blocks was left unallocated 
when Texfel obtained the western half12 (Compare Maps 7 and 9). 
All in all, the ROC-ROK conflict in claims in the East China Sea 
seems minor at best. On the other hand, no overlap exists in conces-
sion blocks actually granted. This means that there is no mining 
rights conflict between companies working for the ROC and those 
exploring in the JDZ. This is likely to continue given cordial ties 
between Taipei and Seoul. 
2. The ROK and the PRC 
Seabeds in the East China Sea covered by the PRC's vague 
claims overlap with those of the ROK, as evidenced by the PRC's 
protests and hostility since 1970 against the ROK (and Japan). 13 But 
the extent of the conflict has never been clear. By 1979, five out of 
seven of the ROK's concession blocks had been relinquished and 
open for bidding again (Map 5). Only part of Block K-4 was re-
granted to Zapata Oil Company in 1981. The sensitive location cou-
pled with their former operator's experiences seem unattractive to 
potential operators. Block K -6 in the Korea Strait does not really 
enter the picture here (Map 5). Nor does the part of Block K-5 still 
held by Caltex since it entails no international delimitation (Map 5). 
In terms of real conflict between the PRC's claim and the ROK's 
concession blocks, therefore, the only relevant area is the JDZ. 
10. Free China Weekly, February 17, 1974, p. 1. 
11. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 118-19. 
12. It is, of course, not unlikely that certain tacit understanding was reached between 
Taipei and Seoul to avoid overlapping of concession blocks. 
13. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 36, 39, 40, 44, and 46. 
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The PRC's protests over the JDZ from 1974 to 1980 seemed to 
have been addressed more to the mode by which it was established 
rather than to the alleged infringement of the PRC's sovereignty, de-
spite the PRC's phrasing to the contrary. 14 The drilling of the 
Longjing and Dongtai wells seems to have engendered similar pro-
tests. In other words, Japan's failure to consult the PRC in advance 
was what really mattered. But Japan could not possibly have done 
so without first consulting the ROK, the other party to the agree-
ment, which the PRC simply refuses to deal with in the first place. 15 
On the other hand, the PRC's response, in a People's Daily article, to 
the Japanese argument that the JDZ lay entirely within the Japanese 
side of the hypothetical Sino-Japanese median line was substantiated 
by the following arguments: 
It is well known that "mid-line" is not a recognized princi-
ple under international law for demarcating the waters be-
tween the littoral states. On the contrary, international law 
requires that such demarcation, including temporary meas-
ures prior to reaching a formal agreement, must be made 
through consultation and agreement between the countries 
concerned. Moreover, the "mid-line" referred to by the 
Japanese side is defined unilaterally and not based on any 
law whatsoever. The argument used by the Japanese Gov-
ernment cannot cover up the essence of its infringement on 
China's sovereignty. 16 
The response, understandably not addressed to the ROK, affected 
14. The recurring theme in the PRC's 1974, 1977, and 1978 official protests was that: 
(A)ccording to the principle that the continental shelf is the natural extension of 
the continent, the People's Republic of China has inviolable sovereignty over 
the continental shelf in the East China Sea, and that the division of those parts of 
this continental shelf which involve other countries ought to be decided on through 
consultations by China and the countries concerned The unilateral marking off 
of a so-called Japan-ROK ·~oint development zone" on the continental shelf in 
the East China Sea by the Japanese Government and the south Korean authori-
ties through signing behind China's back the "Japan-ROK Agreement on Joint 
Development of the Continental Shelf' is an infringement on China's sovereignty 
to which China will never agree. (emphasis added) 
Peking Review, June 30, 1978, p. 25. 
Peking's May 7, 1980 protest largely repeated the above except that the first half of 
the first sentence was rephrased "according to the principle that the continental shelf is 
the natural prolongation of the land territory . . " (emphasis added). The two words 
"extention" and "continent" were replaced by "prolongation" and "land" respectively. 
Beijing Review, May 19, 1980, p. 6. 
15. See supra Chapter 2, note 143. 
16. Jen-min Jih-pao, June 14, 1977, p. I [commentator's article); English translation in 
Peking Review, June 17, 1977, p. 17. 
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the ROKas well. Both Tokyo and Seoul have reserved their previ-
ous positions vis-a-vis each other in establishing the JDZ. The 
ROK's positions regarding Block K-7, which later became the main 
body of the JDZ, are the natural prolongation principle vis-a-vis Ja-
pan and the equidistance principle in relation to the PRC. 17 Japan, 
on the other hand, relied on the equidistance principle alone vis-a-
vis China and the ROK in granting concessions to Nippon, Teikoku, 
and West Japan (later New West Japan), part of whose concession 
areas later came within the JDZ 18 (Map 6). This was why reserva-
tion of previous positions was necessary for Japan and the ROK in 
the Joint Development Agreement. Now, with regard to boundary 
delimitation with the PRC, the only part of the JDZ to be involved is 
its southwestern edge, formerly the edge of the ROK's Block K-7. 
The ROK's equidistance position vis-a-vis the PRC naturally be-
comes the common position of Japan and the ROK in relation to the 
PRC. The PRC's outright rejection of the equidistance solution ob-
viously was not addressed to Japan alone. 
The present conflict between the PRC and the ROK has become 
and will remain a tripartite legal controversy as a result of the advent 
of the JDZ. In purely legal terms, a boundary delimitation between 
the PRC on the one hand and the JDZ on the other is manageable 
(to be shown in Chapter 5 infra). 19 The real obstacle arises from 
politics, not law, however. 
C. Japan and China (the ROC and the PRC) 
As in the Japan-ROK case, Japan and China (at least the ROC) 
hold diametrically opposite views on almost every key issue (Table 
2). As a result, their claims and concession areas overlap substan-
tially (Table 1). Unlike the Japan-ROK case, attempts by the ROC, 
Japan, and the ROK to work out a regional development program 
were nipped in the bud by the PRC.20 Meanwhile, the Tiao-yu-t'ai 
territorial dispute made any separate, bilateral cooperation between 
Taipei and Tokyo politically impossible.21 When Tokyo switched 
17. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 26-30. 
18. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 75-78. 
19. Such a delimitation involves neither mid-ocean islets nor deep trough, unlike lhe 
Sino-Japanese situation. However, the "lying off' situation in the East China Sea be-
tween the PRC and the JDZ poses the same difficulty as it does to Sino-Korean delimita-
tion, supra Chapter 2, notes 31, 32, and accompanying text. 
20. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 29-35. 
21. The ROC then was under strong pressure from Chinese communities all over the 
world not to discuss with Japan any joint development program before the territorial 
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recognition from Taipei to Peking in 1972, the ROC lost its status as 
China's spokesman in all future dealings with Japan. Issues the 
PRC inherited from the ROC against Japan were nonetheless the 
same; yet Peking made a political decision to shelve them all. 
Claiming to represent China, the PRC and the ROC hold identical 
views on some of the sea law issues (Table 2). Yet they differ in 
granting survey licenses and exploration concessions: the ROC in 
the East China Sea and the PRC in the Pohai Bay, the Yellow Sea, 
and the South China Sea. Their respective overlaps with Japan vary 
accordingly. 
1. Japan and the ROC 
The unilateral claims and counterclaims of Japan and the ROC 
were noted in Chapter 2 supra. Here the focus is on concession 
blocks. Table 1 shows that five Japanese blocks and four ROC 
blocks produce nine overlaps. The conflict is indeed substantial. 
One dimension of the conflict is the selection of basepoints. The 
ROC used the coasts of mainland China and Taiwan exclusively as 
basepoints for delineating its Offshore Zones.22 Neither of them re-
lied on the Tiao-yu-t'ais' mid-ocean location.23 Quite to the con-
trary, Japan relied heavily on these islets as basepoints for 
delineating the concession areas of Teikoku (J-2), Uruma (J-la), 
Alaska (J-lb), and Japex (J-lc).24 This demonstrates how the terri-
torial dispute became entangled hopelessly with the seabed issue and 
has prompted writers to recognize the inseparable nexus between 
them.25 Under the then prevailing rules of international law, islands, 
regardless of their "merits" (size, population, and economic value), 
issue was satisfactorily resolved. The "Defending Tiao-yu-t'ai" Movement, first begun 
by Chinese students in the U.S. in late 1970, spread rapidly to Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Europe, and Australia. The movement has had profound impact on Chinese in-
telligentsia at the time. See generally Hearings on Okinawa Reversion Treaty, supra 
Chapter 2, note 57, at 152-53; March, May, June, and August 1971 issues of Ming-Pao 
Yue-K'an; and The Fourth Department of the Kuomintang Central Committee, Tiao-Yu-
T'ai Lien- Yu Wen-T'i Tzu-Liao Hui-Pien [A Collection of Materials on the Tiao-yu-t'ais 
Question] (Taipei, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Collection of Tiao-yu-t'ais Materials). 
22. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 97-99. 
23. Relying on the natural prolongation principle, the ROC did not need these islets 
for claiming the continental shelf of the East China Sea. Besides, the ROC was estopped 
to use them as basepoints in continental shelf delimitation by its reservations to Article 6 
of the Shelf Convention. 
24. Supra Chapter 2. 
25. See infra Chapter 4, note 4. 
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generated as much seabed rights as continental territories did.26 The 
Tokara-Amami-Ryukyu islands chain also benefitted from this rule 
in giving Japan a large chunk of the East China Sea's shelf. The 
disparate views of Taipei and Tokyo on insular seabed rights dictate 
the emergence of the conflict. 
As in the ROK-Japan case, another source of conflict is the Oki-
nawa Trough. The ROC has made a strong case under the natural 
prolongation principle against Japan in treating the Trough as a nat-
ural boundary of Chinese and Japanese seabed jurisdictions. Ja-
pan's insistence on the equidistance principle for seabed 
delimitation, which ignores the Trough, however, receives some sup-
port from the recent trend of expanded maritime jurisdictions. Since 
the Chinese mainland (and Taiwan) and the Ryukyus are less than 
400 miles apart, if the Trough did not exist, a median line seems to 
be an equitable solution when each side has a minimum 200-mile 
shelf jurisdiction. The legal status of the Okinawa Trough, which in 
turn depends on its geological structure (oceanic or continental), and 
the legal regime of islands, are key issues to be dealt with in Chap-
ters 4 and 5 infra. 
2. Japan and the PRC 
From reading the PRC's vague statements since 1970, one con-
cludes that the PRC does lay claims to the continental shelf of the 
East China Sea under the natural prolongation principle and to sov-
ereignty over the Tiao-yu-t'ais on historical grounds. Other than 
these vague claims and drillings of the Longjing and Dongtai wells, 
the PRC has not specifically challenged Japanese concession areas in 
the East China Sea. Nor has it granted any of its own in the same 
area. Therefore, while the question of overlapping concessions does 
not arise, there is a serious conflict of claims between the PRC and 
Japan, whose claim is implicit as well. But the gravity of the conflict 
has been deliberately played down by both sides. The provocative 
fishing-boat incident in 1978 only momentarily revived the territorial 
issue, not the seabed dispute.27 However, the PRC has decided to 
redouble its efforts to go offshore because its onshore prime reserve 
could run out in two decades.28 It could not afford to leave unallo-
26. This is what Article I, Paragraph b of the Shelf Convention literally means. The 
article, along with Articles 2 and 3, was declared by the ICJ as a part of customary 
international law. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 39. 
27. See supra Introduction. 
28. Central Intelligence Agency, China: Oil Produclion Prospecls, supra Chapter I, 
note 47, p. 22. The CIA predicted that if the PRC crude oil output expanded at 10% to 
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cated forever the East China Sea-the most promising among 
China's four marginal seas.29 Overtures on joint development with 
Japan are just one indication;30 the sinking of the Longjin~ and 
Dongtai wells is another. In the long run, as energy demand.s mten-
sify, the seabed and territorial issues are likely to surface agam. The 
Law of the Sea Convention, which both the PRC and Japan have 
signed, will certainly influence the ultimate solution. 
D. The ROC and the PRC 
As seabed rights derive ultimately from a state's sovereignty 
over its land territory, the conflict of seabed claims (as opposed to 
concession conflicts) between the ROC and the PRC expresses itself 
more as an extension of the existing rivalry in speaking for China 
than as a legal clash between two separate states. Both of their sea-
bed claims, identical in substance, reach all the marginal seas of 
China, the only difference being that the ROC's appear more specific 
than the PRC's. The real issue, therefore, is not who claims how 
much seabed, but who represents the state of China, which, under 
international law, is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over its ad-
jacent continental shelf. Though not a purely legal question, this 
issue nevertheless has legal consequences that bear upon the oil dis-
pute in the East China Sea, particularly when third states are in-
volved. This dimension is treated at length in Chapter 6 infra. 
A more pertinent question seems to be the potential overlaps of 
concession areas ofthe ROC and the PRC.31 As if to avoid just such 
a possibility, the PRC did not engage any foreign oil company to 
survey areas where the ROC's concessionaires have been operating 
for years. However, a closer look at the PRC's survey areas (Map 
11) reveals that such a possibility still exists. The most likely overlap 
20% annually, then the prime reserves in the north and northeastern regions of China 
from which 80% of the PRC's output has come, would be exhausted in ten to fifteen 
years. 
29. See supra Chapter l. 
30. Supra Introduction, text accompanying notes 16-17. 
31. As of this writing in August 1984, the PRC has granted no exploration or produc-
tion concessions in the East China Sea. But it has since 1978 engaged dozens of Western 
and Japanese oil firms to conduct geophysical surveys in the rest of China's marginal 
seas; some of these firms have already obtained exploration concessions in the past two 
years, as related in Chapter 2 supra. Although none of these concessions granted by the 
PRC overlaps with the ROC's offshore concessions blocks in the East China Sea, the 
assumption here is that the PRC would sooner or later grant some of these survey sectors 
that are potentially overlapping with the ROC's concession blocks to foreign oil 
companies. 
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exists in the Taiwan Strait where the ROC's Zone I is located, and 
possibly the area offshore Shanghai where the ROC's Zone V lies 
(Map 10). If the ROC's official claims, namely, the five Offshore 
Zones (Map 10), are taken seriously, then the sectors of Phillips, 
Chevron/Texaco, and even Exxon (Esso) (Map 11) fall, in part, 
within the ROC's Zone I, the southern edge of which extends from 
Taiwan all the way to Macao. The overlap would be substantial in-
deed. However, as stated earlier, the western half of these overlap-
ping zones has remained unallocated. A more relevant inquiry, 
therefore, should focus on concession areas actually or potentially 
granted instead of nominal claims. The Phillips sector (Map II), 
reportedly only 80 miles from Taiwan at its closest poine2 where the 
ROC's Zone I (Map 10) (now held by CPC) protrudes I20 miles into 
the Taiwan Strait, is then the most likely candidate. If Map II is any 
guide, the overlapped area could range from a few hundred square 
miles to a few thousand, depending on the exact location of the pres-
ent Phillips sector near the border between the South China Sea and 
Taiwan Strait. 
A second possible area is offshore Shanghai near the Yangtze 
River estuary. The ROC's nominal Zone V (Map 10) might overlap 
with the British Petroleum (BP) sector (Map 11). But the triangular-
shaped block actualry granted to CPC and Texfel, I 50 miles off the 
mainland shore, is unlikely to overlap with the BP sector (Map lO 
and 11 ). Chances of one lying adjacent to the other are good, 
however. 
On the other hand, the drilling by Peking of the Longjing and 
Dongtai wells right in the ROC's Zone V suggests that the PRC 
might, instead of granting that area to foreign interests, explore and 
develop the area itself. If the ROC reacts strongly, the resulting di-
rect confrontation between them would be serious indeed. It is sub-
mitted, however, that any such move would not come about unless 
the two sides are ready for a larger political/military showdown. 
Given the prevailing situation in East Asia and the PRC's recent 
conciliatory attitude toward the ROC, this scenario seems unlikely. 
In view of the above, the first overlap seems more important 
than the second. Texfel has not explored its concession area in Zone 
V and probably will not do so in the foreseeable future. The re-
gional geology, heretofore little known, will remain so until a few 
years after the PRC's exploration in other areas is completed. On 
32. New York Times, August 4, 1979, p. I; Far Eastern Economic Review, September 
28, 1979, p. 19. 
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the other hand, the ROC's Zone I (Map 9), particularly its southern 
part, has been well explored by Cono_co and Am_oc~ (with _a gas 
strike in 1974) and by CPC. The potential overlap hes m a sedimen-
tary basin known as the Leichou Basin,33 extending from southwe~t­
ern Taiwan to Hong Kong, Macao, and on to the Gulf of Tonkm 
(called Beibuwan by Peking). The shallow-water, thick-sediment 
character bespeaks its hydrocarbon potential and economic feasibil-
ity.34 Unlike those far-off areas north of Taiwan, this may be one of 
the priority areas CPC will concentrate its efforts on in the next dec-
ade. Clashes with Phillips or whomever is granted the sector in this 
area are not unlikely. 
Concession overlappings give rise to a host of legal questions: 
Who infringes on whose sovereign rights or mining rights? Who has 
title to the oil produced from the overlaps? If oil is exported to a 
third state by the PRC's operator (or CPC), can Taipei (or Peking) 
claim it? If that state has switched recognition from Taipei to Pe-
king, could the ROC claim the oil at all? Does international law in 
this regard, if any, apply to the ROC and the PRC? These questions 
are discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
E. Summary 
A decade and a half after the present oil controversy first arose, 
one development has brought about profound changes. The conclu-
sion of the Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement has defused 
the Japan-ROK seabed dispute which, though not formally settled, 
probably will lie dormant for fifty years, if the Agreement's term is 
any guide. Meanwhile, the Agreement literally reduced the size of 
the multilateral controversy as a whole. For instance, the number of 
overlapping concession blocks decreased from seventeen to nine (Ta-
ble I). It was pointed out in 197235 that the present controversy, 
though involving five governments, was effectively one between Ja-
pan on the one hand, and China (the PRC and the ROC) and Korea 
on the other, because geophysical similarities in the latter states' 
coastal areas dictated their similar legal positions vis-a-vis Japan. 
Now that the ROK has concluded a "separate peace" with Japan in 
the oil war, the controversy becomes, essentially, a Sino-Japanese 
dispute. This by no means suggests that the Sino-Korean dispute is 
33. K.O. Emery and Zvi ben-Aviaham, "Structure and Stratigraphy of the China 
Basin," UNECAFE/CCOP Technical Bul/erin, Vol. 6, (1972) p. 136, ciled in Harrison, 
supra Chapter I, note 39, p. 287 n.l6. 
34. Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, pp. 54, 99. 
35. Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 20. 
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readily solvable. While legally it may be so, the dispute has been so 
politicized that what really matters is which of the two Chinese gov-
ernments one is dealing with. The net results are, of course, diamet-
rically opposite. The ROK's claims and concession blocks overlap 
with areas under the ROC's nominal claims, but not the ROC's con-
cession zones actually granted. In real terms, the conflict is marginal 
at most. On the other hand, the ROK-PRC conflict is deprived of a 
settlement exclusively for political reasons, although the legal issues 
involved are manageable. 
The Sino-Japanese seabed and territorial disputes seem to be 
the only real conflict left in the East China Sea. Whereas the PRC 
has refrained from pressing its claim against Japan for political rea-
sons, the ROC's concession blocks have overlapped substantially 
with Japanese ones, half of which have used the disputed Tiao-yu-
t'ai Islands as basepoints. Economic reality is changing this picture. 
The PRC's stagnant domestic oil production no longer can afford the 
strategy of playing patience to its neighbors' impatience. Sooner or 
later the parties involved will be serious about seeking a settlement 
of these disputes to clear the way for oil development. The Law of 
the Sea Convention would obviously to play a role. Apart from the 
international dimension, the two Chinese governments also have 
overlapping concession areas. Obviously, the ultimate settlement 
must await political forces at work; but the legal aspects or conse-
quences in particular contexts are nevertheless worth probing. 
What was summarized above defines the scope of inquiry in 
Part II: first, the Sino-Japanese seabed disputes; second, the legal 
aspect of the Peking-Taipei rivalry in the undersea oil context. A 
preliminary analysis of the relevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial 
dispute to the seabed issue will clarify their interrelationship. Refer-
ences are made occasionally to the rest of the disputing states, but 
the focus will remain on China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan. 
PART II THE MARITIME JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE: 
WHO MAY OWN THE UNDERSEA OIL? 
CHAPTER 4 RELEVANCE OF THE TIAO-YU-T'AI 
(SENKAKU) ISLANDS TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
This Chapter does not purport to deal with the territorial dis-
pute over the Taio-yu-t'ai Islands as such, but instead analyzes the 
relevance of this dispute to the larger East Asian seabed jurisdic-
tional issue. In the past decade, an extensive body of literature on 
the sovereignty question has been published in Chinese, Japanese, 
and English. 1 Unless new historical evidence of significance is un-
covered or the international law of territorial acquisition is clarified, 
it is unlikely that either China (the ROC and the PRC) or Japan can 
l. For the Chinese sources, see Co/lee/ion qf Tiao-yu-r'ai Maleria/s, supra Chapter 3, 
note 21. This is the most comprehensive collection of news reports, editorials, and schol-
arly commentaries of ROC origin. See also Yang Chung-Kwei, Chung-kuo, Liu-ch'iu, 
Tiao-yu-r'ai (China, Ryukyu, and Tiao-yu-t'ai) Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 
1972 (hereinafter cited as Yang (1972)); Chiu (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 59. 
For the Japanese sources, see Okinawa (A Japanese quarterly devoted to the prob-
lem of Okinawa and Bonin Islands), No. 56 (Senkaku Islands Special Issue), March 
1971. See also Toshio Okuhara, "Senkaku Rettt'l no ryt'lyilken kizoku montai" (The 
Problem of the Right of Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands),Asahi Asian Review, Vol. 
3, No.2 (1972), pp. 18-25, cited in Cheng (1974), supra Chapter 2, note 57, p. 221, p. 244, 
note 77 (hereinafter cited as Cheng (1974)); Kiyoshi Inoue, "Tiao-yu Shoto ("Senkaku 
Rettt'l" nado) no rekishi to sono ryt'lyilken (sairon)" (The History and Sovereignty of the 
T'iao-yu-t'ai Islands - A Re-assessment), Chukoku Kenkyu Geppo (Chinese Studies 
Monthly), No. 292 (June 1972), p. 36, cited in Cheng (1974), supra p. 248, note 88 (Pro-
fessor Kiyoshi Inoue, a Japanese historian, supported the Chinese position); Kiyoshi In-
oue, Tiao-yu-l'ai Lieh-yu: Li-shih Yu Ling-r'u Chu-ch'uan Te Pou-hsi (An Analysis of the 
History and Territorial Sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets) translated by Chi-nan 
Chen, Taipei: Mei-chuan Hsiao Chiu, 1973. 
For the English sources, see Toshio Okuhara, "The Territorial Sovereignty over the 
Senkaku Islands and Problems on the Surrounding Continental Shelf," Japanese Annual 
of lnrernalional Law, Vol. 15 (1971), p. 97; Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, pp. 37-
48; Choon-ho Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Contro-
versy," Harvard lnlernalional Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 212 (hereinafter cited as 
Park (1973)) (this is a slightly revised version of his 1972 paper); Note, "International 
Law and the Sino-Japanese Controversy over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku 
Islands," Boslon Universiry Law Review, Vol. 52 (1972), p. 763; Note, "The East China 
Sea: The Role of International Law in the Settlement of Dispute," Duke Law Journal 
(1973), p. 823, pp. 846-54; Cheng (1974), supra; Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, 
People's China and lnlernaliona/ Law, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974, 
pp. 346-53; Victor H. Li, "China and Offshore Oil: The Tiao-yu-t'ai Dispute," Sranford 
Journal qf lnlernalional Srudies, Vol. 10 (1975), p. 143. 
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advance any new argument determinative of the sovereignty issue.2 
Moreover, even if questions of fact and law are settled, there is no 
guarantee that the contestants would have the dispute adjudicated 
by a third party pursuant to international law principles. The more 
likely scenario is, like other territorial disputes, a settlement through 
diplomatic negotiations. Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward the 
dispute have, since its emergence, attested to this observation. The 
PRC's decision to shelve the issue in 1972 and revive it in 1978 sim-
ply to serve a particular political purpose vividly illustrates the ex-
tent to which the dispute has been politicized. The same can 
probably be said of Japan. A reexamination of a territorial issue 
which both contestants3 have deliberately kept dormant makes little 
sense, particularly when prospects for breaking new ground are 
poor. 
On the other hand, the seabed issue has received much less at-
tention. International law in this regard was embryonic and confus-
ing. Accordingly, most writers as well as the disputing states 
considered the settlement of the territorial issue as a conditio sine qua 
non to the seabed dispute.4 The 1958 Shelf Convention, the only 
2. For a comprehensive and balanced discussion, see Cheng (1974), supra Chapter 
2, note 57. On the basis of the arguments and evidences presented by Japan and China 
(the PRC and the ROC), Professor Cheng concluded that China had a stronger claim. 
Ibid, pp. 239-41, 266. The unclear aspect of the international law of territorial acquisi-
tion is the doctrine of intertemporallaw as interpreted by Judge Huber in the Is/anti of 
Pa/mas Case (United States v. The Netherlands). United Nations Report of International 
Arbitral Awards, Vol. 2 ( 1949), p. 829; American Journal of International Law, Vol. 22 
(1928), p. 867. For a famous critique of that case, see Philip Jessup, "The Palmas Island 
Arbitration,'' American Journal of International Law, Vol. 22 (1928), pp. 735, 740. See 
also Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963, pp. 28-31. 
3. Japan derecognized the ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC 
in 1972. Accordingly, the relations between Taipei and Tokyo since then have been un-
official. Even if the ROC wished to reopen the territorial issue, Japan could not possibly 
negotiate with a government which it officially has derecognized as representing China. 
4. For writers who explicitly or implicitly took this view, see Park (1972), supra 
Chapter 1, note 18, p. 49; Note [Duke Law Journal], supra note I, p. 846; Cheng ( 1974), 
supra note I, p. 264; Li, supra note l, p. 146; Barry Buzan, A Sea of Troubles? Sources of 
Dispute in the New Ocean Regime, Adelphi Papers No. 143, London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978, p. 38; Derek W. Bowett, The Legal Regime of Is/antis 
in International Law, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1979, p. 307 (herein-
after cited as Bowett (1979)]; Jeanette Greenfield, China anti the Law of the Sea, Air, anti 
Environment, Alphan aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijithotf & Noordhotf, 1979. p. 
129; Choon-ho Park, "Les Jurisdictions Maritimes dans Ia Mer de Chine: Les Pratiqucs 
etatiques actuelles,'' Revue Gimera/e De Droit International Public, Vol. 84 (1980), pp. 
328, 338; Choon-ho Park, "Offshore Oil Development in the China Seas: Some Legal 
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positive law as of this writing, also unequivocally recognizes, in Arti-
cle l(b), the seabed rights of islands regardless ofth_eir "merits." The 
International Court of Justice in 1969 declared m the North Sea 
Cases that Articles l to 3 of the Shelf Convention had acquired the 
status of customary international law applicable to parties and n<:>n-
parties to the ShelfConvention.5 This in tum stiffened the re~pectl~e 
positions of China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan and mtenst-
fied the territorial dispute, since the whole seabed issue hinged upon 
its outcome. 
The following decade witnessed a revolution in the regime of 
the oceans, especially in the areas of expanded national jurisdictions 
and the legal status of islands regarding seabed rights. The new in-
ternational consensus is that small islands may, in some cases, be 
denied continental shelf rights. If the Tiao-yu-t'ais are to have no 
continental shelf of their own beyond the territorial sea, the seabed 
issue can then be detached entirely from the territorial dispute. The 
key question, of course, is whether the Tiao-yu-t'ais should be so 
treated. The analysis below responds to this question. 
A. The Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets: Geographical Context6 
The Tiao-yu-t'ais consist of five uninhabited islets and three 
barren rocks (Map 12). The whole group is 102 miles from Keelung 
in northern Taiwan and 230 miles from Naha, the capital of Japan's 
Okinawa Prefecture (Map 1). However, the distance between the 
group and the nearest Chinese and Japanese territories, including 
small offshore islets, is approximately 90 miles respectively. Scat-
tered between 25°40'N and 26°N latitude and 123°E and 124°34'E 
longitude in the East China Sea, the Tiao-yu-t'ais have three sepa-
rate clusters. Tiao-yu, the largest in the group (4.5 sq. km.), along 
and Territorial Issues" in Ocean Yearbook 2 ed. by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton 
Ginsburg, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 315. 
5. See text accompanying note 21 infra. 
6. This section is based primarily on the following sources: Sha Hsueh-chun, 
"Tiao-yu-t'ai Shu Chung-kuo Pu-shu Liu-ch'iu Chih Shih-ti Ken-chit" (The Historical-
Geographical Evidence of the Chinese and Not the Ryukyuan Sovereignty Over the 
Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands], Hsueh Ts'ui [Sinological Studies], Vol. 14, No.2 (February 1972), 
p. 4, reprinted in Sha Hsueh-chun, Ti-/i-hsUeh Lun-wen-chi (Collected Geographical 
Papers] p. 483, 1972; Yang (1972),supra note l, pp. 131-35; and Tiao-yu-t'ai Lieh-yu Ti-tu 
[A Map of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands], made by Professor H. Sha (scale 1:10,000; size: 37" 
X 51"; color: five colors) (Taipei 1972). Professor Sha was the president of the Chinese 
Geographic Society and Professor of Geography Emeritus at the National Taiwan 
Normal University. The map is allegedly the only large-scale map of the Tiao-yu-t'ais in 
the world. It is partially reproduced as Map 12. 
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with Nan-hsiao (the third largest), Pei-hsiao (the fourth), and three 
barren rocks (Ch'ung-pei-yen, Ch'ung-nan-yen, and Fei-lai) form 
the eastern cluster. Huang-wei, the second largest in the group (1.08 
sq. km.), is 14 miles northeast of Tiao-yu. Ch'ih-wei (also known as 
Raleigh Rock to Westerners), the fifth largest (0.154 sq. km.), lies 48 
miles west of Huang-wei. 
Geologically, the Tiao-yu-t'ais are volcanic formations of the 
Neocene age. Like islets off the northern Taiwan shore (Hua-p'ing 
Mien-hua, and P'eng-chia Islets) (Map 1), they are rocky outcrop-
pings of undersea extensions of coastal mountains in northern Tai-
wan. Small but disproportionately high peaks (383 meters on Tiao-
yu) and steep cliffs are common to all islets. They have served as 
excellent navigational aids in past centuries. All the islets sit atop 
the edge of the East China Sea continental shelf, separated from the 
R yukyus by the deepest part of the Okinawa Trough (over 2,000 
meters). 
B. The Regime of Islands in International Law Regarding Seabed 
Rights 
All states on earth, if not landlocked, have insular territories. 
When the territorial sea concept first emerged in the late 1500s 
among European maritime powers, islands were treated in the same 
way as other mainland territories since many of the states' metropol-
itan and colonial territories were insular.7 The security-oriented ra-
tionale underlying the territorial sea regime called for no 
differentiation. As regards entitlements of tiny islets and rocks to far 
more extensive jurisdictions such as continental shelf and 200-mile 
zones developed during the last three decades, questions of inequity 
arose. One problem concerns the seaward delimitation of these 
zones for islands, namely, whether all islands were capable of gener-
ating a continental shelf or an EEZ. The apparent inequity lay in 
the extreme case where an uninhibited mid-ocean reef of one square 
mile commanded a 200-mile zone of more than 140,000 square 
miles. 8 The other problem resulting from expanded national juris-
7. See generally H.S.K. Kent, "The Historical Origins of the Three-mile Limit." 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 48 (1954), p. 537. 
8. The reef is assumed to be circular in shape with approximately a one-mile diame-
ter. However, in order for an island to have a land area comparable to that of its 200-
nautical mile zone around it, such an island must have a diameter of 965 nautical miles if 
it is circular in shape. In that case, the area of the island's landmass and the 200-mile 
zone would be 967,850 sq. mi. each. It would be larger than Greenland (840,000 sq. mi., 
the largest island in the world) and simply does not exist on earth. 
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dictions related to the effect of islands' presence on shelf and EEZ 
boundaries between neighboring states: that is, whether islands 
should be taken into account in boundary delimitations. These two 
problems are separate but interrelated. Certain categories of islands 
that were not allowed to generate their own shelf or EEZ, were irrel-
evant to shelf or EEZ boundary delimitations. However, it was con-
ceivable that in certain cases an island may generate its own 
maritime zone but may not equitably be granted full effect (or any 
effect) in drawing a boundary. The inequity seemed acute when is-
lands, situated closer to the state other than their home state, were 
used as basepoints in drawing an equidistant boundary.9 The fol-
lowing survey of various sources of international law on this subject 
focuses on the continental shelf alone. 
1. International Legislation 
An island's seaward delimitation is determined by the legal defi-
nition of continental shelf, an erstwhile purely geological term. It 
was first dealt with by the United Nations International Law Com-
mission (ILC) in the early 1950s. 10 The ILC's first draft articles on 
the continental shelf, completed in 1951, made it clear that the term 
"continental shelf" "may apply also to islands to which such subma-
rine areas are contiguous." 11 On the other hand, neither the text 
(Article 7) nor the commentary referred to the effect of islands' pres-
ence on boundary delimitation. Indiscriminate treatment of islands 
and mainlands seemed to have been assumed without challenge in 
previous and subsequent ILC discussions. The ILC's second draft 
articles made no change in the islands' seabed entitlement. 12 In this 
draft the ILC also considered the effect of islands on seabed bound-
ary delimitation between opposite and adjacent states. In the com-
ments on Article 7, "presence of islands" was cited as one of the 
"special circumstances" justifying a departure from the equidistance 
line drawn from the mainland coasts Qf the neighboring states. 13 
The ILC adopted the same formulation in its third draft, couched in 
9. A good example would be the Channel Islands in the English Channel (Map 14). 
10. YBILC (1949), pp. 235, 237. 
11. ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. 6, Supplement (no. 9), 
UN Doc. A/1858 (1951) p. 17, reprinted in YBILC (1951), Vol. 2, p. 141, UN Doc. A/ 
CN.4/SER.A/1951/ Add. I. 
12. ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. 8, Supplement (no. 9), 
UN Doc. A/2456 (1953), p. 12, reprinted in YBILC (1953), Vol. 2, pp. 200, 212-14, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.l. 
13. Ibid., p. 216. 
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Articles 67 to 73 of the draft convention on the law of the sea. 14 This 
draft became the basis of negotiation at Geneva in the first United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958. 
During the Conference, a Filipino proposal15 added to draft Ar-
ticle 67, which omitted islands in the text, a second paragraph explic-
itly providing islands with whatever rights a continent may have. 
The Conference adopted draft Article 67 as amended by the propo-
sal.16 Meanwhile, intensive debate took place in the Fourth Com-
mittee (dealing with continental shelf) on the effect of islands on 
shelf boundaries (draft Article 72). 17 Two proposals by Italy and 
Iran, which would have had the effect of ignoring all islands as base-
points if they were situated in a continental shelf continuous from 
the mainland coast, were rejected. 18 Draft Articles 67 and 72 later 
became Articles 1 and 6, respectively, of the Shelf Convention, the 
relevant parts of which are as follows: 
Article 1 
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental 
shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the 
area of territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond 
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent water ad-
mits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsot1 of similar submarine ar-
eas adjacent to the coasts of islands. 
Article 6 
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the ter-
ritories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite 
14. ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. II, Supplement (no. 9), 
pp. 11-12, 40-45, UN Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in YBILC, (1956), Vol. 2, pp. 253, 
264, 296-301, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l. 
15. Philippines: Proposal (Article 67), UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/C.4/U.26, UNCLOS 
I, Official Records, Vol. 6, 4th Committee (Continental Shelf), UN Doc.A/CONF.l3/42, 
1958, p. 133. 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 
207, also adopted by the 1958 UNCLOS I at Geneva, defines an island in Article 10, 
Paragraph I: 
An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is 
above water at high tide. 
The second paragraph recognizes that an island may have a territorial sea of its own. 
16. UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 6, supra note 15, p. 47. 
17. Ibid., pp. 91-98. 
18. Italy: Proposal, UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/C.4/L.25/Rev.l, ibid., p. 133; Iran: Pro-
posal, UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/C.4/L.60, ibid., p. 142. The voting rejecting both proposals 
appears in ibid., p. 98. 
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each other, the boundary ofthe continental shelf appertain-
ing to such States shall be determined by agreement be-
tween them. In the absence of agreement, and unless 
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
the boundary is the median line, every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is 
measured. 
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the ter-
ritories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the conti-
nental shelf shall be determined by agreement between 
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary shall be determined by application of the principle 
of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is 
measured .... 19 (emphasis added) 
75 
The Shelf Convention went into effect in 1964 with ratifications 
by 22 states; by the time the ICJ decided the North Sea Cases, 39 
states had become parties.20 The ICJ declared, in dictum, that Arti-
cles 1 to 3 of the Convention "were then regarded [by UNCLOS I] as 
reflecting, or as crystalizing, received or at least emerging rules of 
customary international law relative to the continental shelf."21 The 
Court did not address islands which were not at issue in that case. 
Nor did it intend to alter the effect of the presence of islands, as (or 
not as) a special circumstance under Article 6, on seabed boundary 
delimitation. The legislative history of Article 6 clearly shows that, 
absent an agreement between opposite or adjacent states, the general 
rule is the equidistance principle, whereas a departure from that 
principle justified by the presence of islands is an exception.22 In 
other words, despite Article l(b) of the Convention, an island's pres-
ence should be ignored as a general rule unless it is so exceptional as 
to justify a deviation. The Shelf Convention appears to retract par-
tially in Article 6 what it generously grants to islands in Article 1 (b). 
The ICJ, recognizing Article 1 to 3 as reflecting customary interna-
tional law but denying Article 6 the same status, nevertheless did not 
19. UNTS, Vol. 450, p. 311. 
20. United Nations Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secre-
tary-General Performs Depository Functions, List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, 
etc. as at 31 December 1978, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/12 (1978), p. 566. 
21. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 39. 
22. Supra note 12, p. 216. 
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approve the notion that presence of islands may be invoked as a 
"special circumstance" in all cases. Rather, their presence may be 
merely one of the "relevant circumstances" to be taken into account 
by the delimiting states under the rubric of "equitable principles."23 
The troublesome character of islands' shelf entitlement began to 
gain wider recognition in the international community as offshore 
technology made more and more seabed accessible to human beings 
and more and more mid-ocean insular states declared independence. 
Difficult questions of classifying islands according to varying criteria 
were discussed in the early 1970s in the Seabed Committee,24 which 
was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1968, 
and were debated intensively in the Caracas session of UNCLOS III 
in 1974.25 A compromise was reached in the third session at Geneva 
23. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 53, 54. 
24. There were a number of proposals submitted to Sub-Committee II on the regime 
of islands in general and islands' effect on shelf and other maritime boundaries in partic-
ular. See e.g., Greece: Draft article under item 19, Regime of Islands, UN Doc. A/ 
AC.l38/SC.II/L.29 and Corr. 1, Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), p. 70; Algeria, 
Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and United Republic of Tanzania: Draft articles on 
exclusive economic zone, UN Doc. A/AC.l38/SC.Il/L.40 and Corr. 1-3 (Article XII), 
ibid., p. 87 and p. 89; Cameroon, Kenya, Madagascar, Tunisia and Turkey: Draft article 
under article 19, Regime of Islands, UN Doc. A/ AC.l38/SC.Il/L.43, ibid., p. 98 (same 
as Art. XII above); Turkey: Proposal for a study on islands, UN Doc. A/ AC.l38/SC.II/ 
L.49, ibid., p. 105; Romania: Working paper on certain specific aspects of the regime of 
islands in the context of delimitation of marine spaces between neighboring states, UN 
Doc. A/AC.l38/SC.II/L.53, ibid., p. 106. 
By and large, Greece advocated equal treatment of islands and mainland territories 
of a state whereas the rest of the proposals favored a differentiated treatment. 
25. The regime of islands, as agenda item 19, was debated in the 38th, 39th, and 40th 
meetings of the Caracas session. UNCLOS III, 0./ficia/ Records, Vol. 2 (1974), pp. 278-
89. There were nine draft articles relating to islands submitted to the Second Committee 
(dealing with traditional law of the sea issues); Romania: Draft articles on delimitation 
of marine and ocean space between adjacent and opposite neighboring States and vari-
ous aspects involved (Article 2), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L. 18, UNCLOS III, Official 
Records, Vol. 3 (1974), p. 195; Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa: Draft 
articles on islands and on territories under foreign domination or control, UN Doc. A/ 
CONF.62/C.2/L.30, ibid., p. 210; Ireland: Draft article on delimitation of areas of conti-
nental shelf between neighboring states, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43, ibid., p. 220; 
Greece: Draft articles on the regime of islands and other related matters, UN Doc. AI 
CONF.62/C.2/L.50, ibid., p. 227; Romania: Draft articles on definition of and regime 
applicable to islets and islands similar to islets, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.53, ibid., p. 
228; Turkey: Draft articles on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62./C.2/L.55, 
ibid., p. 230; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Libyan Arab Republic, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay: Draft article on islands and 
other territories under colonial domination or foreign occupation, UN Doc. AI 
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in 1975, as reflected in Article 132 of the Informal Single Negotiating 
Text26 (hereinafter ISNT) which provided: 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, sur-
rounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial 
sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and 
the continental shelf of an island are determined in accord-
ance with the provisions of the present Convention applica-
ble to other land territory. 
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or eco-
nomic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic 
zone or continental shelf.27 (emphasis added) 
This formulation combines the definition of island under Article 
10 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone and Article l(b) of the Shelf Convention. Paragraph 3, how-
ever, imposes an important but elusive restriction on an island's enti-
tlement to the continental shelf and the EEZ. Compared to the Shelf 
Convention, the new regime on islands made a significant change-
not all islands may have shelf rights, even in an isolated location 
where no boundary delimitation is involved. The merits of an island 
thus became crucial considerations for its seabed rights. But it is still 
unclear from the language of paragraph 3 just how the dividing line 
is to be drawn between a qualified and an unqualified rock. On the 
other hand, islands' effects on shelf boundaries become, under Arti-
cle 7028 of ISNT, one of the "relevant circumstances" to be consid-
ered in effecting an equitable delimitation employing, where 
CONF.62/C.2/L.58, ibid., p. 232; Algeria, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, 
Madgascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta and 
Zambia: Draft articles on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.62/Rev. 
l,ibid., p. 232; Uruguay: Draft article on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/ 
C.2/L.75, ibid., p. 238. 
Except for the draft article of Argentina et al, (L.58) supra which did not address 
the question of islands' maritime rights, the draft articles of Fiji el al (L.3), Greece (L.50) 
and Uruguay (L.75), supra supported an equal treatment of islands and mainland territo-
ries whereas those of Ireland (L.43), Romania (L.53), Turkey (L.55), and Algeria el al 
(L.62/Rev .l ), supra, advocated a differentiated treatment. A French draft article re-
ferred to islands but did not specify its position on islancs' entitlement to shelf. France: 
Draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or of the economic zone, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.74, ibid., p. 237. 
26. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 4 (1975), p. 
137. 
27. Ibid., pp. 170-171. 
28. Ibid., p. 163. 
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appropriate, the equidistance principle. The change from Article 6 
of the Shelf Convention is, at least in form,29 obvious, as is the heavy 
influence of the North Sea Cases. 
The formulation of ISNT's Article 132 survived all the subse-
quent sessions of UNCLOS III that produced the Revised Single 
Negotiating Text (RSNT) (Article 128) in 1976, the Informal Com-
posite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (Article 121) in 1977 and its three 
subsequent revisions30 in 1979 and 1980 (ICNT/Rev. I, ICNT/Rev. 
2, and Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), Ar-
ticle 121 respectively), the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea31 
(Article 121) in 1981, and finally, the LOS Convention (Article 121) 
in 1982.32 
2. Other Sources of International Law 
Questions of islands' shelf entitlement did not arise until the in-
ternational community's general acceptance of 200-mile maritime 
zones. On the other hand, islands' effects on shelf boundaries have 
long been a subject of controversy among states since 1958. To date, 
a solid body of state practice has accumulated and international 
tribunals have adjudicated three continental shelf boundary dis-
putes. A brief account of these developments is presented below. 
(a) State Practice 
Following the lead of the United States in making unilateral 
claims to adjacent continental shelf, a great number of states, conti-
nental or insular, have asserted seabed rights of islands.33 The uni-
formity and frequency of these claims and the absence of protests 
29. The Court in the Anglo-French Arbitration stated that in substance Article 6 and 
corresponding provisions under discussion at UNCLOS III (including, of course, the 
ISNT Article 70) made little difference as applied to the case before the Court. The 
Anglo-French Award, Chapter 2, note 31 supra, para. 96. 
30. The three revisions of ICNT were: the Informal Composite Negotiating Text/ 
Revision l, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.l0/Rev.l, 28 April 1979, the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text/Revision 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.l0/Rev.2, ll April 1980, and 
the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/ 
WP.l0/Rev.3, 27 August 1980. All three documents have not been reprinted in official 
records of UNCLOS Ill. 
31. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78, 28 August 1981. 
32. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/l22, 7 October 1982. 
33. E.g., Chile (1947), UNLS/1, p. 6, Costa Rica (1948), ibid., p. 9; Philippines 
(1949), ibid, p. 19; Iran (1955), UNLS/15, p. 366; India (1959), ibid., p. 364; Denmark 
(1963), ibid., p. 344; New Zealand (1964), ibid., p. 389; Iceland (1969), ibid., p. 354; Ma-
laysia (1969), UNLS/16, p. 154; Fiji (1970), ibid., p. 141. 
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from other states combined to vindicate the existence of an interna-
tional custom to that effect. Codification of this custom by Article 
l(b) of the Shelf Convention and subsequent endorsement by the 
ICJ in the North Sea Cases as such further strengthen its status. 
On the other hand, state practice in boundary delimitation con-
sists primarily of boundary agreements. As a rule, not all states dis-
close the legal principles underlying their agreement on a particular 
boundary.34 Shelf boundary maps provide useful clues, but they 
sometimes admit of more than one interpretation.35 Nevertheless, 
there is substantial agreement among commentators36 who have sur-
veyed scores of these boundary agreements and summarized their 
treatments of islands. A number of these conduct patterns emerge 
from these agreements. 
34. E.g., the Norway-U.K. shelf boundary agreement stated that the boundary was 
an equidistance line. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, 
Norway-U.K., March 10, 1965, UNTS, Vol. 551, p. 214; UNLS/15, p. 775; "Continental 
Shelf Boundary: North Sea," Limits in the Seas, No. 10 (revised), June 14, 1974, p. 2. 
But the Netherlands-U.K. agreement only specifies the geographical coordinates without 
stating the delimitation principle. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Conti-
nental Shelf Under the North Sea, Netherlands-U.K., October 6, 1965, UNTS, Vol. 595, 
p. 113; UNLS/ 15, p. 779; "Continental Shelf Boundary: North Sea," Limits in the Seas, 
No. 10, supra, p. II. 
35. E.g., Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of Continental Shelf, Sweden-Nor-
way, July 24, 1968, UNLS/16, p. 413; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Norway-Sweden," 
Limits in the Seas, No. 2, January 22, 1970. 
Northcutt Ely, a Washington lawyer, pointed out that "[s]ome small Swedish islets 
or exposed rocks were ignored, i.e., were not used as basepoints" (emphasis added). 
Northcutt Ely, "Seabed Boundaries between Coastal States: The Effect to be Given Islets 
as Special Circumstances." International Lawyer, Vol. 6 (1972), p. 227 [hereinafter cited 
as Ely (1972)]. However, Robert D. Hodgson, the late geographer of the State Depart-
ment, considered that "Norway and Sweden have granted full f!ffect to their respective 
islands ... " (emphasis added). Robert D. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Cir-
cumstances, Research Study RGE-3, Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, Department of State, 1973, p. 55 [hereinafter cited as Hodgson (1973)]. The 
difference of interpretation comes not as a surprise since both states have identical or 
similar insular geography. Granting their respective islands full effect or no effect pro-
duces nearly the same result since the effects are equalized anyway. 
36. See e.g., Ely (1972), supra note 35; L.F.E. Goldie, "The International Court of 
Justice's Natural Prolongation and the Continental Shelf Problems of Islands." Nether-
lands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 237 [hereinafter cited as Goldie 
(1973)]. Hodgson (1973), supra note 35; Donald E. Karl, "Islands and the Delimitation 
of Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysis." American Journal of International 
Law, Vo. 71 (1977), pp. 642, 651-65 [hereinafter cited as Karl (1977)]; Bowett (1979), 
supra note 4, pp. 156-83; CliveR. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in Interna-
tional Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979, pp. 189-204 [hereinafter 
cited as Symmons (1979)]. 
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As between opposite states, which is the concern here, islands in 
general are accorded full effect, partial effect, or no effect in shelf 
boundary delimitations, depending on their location, size, status of 
title, and macrogeography. In terms of location (in the order of as-
cending distance from the island's home state coast): (1) Islands lo-
cated within the territorial sea of the mainland of their home state 
are usually granted full effect in generating their own shelves;37 
(2) islands located close to but outside the territorial sea of their 
home state's mainland coast are accorded partial effect;38 (3) islands 
located on or near the median line (constructed in disregard of their 
very presence) between their home state and the opposite state, are 
given full effect,39 partial effect,40 or no effect,41 depending on other 
considerations; and, (4) islands located close to the mainland coast of 
the opposite state are accorded partial effect or no effect.42 
37. E.g., Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Denmark-Nor-
way, December 8, 1965, UNTS, Vol. 634, p. 71; UNLS/15, p. 780; "Continental Shelf 
Boundary: North Sea," Limits in the Seas, No. lO (revised), June 14, 1974, p. 6; "Conti-
nental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Yugoslavia," ibid., No.9, February 20, 1970; International 
Legal Materials, Vol. 7 (1968), p. 547. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada, Canada-Denmark, December 17, 
1973, UNLS/18, p. 447; International Legal Materials, Vol. 13 (1974), p. 506. In the 
above delimitations, coastal islands within the outer limits of the territorial sea were used 
as basepoints. 
38. E.g., Agreement Concerning the Islands Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and the Delimi-
tation of Submarine Areas, Saudi Arabia-Iran, October 24, 1968, UNTS, Vol. 696, p. 
189; UNLS/18, p. 433; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-Saudi Arabia," Limits in the 
Seas, No. 24 (n.d.); "Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Yugoslavia," supra note 37. 
In the former agreement, the Iranian island of Kharg, 17 miles offshore (Iran claims 
a 12-mile territorial sea), was given half effect in delimiting the median line between 
Iranian and Saudi mainland coasts. In the latter agreement, the Yugoslav islands of 
Jabuka and Andrija were granted partial effects in influencing the median line drawn 
between the mainland coasts of the two states. 
39. See e.g., the Norway-U.K. agreement, supra note 34; "Continental Shelf Bound-
ary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of Korea,'" Limits in the Seas, No. 75, 
September 2, 1977, pp. 1-3. For an elaborate discussion, see text accompanying notes 
111-12 infra. 
40. See e.g., the Italy-Yugoslavia agreement, supra note 37; "Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Italy-Tunisia," Limits in the Seas, No. 89, January 7, 1980. The two bounda-
ries are discussed in text accompanying notes 113-20 infra. 
41. See e.g., Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement, February 22, 1958, 
UNLS/16, p. 409; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Bahrain-Saudi Arabia," Limits in the 
Seas, No. 12, March 10, 1970; Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 38. These two 
boundary delimitations are also discussed in text accompanying notes 121-27 infra. 
42. See e.g., the Italy-Tunisia agreement, supra note 40. But compare "Continental 
Shelf Boundary: India-Indonesia," Limits in the Seas, No. 62, August 25, 1975 (the In-
dian islands of Nicobar (740 sq. mi; population: 14,563), which are 900 miles from the 
SEABED BoUNDARY DELIMITATION 81 
In terms of size, small islets or rocks are usually ignored or 
given limited effect in continental shelf delimitation.43 Since th~se 
tiny land masses are too small to support a permanent populatiOn 
living on them, they are often uninhabited (except by caretakers) 
and have little or no economic value. In terms of status of title, an 
island the sovereignty of which is in dispute is often accorded no 
effect in shelf delimitation.44 This pattern is largely independent of 
other factors. In terms of macrogeography, islands of various loca-
tions and sizes belonging to two states are granted identical treat-
ment, be it full effect, partial effect, or no effect, if the insular 
geography of the delimiting states warrants reciprocal concessions 
on each side.45 The application of this pattern is not limited to is-
lands inter se; it is applicable to islands vis-a-vis other geographical 
features. 46 
These patterns of state practice are, of course, somewhat 
overgeneralized. In practice, the actual delimitation is affected by a 
combination of these factors and possibly even more. The relative 
weight of each factor is a function of the particular context and is 
difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about. 
(b) International Adjudication 
Since the 1945 Truman Proclamation, there have been only 
three adjudicated cases relating to international seabed delimita-
tion:47 the 1969 North Sea Cases, the 1977 Anglo-French Arbitration 
Indian mainland, were granted full effect in drawing the median line between the islands 
and Indonesia's Sumatra Island). 
43. See e.g., the Norway-Sweden agreement, supra note 35; the Italy-Tunisia agree-
ment (treatment of the island of Lampione), supra note 40; Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agree-
ment, supra note 41. See text accompanying notes 119, 121 infra. 
44. See e.g., "Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-United Arab Emirates (Dubai)," 
Limits in the Seas, No. 63, September 30, 1975 (the island of Abu Musa was in dispute 
and thus ignored); "Historical Water Boundary: India-Sri Lanka," ibid., No. 66, Decem-
ber 12, 1975 (the disputed Kachchativu Islet was denied even a territorial sea of 12 
miles). See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra. 
45. See e.g., the Norway-Sweden agreement, supra note 35 (islands were given recip-
rocal treatment, be it full or no effect); the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 38 
(the reciprocal treatment of the islands of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi); the Iran-U.A.E. 
agreement, supra note 44 (two islets each of which belonged to one state were used in 
drawing a boundary line); Japan-ROK agreement, supra note 31 (all islands were given 
full effect). 
46. See e.g., the Norway-U.K. agreement, supra note 34 (the ignorance of the Nor-
wegian Trough as a limiting factor and the full effect granted to the Shetland Islands may 
have been part of a bargain). 
47. There have been a number of international and municipal adjudications relating 
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and the Case Concerning the Continental She!( (Tunisia/ Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya) of 1982 (hereinafter the Tunisian-Libyan Case).48 The 
first case dealt with an adjacent-state situation involving no islands, 
the second case specifically focused on islands' entitlement to conti-
nental shelf, and the third case discussed a half-adjacent, half-oppo-
site coast with some coastal islands. The way islands were treated is 
outlined below. 
The North Sea Cases are relevant to the regime of islands only 
marginally. The ICJ stated in dictum, as noted earlier, that for op-
posite states to effect an equitable delimitation of their common geo-
logical shelf the "presence of islets, rocks . . . " should be ignored to 
eliminate their "disproportionately distorting effect" in constructing 
a median line between the two mainland coasts. 
The Anglo-French case, on the other hand, largely hinged on the 
effect given to islands between opposite states. The seabed of the 
English Channel was, the Court of Arbitration pointed out, a com-
mon prolongation of the territories of the U.K. and France, despite a 
to the maritime boundaries of islands prior to and after the 1945 Truman Proclamation. 
For instance, The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373; 165 Eng. Rep. 815 (1805) (an uninhibated Ameri-
can island was held to have a territorial sea of three miles), The Anglo-Norwegian Fisher-
ies Case, l.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 115 (the Norwegian skjaergaard, or rock rampart, was 
recognized by the Court as legitimate basepoints for measuring the breadth of territorial 
sea), and the Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, l.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 3 (the 
50-mile fishing zone of Iceland, an insular state, was held not opposable to the United 
Kingdom). None of these cases, however, deal with the seabed rights of islands. 
On the other hand, there have been a number of unresolved cases relating to the 
continental shelf: the territorial dispute, which has seabed implications, between Chile 
and Argentina over the Beagle Channel (an arbitral tribunal granted an award in 1977 in 
favor of Chile, which has remained unimplemented due to Argentina's rejection of it). 
See F. V., "The Beagle Channel Affair," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71 
(1977), p. 733; the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case concerning the Greece-Turkey sea-
bed boundary (the dispute was submitted to ICJ which found itself lacking jurisdiction to 
decide the merits), I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3; and the U.S.-Canadian maritime dispute 
regarding the delimitation of the Gulf of Maine (now being submitted to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice), Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, I.C.J. 
Reports 1982, p. 3 (Constitution ofChambre Order of January 20, 1982). For a study of 
the parties' arguments and a proposed solution, see Sang-Myon Rhee, "Equitable Solu-
tions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Between the United States and Canada in the 
Gulf of Maine,'' American Journal of International Law, Vol. 75 (1981), p. 590. A deci-
sion is expected in August 1984. See John Vinocur, "U.S.-Canada Case is Given to 
Judges,'' New York Times, May 13, 1984, p. 11. 
48. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18. For discussions, see Mark B. Feldman, "The Tunisia-
Libya Continental Shelf Case: Geographic Justice or Judicial Compromise?" American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 77 (1983), p. 219 and E. D. Brown, "The Tunisia-Libya 
Continental Shelf Case: A Missed Opportunity," Marine Policy, Vol. 7 (1983), p. 142. 
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minor geological depression.49 (Map 14) ~oth.states agreed~ prin-
ciple that the boundary should be a median line, but they differed 
significantly as to how the line should be drawn.5° France argued, 
inter alia, that the proximity (6 to 16 miles) of the Channel Islands51 
(belonging to the U.K. but maintaining automony) to the French 
coast and their presence in a concave bay surrounded by French 
coast dictated, under equitable principles, a median line drawn be-
tween the two states' mainland coasts, thus denying the Channel Is-
lands their own shelf.52 The U.K. replied that since the Channel 
Islands had substantial land area (195 sq. km.) and population 
( 130,000) and were of economic and political importance, they 
should generate their own continental shelf. 53 
After considering the geographical location, political status, and 
economic importance of the Channel Islands, the existing regimes in 
the region54 (the 12-mile territorial sea and fishing zones of France 
and the U.K., respectively), and the parties' navigation and defense 
interests in the area, 55 the Court concluded: 
The presence of these British Islands close to the French 
coast, if they are given full effect in delimiting the continen-
tal shelf, will manifestly result in a substantial diminution 
of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise ac-
crue to the French Republic. The fact by itself appears to 
the Court to be, prima facie, a circumstance creative of in-
equity and calling for a method of delimitation that in 
some measure redresses the inequity.56 
Short of accepting the French position, the Court decided that a 
primary boundary should be a mid-Channel equidistance line drawn 
between mainland coasts of France and the U.K. (Map 14).57 A sec-
ond boundary in effect was a line 12 miles from the Channel Islands 
in their north and west, leaving France a belt of continental shelf, 
between the mid-Channel line and the Channel Islands, continuous 
with the rest of the French shelves elsewhere (Map 14).58 Thus, an 
49. Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 29, para. 107. 
50. Ibid., para. 146. 
51. Ibid., para. 6. 
52. Ibid., paras. 156-67. 
53. Ibid., paras. 168-79. 
54. Ibid., para. 187. 
55. Ibid., para. 188. 
56. Ibid., para. 196. 
57. Ibid., para. 201. 
58. Ibid., para. 202. 
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enclave was created for the Channel Islands surrounded by French 
shelves. 
A second dispute related to the Atlantic area west of the English 
Channel, where some British islands (the Scillies) extended roughly 
twice as far from the British mainland coast (21 miles) as the French 
islands (Ushant) did from the French mainland coast (10 miles).59 
France favored a delimitation on the basis of a bisector of an angle 
drawn between lines constructed along the general direction of the 
Channel coasts of the U.K. and France whereas the U.K. proposed a 
normal median line between the two coasts. 60 
The Court first identified the geographical character of the area 
as constituting a "special circumstance" under Article 6 of the Shelf 
Convention,61 thus rejecting the U.K. position. The Court also 
found itself unable to accept the French approach since it would 
have detached the delimitation from the coast and thus run afoul of 
the fundamental principle of continental shelf-natural prolonga-
tion of land territories. 62 In view of the Scillies' distorting effect, the 
Court finally decided to accord them half effect in drawing the me-
dian line between French and British mainland coasts in the Atlantic 
area (Map 14).63 
The results of the Anglo-French case fit nicely into the patterns 
of state practice noted above. The enclave treatment of the Channel 
Islands is compatible with pattern four, namely, no effect or partial 
effect accorded to islands located close to the mainland coast of the 
opposite state, whereas granting partial effect to the Scillies finds 
support from pattern two, namely, partial effect accorded to islands 
located close to but outside the territorial sea of their home state. 
More importantly, these results were reached by the Court in the 
belief that Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, customary rules of in-
ternational law, state practice, and even the consensus reached at 
UNCLOS III were simply different expressions of a single concept-
equitable principles.64 The Court's emphasis on taking into account 
all the relevant circumstances65 supports not only the North Sea rul-
ing but also the boundary delimitation provisions of the RSNT (Ar-
ticles 62 and 71) (Articles 74 and 83 in all the subsequent versions of 
59. Ibid., paras. 4, 10, 235, 251. 
60. Ibid., paras. 208, 212. 
61. Ibid., para. 245. 
62. Ibid., para. 246. 
63. Ibid., para. 251. 
64. Ibid., para. 96. 
65. Ibid., para. 97. 
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the negotiating text and the LOS Convention). The inherent and 
unanswered question, of course, is what circumstances are relevant 
and who should decide whether relevance exists. Disagreement be-
tween disputing states could lie precisely there. 
The Tunisian-Libyan Case involves, unlike the North Sea Cases 
and the Anglo-French Arbitration, coasts that are both adjacent to 
and opposite each other. The area in dispute lies in the Pelagian 
Sea, a marginal sea of the Mediterranean Sea (Map 15). The coast-
lines of Tunisia and Libya facing the Pelagian Sea are such that they 
are adjacent in the area near the common land boundary but be-
come opposite in the area farther out to sea. 66 In both areas there 
are islands on the Tunisia side, namely, Jerba and the Kerkennahs, 
but not on the Libyan side. The seabed of the Pelagian Sea, known 
as the Pelagian Block to geologists, is the common continental shelf 
shared by both Tunisia and Libya; there is no distinct geological fea-
ture that may serve as a natural boundary.67 
Both parties have made unilateral continental shelf claims that 
were rejected by the ICJ68 (Map 16). They themselves also rejected 
the applicability of the equidistance method as the boundary delimi-
tation principle.69 The Court, having appreciated the hybrid nature 
of the parties' coastline, decided to divide the disputed area into two 
sectors applying different delimitation principles. 70 In the area near 
the common land boundary (the first sector), the seabed boundary 
largely follows the extension of the land boundary which bears an 
angle of 26° to the meridian, roughly perpendicular to the coastline 
at Ras Ajdir, the land boundary's terminal poinf 1 (Map 17). The 
Court has chosen this line because it had been followed by the par-
ties as a de facto boundary in granting concessions for offshore oil-
exploration during the period 1964-76.72 In this sector the island of 
J erba was disregarded by the Court in assessing the direction of the 
coastline, for it was "at more than a comparatively short distance 
from" Ras Ajdir.73 
66. This hybrid relationship is not unusual in cases where two neighboring states 
share a common bay or bight, such as those between Norway and Sweden in the Skager-
rak, Italy and Yugoslavia in the Adriatic Sea, France and Spain in the Bay of Biscay, and 
China and Korea (North) in the Yellow Sea. 
67. l.C.J. Reports 1982, para. 67, p. 58. 
68. Ibid., para. 113, p. 80. 
69. Ibid., para. 110, p. 79. 
70. Ibid., para. 114, p. 82. 
71. Ibid., para. 121, p. 85. 
72. Ibid., para. 21, p. 35 and paras. 117-18, pp. 83-84. 
73. Ibid., para. 120, p. 85. 
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In the second sector where the parties' coasts were considered 
opposite each other, the Kerkennah Islands were given half effect in 
drawing the boundary based on the equidistance principle (Map 
17).74 The ICJ reasoned that to take account of these islands' sea-
ward coastline as baseline for delimiting the boundary would, "in 
the circumstance of the case, amount to giving excessive weight to 
the Kerkennahs."75 
The ICJ's disregard of the island of Jerba should not be dis-
turbing since its presence is, after all, much less relevant, as the equi-
distance method is not employed here.76 But the Court's treatment 
of the Kerkennah Islands deserves attention. Large (about 65 square 
miles) and populous (more than 15,000), these islands lie only 11 
miles offshore at their closest point and 22 miles at their farthest. 77 
(Tunisia has claimed a 12-mile territorial sea since 1973).78 In state 
practice outlined earlier, islands of this size and location are nor-
mally granted full effect or partial effect. Here the Court, which saw 
equitable principles basically as a result-oriented concept/9 appar-
ently considered that granting no effect or full effect to the Kerken-
nah Islands would result in inequities; hence the adoption of a 
middle ground. Despite the apparent impression of arbitniriness, 
the result of the Tunisian-Libyan Continental She!f Case does not de-
part appreciably from state practice in treatment of islands in seabed 
boundary delimitations. 
C. The Tiao-t'ais Dispute: Is It Relevant to the East Asian 
Seabed Controversy? 
The Tiao-yu-t'ai dispute was triggered in part80 by the Sino-
74. Ibid., para. 128, p. 88. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Employment of the equidistance principle in lateral boundary delimitation be-
tween two adjacent states has a greater chance of creating inequity in cases where islands 
or other prominent geographical features are present by magnifying the protruding effect 
of these features. 
77. Columbia Lippincoll Gaze/leer of the World ( 1962), p. 931 [hereinafter cited as 
Columbia Gazeteer]. 
78. Law 73-49, August 2, 1973, "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions," Limits 
in the Seas, No. 36, 4th revision, May I, 1981, p. 157. 
79. I.C.J. Reports 1982, para. 70, p. 59. 
80. It is, however, important to note that this territorial dispute had existed, without 
much attention being paid by the Chinese and Japanese governments, long before the 
publication of the Emery Report in 1969. Although neither state had openly contested 
the other's claim prior to 1968, each had assumed that the islets were part of its territory. 
Visits to and uses of them for various purposes by their respective nationals, text accom-
panying note 102 infra, have been taken for granted and never challenged by the other 
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Japanese seabed dispute. In the past decade, that disput~ has effec-
tively delayed seabed delimitation and consequently ml develop-
ment in that area. As the legal regime of islands is about to tum a 
new page, it is high time to examine whether the Tiao-yu-t'ais are 
eligible at all, under emerging customary and conventional inter':la-
tional law, for seabed rights. If so, how much? If they are demed 
any effect, then the seabed issue could be dealt with separately 
before the territorial dispute is finally resolved. If they are only de-
nied full effect, then it is necessary to ascertain how much effect they 
should exert on the shelf boundary. Once that is determined, the 
territorial issue can still be detached from the seabed issue. In both 
cases, the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute would be irrelevant. 
1. Under Existing and Emerging Conventional 
International Law 
(a) Existing Conventional Law 
No existing conventional international law applies to the pres-
ent dispute because Japan, the ROK, and the PRC are not parties to 
the Shelf Convention, although the ROC is a party, and no bilateral 
shelf boundary agreement exists between Japan and the two Chinese 
governments. 
(b) Emerging Conventional Law 
On the other hand, the new Law of the Sea Convention, which 
was signed by 117 states at Jamaica in December, 1982 but has not 
come into effect,81 will be the governing conventional law for Japan 
and the PRC, but not necessarily for the ROC. The ROC has been 
precluded from all United Nations activities, including UNCLOS 
Ill, since October 1971 when the PRC took over the ROC's seat at 
the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly under General 
Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI).82 Should the ROC, as a non-
side. (Presumably Chinese and Japanese visitors rarely came across each other.) After 
all, the magnitude and economic value of this tiny landmass would hardly have war-
ranted any government's attention before the prospects for undersea oil were publicized. 
It is thus fair to say that the coastal states' oil hunt merely activated an erstwhile dormant 
territorial dispute but did not create it. For the history of the dispute, see the references 
cited in note 1 supra. 
81. "Sea Law Signed by 117 Nations; U.S. Opposes It; 46 Other Countries Also Re-
fuse to Back Treaty," New York Times, December 11, 1982, p. l. As of January 1984, 
133 countries have signed the convention and nine have ratified. U.N. Chronicle, Vol. 21, 
No. 2 (February 1984), p. 96. 
82. UN Doc. A/RES/2758 (XXIV) (A/L.630 and Corr. 1), UN Monthly Chronicle, 
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party, be bound by the LOS Convention even though it will never be 
able to accede thereto? 
(1) Should the ROC be Bound by the LOS 
Convention? 
To respond, one has first to determine whether the LOS Con-
vention, nearly a universal treaty, declares or creates customary in-
ternational law. The preamble of the LOS Convention explicitly 
illustrates its norm-declaring and norm-creating character: 
Believing that the cod!fication and progressive development 
of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will con-
tribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co-operation 
and friendly relations among all nations .... 83 (emphasis 
added) 
The next question is to ascertain to which category a particular 
provision of the LOS Convention relevant to the present study be-
longs. Article 77, dealing with rights of the coastal state over the 
continental shelf, seems to be a prima facie norm-declaring case. 
This was illustrated by its adoption by the ICJ in the North Sea 
judgment which, as a source of customary law,84 was subsequently 
endorsed by the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration.85 To use the 
late Judge Baxter's words, "the decision maker, legal advisor, or 
scholar must give to the treaty the same weight that would be ac-
corded to [ 117]86 simultaneous, contemporary and identical declara-
tions by those [ 117] states of their understanding of customary 
law."87 
However, one is less sure about Article 121 (dealing with the 
regime of islands), particularly paragraph 3, which denies shelf and 
EEZ entitlements to certain rocks. That paragraph presumably is 
intended to replace the customary law as contained in Article 1(b) of 
Vol. 8, No. 10 (November 1971), p. 61. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65 (1971), p. 
556. The PRC delegate at the U.N. specifically proposed that the ROC not be invited to 
UNCLOS III. "Recommendation for Holding U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea," 
Hsinhua Weekly [New China Weekly], November 5, 1973, p. 22. Hsinhua Weekly is one 
of the PRC's official weekly publications. 
83. LOS Convention, Preamble, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, p. I. 
84. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 46. 
85. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. 
86. This is the assumed number of states that will become parties to the Law of the 
Sea Convention. 
87. Richard R. Baxter, "Treaty and Custom,'' Hague Academy, Recuei/ IJes Cours, 
Vol. 129, Sec. I (1970), p. 25 and p. 55. 
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the Shelf Convention. Therefore, whereas Article 77 may apply to 
the ROC, a non-party to the LOS Convention, qua customary l~~· 
Article 121(3) may not apply until sometime in the future when 1t IS 
declared "through juridical decision or other authoritative pro-
nouncement that the treaty provision has passed into customary 
law."88 
As a practical matter, the ROC probably will not oppose Article 
121(3) to the extent it coincides with its reservation to Article 6 of the 
Shelf Convention that "exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken 
into account" in continental shelf boundary delimitation. 89 Since 
the ROC made this reservation with the Tiao-yu-t'ais in mind,90 it 
seems reasonable to assume that the ROC will accept Article 121(3) 
as applied to the Tiao-yu-t'ais.91 
(2) Article 121 of the LOS Convention: An 
Analysis 
In this context, Article 121, which has been adopted by succes-
sive negotiating texts without change, demands attention. Paragraph 
3, requoted below, is particularly relevant to the Tiao-yu-t'ais: 
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf. 
Nowhere in the LOS Convention is "rock" defined. The fact 
that mathematical criteria suggested by commentators92 and partici-
88. Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
89. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying note 90. 
90. Li-Ja-yuan Kung-pao, supra Chapter 2, note 89, p. 3; Ch'ang Shen-chun, "Chiao-
ch'en Kung-yueh Yu 'Pao-liu T'iao-k'uan' [The Shelf Convention and the "Reserva-
tions"] Chung-kuo Shih-pao [China Times], August 16, 1970, reprinted in Collection of 
Tiao-yu-t'ai Materials,supra Chapter 3, note 21, p. 50; Chiu (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 
59, p. 10 (The China Times is an independent Chinese-language daily based in Taipei). 
91. As a developing and, insofar as territory under effective control is concerned, an 
insular state, the ROC is not expected to find any obvious disadvantag~ in abiding by the 
rules of the LOS Convention. In effect, by declaring a 200-mile EEZ on September 6, 
1979, the ROC seemed to show its receptiveness to developments at UNCLOS III. For 
the declaration, see Introduction, note 20 supra. 
92. See e.g., Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, pp. 17-18; Hodgson classified islands 
into four categories: (I) rocks (less than 0.001 sq. mi. in area); (2) islets (0.001-1 sq. mi.); 
(3) isles (1-1,000 sq. mi.); and (4) islands (over 1,000 sq. mi. in area). This proposal was 
repeated in Hodgson and Smith, "The Informal Single Negotiation Text (Committee II): 
A Geographical Perspective;· Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 3 
(1976), p. 225, pp. 230-31 [hereinafter cited as Hodgson and Smith (1976)]. 
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pating states93 were not adopted by drafters at UNCLOS III be-
speaks the difficulties in reaching agreement. Without a precise, 
objective definition, one is forced to place more emphasis on the 
qualitative criteria of a rock's ability to "sustain human habitation or 
econmic life of [its] own."94 
A logical interpretation of this provision is that rocks that fail 
either test would be disqualified from having a continental shelf 
whereas, to qualify itself, the rock in question must conform to both 
criteria simultaneously.95 A number of questions arise. Does the 
first test mean "uninhabitability" or "uninhabitedness"? Interpreted 
by the ordinary meaning of the words,96 "uninhabitability" seems to 
have been intended.97 The drafters thus envisage a rare but possible 
situation where an inhabitable rock able to sustain its own economic 
life is nevertheless left uninhabited for other reasons. But it is still 
unclear how long the rock in ~uestion should sustain human habita-
tion in order to qualify itself? 8 Weeks? Months? Years? 
The answer seems to depend on how much resources the rock 
has. This inquiry leads to the second test: the rock's ability to sus-
tain its own economic life. In determining that ability, one has first 
to ask: should the rock's economic life originate from resources of 
93. Romania, in its draft articles on islands (L.53), supra note 25, differentiated be-
tween an islet (less than I sq. km.) and an island similar to an islet (larger than I sq. km. 
but smaller than x sq. km.) on the one hand, and islands (over x sq. km.) on the other. 
The draft articles of Algeria et al (L.62/Rev.1), ibid., classified into islands, islets, rocks, 
and low-tide elevations without using any mathematical criterion. Nor did the Irish 
(L.43) and Turkish (L.55) draft articles, ibid. 
94. This shift of emphasis should not give "rock" an excessively broad definition so 
as to include fairly substantial islands. In fact, islands that fail the qualitative criteria are 
rarely substantial in size. 
95. But compare: Hodgson and Smith ( 1976), supra note 92, p. 231 (it was stated that 
"[l]ogically, to qualify, the rock must meet one of the two implicit criteria") (emphasis 
added). 
96. See Article 31 (general rule of interpretation) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which provides, inter alia, 
I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose . . . . 
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents of the 
Conference, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/ll/Add.2, 1970, p. 289;American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 875. 
97. Another indication is that the Romanian draft articles (L.53), supra note 25, sug-
gested both meanings but the ISNT only adopted the former. 
98. Both the draft articles of Romania (L.53) and Algeria et al (L.62/Rev.l) favored 
a requirement of permanent habitation or settlement, supra note 25. This requirement 
was not adopted by ISNT, subsequent negotiating texts and the LOS Convention. 
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the rock proper (the landmass) alone, or those in nearby waters as 
well? Inclusion of nearby resources as part of a rock's "own eco-
nomic life" seems to beg the question since what needs to be deter-
mined is precisely whether the marine resources in the continental 
shelf and the EEZ of that rock should belong to it. On the other 
hand, whether to include the resources within the rock's 12-mile ter-
ritorial sea, which it is undeniably entitled to, poses a harder ques-
tion. A rich fishing ground within the rock's territorial sea could 
sustain a viable economic life, thereby enabling it to claim the petro-
leum lying beneath its continental shelf further seaward. The issue, 
then, is whether the resources in the territorial sea may be used as a 
"stepping stone" to bypass the second test. 
Technically, given sufficient investment, virtually any rock in 
the world could be made economically viable, with or without the 
resources in its territorial sea. A not-too-remote possibility would be 
building an offshore casino on a rock. The "human habitation" and 
"own economic life" tests would be met effortlessly. This again 
leads to the third question: should "economic life of their own" ex-
clude a situation in which massive outside resources pour in to tum 
an erstwhile barren rock into a valuable piece of real estate? If po-
tential resources in the rock's continental shelf or EEZ are rich 
enough, its home state would lack no incentive to do so. In this case, 
the equity of granting extensive maritime jurisdiction to a semi-arti-
ficial island is in serious doubt.99 
The fourth question is whether an inhabitable rock can claim an 
economic life of its own if it has limited indigenous resources in the 
landmass but they are economically unfeasible to develop? What 
standards should be used in determining economic feasibility? 
Neither the LOS Convention nor its travaux preparatoires pro-
vides obvious answers to the last three questions. But the apparent 
object or purpose of Article 121(3) sheds some light on a proper in-
terpretation.100 Since paragraph 3 of that article serves as an excep-
tion to paragraph 2 and clearly is intended to exclude certain types 
of rocks from shelf and EEZ entitlements, 101 a more strict construe-
99. It has been settled that an artificial island or any offshore structure shall have no 
maritime zone other than a 500-meter safety zone around them. LOS Convention, arts. 
60, 80. 
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), supra note 96. 
101. At UNCLOS III, the number of states that supports the restrictions on the conti-
nental shelf and EEZ entitlements of certain islands far exceeds that of the other side. 
This can be seen from the draft articles proposed and the debates on the regime of is-
lands held at the Caracas session, supra note 25. 
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tion should then be given to it to keep the exception from becoming 
meaningless. Under this assumption, to qualify itself, a rock not 
only has to be inhabitable for an extended period of time, but its 
own economic life should be supported by the resources on the rock 
proper alone, not including those in its territorial sea or brought 
from outside. Moreover, the development of the rock's indigenous 
resources must be economically feasible according to local standards 
at the time the question arises. 
(3) Applying Article 121 to the Tiao-yu-t'ais 
A few more words about the Tiao-yu-t'ais are needed before 
applying the above criteria to them. 102 In Table 3, the islets and 
rocks are listed in the order of their sizes. Tiao-yu (No. 1), Nan-
hsiao (No. 3), Pei-hsiao (No. 4), Ch'ung-pei-yen (No. 6), Ch'ung-
nan-yen (No. 7) and Fei-lai (No. 8) should be, as noted earlier, con-
sidered together because of their proximity (4 miles apart) which 
would make their shelf entitlements, if any, largely identical. Since 
Huang-wei (No.2) is not far (10 miles) from Ch'ung-pei-yen (No.6), 
it is discussed together with the Tiao-yu cluster. We shall begin with 
Ch'ih-wei (No. 5), to be followed by the rest. 
Ch'ih-wei is a volcanic rock without vegetation. The rocky sur-
face and steep cliffs make it virtually useless except as a navigational 
aid in ancient times and for target practice in modern times. From 
all available evidence, Ch'ih-wei has not and prabably cannot sus-
tain human habitation and economic life of its own. 
Tiao-yu and Huang-wei, about 30 and 7 times, respectively, the 
size of Ch'ih-wei, are also of volcanic origin. They and Nan-hsiao 
are the only ones that have vegetation on them. In addition to palm 
trees and tropical bushes, Tiao-yu and Huang-wei are abundant in 
Hai-:fujung or Shih-ts'ungjung (Statice arbuscula), a precious Chi-
nese medicinal herb good for curing high blood pressure and rheu-
matism. Whereas Huang-wei has no potable water, Tiao-yu is said 
I 02. In addition to the literature cited in supra note 6, this section is based, unless 
otherwise indicated, on the following sources: Ch'i Tung-hsin, "T'iao-yu-t'ai Ch'un-tao 
Chien-chieh" (A Brief Note on the T'iao-yu-t'ai Islands], Chung-yang Jih-pao, August 18, 
1970, reprinted in Collection of T'iao-Yu-T'ai Materials, supra Chapter 3, note 21, p. 51; 
Yao Chuo-jan, Ch'ing-t'ing Yu-min-men Te Hu-sheng: "Tiao-yu-t'ai Shih Wo-men-te!" 
[Please listen to the Fishermen: "The Tiao-yu-t'ais are Ours!"), Chung-kuo Shih-pao, 
August 28, 1970, reprinted in Collection of Tiao- Yu- Tai Materials, supra Chapter 3, note 
21, p. 73; Liu Pen-yen, "Tiao-yu-t'ai Chiu-ching Shih-She-mo Yang-tzu?" [What Are 
the Tiao-yu-t'ais like after all?), Chung-yang Jih-pao, August 24, 1970, reprinted in Col-
lection of Tiao-yu-t'ai Materials, supra Chapter 3, note 21, p. 59; Okuhara (1971), supra 
note I. 
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to have a spring big enough to accomoda!e 200 people .. N~arby ~a­
ters are rich in bonito. A strait between Ttao-yu and Fet-lat provtdes 
a good gale shelter for fishing vessels in the region. 
In the past six centuries, Chinese imperial envoys of Ming and 
Ch'ing Dynasties first used the Tiao-yu-t'ais as navigational aids on 
their way to the Ryukyu Kingdom, then a tributary of China, to offi-
ciate at investiture ceremonies. 103 In the nineteenth century came 
the Chinese fishermen and pharmacists. Around the turn of this cen-
tury, an enterprising Japanese named Koga brought in scores of sea-
sonal workers, food, and supplies each year to develop Tiao-yu, 
Huang-wei, and Nan-hsiao. Houses, reservoirs, docks, warehouses 
and sewers were built and experimental planting was conducted. 
Koga was engaged in the business of collecting guano and albatross 
feathers, bonito canning, and bird stuffing. His business was discon-
tinued in 1915 because of high cost. After his death in 1918, his son 
continued his fish canning and bird stuffing businesses until the early 
1940s, when all operations were terminated and enterprises aban-
doned. After the war, the Tiao-yu-t'ais were placed, along with the 
Ryukyus, under U.S. administration}04 No other use was made of 
them except for naval target practice on Huang-wei and Ch'ih-wei. 
In the 1950s and 1960s a Taiwan-based salvage company used 
Huang-wei as a work site, having built a 200-meter railroad and an 
iron pier which were later destroyed by naval bombing. Coming 
from Taiwan, Chinese fishermen still regularly, and pharmacists oc-
casionally, visited the islets or nearby waters until the Sino-Japanese 
territorial dispute erupted and Japanese patrol boats began to chase 
them away. Currently the Tiao-yu-t'ais are under Japanese physical 
control. Ever since Koga and company left, the islets have been 
uninhabited for four decades. How will these islets fare, in light of 
the above descriptions, under Article 121(3) ofthe LOS Convention? 
As to the "inhabitability" test, one could argue that at least the 
103. Cheng (1974), supra Chapter 2, note 57, pp. 254-56, especially p. 256 note 108. 
See generally Ta-tuan Ch'en, "Investiture of Liu-ch'iu Kings in the Ch'ing Period," in 
The Chinese World Order, edited by John K. Fairbank, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1968, p. 135. 
104. The Ryukyus were under the physical control of the U.S. forces when Japan 
surrendered in 1945. The 1951 peace treaty with Japan, UST, Vol. 3, p. 3169; TIAS, No. 
2490; UNTS, Vol. 130, p. 45, placed the Ryukyus under U.S. administration, to be in-
cluded in the U.N. trusteeship system (which never happened). In 1953, the U.S. Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyus issued Proclamation No. 27 which embraced the Tiao-
yu-t'ais within the scope of the U.S. civil administration, Hearing on Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty, supra C~apter 2, n?te 5~, p. 149. For a denial of the alleged legal effect of the 
above proclamation on China wtth respect to the Tiao-yu-t'ais, see ibid., p. 152. 
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Tiao-yu Island can sustain human habitation, given its potable water 
and tillable soil. After all, it has been done in the past for a fairly 
long period of time. On the other hand, opponents can point out 
that to sustain human habitation Koga and company had not only to 
bring in food and supplies but also constantly replace the seasonal 
inhabitants. Additionally, they can argue that the attempt to settle 
on the islets was unsuccessful. It is true that the Kogas' experience 
admits of conflicting interpretations. But if "inhabitability" is not 
intended to mean "permanent settlement," 105 then Tiao-yu and 
Huang-wei seem qualified to be inhabitable under that test. 
Next is the "own economic life" test. Proponents can argue that 
the collection of guano, feathers and herb and production of stuffed 
birds and canned fish enable the islets to sustain an economic life of 
their own. However, arguments can also be advanced to the effect 
that the absence of the collecting of guano, which is exhaustible, in 
the post-war decades attests to its unfeasibility; that the drastic re-
duction of birds, according to a Japanese study, 106 also makes 
feather collecting or bird stuffing difficult, if not impossible; and that 
the herb, according to a Chinese pharmacist in Taiwan who has oc-
casionally extracted herbs on the Tiao-yu-t'ais, can sustain large-
scale exploitation for only five years. 107 Opponents may conclude 
that the ultimate failure of Koga's family business and the absence 
of its restoration thereafter bespeaks the unfeasibility of establishing 
an indigenous economic life on the islets. As for fish canning, it has 
been assumed that the living resources in nearby waters of a rock are 
excluded from its "own economic life". So is the use of these islets 
as temporary work sites. 
Unlike the "inhabitability" notion susceptible of more objective 
criteria, the "own economic life" test has various interpretations. 
"Economic life" itself is vague enough to literally include everthing 
of economic value. But with the word "own" strictly construed to 
denote only indigenous resources from the rock proper, the case dis-
qualifying Tiao-yu and Huang-wei seems to be stronger than the 
case qualifying them. 
The above analysis relies on a few assumptions intended to give 
Article 121(3) a strict reading according to the purpose and object of 
105. Supra note 98. 
106. The study said that there were around 850,000 birds in the area in 1963. By 1970, 
the number went down to about 110,000. This study, done by the Japanese in 1970, was 
cited in Yang (1972), supra note I, p. 134. 
107. This was estimated by Mr. Shen Ch'eng-nan, a Chinese herbal pharmacist who 
was familiar with the Tiao-yu-t'ais. See Liu, supra note 102, p. 61. 
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the article as a whole. Applying that paragraph under these assuJ?~­
tions, Tiao-yu and Huang-wei can sustain human habitation but It IS 
doubtful that these islets can sustain an economic life of their own 
without bringing in substantial resources from outside. 
2. Under Customary International Law 
(a) State Practice 
The state practice in this regard discussed above may not have 
become so general as to evidence an international custom or consti-
ute an opinio juris, as required by the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice 108 (Article 38) and the North Sea Cases .109 But a 
few patterns summarized earlier may be in the process of becoming 
one, if more states whose interests are specially affected follow those 
patterns. In the following analysis, factors that influence islands' ef-
fect on shelf boundaries such as location, size, status of title, and 
macrogeography are considered together with location as the con-
necting factor. 
In addition to their small size and disputed status, the Tiao-yu-
t'ais have another characteristic. They (except Ch'ih-wei) are lo-
cated exactly on or very close to the hypothetical median line drawn 
from the coasts of China (including Taiwan) and Japan (including 
the Ryukyus) in disregard of the presence of the Tiao-yu-t'ais (Map 
1 ). Islands in the following shelf boundary agreements selected from 
state practice have at least one of the three characteristics. The mid-
way location is used as the connecting factor. 
(1) Full Effect to Midway Islands 
There have been two relevant full-effect cases: 1 10 the Shetland 
108. Article 38 provides, inter alia: 
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, . . . ; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
109. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44. This requirement was criticized as too rigid by dissent-
ing Judges Tanaka and Lachs, ibid., p. 175, and p. 231. 
110. Another two cases of interest are the treatment of the Indonesian islands of 
Natuna (815 sq. mi.) and Anambas (260 sq. mi.) in the South China Sea and the treat-
ment of the Venezuelan Aves Isle in the Carribbean Sea. In the first case, the two groups 
of islands, situated approximately midway from Borneo and the Malay Peninsula, were 
granted full effect in the Indonesian-Malaysian shelf boundary delimitation. However, 
apart from the islands' substantial size which would have justified full-effect treatment 
anyway, they were in fact included within Indonesia's straight baseline system. There-
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Islands in the North Sea between the United Kingdom and Norway 
and the Tsushima Island in the Korea Strait between the ROK and 
Japan. In the former case, a 1965 shelf boundary agreement be-
tween London and Oslo111 gave full effect to the Shetland Islands in 
drawing a median-line boundary (Map 13). (The Shetlands lie 
outside the British straight baseline system and are 96 and 173 miles 
from the nearest British and Norwegian mainland coasts respec-
tively. The distance between the two coasts in that part of the North 
Sea is about 270 miles.) In the latter case, points on the coast of 
Tsushima Island, situated 37 and 53 miles respectively from Korean 
and Japanese coasts in the 95-mile-wide Korea Strait, were used as 
basepoints in drawing an equidistance shelf boundary under the 
1974 Japan-ROK agreement (Map 1). 112 
A closer look at the geographies of the two cases reveals that 
their full shelf entitlements may have little to do with their midway 
or near-midway location. First, in both cases the islands involved 
are fairly large (Shetlands: 552 sq. mi.; Tsushima: 271 sq. mi.), pop-
ulous (Shetlands: 17,298; Tsushima: 58,672) and important. There 
is little reason to deny them a continental shelf. Second, considera-
tions of reciprocal concessions may have heavily influenced the 
boundaries. For instance, in the Norway-U.K. case, the Norwegian 
Trough lying only a few miles off Norway could have caused Nor-
fore their use as basepoints had nothing to do with their midway location. See Agree-
ment on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves, Malaysia-Indonesia, October 12, 
1969, UNLS/16, p. 417; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Indonesia-Malaysia," Limits in 
the Seas, No. I, January 21, 1970. But see Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, p. 63 (the 
effects these islands received were said to range from half to 86 percent rather than full 
effect). 
In the second case, Venezuela's tiny Aves Isle (0.02 sq. mi.) was also granted full 
effect. The Islet is located in the east Caribbean Sea 300 miles from Venezuelan main-
land coast and 191 miles from Puerto Rico, a self-governing commonwealth of the U.S. 
The islet, which is actually a sand bar covered by purslane and inhabited by birds and 
turtles, is occasionally used as garrison by the Venezuelan military authorities. Under 
the Maritime Boundary Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Venezuela concluded on March 18, 1978, TIAS No. 9890, the U.S. agreed to grant it 
full effect primarily because of political considerations. For the boundary and the Aves 
Isle, see "Maritime Boundary: United States-Venezuela," Limits in the Seas, No. 91, 
December 16, 1980. For the Venezuelan perspective, see Kaldone G. Nweihed, "EZ 
(Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-Enclosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements be-
tween Venezuela and Her Neighbors," Ocean Development and International Law Jour· 
nal, Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 5 (map), 20-21. For the U.S. perspective, see Mark B. Feldman 
and David Colson, "The Maritime Boundaries of the United States," American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 75 (1981), p. 747. 
Ill. Supra note 39. 
112. Supra note 39. 
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way difficulties in claiming the shelf west of the Trough had the 
United Kingdom stressed the discontinuity of the Norwegian shelf. 
However, the median-line boundary was drawn in total disregard of 
the Trough's presence as a potential limiting factor. To what extent 
this concession of the United Kingdom was linked to granting full 
effect to the Shetlands is a matter of conjecture. But such a possibil-
ity obviously exists. In the Japan-ROK case, a similar situation ap-
pears. The ROK's Cheju Island in the mouth of the Korea Strait is 
48 miles offshore. Like Tsushima, it was used as a basepoint in con-
structing the southern portion of the Japan-ROK median line in the 
Korea Strait. lfTsushima had been granted no effect (other than the 
territorial sea), there would have been little reason to treat Cheju 
differently. Using these islands in question in both cases as base-
points admittedly displaced the median lines to varying degrees 
(more so in the wider North Sea than in the narrower Korea Strait), 
but the resulting distorting effects were reduced or eliminated by re-
ciprocal concessions from macrogeographical perspectives. The two 
cases shed little light on the Tiao-yu-t'ais' shelf entitlement, however, 
because of the disparity in size and importance between them. 
(2) Partial Effect to Midway Islands 
The two most noted partial-effect cases involve Italy. In a 1968 
agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, 113 Pelagrus and Kajola, 
two tiny Yugoslav islets 114 midway in the Adriatic Sea, were only 
accorded a 12-mile zone which created a bulge in the otherwise 
smooth median line between the Italian and Yugoslav mainland 
coasts. Since Yugoslavia did not claim a 12-mile territorial sea until 
1978, 115 the two-mile continental shelf beyond its then 10-mile terri-
torial sea reflected recognition of the partial effect of these islands at 
the time. After Yugoslavia's extension of territorial sea to 12 miles, 
these islands' effects on the median-line boundary were eliminated 
entirely. 
Another instance was the 1971 shelf boundary agreement be-
tween Italy and Tunisia 116 that went into effect in 1978. One island 
(Pentelleria, 32 sq. mi.), 117 two islets 118 (Lampedusa and Linosa, 3 
I 13. Supra note 37. 
114. Information about the size and economic life of these two islets is not available. 
115. "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions," supra note 78, p. 175. 
116. Supra note 40. 
117. See Webster's New Geographical Dictionary (1972), p. 920. Pantelleria's 1961 
population was 9,267. See also Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, p. 62, note 43. 
118. The Columbia Gazetteer, supra note 77, p. 1015 and p. 1060. Lampedusa's 1971 
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sq. mi and 2 sq. mi respectively) and one uninhabited rock119 (Lam-
pione, less than 1 sq. mi.) are situated either on the median line 
drawn without regard to their presence or on the Tunisian side of 
that line (Map 15). Under the agreement four semicircles of differ-
ent radius were drawn around these islands as their entitlements to 
continental shelf. Except for Lampione, which was accorded a 12-
mile zone, the rest got a 13-mile zone. All the semicircles intersect 
with the median line or with each other so that no enclave was cre-
ated. Since Italy claimed a 6-mile territorial sea in 1971 and ex-
tended it to 12 miles in 1974, 120 all the islands' effects on shelf 
boundary may be categorized as "partial" before 1974. Thereafter, 
the effect of Lampione became nil. In fact, Italy might have deliber-
ately used a 12-mile limit in anticipation of its prevalence in the fu-
ture as the width of territorial sea. 
These two cases have important implications for the Tiao-yu-
t'ais in view of their great resemblance in size, location, and 
macrogeography. None of these islets was granted full effect; the 
partial effects they received were limited or even symbolic. Particu-
larly noteworthy is that an island of the magnitude of Pantelleria 
(population over 9,000) was accorded only slight effect in shelf 
delimitation. 
(3) No Effect to Midway Islands 
Where islands are granted no effect, the result may be the mere 
existence of a territorial sea (including, of course, the seabed) or even 
a reduced territorial sea if the area to be delimited is very small. In 
addition to the Lampione instance discussed above, there have been 
a number of cases where small, midway, and/or disputed islets are 
ignored in shelf boundary delimitation. 
In 1958, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia delimited a shelf bound-
ary121 where small islands between their coasts were either ignored 
or used as turning points on the equidistance line (which is another 
way of denying maritime zones, including territorial sea, to midway 
population was 4,387. John Paxton, The Statesman's Yearbook World Gaze/leer, London 
and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979, p. 299. Linosa's population in the 1950s 
was 336. It is noteworthy that Linosa's small size and precisely midway location are 
extremely similar to those of Tiao-yu Islet in the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands. 
119. Information about Lampione is limited; it has no entry (or separate entry) in the 
above-cited geographical references. Its land area is estimated at less than 0.2 sq. mi., 
approximately the size of Nan-hsiao Islet of the Tiao-yu-t'ais. 
120. "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions," supra note 78, p. 90. 
121. Supra note 41. 
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islands). In the Iran-Saudi Arabia shelf boundary agreemen.t of 
1968122 there were two tiny islets, Farsi (Iran) and Al-'Arab1yah 
(Saudi Arabia), sitting very close to the median line (but on the 
Saudi side) drawn between the mainland coasts of the two states. 
These islets were allowed to have only a 12-mile territorial sea, thus 
having no effect on the shelf boundary. A "local" median line de-
limited the territorial sea boundary between them. 
In 1974, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement 123 to delimit 
their "historical waters" in the island-riddled, 45-mile-wide Palk 
Strait. It is of interest to note that Kachchativu, 124 a tiny landmass 
located 1.2 miles from the median line drawn without regard to its 
presence, was denied even a 12-mile territorial sea, which Sri Lanka 
claims. The islet's sovereignty was previously in dispute between In-
dia and Sri Lanka. The agreement allocated the islet to the latter but 
guaranteed the citizens of the former free access to it for fishing and 
religious purposes. 125 Also in 1974, Iran and the United Arab Emir-
ates (U.A.E.) signed an agreement126 delimiting their shelf boundary 
in the Persian Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. The mid-gulf island 
of Abu Musa, 127 claimed by both Iran and Sharjah Emirate (a part 
of the U.A.E.), was ignored in drawing the boundary, which was not 
a median line. 
(4) Observations 
The cases of Shetland and Tsushima Islands apparently exem-
plify that midway location alone may not determine shelf entitle-
ment. Size does matter; so do macrogeographical considerations. If 
the midway islands are small, as the Italian-Yugoslav and Italian-
Tunisian shelf boundaries show, they are given partial effects rang-
ing from two to seven miles beyond the territorial sea of the state to 
which the islands belong. In yet another series of shelf or other mar-
itime boundaries in the Persian Gulf and the Palk Bay, small islets 
situated near the median lines drawn in disregard to their presence 
were either completely ignored or were permitted to maintain a terri-
122. Supra note 38. 
123. Supra note 44. 
124. The land area is estimated by the author at about 0.1 sq. mi., roughly the size of 
Pei-hsiao in the Tiao-yu-t'ai. 
125. See India-Sri Lanka Historical Waters Boundary Agreement, Article 5, supra 
note 44. 
126. Supra note 44. 
127. The land area is estimated at about 4 sq. mi. The treatment of this island was 
also referred to in Ely (1972), supra note 35, p. 230. 
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torial sea only. If the particular islet's sovereignty is in dispute, ig-
noring its presence in boundary delimitation seems to be the rule, as 
the treatments of Kachchativu (Sri Lanka) and Abu Musa (U.A.E.) 
demonstrate. 128 The above observations are in general accord with 
proposals on treatment of islands by commentators. 129 
(b) The North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French 
Arbitration, and the Tunisian-Libyan 
Case 
(1) The North Sea Cases 
The North Sea Cases are relevant here only in general terms 
because the ICJ did not address, except in passing, the question of 
islands not at issue in that case. 130 The Court nevertheless expressly 
favored disregard of the presence of "islets, rocks and minor coastal 
128. That a disputed island should be given no effect in the delimitation of continental 
shelf or EEZ is a convenient proposition. But it must be subject to the caveat that it may 
be abused by a state by creating a dispute over an erstwhile undisputed island near its 
coast but belonging to another state. Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, pp. 57-58. This is 
not the case with respect to the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute. For details, see supra note 
80. 
129. See e.g., S. Whittemore Boggs, "Delimitation of Seaward Areas under National 
Jurisdiction," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 240, 258-59 
(hereinafter cited as Boggs (1951)]; David J. Padwa, "Submarine Boundaries," Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9 ( 1960), pp. 628, 647-50 [hereinfter cited as 
Padwa (1960)]; Louis Henkin, Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources, New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1968; Shigeru Oda, "Boundary of the Continental Shelf," Japanese 
Annual of International Law, Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 264, 281-83; Juraj Andrassy, Interna-
tional Law and the Resources of the Sea, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 
pp. 103-05; Edward D. Brown, The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1971, p. 64 [hereinafter cited as Brown (1971)]; Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, pp. 
55-59 and pp. 62-63; Goldie (1973), supra note 36, pp. 258-59; Karl (1977), supra note 36, 
pp. 655-59; Symmons (1979), supra note 36, p. 206; Kiyofumi Nakauchi, "Problems of 
Delimitation in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan," Ocean Development and Inter-
national Law Journal, Vol. 6 (1979), pp. 312-16; Jon M. Van Dyke and Robert A. Brooks, 
"Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Ocean's Resources," Ocean 
Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 12 (1983), p. 288. 
130. There are fringes of islands along the North Sea coasts of the Netherlands, Ger-
many, and Denmark: notably the West, East, and North Frisian Islands (Map 13). All 
closely related to the coasts geographically, these islands should be regarded as part of 
the coast for purposes of continental shelf delimitation. The only island that stands out is 
Helgoland, 27 miles off the German coast. Previously heavily fortified and famous but 
now deserted, Helgoland is located on or near the line that bisects the approximate right 
angle formed by the concave coastlines of Germany. More seaward than any other is-
lands in the area, Helgoland is, however, still too landward to significantly influence the 
courses of boundaries between the three states inter se even if geometrically median lines 
are drawn from the respective coasts. This probably explains why Helgoland did not 
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projections" in a delimitation between opposite states. 131 Given the 
generality of the opinion, the Court seemed to regard th~ pr~sence of 
these minor geographical features as inherently distort1ve m oppo-
site-coast delimitations. 
(2) The Anglo-French Arbitration 
The Anglo-French case, particularly the part relating to the 
Channel Islands, has some bearing here. In macrogeography, the 
two cases share a few similarities. Both involve an insular state 
(U.K., Japan) and a continental state (France, China), and both have 
opposite-coast situations (which seem inevitable between insular and 
continental states). The two cases, however, have more geophysical 
differences. The seabed of the English Channel is, as the Court of 
Arbitration and the parties all agreed, a continental shelf continuous 
from the United Kingdom to France. Such geological integrity of 
continental shelf is presumably lacking in the East China Sea, given 
the presence of the deep Okinawa Trough. Second, whereas the 
Channel Islands are large (195 sq. km.) and densely populated (667 
persons per sq. km.), the Tiao-yu-t'ais are tiny (total area: 6.5 sq. 
km.) and uninhabited. Third, the Channel Islands are situated much 
closer to the French coast than to the English coast, whereas the 
Tiao-yu-t'ais are just about equidistant to the nearest territories of 
China and Japan. Finally, having agreed that their coasts were op-
posite and the shelf in between was continuous from their coasts, the 
United Kingdom and France agreed to apply the equidistance prin-
ciple. The only difference between them was how the median line 
was to be drawn. Here, China (the PRC and the ROC) and Japan 
differ profoundly on the delimitation principle: the former advo-
cates the natural prolongation principle while the latter insists on the 
equidistance principle. 
Despite the dissimilarities, the Anglo-French award contains 
principles of general application relating to islands. The Court of 
Arbitration's determination on an island's effect in shelf delimitation 
depends on whether full effect, if granted, would create inequity, 
given the broad equality of the coastlines of the two opposite states. 
Thus, like the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French decision is also 
predicated on the a priori equality of the macrogeography of a par-
ticular case to determine whether a balance is disturbed by the pres-
become an issue either in the North Sea Cases or the subsequent bilateral negotiations by 
the three states in accordance with the North Sea judgment. 
131. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36. 
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ence of islands. In the East China Sea, one doubts that the 
macrogeography of Japan and China- island chains (the Ryukyus 
et al ) separated by a deep trough and a vast shelf from a continent 
(China) -can be characterized as "broadly equal", since the geo-
physical setting. here is two-dimensional as opposed to the one-di-
mensional seabed of the English Channel. If one takes into account 
the regional geology, then the natural prolongation principle, which 
the Anglo-French Court also endorsed, 132 would boost the Chinese 
claim all the way to the middle of the Okinawa Trough. In that case, 
the question of islands' effect (or inequity-creating potential) be-
comes moot because the shelf entitlements of the Chinese mainland 
and the Tiao-yu-t'ais would merge. On the other hand, if the geo-
logical factor is ignored and the coastline of the R yukyus et al is 
considered as broadly equal to that of China's mainland and Tai-
wan, then a median line would supposedly effect an equitable delim-
itation. The Tiao-yu-t'ais, if granted full effect, would certainly 
command an enormous piece of seabed around them owing to their 
isolated location (Map 1) and thus "manifestly result in a substantial 
diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise 
accrue to" the country eventually not owning them. Thus ignoring 
their presence seems to be required under the Anglo-French rule. 
In sum, the Anglo-French case applies here only to the extent 
geophysical similarities permit. But it at least establishes that islands 
of the Channel Islands' magnitude can be discounted in the name of 
equity. Other things being equal, the tiny Tiao-yu-t'ais ought to be 
disregarded in the Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation a fortiori. 
(3) The Tunisian-Libyan Case 
The role of islands in the Tunisian-Libyan case in determining 
the final seabed boundary was, as discussed earlier, limited. The 
Kerkennah Islands, the only islands involved in that case that have 
affected delimitation, bear virtually no similarity to the Tiao-yu-t'ai 
Islands here. (Maps 12 and 15) 
Geologically, the Kerkennahs are sitting on the natural prolon-
gation of Tunisia's land territory, which, according to the ICJ, is also 
the natural prolongation of Libya's land territory. Such continuity 
of continental shelf simply does not exist in the situation of the Tiao-
yu-t'ais in the East China Sea where they are geologically separated 
from Japan's Ryukyu Islands by the deep Okinawa Trough. The 
macrogeographies of these two island groups also differ greatly. The 
132. Anglo-French Award, supra note 29, para. 246. 
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Kerkennahs, comparatively large (65 sq. mi.) and yopulous (more 
than 15,000), are situated very close to shore (11 mlles) whereas the 
Tiao-yu-t'ais are tiny (2.5 sq. mi.), uninhabited, and l~~ated h~lfway 
(90 miles) between Taiwan and the Ryukyus. In addttwn, whtle the 
Tunisian-Libyan coasts are both adjacent and opposite, the China 
(Taiwan)-Japan (Ryukyu) coasts are only opposite each other. Fi-
nally, the Kerkennahs are undisputably Tunisian territory whereas 
the territorial sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ais are still contested be-
tween China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan. 
Given the above-stated dissimilarities, the Tunisia-Libyan Case 
is of little specific applicability to the Tiao-yu-t'ais situation. How-
ever, like the Anglo-French Arbitration, the Tunisian-Libyan judge-
ment also contains principles of general application relating to 
islands. The judgment (particularly the part relating to the second 
sector) was also predicated, as in the Anglo-French Arbitration, on 
the a priori equality of the macrogeography of a given case to deter-
mine whether the balance is disturbed by the presence of islands. 
This was why the Kerkennahs were given neither full effect nor no 
effect, but rather were given half effect. Leaving aside the question 
of regional geology which also differs fundamentally in the two cases 
under discussion, the conclusion one gets from analyzing the Tuni-
sian-Libyan Case is that if islands of the Kerkennahs' magnitude 
may be denied full effect in the name of equity, it is all the more 
logical to ignore the presence of the tiny Tiao-yu-t'ais in continental 
shelf delimitation in the East China Sea between China (the ROC 
and the PRC) and Japan. 
D. Concluding Remarks 
Under the new LOS Convention, which reflects current interna-
tional consensus, the Tiao-yu-t'ais seem to lie in the gray area. Yet 
denying their. shelf entitlement seems to be a stronger case than 
granting one. The state practice in shelf delimitation between oppo-
site states seems to favor a no-effect treatment for the Tiao-yu-t'ais as 
well, or alternatively, some effect such as a few miles beyond the 
islets' territorial sea. But the Tiao-yu-t'ais' disputed status, an in-
dependent factor, dictates the denial of effect. The North Sea Cases 
endorses, in general, the disregard of the presence of islets in oppo-
site-coast situations. The Anglo-French Arbitration and the Tunisian-
Libyan Case, though not squarely applicable here, at least establish 
the likelihood of denying the shelf entitlement to islands much larger 
and more important than the Tiao-yu-t'ais in an opposite-state 
delimitation. 
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The combined effect of the above summary suggested a rather 
strong case for denying the Tiao-yu-t'ais any continental shelf be-
yond its territorial sea of 12 miles. The territorial dispute can then 
be wholly detached from the continental shelf issue. However the 
territorial issue is eventually resolved and whoever ultimately ac-
quires the sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ais, the disputing states would 
be unable to take advantage of the islets' strategic location in claim-
ing any portion of the seabed of the East China Sea beyond their 
territorial sea. 
At first glance, the conclusion reached here seems to differ insig-
nificantly from the "enclave" solution proposed by some writers 133 in 
the early 1970s. A closer look reveals two important distinctions, 
however. First, the approach leads to the conclusion. Previous writ-
ers relied primarily on a few scattered shelf boundary agreements 134 
alone which at the time hardly provided any evidence of a general 
practice of states capable of creating an international custom. The 
approach here, on the other hand, derives its authority from a vari-
ety of emerging conventional and customary sources of international 
law, including not only more extensive, and thus more conclusive, 
state practice, but also adjudicated cases and crystallized interna-
tional consensus on the subject to date. It seems obvious that the 
133. See e.g. , Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 31 (although the reference there 
was made to Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima and not directly to the Tiao-yu-t'ais); Donald 
R. Allen and Patrick H. Mitchell, "The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of East 
China Sea," Oregon Law Review, Vol. 51 ( 1972), pp. 80 1-10; Note, "The Distance Plus 
Joint Development Zone Formula: A Proposal for the Speedy and Practical Resolution 
of the East China and Yellow Seas Continental Shelf Oil Controversy," Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal, Vol. 7 (1973), pp. 59-60. 
134. See e.g., The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 41; the Iran-Saudi 
Arabia agreement, supra note 38; the Italy-Yugoslavia agreement, supra note 37; Agree-
ment Concerning the Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf, Iran-Qatar, Sep-
tember 20, 1969, UNTS, Vol. 787, p. 165; UNLS/16, p. 416, Limits in the Seas, No. 25, 
July 9, 1970. (This agreement was not discussed in the text above because its indiscrimi-
nate disregard of all islands in the Persian Gulf, presumably out of practical conven-
ience, makes it largely irrelevant here. However, two writers did discuss it and 
interpreted its significance differently. Karl ( 1977), supra note 36, p. 657; Bowell ( 1979), 
supra note 4, pp. 172-73); and the Abu Dhabi-Qatar agreement, "Continental Shelf 
Boundary: Abu Dhabi-Qatar," Limits in the Seas, No. 18, May 29, 1970. (A small Abu 
Dhabi (now the United Arab Emirates) island, Dayyinah, situated near the equidistance 
line but on Qatar's side was given a 3-mile seaward zone coextensive with the breadth of 
Abu Khabi's territorial sea. The island, whose ownership was also determined by the 
agreement, thus creates a bulge on the equidistance line in favor of Abu Dhabi. Despite 
similarities between this island and the Tiao-yu-t'ais in terms of size and location, the 
agreement was not discussed in the text above because Abu Dhabi and Qatar are adja-
cent states and thus do not fit into the discussion exclusively on opposite-state situations.) 
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conclusion reached here has a solid legal foundation rather than 
merely an arbitrary sense of equity. 
The second distinction lies in the inference drawn from the con-
clusion reached. A few writers, though proposing the "enclave" so-
lution, still considered settlement of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial 
dispute precedent to that of the East Asian seabed issue. 135 Hence 
the complication of the whole East China Sea oil controversy. The 
inference drawn here, which seems logically imperative, is that the 
Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute, given its irrelevance to the East 
Asian seabed issue, can be, and should be, taken completely out of 
the picture. 
135. See e.g., Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 49. 

CHAPTER 5 THE SINO-JAPANESE SEABED DISPUTE: A 
FRESH LOOK 
A. Introduction: A Framework for Analysis 
It has been suggested that the continental shelf dispute in the 
East China Sea is, for all practical purposes, a Sino-Japanese dis-
pute. Like the shelf delimitation problems involving the Channel 
Islands (France versus Britain) and the Aegean Sea Islands (Greece 
versus Turkey), the East China Sea problem is among the cases gen-
erally recognized as intractable. Unlike the above two cases which 
are physically one-dimensional (geography), the Sino-Japanese dis-
pute involves two dimensions, geography and geology, which result 
from the presence of the Ryukyu Islands chain and the Okinawa 
Trough. The detachment of the Tiao-yu-t'ai dispute from the seabed 
controversy, as analyzed in the preceding chapter, at least makes the 
geographical dimension of the present dispute more manageable, if 
not any easier. This chapter will deal with the rest of the legal issues 
arising from the two dimensions and other relevant circumstances. 
Given the complexity of the issues involved, a legal framework 
for identifying and analyzing them is clearly needed. In establishing 
such a framework, the first issue encountered is the applicable law 
governing the present dispute. 
The LOS Convention, adopted by UNCLOS III in 1982, will 
enter into force 12 months after it has been ratified or acceded to by 
60 states. Article 83 of the Convention, which deals with shelf de-
limitation, provides: 
Article 83 
Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts 
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between 
States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reason-
able period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the 
procedures provided for in Part XV. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 
1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-
operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
(107) 
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arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transi-
tional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of 
the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the 
States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance 
with the provisions of that agreement. 1 
Among the disputants to the present controversy, Article 83 will 
become the positive law for the PRC and Japan, both of which have 
signed2 and will probably ratify the Convention, to settle their differ-
ences regarding the East China Sea continental shelf. On the other 
hand, the ROC, unable to participate in UNCLOS III in the past 
and unlikely to accede to the Convention in the future because of the 
PRC's vigorous obstruction,3 has shown considerable receptiveness 
toward developments at UNCLOS III by, for instance, extending its 
territorial sea to 12 miles and declaring a 200-mile EEZ in 1979.4 
With regard to EEZ delimitation, the 1979 declaration states: 
(2) Where the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of 
China extends over any part of the exclusive economic 
zone as proclaimed by other states, the boundaries shall be 
determined by agreement between the states concerned or in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of international 
law on delimitation .5 (emphasis added) 
This position of the ROC is in essential accord with Article 74 
of the LOS Convention, which is identical to Article 83 except that 
the term "continental shelf' is replaced by "exclusive economic 
zone." Therefore, barring any unexpected turn of events in the fu-
ture, one can probably assume that Article 83, particularly para-
graph 1, will be the applicable law governing the shelf delimitation 
between China (the PRC and the ROC) and Japan. 
Other than requiring that the solution be equitable, Article 83 
offers little guidance in terms of specific criteria for shelf boundary 
delimitation in order to achieve such an equitable solution. The 
UNCLOS III's acceptance of this masterpiece of ambiguity, pro-
posed by Conference President Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore at 
1. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, p. 36. 
2. See supra Introduction, note 21. 
3. See supra Chapter 4, note 82 and accompanying text. 
4. See supra Introduction note 20. 
5. Ibid. 
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the Resumed Tenth Session in August 1981 at Geneva, was intended 
to resolve a hopeless, prolonged deadlock in negotiations between 
two groups of states belonging respectively to the "equidistance" and 
"equitable principles" schools regarding shelf delimitation.6 The 
reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, which includes trea-
ties, custom, general principles of law, and judicial decisions and au-
thoritative scholarly teachings as sources of international law, has in 
effect passed the law-making burden from the Conference to the 
evolution of customary international law. A brief analysis of cus-
tomary law on shelf delimitation thus is necessary. 
A general trend, if not already a general rule, of customary in-
temationallaw regarding the delimitation of continental shelf, as re-
flected by the 1958 Shelf Convention, the 1969 North Sea Continental 
She!fCases, the 1977 Anglo-French Continental She!f Arbitration, the 
1982 Tunisian-Libyan Continental She!f Case and the deliberations at 
the UNCLOS III, which have crystallized pre-existing or emerging 
rules of customary law, seems to have taken shape. Simply put, it is 
that a shelf boundary should be effected by agreement between the 
delimiting states in accordance with equitable principles, taking into 
account all the relevant circumstances, and that, failing to reach an 
agreement, the parties should have the dispute adjudicated by a 
third-party process entailing a binding decision. This formulation 
serves as a convenient point of departure for the analysis in this 
chapter. It consists of three obligations on the part of the delimiting 
states: the obligation to conduct "meaningful" negotiations (or 
good-faith bargaining7); the obligation to consider all the relevant 
circumstances in applying equitable principles to reach agreement 
on an equitable delimitation; and, the obligation to resort to interna-
tional adjudication in the absence of an agreement. The first and the 
last obligations are procedural in character. The second obligation 
addresses the substance of shelf delimitation and thus deserves atten-
tion and elaboration. 
While the notion of equity may be vague and abstract, a few 
6. UN Press Release, SEA/445 (1981), p. I. For a criticism on the hasty manner in 
which the new text was adopted and the extent to which it deviates from the jurispru-
dence on the subject, see Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981)," American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 76 (1982), pp. 14-15. 
7. The term is borrowed from American labor law. For a discussion, see L.F.E. 
Goldie, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Ray of Hope for the International 
Court?" New York Law Forum, Vol. 16 (1970), pp. 325, 359-66; L.F.E. Goldie, "The 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A Postscript," New York Law Forum, Vol. 18 ( 1972), 
pp. 411, 414-15. 
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substantive "equitable principles" of continental shelf delimitation, 
such as the principles of natural prolongation8 and equidistance,9 
which have grown out of state practice and international adjudica-
tions and have in effect become legal principles, are fairly concrete 
and comprehensible. Even more concrete are the "circumstances" in 
which these principles are to operate. An ideal delimitation process, 
usually via negotiations by the delimiting states, would involve a 
close interplay of these three elements. The equity of a substantive 
equitable principle still depends very much upon the relevant cir-
cumstances to which that principle is to apply. Thus, the equidis-
tance principle-the most frequently employed principle in state 
practice-may not be applicable or may have to undergo substantial 
modification in a particular geographical setting simply because its 
strict application would produce inequitable results. The North Sea 
Cases is an instructive example. The Court in that case held that 
application of the equidistance principle, as urged by Denmark and 
the Netherlands, in delimiting the lateral boundaries between the 
two states on the one hand and Germany on the other in the North 
Sea would have a disproportionately distorting (and thus inequita-
ble) effect on the shelf boundaries because of the concave coastline 
of Germany. 10 On the other hand, in determining the relevance of 
and, particularly, the weight to be assigned to a given circumstance, 
be it geographical, geological or otherwise, one may have, at times, 
to tum to the notion of equity. Thus, in the Anglo-French Arbitration 
the Court acknowledged the relevance of the presence of the Chan-
nel Islands but denied them any weight in effecting the mid-Channel 
shelf boundary between France and the United Kingdom in order to 
"correct" the disproportionate influence they would otherwise have 
8. The ICJ considered the natural prolongation principle as the most fundamental 
principle of the continental shelf doctrine in seaward delimitation and an equitable prin-
ciple in inter-state delimitation. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 3, 22, 47. This position was 
somewhat toned down in the Tunisian-Libyan Case, l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 46. 
9. Whittemore Boggs in 1951 suggested that the median line method "would pro-
vide the 'equitable principles' for accord between the United States and a neighbor state 
which are referred to in" the 1945 Truman Proclamation. Boggs ( 1951 ), supra Chapter 4, 
note 116, p. 262, note 34. Since the adoption by the Shelf Convention, the equidistance 
principle has been used extensively in state practice of shelf delimitation. See Table 4 in 
the Appendix. Despite the North Sea Cases the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration did 
consider that principle as an equitable principle and part of customary international law. 
Anglo-French Award, supra Chapter 2, note 31, paras. 70, 75. For an excellent discus-
sion, see M.D. Blecher, "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf," American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 73 ( 1979), pp. 60, 68-73 [hereinafter cited as Blecher ( 1979)). 
10. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 49. 
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were they granted full effect. 11 The same can be said of the Tun~s~a~­
Libyan Case, where the ICJ granted only half effect to Tums1a s 
Kerkennah Islands, despite their large size and proximity to shore, 
because, according to the ICJ, giving them full effect would be "ex-
cessive."12 The complexity of a given situation may call for the ap-
plication of more than one principle to satisfactorily solve a 
delimitation problem, since both the means and ends of a shelf de-
limitation must be equitable with the means being subordinate to the 
ends. 13 Questions as to whether one principle should override the 
other(s) will naturally arise; the answer probably has to be sought 
again in the notion of equity in light of the relevant circumstances. 
That the prevailing trend of shelf delimitation derives its ulti-
mate authority from equity should not, in theory, obscure the fact 
that in neither the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French Arbitration nor 
the Tunisian-Libyan Case were the courts deciding the disputes ex 
aequo et bono. 14 Both courts insisted that they applied exclusively 
legal principles in adjudicating the disputes before them. 15 As a 
matter of procedure, they could not have decided the cases ex aequo 
et bono without the consent of the parties. 16 Despite the courts' dis-
claimer, however, the results of the three cases, which are generally 
regarded as reasonable, could well have been reached the same way 
even if the courts were in fact instructed to make the decisions ex 
aequo et bono. The ICJ singled out, on the one hand, the concavity 
of the German coastline as a natural feature creative of inequity and 
needing to be redressed. The Court refused, on the other hand, to 
"completely refashion" nature by redressing all inequities created by 
nature. Such reasoning leaves one largely in the dark as to just how 
far one should go in correcting natural "inequities", even if they are 
at all readily identifiable under well-defined criteria. The same can 
be said of the Anglo-French court, particularly regarding its giving 
half effect to the British Scilly Islands but granting full effect to the 
French island of Ushant in the Atlantic region west of the English 
Channel. The ICJ's treatment of the Kerkennah Islands in the Tuni-
sian-Libyan Case, as noted earlier, is another example. The Courts' 
II. Anglo-French Award, para. 196. 
12. l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 89. 
13. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50; I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 59. 
14. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 48; Anglo-French Award, para. 245; I.C.J. Reports 1982, 
p. 60. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 2. In the case of arbi-
tration, the arbitral tribunal's competence is derived from the parties' consent as well. 
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intuition of equity or proportionality appears very evident. It is 
therefore not unreasonable to characterize the two courts, as the late 
Professor Friedmann did with respect to the ICJ in the North Sea 
Cases, as "[applying] a kind of distributive justice while denying that 
[they were] doing so" and "in effect, giving [decisions] ex aequo et 
bono under the guise of interpretation." 17 Apparently, the judges' 
subjective sense of equity and justice has played a significant part in 
deciding these cases, whether the reasoning process or guiding prin-
ciple is labeled ex aequo et bono, absolute equity, equity praeter 
legem, or equity secundum legem. 18 
What has been discussed above is in actuality a recurring phe-
nomenon in the operation of law in human society, municipal or 
international. Legal principles grow out of notions of equity, justice, 
and fairness, which themselves are a part of the law. These legal 
principles may become, over time, too rigid to produce just results 
under certain circumstances, which then call for correction in ac-
cordance with equity. As a matter of approach, the following analy-
sis on the seabed issue of the East China Sea will begin by 
identifying all the "relevant circumstances" of that area as such. Re-
course is had, in the process, to various sources of international law 
for guidance. This approach has in fact been employed in the pre-
ceding chapter to establish the irrelevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territo-
rial dispute. Once the relevance question, which is a comparatively 
easier one, is settled, the next question is to determine, according to 
equitable principles, the relative weight of relevant circumstances in 
influencing the ultimate shelf boundary. Finally, the focus will be 
shifted to the selection of substantive equitable principles of shelf 
delimitation, with all the weighed circumstances considered. The 
result may be one principle or a combination of several principles. 
Admittedly, the exercise cannot but have a measure of subjec-
tivity since there are few hard and fast rules to draw upon. There-
fore, a few alternatives based on different but comparable weights 
assigned to each relevant circumstance are suggested. These sugges-
tions are intended to indicate the range of equitable solutions. They 
could also serve as a basis for the parties, reportedly already engaged 
intermittently in negotiations for joint development of the resources 
17. Wolfgang Friedman, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A Critique," 
American Journal of lnlemational Law, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 229, 236. Similar criticism 
was voiced in E.D. Brown, "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case," Marine Policy, 
Vol. 7 ( 1983), p. 149. 
18. Bin Cheng, "Justice and Equity in International Law," Current Legal Problems, 
Vol. 8 ( 1955), pp. 185, 202-11. 
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near the Tiao-yu-t'ais, 19 to tackle the larger issue of shelf delimita-
tion elsewhere in the East China Sea. 
B. The "Relevant Circumstances" and International Law of 
Seabed Delimitation 
In view of the open-ended character of the requirement that all 
the relevant circumstances be taken into consideration in reaching 
agreement on shelf boundaries, a review of the existing conventional 
and customary rules of international law may offer some guidelines 
for identifying the relevant circumstances in the East China Sea. 
1. The 1958 She!( Convention 
Article 6 of the Shelf Convention provides, with similar lan-
guage in paragraphs 1 and 2, that a shelf boundary between opposite 
and adjacent states shall be determined by agreement; and failing 
that, "and unless another boundary line is justified by special cir-
cumstances," the boundary shall be the equidistance line. The con-
cept of "special circumstances" which is functionally parallel to, but 
far less extensive as, that of the "relevant circumstances," is not de-
fined in the Convention itself. But a glance at its travaux 
preparatoires, including deliberations ofthe International Law Com-
mission of the United Nations during 1950-1956 and of the Geneva 
Conference in 1958, reveals in part what was in the drafters' minds 
with respect to that concept. The references may be grouped into 
two categories: unusual geographical features and legitimate uses of 
the sea. 
(a) Unusual Geographical Features 
In the ILC's Comments on draft article 7 (similar to Article 6 of 
the Shelf Convention) of its 1953 Report to the General Assembly, it 
was stated that: 
[M]oreover, while in the case of both kinds of boundaries 
the rule of equidistance is the general rule, it is subject to 
modifications in cases in which another boundary line is 
justified by special circumstances. As in the case of bound-
aries of coastal waters, provision must be made for depar-
tures necessitated by any exceptional configurations of the 
coast, as well as the presence of islands or of navigable chan-
nels. To that extent the rule adopted partakes of some elas-
19. See supra Introduction, text accompanying notes 15-17. 
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ticity.20 (emphasis added) 
Nearly identical words appeared in the ILC's 1956 draft article 7221 
which later was adopted by the Geneva Conference as Article 6 of 
the Shelf Convention. During the Conference, a number of dele-
gates also made references to these unusual features as constituting 
special circumstances justifying a boundary other than the equidis-
tant line.22 Given the great variety of complex geographical situa-
tions, the Conference could not have, and did not, set any criteria for 
this purpose. 
(b) Other Legitimate Uses of the Sea 
Considerations in this regard include navigation, fishing, and 
exploitation of the seabed. References were made to "navigable 
channels" in both the ILC's 1953 and 1956 draft articles quoted 
above and during the Geneva Conference. Since the legal continen-
tal shelf does not include the superjacent water column, which is still 
part of the high seas, these concerns were satisfactorily addressed by 
Articles 3 and 5 of the Shelf Convention. 23 The same can be said of 
fishing of the free-swimming species which is carried out also in the 
water column above the continental shelf. Article 5 of the Shelf 
Convention offers at least de jure protection to the fishing rights as 
against unjustifiable interference resulting from exploitation of the 
continental shelf. Finally, the question of existing exploitation 
rights, though referred to in the Conference as a special circum-
stance, 24 received little attention. 
It is evident that the relatively narrow concept of "special cir-
cumstances," as the drafters of the Shelf Convention saw it, is basi-
cally geographically oriented. It is of special interest to note that 
20. YBILC (1953), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 13, p. 216. 
21. YBILC (1956), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 15, p. 300. 
22. E.g., Statements of the Venezuelan delegate, UNCLOS I, Official Record, Vol. 2 
supra Chapter 4, note 16, p. 92, and of the United States delegate, ibid. p. 95. 
23. Article 3 provides: 
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal 
status of the superjacent waters as the high seas, or that of the air space above 
those waters. 
Article 5, Paragraph 1 provides: 
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural re-
sources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing 
or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interfer-
ence with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out 
with the intention of open publication. 
24. The reference was made by Commander Kennedy, representing the United 
Kingdom. UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 6, supra Chapter 4 note 16, p. 93. 
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geological consideration did not figure prominently in_ the t~a~aux 
preparatoires of the Shelf Convention despite the geological ongm of 
the continental shelf doctrine. 
2. State Practice 
It was noted earlier that state practice in continental shelf de-
limitation is found in boundary agreements, excluding, of course, 
unilateral delimitations protested by neighboring states. Delimita-
tion principles employed are sometimes provided for in the agree-
ments, but provisions for consideration of certain special 
circumstances are rarely seen. As the analysis in the preceding chap-
ter of state practice on islands shows, one may be able to infer from 
boundary maps that certain geographical or geomorphological fea-
tures (such as the presence of islands or troughs) were taken into 
account or ignored, but very little can one learn about the influence 
of other factors such as the regional geology or the ratio of the length 
of coastlines to shelf entitlements. Information about these factors 
either does not show on a map or has to be gathered through precise 
mathematical calculations. 
Despite the difficulties, some general observations nevertheless 
can be made. Conceivably, geographical considerations play the 
most important part in shelf delimitation between neighboring 
states, particularly where the equidistance principle is employed. 
Examples can readily be found in shelf boundaries in the North Sea, 
the Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf (Table 4). As most of 
the areas covered by boundary agreements concluded so far lie in 
relatively shallow and smooth parts of the geological shelf, geologi-
cal and geomorphological considerations at most remain in the back-
ground. In a few localities where distinctive geological or 
geomorphological features exist, such as the Georges Bank (Canada-
United States),25 the Rockall Bank (Ireland-United Kingdom),26 and 
25. The Georges Bank, located in the Gulf of Maine off the U.S. and Canada, is rich 
in lobsters and oil. The decade-old dispute over the maritime jurisdiction over the area 
became explosive when both the U.S. and Canada declared a 200-mile fishing zone. Af-
ter lengthy negotiations filled with turns and twists, they finally agreed to submit the 
dispute to the ICJ. For the history of the dispute and the parties' contentions, see Sang-
Myon Rhee, "Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute between the 
United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine", American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 75 (1981), p. 590. The ICJ has constituted a special chamber of the Court to adjudi-
cate the dispute. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(U.S. v. Canada), I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 3 (Constitution of Chamber Order of January 
20). At this writing of August 20, 1984, the Court has not yet rendered the decision on 
the merits. 
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the East China Sea (China-Japan-Korea), disputes rather than 
agreements become the rule, with the notable exceptions of the Nor-
wegian Trough (Norway-United Kingdom, Denmark-Norway) and 
the Timor Trough (Australia-Indonesia) to be discussed infra .27 
Considerations of unity of deposits (of minerals), 28 the presence of 
offshore structui:es,29 and existing navigation channels30 have, in a 
few isolated occasions, influenced parts of the course of the shelf 
boundaries, but the main courses are still dominated by geographical 
factors. Existing legal regimes of the sea, such as straight baselines31 
and territorial sea boundaries,32 have also played limited roles in 
measuring the shelf boundaries. 
The brief survey above of state practice regarding the influence 
of "special" or "relevant" circumstances seems to confirm the pre-
vailing view that they have been and should be taken into account in 
shelf boundary delimitation. However, given the great variety of 
physical circumstances, state practice so far has not produced any 
specific pattern of conduct regarding the treatment of special or rele-
vant circumstances uniform enough to evidence an international 
custom. 
3. The North Sea Cases 
After rejecting the principle of equidistance as a mandatory rule 
26. The most comprehensive study thus far on the Rockall problem is contained in a 
lengthy, two-part article by Professor E.D. Brown of the University of Wales, England. 
E.D. Brown, "Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the UK," Marine Pol-
icy, Vol. 2 (1978), pp. 181 (Part 1), 275 (Part 2) [hereinafter cited as Brown (1978)]. 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 186-204. 
28. Eg., The Iran-Saudi Arabia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 38. The 
northern sector of the boundary, zigzag in shape, was said to have been delimited in 
consideration of the undersea oil deposits. For an analysis, see Richard Young, "Equita-
ble Solutions for Offshore Boundaries: the 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement," Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 152, 154, 156. 
29. Eg., the Iran-United Arab Emirates shelf boundary, which is not a median line, 
was drawn to avoid an offshore anchorage platform near the second turning point. For a 
brief reference, see Bowett (1979), supra Chapter 4, note 4, p. 174. 
30. Eg., The Argentina-Uruguay boundary. "Continental Shelf Boundary: Argen-
tina-Uruguay," Limits in the Seas, No. 64 October 24, 1975. The boundary (between two 
adjacent coasts) follows the navigation channel instead of the equidistant line. Ibid. p. 
14. 
31. Eg., the Indonesia-Malaysia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 110. See also 
infra text accompanying note 144. 
32. Eg., The Norway-Sweden shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 35. The shelf 
boundary begins where the territorial sea boundary, which was delimited according to 
previous treaties and the award of the famous Grisbadarna Arbitration, ends. 
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of international law regarding continental shelf delimitation among 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, the ICJ went on to elabo-
rate the elements of equity, itself a rule of law, in reference to the 
legal regime of the continental shelf. These elements include, inter 
alia, the obligation on the part of the parties to take into account all 
the relevant circumstances in applying equitable principles. Conced-
ing that "there is no legal limit to the considerations which States 
may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply 
equitable procedures,"33 the Court nevertheless listed three "factors 
to be taken into account:" 
(I) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, 
as well as the presence of any special or unusual features; 
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical 
and geological structure, and natural resources, of the con-
tinental shelf areas involved; 
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, 
which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equita-
ble principles ought to bring about between the extent of 
the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State 
and the length of its coast measured in the general direction 
of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the 
effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf 
delimitations between adjacent States in the same region. 34 
Intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive, these "relevant 
circumstances" are far more extensive than the "special circum-
stances" as conceived by the drafters of the Shelf Convention. 
Given the format of a general rule, they seem to be intended for 
general application elsewhere as well. The ICJ thus in fact granted 
carte blanche to the delimiting states insofar as factors affecting a 
shelf boundary delimitation are concerned. 
4. The Anglo-French Arbitration 
The geography of the British and French territories in the Eng-
lish Channel (Map 14) and the treaty relations between the two 
states gave the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration a unique opportu-
nity to interpret and apply both conventional and customary interna-
tionallaw relating to "special" and "relevant" circumstances in shelf 
33. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50. 
34. Ibid., p. 54. Since the Court was not asked to actually delimit the boundary 
between the parties' coasts, it did not relate these factors to the geography or geology of 
the North Sea. 
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delimitation. Both the United Kingdom and France are parties to 
the Shelf Convention. But since France had made reservations,35 to 
which the United Kingdom later objected,36 to Article 6 to exclude a 
number of areas characterized as special circumstances from the ap-
plication of the equidistance principle, the Court declared that Arti-
cle 6 was inapplicable to the parties to the extent of the French 
reservations.37 That is to say, delimitation in the Bay of Granville 
(Channel Islands area), one of the areas being excluded, was not 
governed by Article 6 but by customary international law, namely, 
the rules stated in the North Sea Cases .38 But the Court added that 
the two sets of rules made no difference in substance as far as the 
case at bar was concerned. 39 On the other hand, Article 6 still ap-
plied to the Atlantic region which was not referred to in the French 
reservations. 
In actually delimiting, instead of merely expounding the legal 
principles governing, the Anglo-French boundary in the Channel Is-
lands area, 40 the Court took into account the following factors: 
-regional geology (particularly some geomorphological 
depressions, that is, the Hurd Deep, in the middle of the 
English Channel);41 
-macrogeography (the broad equality existing between 
the British and French coasts in the English Channel42 
and the notion of proportionality);43 
-size of the Channel Islands ( 195 sq. miles), population 
(130,000), economy (agriculture and commerce), and 
political and legal status (direct dependency of the Brit-
ish Crown maintaining substantial autonomy except in 
the area of defense and foreign affairs );44 
-existing maritime regimes in the area45 (France's 12-mile 
territorial sea and the United Kingdom's 12-mile fishing 
zone); and 
-navigational, defense, and security interests of the parties 
35. UN Multilateral Treaties, mpra Chapter 2, note 10, p. 568. 
36. Ibid., p. 570. 
37. The Anglo-French Award, para. 61. 
38. Ibid., para. 62. 
39. Ibid., para. 65. 
40. Art. 2 of the Anglo-French Arbitration Agreement. Ibid., p. 4. 
41. Ibid., paras. 9, 12, 104-108. 
42. Ibid., paras. 181-83. See also infra text accompanying notes 179-84. 
43. Anglo-French Award, paras. 98-101. 
44. Ibid., para. 184. 
45. Ibid., para. 179. 
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in the disputed area.46 
These factors were all considered as relevant to, but were as-
signed quite different weights in, determining the primary (mid-
channel) and the second (around the Channel Islands) shelf bounda-
ries in the Channel Islands area. The regional geology in general, 
namely, continuity of the continental shelf in the English Channel, 
constitutes one of the foundations of the Court's decision.47 But the 
significance of the Hurd Deep was dismissed summarily.48 The 
macrogeography of the area (broad equality between French and 
English coasts) is the other cornerstone underlying the Court's 
choice of the median line as the primary shelf boundary.49 Consid-
erations of size, population, economy, and political and legal status 
prevented the Channel Islands from being totally ignored; and the 
existing juridical regimes provided some guidance to the effect to be 
accorded them. The relevance of these factors seems to be largely 
confined to the second shelf boundary, however.50 The influence of 
the navigational, defense, and security interests of the parties was 
expressly regarded by the Court as not "decisive" and their weight 
"diminished," despite their being said to support the French 
position. 51 
In the Atlantic region, the Court seems to consider only the 
macrogeographical factor: the fact that the Scilly Islands extend 
roughly twice as far from the United Kingdom mainland as does 
Ushant Island from the French mainland.52 By invoking this geo-
graphical fact as a special circumstance within the meaning of Arti-
cle 6 of the Shelf Convention, the Court justified the departure from 
the equidistance boundary which would have otherwise obtained in 
that area. 53 The geological factor again remained in the 
background. 
5. The Tunisian-Libyan Case 
The Tunisian-Libyan dispute was submitted on December 1, 
1978 to the ICJ by Special Agreement between the parties with the 
following question put to the Court: 
46. Ibid., para. 188. 
47. Ibid., paras. 9, 12, 104-09. See also infra text accompanying notes 285-90. 
48. Ibid. 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 179-84. 
50. Ibid., para. 202. 
51. Ibid., para. 188. 
52. Ibid., paras. 249-51. 
53. Ibid., para. 250. 
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What are the principles and rules of international law 
which may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the 
continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People's Re-
public of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to the area of the 
continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia, 
and the Court shall take its decision according to equitable 
principles, and the relevant circumstances which characterize 
the area, as well as the new accepted trends in the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 54 (emphasis added) 
Reasoning that "[i]t is clear that what is reasonable and equita-
ble in any given case must depend on its particular circumstances,"55 
the Court went on to identify the following relevant circumstances: 
-geography (the area to be delimited, configuration of the 
parties' coasts, and the presence of islands and low-tide ele-
vations)56 (Map 15); 
-geomorphology (particularly the Tripolitanian 
Furrow);57 
--existence and interests of other states in the area;58 
-the Tunisian-Libyan land boundary (particularly its ter-
minus, Ras Ajdir, at which the land boundary intersects 
with the coastline)59 (Map 15); 
-the parties' alleged maritime limits (i.e., ( 1) Tunisia's ZV 
(Zenith Vertical) 45° line, (2) Libya's 1955 petroleum ex-
ploration line, (3) the perpendicular modus vivendi line, and 
(4) the 26° northeast line)60 (Map 16); 
-Tunisia's historical rights (straight baselines and seden-
tary fishery);61 and 
--economic considerations (Tunisia's relative poverty and 
lack of natural resources; presence of oil wells in the delim-
itation area).62 
All these circumstances were considered and weighed in deter-
mining the ultimate shelf boundary. The geographical circum-
54. Special Agreement between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People's 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, signed June 10, 1977, quoted in I.C.J. Repons 1982, p. 21. 
55. Ibid., p. 60. 
56. Ibid., pp. 61-64. 
57. Ibid., p. 64. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
60. Ibid., pp. 66-71, 83-85. 
61. Ibid., pp. 71-77. 
62. Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
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stances exerted substantial influence on the course of the boundary 
in the second, more seaward sector north of the 34°10'30" north lati-
tude. While the turning point from which the boundary in the sec-
ond sector (Map 17) begins was determined by reference to the 
westernmost point of the Gulf of Gabes where the abrupt change of 
the general direction of the Gulf coast occurs, the angle of the 
boundary to the meridian in the second sector was calculated by giv-
ing the Kerkennah Islands half effect.63 The island of Jerba was ig-
nored because of its close proximity to shore.64 
The geomorphological circumstances were generally discounted 
since the Court considered the seabed in the delimitation area as the 
common, continuous shelf of both Tunisia and Libya. It thus is not 
surprising that although the Tripolitanian Furrow, a submarine val-
ley running roughly parallel to the Libyan coast, received some con-
sideration, it was subsequently dismissed.65 
The existence and interests of other states in the areas, namely, 
those of Italy and Malta, were not, according to the Court, 
prejudiced by the present delimitation.66 Italy delimited a modified 
equidistance boundary with Tunisia in 1971 which entered force in 
197867 (Map 15). Malta has not delimited its seabed boundary with 
either Tunisia or Libya; it has sought but failed to intervene in the 
present case.68 Because of this uncertain boundary situation in the 
northeastern part of the delimitation area, the end of the boundary 
in the second sector was left open (the arrow in Map 17). On the 
other hand, in calculating the areal ratios of the parties' shelves 
under the proportionality principle, shelf areas potentially belonging 
to Malta were included for comparison purposes.69 
The terminus of the Tunisian-Libyan land boundary, Ras Ajdir, 
is relevant here primarily for constructing the 26° line as the bound-
ary in the first sector (Map 17). As to the alleged maritime limits, the 
63. Ibid., pp. 87-89. 
64. Ibid., p. 85. 
65. Ibid., p. 64. 
66. Ibid., p. 91. 
67. "Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Tunisia", Limits in the Seas, No. 89, January 
7, 1980. 
68. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application to Intervene, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 3, referred to in I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 24. A special 
agreement between Malta and Libya to submit the question of shelf boundary delimita-
tion to the ICJ was notified to the Court on July 26, 1982. The Court has set April 26, 
1983 as the time limit for the filing of memorials. International Legal Materials, Vol. 21 
( 1982), p. 971. 
69. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91. 
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first two were disregarded summarily as unilateral claims not oppos-
able to the other party.70 The third line, the tacit modus vivendi line 
perpendicular to the coastline at Ras Ajdir, was held not precise 
enough and discounted.71 But it was actually very close to the fourth 
line-the 26° northeast line which was ultimately used as the first 
sector boundary.72 
Tunisia's historical rights of sedentary fishery were considered 
irrelevant to the delimitation.73 The seabed of its territorial sea and 
areas landward of its straight baselines also were held to be included 
in calculating the degree of proportionality between area of the shelf 
and length of the coastline, despite the fact that these areas are not 
continental shelf in the legal sense. 74 On the other hand, the eco-
nomic considerations advanced by Tunisia were all rejected as irrele-
vant.75 But the Court also stated that oil wells located in the 
delimitation area may be taken into account in achieving an equita-
ble result. 76 
6. The LOS Convention 
During the nine years before the present LOS Convention was 
finally adopted by UNCLOS III in December 1982, it had had five 
versions of negotiating texts and two versions of draft conventions. 
They are (with shelf delimitation articles): 
-Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) (1975),77 Arti-
cle 70; 
-Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) (1976),78 Arti-
cle 71; 
70. Ibid., p. 68. 
71. Ibid., p. 69. 
72. Ibid., pp. 70-71, 83-85. 
73. Ibid., pp. 71-77. 
74. Article 1 of the Shelf Convention, which has become part of customary interna-
tional law, provides that the continental shelf is "outside the territorial sea". UNTS, Vol. 
449, p. 311. But the Court argued that calculations of the ratio of proportionality are 
based on the lengths of coasts, not the straight baselines around the coasts. I.C.J. Reprts 
1982, p. 76. 
75. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 77. 
76. Ibid., p. 78. 
77. Informal Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, 7 May 1975, 
UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 4 (1975), p. 137. 
78. Revised Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. I, 6 May 
1976, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 5 (1976), p. 125. 
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-Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (1977)/9 
Article 83; 
-Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1 
(ICNT/Rev.1) (1979),80 Article 83; 
-Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2 
(ICNT/Rev. 2) (1980),81 Article 83; 
-Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) 
( 1980), 82 Article 83; and 
-Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (1981),83 Article 
83. 
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The substantive delimitation principles contained in these docu-
ments have undergone several changes, but up to the Draft Conven-
tion (Informal Text) of 1980, the basic formula had remained largely 
the same. That is, regardless of whether the delimiting states' coasts 
are opposite or adjacent to each other, the delimitation is to be ef-
fected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles (and/or 
in conformity with international law), employing, where appropri-
ate, the median or equidistance line, and taking into account all the 
relevant circumstances (or all the relevant circumstances prevailing 
in the area concerned). However, in order to break the impasse of 
negotiation created by the irreconcilable confrontation between the 
"equidistance" and the "equitable principles" schools, the Confer-
ence finally decided to remove all the references to equitable princi-
ples, equidistance median or line, and relevant circumstances, as 
noted earlier.84 The compromise solution as contained in Article 83 
of the 1981 Draft Convention later became Article 83 of the present 
LOS Convention. 
The changes notwithstanding, customary international law in 
this regard remains the same, as analyzed in the beginning of this 
chapter. However, neither customary international law nor the 1980 
Draft Convention (Informal Text) and previous negotiating texts de-
fines "relevant circumstances." As far as the latter are concerned, 
79. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.IO, 15 July 
1977, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 8 (1977), p. 1. 
80. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision I, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/ 
WP.IO/Rev.l, 28 April 1979. 
81. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/ 
WP.IO/Rev.2, II Aprill980. 
82. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/ 
CONF.62/WP.IO/Rev.3, 27 August 1980. 
83. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78, 28 August 
1981. 
84. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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recourse has to be had to the LOS Convention's travaux 
preparatoires: the proceedings of the UNCLOS III since 1974 and 
those of the Seabed Committee prior to that. Since Article 83 and 
Article 74 (dealing with EEZ delimitation), are nearly identical, and 
since within 200 miles from the shore of a coastal state its continental 
shelf is part of its EEZ, references will be made to the EEZ as well. 
However, because of the fundamental differences between these two 
concepts on the one hand and that of the territorial sea on the other, 
factors which states considered relevant to the delimitation of the 
latter will not be discussed. 
Negotiations at the UNCLOS III show that states which fa-
vored the adoption of equitable principles as the rule of delimitation 
of the continental shelf and EEZ outnumbered those adhering to the 
equidistance/special circumstance rule under Article 6 of the Shelf 
Convention.85 However, not all of the states in the former group 
have spelled out what specific "relevant circumstances" they had in 
mind. Presented below are specific illustrations which some of these 
states have given in the draft articles and debates. 
Apparently having the Greek Aegean Islands in mind, Turkey 
was the only state in the Seabed Committee that specified the term 
"special circumstances" which includes: 
fljnter alia, . . . the general configuration of the respective 
coasts, the existence of islands or islets of another state and 
the physical and geological structure of the marine area in-
volved including the seabed and subsoil thereof.86 (empha-
sis added) 
During the 1974 Caracas session of the UNCLOS III where ma-
jor debates and proposals were made, Romania proposed that de-
limitation of marine spaces be effected by agreements between 
neighboring states in accordance with equitable principles, "taking 
into account all the circumstances affecting the marine or ocean area 
concerned and all relevant geographical, geological or other fac-
tors."87 (emphasis added) 
85. The former group had 29 states while the latter 22. Reports the Committees and 
Negotiating Groups on Negotiations at the Seventh Session [and the Resumed Seventh 
Session] Contained in A Single Document both for the Purposes of Records and for the 
Convenience of Delegations. UN Docs. A/CONF.62/RCNG/l and 2. UNCLOS III, 
Ojjicial Records, Vol. 10 (1978), pp. 13, 124, 126, 170. But since UNCLOS II adopts the 
consensus method to conduct negotiations, no vote has ever been taken on this hotly 
contested issue. 
86. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), pp. 22-23. 
87. Romania: Draft articles on delimitation of marine and ocean space between ad-
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Turkey again proposed: 
In the course of negotiations, the States shall take into ac-
count all the relevant factors, including, inter alia, the geo-
morphological and geological structure of the shelf up to the 
outer limits of the continental margin, and special circum-
stances such as the general configuration of the respective 
coasts, the existence of islands, islets or rocks of one State 
on the continental shelf of the other.88 (emphasis added) 
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A similar list of factors relating to delimitation of the EEZ was also 
proposed by Turkey later. 89 
Meanwhile, the delegate of the Libya Arab Republic, Mr. Unis, 
stated in the 16th meeting of the Second Committee: 
In order to delineate the limits of area allocated to each of 
the adjacent or opposite States, any one of a combination 
of delimitation methods appropriate for arriving at an eq-
uitable subdivision of the economic zone might be applied, 
taking into consideration the historical and geographical 
conditions and special circumstances.90 (emphasis added) 
The Draft Article on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
or the Exclusive Economic Zone, submitted by Kenya and Tunisia 
to the Second Committee, provided, inter alia: 
For [the purpose of delimitation], special account should be 
taken of geological and geomorphological criteria, as well as 
all the special circumstances, including the existence of is-
lands or islets in the area to be delimited. 91 (emphasis 
added) 
In their draft articles on the delimitation of the continental shelf 
and the economic zone, Ireland92 and France93 proposed slightly dif-
jacent and opposite neighboring States and various aspects involved, art. 1, UN Doc. A/ 
CONF.62/C.2/L.l8, UNCLOS lll, Official Records, Vol. 3 (1975), p. 195. 
88. Turkey: Draft articles on delimitation between States: Varous aspects involved, 
art. 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.23, ibid., p. 201. 
89. Turkey: Draft articles on delineation between adjacent and opposite States, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.34, ibid., p. 213. 
90. UNCLOS lll, Official Records, Vol. 2 (1975), p. 145 (16th mtg, 2nd Comm.). 
91. Kenya and Tunisia: Draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or 
the exclusive economic zone, art. 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.28, UNCLOS lll, Offi-
cial Records, Vol. 3 (1975), p. 195. 
92. Ireland: Draft articles on delimitation of areas of continental shelf between 
neighboring States, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43, ibid., p. 220. 
93. France: Draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or of the eco-
nomic zone, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.74, ibid., p. 237. 
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ferent rules. Yet both states specifically singled out the presence of 
islands and islets as a special circumstances deserving ad hoc consid-
eration. It is apparent that Ireland had the British Rockall Rock in 
mind whereas France was worried about the Channel Islands. 
Last, in the draft articles on the EEZ submitted by eighteen Af-
rican states, it was proposed that, inter alia: 
For this purpose [of delimitation of the exclusive economic 
zone], special account shall be taken of geological and geo-
morphological factors as well as other special circumstances 
which prevail.94 (emphasis added) 
To sum up, the common denominator of circumstances re-
garded as "relevant" by the participating states of the Seabed Com-
mittee and the UNCLOS III who have addressed the question seems 
to include the following: 
-regional geography, such as the general configuration of 
the coast and presence of islands; and 
-regional geology and geomorphology. 
None of these factors was unknown previously. They seem to reflect 
the influence of the North Sea Cases in this area. 
A question arises as to whether these proposals or statements 
constitute a source of international law. The ICJ correctly pointed 
out, in the 197 4 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 95 between Iceland and the 
United Kingdom, that they are merely "manifestations of the views 
and opinions of individual States as vehicles of their aspirations 
rather than as expressing principles of existing law."96 But when the 
Convention enters into force, these proposals will be firsthand 
sources of travaux preparatoires for interpreting the new convention 
because of the direct contribution of their adoption, rejection, or re-
vision to the final text of the convention. Hence, the significance of 
these proposals and debates. 
C. Identifying the "Relevant Circumstances" in the East China 
Sea Other Than Its Geography, Geology, and 
Geomorphology 
The above review provides certain guidelines as to where to 
94. Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Arab Republic, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, United 
Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire: Draft articles on the 
exclusive economic zone, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82, ibid., p. 240. 
95. I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 3. 
96. Ibid., p. 23. 
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look for the "relevant circumstances" in the East China Sea for the 
purpose of Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation. The circumstances 
worth considering are grouped into four categories: irrelevant, par-
tially relevant, potentially relevant, and relevant circumstances. 
What follows is a discussion of the relevance of the former three 
types of circumstances chosen according to the above guidelines. 
The fourth type, i e., the geographical, geological, and geomorpho-
logical circumstances are reserved for the next two sections. 
1. Irrelevant Circumstances 
(a) Defense and Security Interests 
A state's sovereignty over its adjacent continental shelf is, at 
least theoretically, resources-oriented and does not reach the super-
jacent water where surface and submarine navigation takes place. 
The defense and security interests, if any, of a coastal state with re-
spect to the continental shelf largely consist of the freedom of ma-
neuver of its submarines. In the Anglo-French Arbitration France 
did stress the need for its navy to control activities on the continental 
shelf around the Channel Islands.97 If the French continental shelf 
was cut into two separate parts in consequence of granting full effect 
to the Channel Islands, France argued, "serous inconveniences and 
risks for French submarines stationed at Cherbourg"98 would result 
(Map 14). These considerations, held to be relevant but not decisive 
in that case,99 seem to be absent in the East China Sea. Despite its 
semi-enclosed configuration, the East China Sea is much larger and 
far more open than the English Channel. Moreover, neither of the 
boundaries based on the claims of China (the ROC and the PRC) or 
Japan (Map 1) would result in the severance of either state's conti-
nental shelf into two separate zones. The freedom of maneuver of 
either state's submarines would hardly be affected. Hence the irrele-
vance of defense and security considerations. 
(b) Navigation 
This is a concern that existed only in the early stages of the 
evolution of the continental shelf doctrine when the juridical status 
of that novel notion was unclear and the high seas freedoms were 
feared threatened. Since 1958, the rule that the legal status of the 
waters superjacent to the continental shelf remains as high seas has 
97. Anglo-French Award, para. 161. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Ibid., para. 188. 
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become part of customary international law. Consideration of navi-
gation thus becomes irrelevant. 
(c) Historical Title 
The historical title to a maritime area is a legitimate considera-
tion for delimitation of territorial sea between neighboring states, 
given the proximity of that jurisdiction to shore and the long history 
of human activities in coastal waters. Both customary international 
law and the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone recognize historical bays and other historical titles to coastal 
waters. 100 It is doubtful, however, whether such rights exist in con-
nection with the seabed and subsoil outside the territorial sea. There 
are nevertheless a few possibilities: existing rights to sedentary fish-
eries101 and exploitation of seabed resources. The East China Sea is 
not noted for sedentary species of living organisms. Even if it were, 
that consideration would still be irrelevant since the possible site of 
the Sino-Japanese shelf boundary, based on either the Japanese or 
the Chinese claim, would lie in waters ranging from 100 to 2,000 
meters in depth where sedentary fishery is unlikely. 
Historical title based on exploitation of undersea oil is also 
questionable, insofar as the East China Sea is concerned. Aside 
from the lack of a solid legal foundation of such a title, 102 as con-
ceded by Judge Jessup in his separate opinion of the North Sea 
Cases, 103 there have not been much exploitation activities by the 
PRC, the ROC, or Japan in the disputed area. As noted in Chapter 
2, all the wells drilled by CPC and its foreign partners lie on the 
Chinese side of the hypothetical median line; so do the three wells, 
Longjing I and II and Dongtai-1, drilled by the PRC (Map 10). Jap-
anese drillings have also been confined to areas east of the Okinawa 
Trough even farther from the potential boundary line. Even if large-
scale exploitation had been conducted by either state in the disputed 
area on the continental shelf, the vigorous protests by the other state, 
100. Art. 7(6), 12. 
101. The "natural resources" as defined by Article 2 of the Shelf Convention include 
only one kind of living resources, i.e., sedentary species. 
102. Under Article 2 of the Shelf Convention, a coastal state's right to the continental 
shelf is inherent and exclusive, not depending on occupation, effective or notional. Other 
states may not obtain such rights without the express consent of the coastal state. There 
is, accordingly, little basis to claim historical title based on occupation, prior use, or pre-
scription. This point was discussed by the ICJ in the Tunisian-Libyan Case in connection 
with Tunisia's historical rights in the disputed area. l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 74. 
103. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 80. But see infra text accompanying note 276. 
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which would have been made before any drilling took place, would 
have prevented the creation of any title based on prescription or 
other legal doctrines. 
(d) Unity of Deposits 
The ICJ prescribed, in the North Sea Cases, the unity of depos-
its of natural resources, "so far as known or readily ascertain-
able," 104 as a relevant circumstance. It has been suggested in 
Chapters I and 2 that despite the bright prospects for hydrocarbons 
in the East China Sea, very little is known about the bulk of its sea-
bed simply because jurisdictional disputes effectively have delayed 
oil exploration. Since knowledge about a deposit will not be ob-
tained before the boundary disputes are settled and large-scale ex-
ploration begins, the "unity of deposits" question logically will be 
irrelevant to boundary delimitations in the East China Sea. 
(e) Fishing and the EEZ 
As in the case of navigation, fishing of free-swimming species, 
one of the high seas freedoms, 105 was thought to be threatened upon 
the advent of the continental shelf doctrine. Article 5 of the 1958 
Shelf Convention, which prohibits "any unjustifiable interference 
with fishing or the conservation of the living resources" by explora-
tion and exploitation of the continental shelf, eliminates such fear 
only on an ipso jure basis. In fact, competition between the fishing 
and ocean mining industries becomes increasingly acute in areas 
where rich fishing grounds and mineral deposits lie side by side. The 
North Sea, 106 the Atlantic Ocean off New England coast (Georges 
Bank), 107 and the East China Sea off the coast of Kyushu, 108 just to 
name a few, are illustrative examples. 
Another dimension of the relationship between fishing and the 
continental shelf relates to their jurisdictional limits. Despite their 
juridically distinguishable character, the seaward limit of one may, 
for administrative purposes, coincide with that of the other. In fact, 
104. l.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 54. 
105. Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, UST, Vol. 13, p. 2312; TIAS, No. 5200; 
UNTS, Vol. 450, p. 82. That article is generally recognized as having codified customary 
internationa1law. 
106. See generally John P. Grant, "The Conflict between the Fishing and the Oil In-
dustries in the North Sea: A Case Study," Ocean Management, Vol. 4 (1978), p. 137. 
107. "Oil Drilling Foes Drop Court Suit," Boston Globe, December 22, 1980, p. I. 
108. Ron Richardson, "South Korea Posed to Drill," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 14, 1979, p. 63. 
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the evolution of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, which 
comprises the water column, the seabed, and the subsoil, can be con-
ceived as a step further toward the marriage of the concepts of the 
continental shelf and the exclusive fishery zone. Moreover, in the 
Anglo-French Arbitration, the 12-mile fishery zone of the Channel 
Islands was taken into account by the Court in determining the ex-
tent of their continental shelf. 109 The boundary finally delimited was 
in fact a 12-mile zone to the north and west of the Channel Islands 
(Map 13). 
In the East China Sea, a fishing ground from time immemorial, 
fishing has been regulated in the past three decades by treaties and 
non-governmental arrangements among the three coastal states. 110 
As between Japan and the PRC, lack of diplomatic ties during the 
pre-1972 period necessitated a series of unofficial arrangements 
which were later superseded by formal treaties. 111 The latest was 
one signed in 1975 and renewed in 1977. 112 Fishing zones estab-
lished thereunder are located closer to the Chinese mainland than to 
Japan. They consist of an irregular belt of the sea with an average 
width of 100 miles beyond the PRC's straight baselines. The most 
seaward part of their outer limit extends 140 miles into the East 
China Sea. Within these zones, fishing vessels from both states are 
subject to various restrictions for conservation purposes. 
The outer limits of the fishing zones seem to provide little gui-
dance as to how the continental shelf boundary between China and 
Japan should be delimited. 113 The fishing boundary is much closer 
to the Chinese mainland coast than the median line proposed by Ja-
pan. Since the PRC, like the ROC, adheres to the natural prolonga-
tion principle and has raised objections to a median line solution, it 
would a fortiori reject the fishing limits as a shelf boundary which is 
109. See text accompanying note 50 supra. 
110. See generally Choon-ho Park, "Fishing Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast 
Asia Fishery Controversy," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 2 
(1974), p. 96. 
Ill. See generally Tao Cheng, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea,'' American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 47; Song Yook Hong, The Sino-Japanese 
Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparision with Other North Pac(jic Fisheries Agree-
ments, No.6, Hungdah Chiu ed., University of Maryland Law School: Occasional Pa-
pers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1977, and the references cited 
therein. 
112. For the text of the 1975 agreement and the chart showing the fishing zones, see 
"Fisheries Agreement China-Japan," Limits in the Seas, No. 70, April 6, 1976. The 
agreement was renewed in 1977. 
113. In accord is Bowett (1979), supra Chapter 4, note 4, p. 305. 
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even more unfavorable to it. Besides, there seems to be little legal or 
practical justification whatsoever in taking into accoun~ the fishing 
zone in seabed delimitation in the East China Sea. Fmally, these 
fishing zones are by no means permanent and may be overtaken 
shortly by a new boundary based on the 200-mile EEZ. As of 1984, 
at least Japan and the ROC have asserted a 200-mile fishing zone or 
an EEZ. 
At this juncture, a question arises regarding the interrelation-
ship between boundaries of the EEZ and the continental shelf. 
Without going into detailed discussion of the EEZ as a legal regime, 
one should ask: should the shelf and the EEZ boundaries necessar-
ily coincide if the PRC and Japan also proclaim their respective 
EEZs? 
Conceptually, the EEZ, as defined in the LOS Convention's Ar-
ticles 56 and 57, 114 incorporates the continental shelf up to a maxi-
mum distance of 200 miles from shore. Functionally, the major 
resource-related concern, or the only concern in the foreseeable fu-
ture in the EEZ, is fishing, since other exotic uses of the water col-
umn 115 will not be technically or economically feasible soon. In 
contrast, the interest in the continental shelf almost exclusively con-
sists in the underlying petroleum. With respect to the question of 
interstate boundary, the distance- (or geographically) oriented re-
gime of the EEZ clearly is more amenable to such a distance-ori-
ented delimitation principle as the equidistance principle than to the 
geologically-oriented regime of the continental shelf, which cannot 
escape considerations of geology and geomorphology. Therefore, 
separate EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, though difficult to 
administer, are not incompatible with the fundamental rationale un-
derlying these two regimes. 116 The following discussion therefore is 
114. Article 56 provides: 
I. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing the nat-
ural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the 
seabed and subsoil and of the seabed and its subsoil . . 
Article 57 provides: 
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
115. E.g. Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC). See generally Michael Mul-
cahy, "OTEC-from $85,000 to $35 Million in Six Years," Sea Technology, Vol. 18 (Au-
gust, 1977), p. 16. 
116. For a discussion in support of this view, see Bowett (1979), .supra Chapter 4, note 
4, pp. 188-89. But see J.C. Phillips, "'The Exclusive Economic Zone as a Concept in 
International Law," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1977), pp. 
585, 613-15. 
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based on this premise. 
2. Partially Relevant Circumstances 
It was noted earlier that in deciding whether the Channel Is-
lands would be allowed to generate their own continental shelf, the 
Anglo-French Court of Arbitration took account of the size, popula-
tion, economy, and political and legal status of the Channel Islands. 
These considerations eventually proved to have only marginal effects 
on the primary (mid-channel) boundary between France and the 
United Kingdom but were important to the secondary boundary to 
the north and west of the Channel Islands. Hence the characteriza-
tion "partially relevant" circumstances. In the East China Sea, both 
China (PRC and ROC) and Japan have substantial insular territo-
ries that may be relevant to seabed delimitation, s¥ch as the coastal 
islands of mainland China, Taiwan (including offshore islands), 
Kyushu (including offshore islands), arrd the Ryukyu Islands. A 
brief review of their "merits" seems warranted. The coastal islands 
of mainland China, which mostly are included in the PRC's straight 
baseline system, will be the subject of a later discussion. Meanwhile, 
since Kyushu (16,215 sq. miles) and Taiwan (13,885 sq. miles) have 
substantial landmass (the 31st and 36th largest islands on earth, re-
spectively)117 and constitute the major portion of the territory of Ja-
pan and the ROC, they will be treated as mainlands. The review 
below therefore is confined to the Ryukyu Islands only. 
The Ryukyu Islands 118 comprise three major island groups 
(gunto in Japanese): The Amami Gunto (north), the Okinawa 
Gunto (central), and the Sakishima Gunto (south) (Map 1). The 
R yukyu Islands from a northeast-southwest trending arc extending 
650 miles from the southern tip of Kyushu all the way down to the 
vicinity of Taiwan. The islands are fairly large (total area: 1,338 sq. 
miles) and populous (around one million). Fishing and agriculture 
are the major economic activities with a less significant light indus-
trial sector. The Amami Gunto was "returned" to Japan by the 
United States in 1953 and the rest ofthe Ryukyu Isla~ds in 1972. 
Administratively, the Amami Gunto belongs to the Kogashima Pre-
fecture with its seat in Kyushu, whereas the Okinawa Prefecture in-
cludes the Okinawa Gunto and the Sakishima Gunto. 
117. Hodgson (1973), supra Chapter 4, note 35, p. 4. 
118. The physical and political geographies of the Ryukyu Islands are based on Co· 
/umbia Gazetteer, supra Chapter 4, note 77, p. 1618; Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 24 
(1974), p. 62; Statistics Bureau, The Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook, 
Vol. I (1979). 
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The above review seems to suggest that the R yukyu Islands are 
capable of generating their own continental shelf under any cr~teria. 
Given their location in a semi-enclosed sea (at least on one s1de of 
these islands) less than 400 miles in width, however, there is no guar-
antee that they actually would obtain full entitlement in a shelf 
boundary delimitation. In other words, the circumstances of size, 
population, etc., merely provide the necessary conditions enabling 
the R yukyu Islands to receive full consideration in the process of 
balancing the equities. They are not sujficient conditions, however. 
3. Potentially Relevant Circumstances 
A few legal and physical circumstances in the East China Sea 
appear to be prima facie potentially relevant to the seabed delimita-
tion. But the ex~ent of their relevance depends not so much on their 
own merits as on certain extrinsic variables. These circumstances 
include two existing legal regimes, namely, the Japan-ROK Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ) and the PRC's straight baselines, and the 
presence of coastal islands off K yushu and Taiwan. 
However, these potentially relevant circumstances are not to be 
confused with the partially relevant circumstances discussed above. 
While relevance of the former is uncertain, depending on future 
events, tpe latter's relevance is definite, but the weight assigned it 
may be only marginal. 
(a) The Japan-ROK Joint Development Zone 
It was noted in Chapters 2 and 3 that the JDZ, not being a de 
jure shelf boundary as such, will nevertheless commit Japan and the 
ROK for at least 50 years, unless the resources in the JDZ become 
economically unexploitable sooner. 119 But since the legal continen-
tal shelf is precisely a resource-oriented concept, if the joint efforts of 
Japan and the ROK eventually deplete the undersea hydrocarbons 
in the JDZ, there simply would exist no reason for the other claim-
ants to assert sovereignty over the then sterile seabed of the JDZ. 120 
In this sense, the JDZ functions as a de facto shelf boundary zone, 
despite the parties' disclaimer to the contrary. 
The potential relevance of the JDZ as a de facto shelf boundary 
expresses itself in two ways. First of all, part of the JDZ's western 
119. The Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement, arts. XXVIII, XXXI, supra 
Chapter 2, note 42. 
120. S"ee Choon-ho Park, "China and Maritime Jurisdiction: Some Boundary Issues", 
German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 22 (1979), p. 119. 
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edge coincides with the Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese hypotheti-
cal median lines (Map 1 ). This overlapping segment naturally in-
cludes the trijunction point of the Sino-ROK and Japan-ROK 
hypothetical median lines. Should the application of the equidis-
tance principle in this region be considered equitable by the parties, 
then this segment as a reference line would be potentially significant. 
Second, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the JDZ lies en-
tirely on the Japanese side of the Japan-ROK hypothetical median 
line. Japan thus is thought to be willing to tolerate the ROK's shelf 
claim based on the natural prolongation principle at the expense of 
its own claim based on the equidistance principle. Although the 
JDZ is not a shelf boundary as such, Japan's apparent concession 
could adversely affect its legal position vis-a-vis China (PRC and 
ROC) in the southern part of the East China Sea where the geophys-
ical situations are similar to those of the north but the petroleum 
geology may be much more favorable. 
To conclude, since Japan and the ROK can always defend, ipso 
jure, that the JDZ is not a shelf boundary, it is considered here only 
as a potentially relevant circumstance. 
(b) The PRC's Straight Baselines (Map 1) 
One of the important dimensions of continental shelf delimita-
tion is the determination of baselines (or basepoints) from which the 
territorial sea is measured. The whole question of islands' entitle-
ment to continental shelf in substance can be conceived of as a ques-
tion of whether islands may be used as basepoints in seaward or 
lateral delimitations. Two methods for determining baselines are 
most widely used in state practice and recognized in international 
treaties. The first method, known as the low-water baseline or nor-
mal baseline, calls for a line following the low-water marks of a 
coastal state's seashore. 121 The other method, known as the straight 
baseline, consists of a series of straight lines connecting salient points 
of a coastline irrespective of the low-water marks. 122 While most 
states employ the normal baseline method, states with irregular 
coasts have applied the straight baseline method to the whole or a 
part of their coasts for practical, economic, security, and other rea-
sons. In the 1951 Fisheries Case between Norway and the United 
Kingdom, Norway's time-honored employment of the straight base-
121. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 3, UST, Vol. 15, p. 
1606; TIAS No. 5639; UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 205. 
122. Ibid., article 4. 
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line method to its exceptionally indented coasts was sanctioned by 
the ICJ as "not contrary to international law." 123 Since then, 
through state practice, codification efforts of the U.N. International 
Law Commission, 124 and the adoption by the Geneva Conference, 
the straight baseline method has acquired the status of customary 
international law. As of today (1984), out of the world's 140 or so 
coastal states, more than sixty have passed domestic legislation per-
mitting the use of straight baseline or have actually drawn it along 
their coasts. 125 
(1) The 1958 Declaration 
The PRC was one of the fifteen harbinger states that had de-
clared a straight baseline system prior to 1960. 126 In its "Declaration 
on China's Territorial Sea" on September 4, 1958, the PRC stated: 
1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Re-
public of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provi-
sion applies to all territories of the People's Republic of 
China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal is-
lands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the 
Penghu [Pescadore] Islands, . .. 
2. China's territorial sea along the mainland and its 
coastal islands takes as its baseline the line composed of the 
straight lines connecting basepoints on the mainland coast 
and on the outermost of the coastal islands;. . . The water 
areas inside the baseline, including Pohai Bay and the 
Chiungchow Strait, are Chinese inland waters. 
4. The principles provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 likewise 
apply to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu 
Islands. . . and all other islands belonging to China. 127 
(emphasis added) 
The PRC has never made public how its straight baseline sys-
tem would be drawn on the Chinese coast of 11,900 km. (6,432 
miles). (The system does not, of course, cover Taiwan and the Pes-
123. I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 115, 143. 
124. YBILC (1956), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 15, p. 257. 
125. The figures are derived from the author's calculations based on "National Claims 
to Maritime Jurisdictions," Limits in the Seas, No. 36, 4th rev., May I, 1981. 
126. The others were Albania, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland, 
Iran, Norway, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and 
Yugoslavia. 
127. Peking Review, September 9, 1958, p. 21. 
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cadores which are under the ROC's control.) This move would have 
been required if the PRC joined the 1958 Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 128 The Geographer of the United 
States Department of State in 1972 drew hypothetical straight base-
lines to the Chinese coasts on a naval chart. 129 In the accompanying 
comments, he concluded: 
Basically, Peking appears to have taken a realistic and 
non-expansive attitude in drafting its straight 
baselines .... 
. . . With the exception of the Spratly Islands, the 
straight baselines shown on the attached charts would 
probably be quite consistent with international state 
· do practices .... 
(2) Challenges and Protests 
Shortly thereafter, two American commentators131 challenged 
the legality of the PRC's straight baselines in the East China Sea on 
the grounds that some of the outlying islands supposedly used as 
basepoints are excessively distant from the mainland coast (the 
greatest distance being 69 miles) and that the straight lines connect-
ing these islands do not follow the general direction of the Chinese 
coastline, 132 as required by customary international law reflected in 
the ruling of the Fisheries Case. 
In practice, however, other than the United States 133 and the 
128. Supra note 122. 
129. See "Straight Baselines: People's Republic of China," Limits in the Seas, No. 43, 
July I, 1972. 
130. Ibid., pp. 3, 6. 
131. Allen & Mitchell (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 28. 
132. Ibid., pp. 796-800. Art. 4, paras. I and 2 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone provide: 
I. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there 
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of 
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent 
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the line 
must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the re-
gime of internal waters. 
UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 208. 
133. Department of State, "The Legal Considerations Affecting the Status of Taiwan 
and the Offshore Islands," American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1189, 
1198. 
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United Kingdom, 134 no state has ever raised any obj~ctions. Sin~e 
the United Kingdom itself adopted the straight baseline method m 
1964,135 its objection seems to be weakened, if still valid. Mean-
while, the ROK promulgated a system of straight baselines on Sep-
tember 20, 1978.136 Inasmuch as the East China Sea is concerned, 
the PRC's straight baselines have met with no objection from Japan. 
The ROC also has been silent so far. 137 
(3) Opposability to Japan 
If Japan presumably has acquiesced since 1958 to the PRC's 
straight baselines for measuring China's territorial sea, is it thereby 
estopped from objecting to such method when the same baselines are 
used for measuring China's continental shelf? The interests of Japan 
in the seabed of the East China Sea were not aroused until the late 
1960s. But it took part in the negotiations at the 1958 Geneva Con-
ference. Although Japan did not sign nor later accede to the Shelf 
Convention, it ought to be aware that the continental shelf of a 
coastal state begins outside the territorial sea but is measured from 
the same baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. 138 It thus is arguably, at least, that the PRC's straight 
baseline system is opposable to Japan on the same ground on which 
the ICJ decided the Fisheries Case in favor of Norway: 
The notoriety of the fact, the general toleration of the inter-
national community, Great Britain's position in the North 
Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged 
abstention would in any case warrant Norway's enforce-
ment of her system against the United Kingdom. 139 
It seems necessary at this juncture to discuss the ICJ's treatment 
of Tunisia's straight baselines in relation to shelf delimitation in the 
134. U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press [SCMP], 
No. 1871 (October 9, 1958), p. 89. 
135. Territorial Waters Order in Council of 25 September 1964, article 3, UNLS/15, 
pp. 129, 130. For an analysis with charts, see "Straight Baselines: United Kingdom," 
Limits in the Seas, No. 23, June 26, 1970. 
136. "Straight Baselines: Republic of Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 82, January 22, 
1979, p. I; UNLS/19, p. 98. 
137. The ROC was said to have seriously considered the use of the straight baseline in 
the past. Hungdah Chiu, "China and the Question of Territorial Sea," International 
Trade Law Journal, Vol. l (1975), pp. 29, 49-50. 
138. Although Article I of the Shelf Convention (definition of the continental shelf) 
does not so prescribe, Article 6 (delimitation between states) should make this point quite 
clear. 
139. I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 139. 
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Tunisian-Libyan Case .140 The question there was whether Tunisia's 
internal waters and territorial sea should be included in calculating 
the degree of proportionality between the shelf areas appertaining to 
each of the parties and the lengths of their respective coasts. Tunisia 
argued that by definition the legal continental shelf begins where the 
territorial sea ends; the seabed of its territorial sea and internal wa-
ters landward of the straight baselines therefore should be excluded 
from shelf delimitation. On the other hand, Libya contended that 
the whole seabed of the delimitation area must be taken into account 
in making these calculations. The Court, disclaiming passing any 
judgment on the legality of or opposability to Libya of the Tunisian 
straight baselines, stated that it was not convinced by Tunisia's con-
tention. It concluded: 
It should be reaffirmed that the continental shelf, in the 
legal sense, does not include the sea-bed areas below terri-
torial and internal waters; but the question is not one of defi-
nition, but of proportionality as a function of equity. The fact 
that a given area is territorial sea or internal waters does 
not mean that the coastal State does not enjoy "sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its nat-
ural resources". . . . Furthermore, the element of propor-
tionality is related to lengths of the coasts of the States 
concerned, not to striaght baselines drawn round those 
coasts. . . . [S]ince it is a question of proportionality, the 
only absolute requirement of equity is that one should com-
pare like with like .141 (emphasis added) 
The real rationale, however, underlying the ICJ's deviation 
from the fundamental legal concept of the continental shelf in the 
name of equity is, it seems, that the inclusion or exclusion of the 
Tunisian internal and territorial waters would make "a very marked 
difference in the ratios resulting from any foreseeable delimitation 
line." 142 As is clearly shown in Map 16, the areas landward of Tuni-
sia's territorial sea limits amount to nearly one third of the whole 
delimitation area lying off the coasts of Tunisia up to Ras Kaboudia 
and of Libya up to Ras Tajoura. If these areas had been excluded, 
Tunisia would have gained an enormous advantage vis-a-vis Libya 
in dividing the remaining two-thirds of the delimitation area. Fur-
thermore, Tunisia's straight baselines were declared in 1973, five 
140. I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 71-76. 
141. Ibid., p. 76. 
142. Ibid., p. 71. 
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years after the critical date when the present di~p~te aros~. ~43 The 
1973 law has substantially changed the pre-eXIstmg Tums1an law 
which did not constitute the waters in question as internal or territo-
rial. Therefore, the above considerations must have combined to 
convince the Court that equity requires the inclusion of Tunisian ter-
ritorial and internal waters in applying the proportionality test. 
Despite the smokescreen of the Court's disclaimer on the legal-
ity of Tunisia's system of straight baselines, it seemed to disapprove 
of the way they were drawn to include so large an area in Tunisia's 
exclusive domain. But to admit such disapproval on the record 
would, of course, have unnecessarily complicated the already sticky 
question at issue. 
Now the question is: should the Tunisian-Libyan rule apply 
here in the Sino-Japanese shelf delimitation in the context of the 
East China Sea? It seems that the Sino-Japanese case is distinguish-
able from the Tunisian-Libyan Case in two respects. First, the delim-
itation area here is the whole of the East China Sea (Map 1 ), which 
is much larger both in absolute terms than the delimitation area in 
the Tunisian-Libyan Case (Map 15) and in relation to the PRC's in-
ternal and territorial waters measured from its straight baselines. In-
clusion or exclusion of these areas therefore would not make a 
marked difference in calculating the proportionality ratios as in the 
Tunisian-Libyan Case. Second, the PRC's straight baselines were 
declared in 1958, as noted above, long bifore any shelf dispute in the 
East China Sea arose. In fact, the declaration was the PRC's first 
legislation on the subject, not amending any pre-existing law. 
Therefore, even if Japan cites the Tunisian-Libyan rule in support of 
its own claim in future shelf delimitations with China (PRC and 
ROC), the rule's applicability to a wholly dissimilar East China Sea 
is only open to question. 
Another aspect of the opposability of the PRC's straight base-
lines to Japan concerns their relationship to boundary delimitation 
principles. The straight baseline, by nature, extends more seward 
than does the normal baseline and consequently would affect any 
shelf boundary based on distance-oriented criteria, such as the equi-
distance principle, in favor of the state that adopts the straight base-
line. The Indonesia-Malaysia continental shelf boundary is a case in 
point. Precisely to counteract such an effect resulting from Indone-
143. Continental Shelf, Separate Opinion of Jimenez de Arechaga, I.C.J. Reports 
1982, p. 139. 
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sia's extensive straight baselines, Malaysia declared its own 144 
shortly before the two states agreed upon their shelf boundaries in 
1969. By the same token, should the equidistance principle apply to 
either the Yellow Sea or the East China Sea, Japan may, instead of 
objecting to the PRC's system, simply declare its own. However, if 
other principles based on depth of water or the natural prolongation 
of the coast apply, the effect of the straight baseline on the shelf 
boundary becomes nil since the boundary is drawn independent of 
the coastal configuration as well as the distance from the coast. 
(4) Conclusion 
In conclusion, the relevance of the PRC's straight baselines to 
the continental shelf delimitation in the East China Sea depends on 
the delimitation principle and the proportionality test to be em-
ployed. The delimitation principle should, in turn, be determined by 
the larger context of geography, geology, and geomorphology of the 
East China Sea as a whole. 
(c) The Coastal Islands of Kyushu and Taiwan 
( 1) The Coastal Islands of K yushu 145 
There are two groups of islands off the northwestern shore of 
Kyushu, namely, Goto Retto and, further south, Danjo Gunto and 
Tori Shima (Map 1). (The Osumi Gunto southeast of Kyushu are 
largely irrelevant due to their far-east location.) The Goto Retto, 
comprising seven main islands, are relatively large (240 sq. miles) 
and populous (150,000). They are situated about 25 miles west of 
K yushu, separated therefrom by waters dotted with islets and rocks. 
Two islands in the Goto Retto were used six times as basepoints in 
constructing the southern portion of the Japanese-ROK shelf bound-
ary in the Korea Strait. 146 Given their proximity to Kyushu, the 
Goto Retto perhaps might be enclosed in a straight baseline system 
as part of Kyushu should Japan decide to adopt one. However, the 
144. Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 7, 1969, as amended in 1969, an. 
3, UNLS/16, pp. 14, 15. 
145. Unless otherwise indicated, descriptions of the physical geography of Goto Retto, 
Danjo Gunto, and Tori Shima are based on Columbia Gazetteer, supra Chapter 4, note 
77, pp. 649, 701, Allen & Mitchell (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 28, pp. 803-04, and Park 
(1972), supra Chapter l, note 18, pp. 30-32. 
146. They were Sagono Shima and Shiro-Se, each of which was used three times. 
"Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of Korea," 
Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977, (Table 1). 
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Goto Retto are so located that they are relevant only to delimitation 
between Japan and Korea and not between Japan and China. 
More troublesome to the Sino-Japanese delimitation are the 
Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima. The former consists of several small 
islets with a total area of less than four square miles. They lie 34 
miles south of Fukue Shima, the largest and the southernmost island 
of the Gotto Retto. Tori Shima comprises two small islets lying 32 
miles southwest of Goto Retto and 18 miles northwest of Danjo 
Gunto. With no intervening islands between them and Goto Retto, 
Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima cannot be connected with Gotto Retto 
by their territorial seas. Other than the existence of caretakers of a 
light house and a radio signal tower in Danjo Gunto, the two groups 
are also uninhabited. To complicate matters further, Danjo Gunto 
and Tori Shima are sitting on the geological continental shelf contin-
uous from Korea but separated from Gotto Retto by the northern-
most end of the Okinawa Trough. The ROK maintained, at least 
prior to 197 4, that these islets were too small to generate their own 
continental shelf and that in any case, under the natural prolonga-
tion principle, Japan's continental shelf would terminate on the east-
em rim of the Okinawa Trough near Goto Retto. 147 
When the 1974 Japan-ROK shelf boundary in the Korea Strait 
was delimited, the ROK seemed to have retreated from its previous 
position by allowing Japan to use Tori Shima as a basepoint 148 in 
determining the southernmost terminal point of that boundary. 
Danjo Gunto, unlike Goto Retto, are also likely to be used as base-
points by Japan in future Sino-Japanese delimitation because they 
are among the few Japanese territories north of 26°N latitude that 
are close to the Chinese mainland coast (Map 1 ). 
(2) The Coastal Islands of Taiwan 149 
Three volcanic outcroppings, P'eng-chia, Mien-hua, and Hua-
147. See supra Chapter 2. 
148. According to Limits in the Seas, supra note 143, the name of the islet was Torino 
Shima and not Tori Shima. However, on the naval chart attached to the book, only the 
latter appears. Moreover, Tori Shima's distance from the terminal point, actually mea-
sured by this author, is almost identical to the distance between the terminal point and 
the nearest Korean territory, Cheju. This finding is in accord with the distance figures in 
Table I of the same book. Therefore, the name "Torino Shima" is taken either as a 
typographical error or as another name of the same islet. 
.149. f!nless otherwise indi,cated, descriptions of the physical geography of the P'eng-
chta, Mten-hua, and Hua-p mg Islets are based on Jui-nan Chou, "P'eng-chia Yu: 
Taiwan Ch'ih Tsui-pei-tien" (P'eng-Chia Islet: Taiwan's Northernmost Point), Shih-yu 
t'ung-hsun, supra Chapter 2, note 103, No. 281, p. 33 (Jan. I, 1975). Chou identified his 
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p'ing Islets, lie 30, 23, and 17 miles, respectively, from the northern 
coast of Taiwan in the East China Sea (Map 1 ). All of them sit on 
the geological shelf continuous from Taiwan but separated from the 
Sakishima Gun to of the R yukyu Islands by the Okinawa Trough. 
The total area of the group is less than one square mile. Otherwise 
uninhabited, there is a light house on P'eng-chia staffed with a few 
caretakers and weathermen. 
The ROC's newly declared 12-mile territorial sea, applicable 
under international law even to the most tiny little landmass insofar 
as it is naturally formed and above high tide at all times, 150 connects 
the three islets with Taiwan by a continuous belt of territorial sea. 
However, the ROC's renunciation in its reservations to the Shelf 
Convention of the use of "exposed rocks and islets" as basepoints on 
shelf delimitation 151 could deprive them of any shelf entitlements. 
The PRC's straight baseline system, which was intended to apply to 
"Taiwan and its surrounding islands" as well, probably would give 
rise to protests from other states if it is applied to these islets. The 
straight lines connecting these islets and Taiwan obviously will de-
part appreciably from the general direction of the northern coast of 
Taiwan, even if the islets could be characterized as situated in the 
"immediate vicinity" of the Taiwan coast. 152 
(3) Relevance of the Coastal Islands of Kyuhsu and 
Taiwan 
The geographic locations and physical dimension of these two 
groups of islets are largely comparable to those of the Tiao-yu-t'ai 
Islands. Some of the arguments that support the disregard of the 
Taio-yu-t'ais' presence in the Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation ap-
parently are applicable here. Even if, however, the Tiao-yu-t'ais are 
differentiated by reference to their disputed status, the relevance of 
Danjo Gunto eta/. still depends on two variables: first, whether the 
treatment accorded them is reciprocal; and second, whether the equi-
distance principle is used. 
Despite the ROC's expressed disregard of "exposed rocks and 
islets" in shelf delimitation in its reservations to the Shelf Conven-
tion, this disclaimer does not seem to be unconditional. The ROC 
would be unlikely to adhere to that reservation unilaterally if the 
source as Keelung City Government, Statistical Yearbook of the City o/ Kee/ung. No 
publication date was indicated. Ibid., p. 34. 
150. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 10(1). 
151. See supra Chapter 2, text accompanying note 90. 
152. See supra note 94. 
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other side refused to go along. In other words, reciprocity in t~eat­
ment, which appears evident in the language of the reservatwns, 
would be crucial. Furthermore, the PRC has never disclaimed the 
use of islets as basepoints. 
Assuming that all these islets would be used as basepoints, their 
relevance still would depend on what delimitation principle is to 
govern. As in the case of the PRC's straight baselines, the islets' use 
or non-use makes a difference only if a distance-oriented delimita-
tion principle, e.g., equidistance, applies. Thus, once again the con-
clusion is that the ultimate answer to the relevance question depends 
on the larger physical context of the East China Sea. 
D. Geography as a Relevant Circumstance 
Each independent sovereign state occupies a defined piece of 
the globe's dry surface as its territory. Boundaries between states on 
land, in rivers and lakes, or in the seas unavoidably involve the geog-
raphy of that region. Distinctive geographical features, such as riv-
ers and mountain ridges are often directly used, for practical 
purposes, as boundaries. Ever since the advent of the legal concept 
of the continental shelf, geographical considerations also have 
played a prominent role in shelf boundary delimitation, as evidenced 
by treaties, international judicial decisions, and state practice. 
Geographical circumstances usually relate to suiface features 
only, whereas submarine features fall into the ambit of regional geo-
morphology and geology. Specifically, two geographical features 
have generated the greatest influence in shelf delimitation: the over-
all coastal configuration and, to a lesser extent, the presence of is-
lands. The former may be referred to as the "macrogeography," 
whereas the latter may be termed the "microgeography". In Chapter 
4 the legal significance of small, isolated islands was examined. Here 
we shall deal with the macrogeography of the East China Sea. Since 
the choice of the equidistance principle in state practice to date (Ta-
ble 4) is largely dictated by the coastal configuration of the delimit-
ing states, it is adequate to treat the applicability of that principle 
together with the discussion of geography. 
1. The Macrogeography of the East China Sea 
The detailed physical geography of the East China Sea was 
noted in Chapter 1. Here we will only pinpoint a few legally signifi-
cant features as a frame of reference. First, there exists no common 
land boundary between China and Japan, between Japan and the 
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ROK, or between China and the ROK. 153 The geographical rela-
tionships of the three states inter se, are, accordingly, opposite-coast 
situations (Map 1). Second, for the Japan-ROK and China-ROK 
pairs, the juxtaposition of the two "opposite" relationships exists 
only in the northern part of the East China Sea, roughly north of the 
30°N parallel. 154 South of that latitude the opposite relationship 
finds itself only between Japan and China (ROC and PRC). For the 
purpose of this study, the former area is referred to as the North 
Region while the latter area is referred to as the South Region. 
Third, and more specifically, the Chinese coasts in the North Region 
include the Yangtze River estuary and the island-spattered 
Hangchou Bay. The Japanese coasts comprise those of Kyushu and 
its offshore islands. In the South Region, the Chinese coasts begin 
with the southern headland of the Hanchou Bay to the Hai-t'an Is-
land in Fukien Province and include that of Taiwan whereas the 
Japanese coasts consist only of those of the Ryukyu Islands. In the 
North Region, which is a trijunction area, the future Sino-Japanese 
shelf boundary likely would be influenced by the future Sino-ROK 
and Japan-ROK boundaries and possibly by the Japan-ROK JDZ. 
As suggested earlier, politics rather than law would be more determi-
native of the outcome. We therefore shall focus more on the South 
Region, which is exclusively a Sino-Japanese sphere. 
Between states having opposite coasts facing each other, the in-
evitable question relating to seabed delimitation is: should the equi-
distance principle apply? Japan's response is positive while the 
responses of China (and the ROK) are in the negative. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the applicability of that principle to the East 
China Sea in light of its macrogeography and precedents in interna-
tional practice. 
153. The PRC and the DPRK (North Korea) do share a common land boundary, i.e., 
the Yalu River which is not, however, near the East China Sea. 
154. The choice of the 30°N latitude as the demarcation line between two macroge-
ographically distinct regions is an intermediary position. The geographical trijunction 
point of the three median lines drawn between the coasts of Japan and Korea, Korea and 
China, and China and Japan has geographical coordinates of 30°46.2 N Latitude and 
125° 55.5 E Longitude. That point, of course, is north of the 30°N parallel. On the other 
hand, the ROK's concession block K-7 extends to 28°36'N Latitude, which is south of 
the 30°N parallel, indicating the ROK's perception of the southern limit of the Sino-
Korean, and Japanese-Korean opposite relationships. Controversial as the location of 
that demarcation line is, a sensible choice must be a convenient, intermediary one. Since 
the 30°N parallel roughly coincides with the geographical boundary between Kyushu 
(including the Osumi Gunto) and the Ryukyu Islands (including the Tokara Gunto) 
(Map I) and the northern limit of the 1,000 meter isobath of the Okinawa Trough (Map 
Ia), it is accordingly chosen. 
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2. The Equidistance Principle: Should It Apply? 
The equidistance principle is the rule, the ap~lica~ion o~ ~hich 
calls for the drawing of a line every point of whtch 1s eqmdtstant 
from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured. 155 An equidistant line so drawn between 
opposite coasts is referred to as a "median" line, whereas the line 
between two adjacent coasts is a "lateral" line. This principle, some-
times with variations, has been used extensively in the state practice 
of maritime boundary delimitation for over one hundred years. 156 It 
also has been adopted by a number of bilateral and multilateral trea-
ties. Its evolution as an important rule of international boundary 
delimitation and its legal and technical applications have been 
treated elaborately by the U.N. International Law Commission, 157 
the ICJ, 158 and many commentators. 159 
Before we proceed to address the East China Sea problem, one 
important assumption has to be made. The presence of the Okinawa 
Trough, which makes the seabed issue two-dimensional, fundamen-
tally disturbs the geological continuity on which the appliability of 
the equidistance principle in many cases is premised. Therefore, for 
the purpose of the following analysis, the Okinawa Trough is re-
155. The technique of drawing a strict median line was said to be developed by a 
Colonel Lawrence Martin in connection with the Michigan-Wisconsin boundary in the 
Great Lakes. It was later used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Michigan, 297 
U.S. 547 (1963), and theorized by S. Whittemore Boggs, a geographer advising the State 
Department, in his article entitled "Problems of Water Boundary Definition," Geographi-
cal Review, Vol. 27 (1937), p. 445. See Boggs (1951), supra Chapter 4, note 129, p. 258 
note 30. But the use of median or equidistant line as water boundary began much ear-
lier. See Padwa ( 1960), supra Chapter 4, note 129, p. 631. For the technical construction 
of an equidistant line, see Aaron L. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries, Vol. 1, Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Coast and Goedetic Survey, 1962, pp. 232-
35. 
156. Sang-Myon Rhee, "Sea Boundary Delimitation between States before World 
War II," American Journal o.f International Law, Vol. 76 (1982), p. 555. Some water 
boundaries, which in fact coincided with the equidistant line in whole or in larger part, 
did not refer to that principle as such but only enumerated geographical coordinates. 
This practice still prevails today. See the treaties listed in Table 4. 
157. For a terse summary of the ILC's deliberations, see Etienne Grisel, "The Lateral 
Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases," American Journal o.f International 
Law, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 562, 570-73 [hereinafter cited as Grise! (1970)]. 
158. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, particularly the 
dissenting opinions. 
159. Eg., Padwa (1960), supra Chapter 4, note 129, pp. 631-47; Grisel (1970), supra 
note 157, pp. 570-79; Brown (1971), supra Chapter 4, note 129, pp. 57-62; Collins & 
Rogoff (1982), supra Introduction, note 23, p. 14 and pp. 24-29. 
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garded as non-existent and the geological shelf is assumed to extend 
from the Chinese mainland coast all the way to the R yukyu Islands. 
We now begin the survey of state practice to see under what circum-
stances the equidistance principl~ is applied or rejected. 
(a) State Practice 
One of the direct consequences of expanded national maritime 
zones in the last two decades is the increasing overlapping jurisdic-
tions and hence the urgent need to delimit boundaries between 
neighboring states. According to Dr. R. Hodgson, 160 the late geogra-
pher of the Department of State and a recognized authority on the 
geographical aspects of the law of the sea, as of mid-1976, 
[t]here are approximately 300 potential territorial sea or 
continental shelf boundaries at the present state of time and 
geography. Of these, 156 boundaries divide opposite states 
while 144 divide adjacent states. The figures are, surpris-
ingly, nearly equal. Of the 156 "opposite" boundaries five 
are limited to the territorial sea, while eight of the adjacent 
boundaries fall in that category. Thus, there are 151 "op-
posite" territorial sea or continental shelf boundaries and 
136 "adjacent" limits. 161 
Hodgson also indicated that only 21 per cent or (63) of the 300 po-
tential boundaries have been negotiated by them, but he did not give 
separate numbers for each of the group of "adjacent" and "opposite" 
boundaries. By 1981, out of a total of 331 maritime boundaries, ap-
proximately 100 had been negotiated. 162 
A survey by this author, on the basis of a variety of sources to 
date concerning "opposite" shelf boundaries published under the 
auspices of the United Nations, 163 the United States Department of 
State, 164 and private publicists, 165 indicated 45 delimitations of "op-
160. Robert D. Hodgson and Robert W. Smith, "Boundaries of the Economic Zone," 
in Edward L. Miles and John King Gamble, ed., Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes 
and Problems of Implementation, Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Tenth An-
nual Conference, June 22-25, 1976, Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1977, p. 183 [hereinafter cited as Hodgson & Smith (1977)]. 
161. Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
162. See Robert D. Hodgson and Robert W. Smith, "Boundary Issues Created by 
Extended National Marine Jurisdictional", The Geographical Review, Vol. 69 (1979), p. 
426 and Robert W. Smith, "The Maritime Boundaries of the United States", ibid., Vol. 
71 (1981), p. 397. 
163. le., UNLS/15, UNLS/16, UNLS/18, and UNLS/19. 
164. le., the Limits in the Seas series (97 issues as of August 1984). 
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posite" shelf boundaries (including the Anglo-French boundary)~ as 
shown in Table 4. (The Tunisian-Libyan shelf has not been delim-
ited since the ICJ judgment.) The geographical distribution of these 
boundaries is as follows: Europe (14), Asia (16), the Americas (12), 
and the Oceans (3). With two exceptions, all the boundaries were 
delimited on or after 1965. This survey plainly shows the high fre-
quency of the use of the equidistance principle. The list may well be 
incomplete, given the possibility of unpublished treaties. It never-
theless includes the vast majority of "opposite" shelf boundaries de-
limited to date and provides a reasonable basis for analysis. 
Table 4 is intended to examine the correlations between the 
choice of the equidistance principle and the macrogeography of the 
opposite coasts. The concept of a "broad equality of coasts," as used 
by the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration to describe the macroge-
ography of the English Channel, 166 is employed here as a measuring 
rod. The coasts compared here involve only those that are relevant 
to the particular boundary delimitation, and thus do not include the 
same delimiting states' other coasts situated outside the delimitation 
area. For instance, the overall coasts of Norway and Denmark 
clearly are unequal; yet the parts of their coasts which actually were 
used as basepoints-those in the Skagerrak-in delimiting the Dan-
ish-Norwegian shelf boundary, are broadly equal in configuration 
and length. 
It is submitted that in view of the great variety of coastal geog-
raphies, the labelling of two opposite coasts as being "broadly equal" 
inherently involves a measure of subjectivity. Some allowances for 
arguably different characterizations therefore are provided for. The 
brief remarks in Table 4 on salient geographical features also should 
shed some light on the labelling process. In some cases, the straight 
baselines may equalize otherwise broadly unequal coastlines. 
The notions of "true" or "simplified" or "selective" equidistant 
lines are borrowed from Dr. Hodgson's usage 167 with certain modifi-
cations. Theoretically, in a "true" equidistant line, every point along 
the line must be equidistant from at least one basepoint on each 
coast; the turning points must be equidistant from three basepoints: 
one on one coast and the rest on the other. In practice, states follow 
that principle strictly in situations where their coasts are practically 
165. !e., the multi-volume New Directions in the Law of the Sea (II volumes as of 
August 1984). Other private sources have also been consulted, see Index to Sources Con-
sulted in Table 4. 
166. Supra note 42. 
167. Hodgson & Smith (1977), supra note 160, pp. 188-92. 
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equal, but simplify, for administrative purposes, the boundary in 
certain localities by eliminating certain turning points, or by minor 
exchanges of areas. The former line thus is called a "true" median 
line while the latter is a "simplified" one. Both fall in the same cate-
gory for being the closest to the geometrical median line. The "se-
lective" equidistant line is one which is equidistant from the two 
baselines only at selected points of the boundary. As used here, this 
concept also includes boundaries, one or more segments of which are 
delimited under other principles or considerations. For instance, 
about 45 percent of the length of the Italy-Yugoslavia boundary was 
a true equidistant line; the rest was influenced heavily by equitable 
considerations necessitated by the presence of Yugoslav islands. 168 
Similar situations appear in the Italy-Tunisia, 169 Iran-Saudi Ara-
bia, 170 Australia-Indonesia, 171 and Canada-Denmark172 boundaries. 
Boundaries under the caption "other" refer to those delimited 
entirely under equitable or other considerations. It is unfortunate 
that the charts on which about ten percent of these 45 boundaries 
appear are unavailable; hence the impossibility of understanding the 
particular delimitation principle employed there. The principles ac-
tually applied may vary greatly. Where the boundary charts are 
published and studied, there is a strong consistency between the 
equidistant lines drawn on the charts and the references to the equi-
distance principle in the boundary agreements. Therefore, in some 
cases where charts are unavailable, the labelling of "true/simplified 
equidistance" is based on the references in treaty provisions, 173 sub-
ject, of course, to future studies on actual delimitations. 
Despite some irregularities as stated above, a tentative general-
168. Supra Chapter 4, note 37. 
169. Italy-Tunisia shelf boundary, ibid., note 40. 
170. Iran-Saudi Arabia shelf boundary, ibid., note 38. 
171. Agreement Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries, Australia-Indonesia, May 
18, 1971, UNLS/18, p. 433; Agreement Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the 
Area of the Timor and Arufura Seas Supplementary to the Agreement of 18 May 1971, 
Australia-Indonesia, 9 October 1972, ibid., p. 441. Both agreements, hereinafter referred 
to as the Australia-Indonesia shelf boundary agreement, are analyzed in "Territorial Sea 
and Continental Shelf Boundaries: Australia and Papua New Guinea-Indonesia," Limits 
in the Seas, No. 87, August 20, 1979. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying 
notes 270-80. 
172. Supra Chapter 4, note 37. 
173. E.g., the Columbia-Dominican Republic agreement, NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 
78. But in certain cases the designation in treaty text makes little sense. For instance, in 
Article I of the boundary agreement between Cuba and Haiti, it is stated that the EEZ 
shall be delimited "on the basis of the principle of equidistance or equity" (emphasis 
added). NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 69. 
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ization seems possible on the basis of Table 4. While there are cases 
where the broad equality of opposite coasts was present but the par-
ties resorted to principles other than the equidistance rule, there has 
been no instance where the coasts are not broadly equal but the par-
ties nevertheless apply the equidistance principle. Logically, the 
existence of broadly equal coasts seems to constitute a conditio sine 
qua non to the application of the equidistance principle. A statisti-
cally positive correlation between these two variables thus can be 
established. This observation is supported by over 90 percent of the 
boundaries surveyed, with the delimitation principle of only three 
boundaries entirely unknown. Among the latter three, what is 
known is that all of them are located between two broadly equal 
coasts. Thus, even if all of them had been delimited under principles 
other than the equidistance rule, the above observation logically still 
would stand. This is so because the presence of broadly equal coasts 
is here established as a necessary condition, but not as a sufticient 
condition, to the application of the equidistance principle in its true, 
simplified, or selective versions. 
(b) The North Sea Cases 
The ICJ in this case reviewed at length the rationale, origin, and 
the legal status of the equidistance principle. It rejected the "funda-
mentalist aspect" for the contentions of Denmark and the Nether-
lands, namely the proposition that the equidistance rule was an a 
priori accompaniment of the continental shelf doctrine based upon 
the notion of proximity. 174 Meanwhile, the Court stressed that the 
natural prolongation principle, which conferred ipso jure title in re-
spect of the continental shelf to the coastal state, was more funda-
mental to the continental shelf doctrine than the notion of proximity, 
which provided only per se title to land territory. 175 After reviewing 
the travaux preparatoires of Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, the 
Convention's provisions relating to reservations, and the state prac-
tice since 1958, the Court also dismissed the Danish and Dutch con-
tentions that the equidistance rules either embodied or created 
customary rules of intemationallaw. 176 
It seems obvious that the Court was not addressing merely the 
equidistance principle as applied to an adjacent-coast situation, 
which was the subject of the North Seas Cases, but was examining 
174. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 28-31. 
175. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
176. Ibid., pp. 32-46. 
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that principle in general. However, one is still inclined to view the 
geography of the three North Sea states (a concave German coast 
adjacent to two convex Danish and Dutch coasts (Map 13)) as the 
single most important factor underlying the Court's rejection of the 
equidistance rule since its application would obviously produce 
grossly inequitable results. An inevitable question immediately 
arises: would the Court's opinion hold true in an opposite-coast 
situations? 
The Court in fact did address that question, albeit in a more 
casual way. 177 There are only two passages in the Court's opinion 
addressing the opposite situation and are thus worth quoting in full: 
57. Before going further it will be convenient to deal 
briefly with two subsidiary matters. Most of the difficulties 
felt in the International Law Commission related, as here, 
to the case of the lateral boundary between adjacent States. 
Less difficulty was felt over that of the median line bound-
ary between opposite States, although it too is an equidis-
tance line. For this there seems to the Court to be good 
reason. The continental shelf area off, and dividing, oppo-
site States, can be claimed by each of them to be a natural 
prolongation of its territory. These prolongations meet and 
overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a 
median line; and ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and 
minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting 
effect of which can be eliminated by other means, such a 
line must effect an equal division of the particular area in-
volved. If there is a third State on one of the coasts con-
cerned, the area of mutual natural prolongation with that 
of the same or another opposite State will be a separate and 
distinct one, to be treated in the same way. This type of 
case is therefore different from that of laterally adjacent 
States on the same coast with no immediately opposite 
coast in front of it, and does not give rise to the same kind 
of problem-a conclusion which also finds some confirma-
tion in the differences of language to be observed in the two 
paragraphs of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention (repro-
duced in paragraph 26 above) as respects recource in the 
one case to median lines and in the other to lateral equidis-
tance lines, in the event of absence of agreement. 
58. If on the other hand, contrary to the view ex-
177. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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pressed in the preceding paragraph, it were correct to ~ay 
that there is no essential difference in the process of delim-
iting the continental shelf areas between opposite States 
and that of delimitations between adjacent States, then the 
results ought in principle to be the same or at least compa-
rable. But in fact, whereas a median line divides equally 
between the two opposite countries areas that can be re-
garded as being the natural prolongation of the territory of 
each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to one 
of the States concerned areas that are a natural prolonga-
tion of the territory of the other. 178 
151 
These passages present a more balanced picture of the equidis-
tance principle. They should, of course, be read in their context. 
The Court then was comparing the equities between applying the 
equidistance rule in an opposite situation and applying it in an adja-
cent one. In the former, it is less likely to produce inequitable results 
if certain "disproportionately distorting" features are ignored. One 
difficulty with the dictum is that the geographical and geological 
contexts the Court had in mind are not entirely clear. Given the 
generality of its formation, the Court was presumably referring to 
the most common situation, i.e., two broadly equal or comparable 
coasts. Moreover, a geologically continuous continental shelf, which 
constitutes the natural prolongation of each state's territory, seems 
also to have been assumed. One is, accordingly, unable to predict 
what the Court's view would be if the assumed geographical and/or 
geological contexts were lacking. In any event, this dictum suggests 
nothing that supports an automatic and unconditional application of 
the equidistance principle in any opposite-coast situation and there-
fore should not derogate from the Court's general ruling that a de-
limitation should be effected by agreement in accordance with 
equitable principles. 
(c) The Anglo-French Arbitration 
Two geographical and legal factors that distinguish the Anglo-
French case from the North Sea Cases render the former more rele-
vant to the present question of the East China Sea. First, the Court 
of Arbitration was requested to actually delimit the course of the 
shelf boundary between France and the United Kingdom. 179 It thus 
had ample opportunity to weigh the specific geographical circum-
178. Ibid. 
179. Supra note 40. 
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stances of the area in question. Second, the macrogeography in-
volved in the Anglo-French case (Map 14), like that in the East 
China Sea and unlike that in the North Sea Cases, was an opposite-
coast situation. The equidistance principle was more pertinent and 
its application accordingly had been closely examined. 
In deciding the course of the boundary in the Channel Islands 
region, the Court began by identifying the "features and considera-
tions" relevant to that region. The Court opined: 
. . . The region forms an integral part of the English 
Channel. .. ; and for the purpose of delimiting its conti-
nental shelf the region has clearly, in the opinion of the 
Court, to be viewed in its context as part of that whole mar-
itime area. . . . Along the whole 300 miles of the south 
coast of the Channel runs the mainland coast of the French 
Republic; along the whole 300 miles of the north coast of 
the Channel runs the mainland coast of the United King-
dom. Each country has some promontories on its coast and 
the general result is that the coastlines of their mainlands face 
each other across the channel in a relation of approximate 
equality. 
Between opposite States, . . . a median line boundary 
will in normal circumstances leave broadly equal areas of 
continental shelf to each State and constitute a delimitation 
in accordance with equitable principles. It follows that 
where the coastlines of the two opposite states are themselves 
approximately equal in their relations to the continental shelf 
not only should the boundary in normal circumstances be the 
median line but the areas of shelf left to each Party on either 
side of the median line should be broadly equal or at least 
broadly comparable. 180 
The Court then considered the presence of the Channel Islands and 
concluded that: 
Inevitably, the presence of these islands in the English 
Channel in that particular situation disturbs the balance of 
the geographical circumstances which would otherwise ex-
ist between the Parties in the region as a result of the broad 
equality of the coastlines of their mainlands. 181 (emphasis 
added) 
180. The Anglo-French Award, paras. 181-82. 
181. Ibid., para. 183. 
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It seems quite clear that for the equidistance principle to apply, 
the presence of an opposite-coast situation alone does not suffice. A 
more important geographical factor has to be present, namely, the 
coastlines of the two opposite states must be "approximately equal" 
in the sense that their respective length and irregular projections are 
broadly equal or comparable. 
The geographical situation of the Atlantic region is distinguish-
able from that of the Channel Islands in that the areas of continental 
shelf to be delimited in the former lay "off' rather than "between" 
the coasts of France and the United Kingdom. This situation is sim-
ilar to that of the continental shelf between China and Korea, and 
between Japan and Korea, in the East China Sea, but not between 
China and Japan (Map 1). The relevance of the Court's opinion in 
relation to the present case accordingly diminishes. However, the 
Court's reasoning in general still deserves attention. Relying on the 
"fact that in other respects the two States abut on the same continen-
tal shelf with coast not remarkedly different in extent and broadly simi-
lar in their relations to that she!f'' 182 (emphasis added), the Court 
declared that the further seaward protrusion of the British Scilly 
Isles distorted the boundary delimited by reference to them, resulting 
in a "gain" of 4,000 square miles of shelf areas to the United King-
dom and a corresponding "loss" of the same magnitude to France. 183 
A special circumstance in the sense of Article 6 of the Shelf Conven-
tion was, according to the Court, present and another boundary thus 
was justified to redress the inequity created. 184 
(d) The Tunisian-Libyan Case 
The equidistance principle played a minor role in the decision 
of the ICJ in the Tunisian-Libyan Case primarily for two reasons. 
First, the Court, in recalling its 1969 judgment in the North Sea 
Cases, which also involved an adjacent-coast situation, reiterated 
that the equidistance method was not prescribed by a mandatory 
rule of international law; nor did it have any privileged status in 
relation to other methods in shelf delimitation. 185 Although that 
method had been employed frequently in state practice since 1969, 
the Court noted that states also deviated from it whenever equitable 
considerations dictated. 186 Second, the fact that both Tunisia and 
182. Ibid., para. 244. 
183. Ibid., para. 243. 
184. Ibid., para. 245. 
185. l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 79. 
186. Ibid. 
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Libya were opposed to the use of the equidistance line, which they 
firmly believed would result in inequity in the present case, greatly 
impressed the Court. 187 
As the Court was requested under the parties' special agreement 
to clarify the delimitation method in the specific situation of the 
present case, it decided to adopt a two-sector-two-method approach, 
namely, applying two delimitation methods, respectively, in two sec-
tors of the delimitation area. 188 In the first sector, which is immedi-
ately off the parties' territorial sea, the Court considered four 
possible lines before finally choosing the 26 o northeast line as the 
shelfboundary 189 (Map 17). But, since the line is approximately per-
pendicular to the coast at Ras Ajdir, it becomes less appropriate as it 
extends farther out to the sea. Two factors required its change of 
course in the second sector: the abrupt tum of the coast of the Gulf 
of Gabes and the ~resence of the Kerkennah Islands and nearby 
low-tide elevations 90 (Map 15). As a perpendicular, the 26° line 
was unable to take account of these changed circumstances to which 
the Court attached great importance. A line based on other meth-
ods, which would veer in a more easterly direction than the 26° line, 
so as to reflect the geographical changes, therefore was called for. 
In this connection the Court thought it proper to weigh the rele-
vance of the equidistance line, which Tunisia once advocated in 1976 
but dropped in its present memorial. 191 The Court first noted that it 
is the virtue as well as the weakness of the equidistance method to 
take full account of almost all the geographical variations of the 
coastline. 192 It then recalled its opinion in the North Sea Cases that 
the equidistance method would encounter much less difficulty in an 
opposite-coast situation than in an adjacent one. Then the Court 
concluded: 
The major change in direction undergone by the coast of 
Tunisia seems to the Court to go some way, though not the 
whole way, towards transforming the relationship of Libya 
and Tunisia from that of adjacent States to that of opposite 
States, and thus to produce a situation in which the position 
of an eqwdistance line becomes a factor to be given more 
weight in the balancing of equitable considerations than 
187. Ibid. 
188. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
189. Ibid., pp. 85. 
190. Ibid., pp. 86-89. 
191. Ibid., p. 87. 
192. Ibid., p. 88. 
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would otherwise be the case. 193 (emphasis added) 
Since the final boundary delimited by the Court in the second 
sector was not an equidistance line, the equidistance principle thus 
only played a "reminder" role in pointing to the need for a line that 
takes full account of the relevant geographical circumstances in or-
der to reach an equitable delimitation. The perspective in which the 
court elaced the equidistance principle, which has given rise to criti-
cism, 1 4 may be summarized below by quoting the Court's own 
words: 
Treaty practice, as well as the history of Article 83 of the 
draft convention on the Law of the Sea, leads to the conclu-
sion that equidistance may be applied !fit leads to an equita-
ble solution; !f not, other methods should be employed. 
Nor does the Court consider that it is in the present case 
required, as a first step, to examine the effects of a delimita-
tion by application of the equidistance method, and to re-
ject that method in favour of some other only if it considers 
the results of an equidistance line to be inequitable. A find-
ing by the Court in favour of a delimitation by an equidis-
tance line could only be based on considerations derived from 
an evaluation and balancing up of all relevant circum-
stances . ... 195 (emphasis added) 
Given the limited role the equidistance principle played in the 
Tunisian-Libyan Case, the Court did not take the trouble to elabo-
rate under what circumstances, other than the presence of certain 
geographical features, the application of the equidistance principle 
will lead to an equitable solution. Thus the Tunisian-Libyan Case, 
unlike the Anglo-French Arbitration, shed little light on whether the 
equidistance principle should apply to the Sino-Japanese shelf de-
limitation in the East China Sea. 
The above analysis of the three cases confirms the conclusion 
that the applicability of the equidistance principle is a function or 
reflection of the geographical circumstances of a particular case. 
Specifically, the application of the equidistance principle seems to 
require a broadly equal or comparable geography of the coasts facing 
each other in an opposite-coast situation. 
193. Ibid. 
194. E.g., E.D. Brown, "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: A Missed Oppor-
tunity," Marine Policy, Vol. 7 (1983), pp. 154-56. 
195. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 79. 
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(e) The Equidistance Principle and the Sino-Japanese 
Seabed Delimitation 
The above survey of international judicial cases suggests that 
while the North Sea and Tunisian-Libyan Cases did not specifically 
address the geographical circumstances under which the equidis-
tance principle should apply, the Anglo-French Court did exactly 
that. The latter's ruling that the approximate equality of the coast-
lines of two opposite states makes equitable the application of the 
equidistance principle finds overwhelming support from state prac-
tices to date. The inevitable question therefore is: are the coastlines 
of China and Japan in the East China Sea broadly equal in their 
relations to the continental shelf? 
( 1) The North Region 
If the Okinawa Trough did not exist, the equidistance principle 
would probably apply among the three states in the North Region 
inter se. For broad equality of coasts seems to be present prima facie 
between China and Korea, Korea and Japan, and China and Japan 
in that area (Map 1). Such broad equality exists initially in the Yel-
low Sea between the Chinese mainland coast and the west coast of 
Korea and in the Korea Strait between the southern Korean coast 
and Japan. Such broadly equal relationships continue southerly into 
the East China Sea, crossing the artificial boundaries between the 
Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, and between the East China Sea 
and the Korea Strait. The southerly extensions of the hypothetical 
Sino-Korean median line in the Yellow Sea and the existing Japan-
ROK median line in the Korea Strait would divide approximately 
equally the continental shelf areas appertaining to each state. The 
two median lines would converge at a point with the geographical 
coordinates of30°46.2'N latitude and l25°55.5'E longitude, which is 
now the westernmost point on the western limit of the Japan-ROK 
JDZ (Maps 6 and 1). Presumably, a Sino-Japanese median line 
would start at that point and extend in a southerly, then southwest-
erly, direction for about 90 miles, intersecting the 30°N parallel. 
The course of this median line would change if Danjo Gunto and 
Tori Shima were not used as basepoints and were not given full ef-
fect in the delimitation. Given the broadly comparable macroge-
ographies of the states' coasts, an equidistance line seems to be a 
good start for shelf delimitation in the North Region, subject to the 
proportionality test, to be discussed infra. 
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(2) The South Region 
South of the 30°N parallel, with the Korean Peninsula, the 
Chejo Do, and Japan proper (Kyushu) out of the picture, the 
macrogeography of the East China Sea changes markedly (Map 1 ). 
In the west there still lie the coasts of the Chinese mainland and 
Taiwan; in the east, however, only those of the scattered Ryukyu 
Islands exist. Broad equality of coasts no longer presents itself prima 
facie. Moreover, the relationship of mainland (plus large islands) 
versus island chain is not unequal per se. The crucial tests, as sug-
gested by the North Sea and Anglo-French cases involve the coastal 
configuration and the length of coastline. Does broad equality exist 
under each test between China (ROC and PRC) and Japan in the 
South Region? 
Chapter 1 noted that the two seaward arcs formed by the Chi-
nese mainland coast and the R yukyu Islands chain largely are paral-
lel. The addition of Taiwan's coastline to that of the Chinese 
mainland does not alter substantially this parallel relationship. 
Since the intervening water gaps between each island in the R yukyu 
chain, the total length of which exceeds the total length of the land-
mass, hardly can be regarded as part of the islands' general configur-
ation, then broad equality seems to be lacking. 
As for the question of the length of coastline there is no obvious 
answer, however. A preliminary question is: how should the coast-
line be measured? Following all the sinuosities of the coast? Or its 
"general direction" and "coastal front" as suggested by the ICJ in 
the North Sea and Tunisian-Ltbyan Cases? 196 How should the length 
of islands be measured? Since the whole idea of measuring the 
length of coastline is intended for comparison, it matters little as 
long as the method is simple and equally applied. 197 Therefore, the 
"general direction" as well as the "coastal front" approaches to the 
mainland coast seem acceptable. Under the same rationale, an is-
land's coast may be measured by its maximum length instead of fol-
lowing its sinuosities. 198 Under this formula, China (ROC and 
PRC) has, in the East China Sea, approximately 748 miles of coast-
line (365 miles in the South Region) for its mainland and Taiwan, 
whereas Japan has 415 miles for Kyushu, Osumi Gunto and the en-
196. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52; I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91. 
197. The Tunisian-Libyan judgment is in accord, I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 75-76. 
198. The "maximum length" idea owes its origin to Donald E. Karl who developed it 
in Karl (1977), supra Chapter 4, note 36, p. 633, note 85 and accompanying text. 
158 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
tire Ryukyu Islands (205 miles in the South Region). 199 For present 
purposes, the PRC's straight baselines are disregarded. 
The above exercise indicates that broad equality does not seem 
to exist in the South Region between Chinese and Japanese territo-
ries in terms of coastal configuration and length. If the landmass of 
the R yukyu Islands were as continuous as that of the four main is-
lands of Japan proper, such a relationship probably would exist. 
Given the R yukyus' broken-chain configuration with many interven-
ing water gaps (the greatest distance being 120 miles between the 
Okinawa and Sakishima Guntos), it is only natural that their general 
configuration and length of coastline are not comparable to China's. 
In conclusion, the appliability of the equidistance principle to the 
South Region seems, absent broad equality of coastal geography, 
questionable, if not altogether impermissible. 
3. The Equitability Test: Proportionality 
The objection against the equidistance principle as applied to 
the South Region is directed primarily at its strict application, which 
is likely to result in disproportionate distortions of the boundary in 
view of the markedly incomparable configuration and length of 
coastlines of the two states in that region. This rationale brings into 
play the notion of proportionality in continental shelf delimitation. 
In fact, where the application of the equidistance principle is re-
garded as equitable, one element of such equity lies precisely in the 
broadly proportionate division it effects.200 This element is quite vis-
ible in the opinions of the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French Arbi-
tration, and the Tunisian-Libyan Case quoted earlier. If, as 
suggested above, the landmass of the R yukyus extended, like that of 
Japan proper, in a nearly uninterrupted fashion, the applicability of 
the equidistance principle probably would be assured, given the 
comparable configuration and coastal length and the resulting pro-
portionate division of the assumed continuous continental shelf. It is 
therefore necessary to ascertain the legal status of the proportionality 
concept. 
199. For details about the calculations, see Table 5. 
200. This point was well made by M.D. Blecher in Blecher (1979), supra note 9, pp. 
73-77. 
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(a) Proportionality and the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-
French Arbitration, and the Tunisian-Libyan 
Case 
The proper role of the proportionality concept is not devoid of 
controversy. In the North Sea Cases, the Court specifically rejected 
the German contentions, "at least in the particular form they have 
taken," that each of the three North Sea states should get a "just and 
equitable share of the available continental shelf in proportion to the 
length of its coastline or sea-frontage."201 The Court first distin-
guished delimitation from apportionment: 
Delimitation is a process which involves establishing the 
boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining to 
the coastal state and not the determination de novo of such 
an area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, 
but not the same thing as awarding a just and equitable 
share of a previously undelimited area, even though in a 
number of cases the results may be comparable or even iden-
tical.202 (emphasis added) 
It then dismissed the whole concept of "just and equitable share:" 
More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and 
equitable share appears to be wholly at variance with . . . 
the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the 
continental shelf . . . namely that the rights of the coastal 
State in respect of the area of continental shelf that consti-
tutes the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its 
sovereignty over the land . . . In short, there is here an 
inherent right. 
The delimitation itself must indeed be equitably ef-
fected, but it cannot have as its object the awarding of an 
equitable share, or indeed of a share, as such, at all,-for 
the fundamental concept involved does not admit of there 
being anything undivided to share out. 203 
Despite the strong language of these quotations, three inferences 
can be drawn. First, the Court did not reject the concept of propor-
tionality as a factor in shelf delimitation, but it only discounted an 
extreme application of that concept. Second, the Court's objections 
are more theoretical than practical since the Court itself admitted 
201. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 21. 
202. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
203. Ibid., p. 22. 
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that "in a number of cases the result may be comparable or even 
identical." Third, and most importantly, the Court's reference in its 
final judgment to the concept of proportionality demands attention. 
A final factor to be taken account is the element of a rea-
sonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation ef-
fected according to equitable principles ought to bring 
about between the extent of the continental shelf appertain-
ing to the States concerned and the lengths of their respec-
tive coastlines,-these being measured according to their 
general direction in order to establish the necessary balance 
between States with straight and those with markedly con-
cave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines 
to their truer proportions. The choice and application of the 
appropriate technical methods would be a matter for the 
parties. One method discussed in the course of the pro-
ceedings, under the name of the principle of the coastal 
front, consists in drawing a straight baseline between the 
extreme points at either end of the coast concerned, or in 
some cases a series of such lines. Where the parties wish to 
employ in particular the equidistance principle method of 
delimitation, the establishment of one or more baselines of 
this kind can play a useful part in eliminating or diminish-
ing the distortions that might result from the use of that 
method.204 (emphasis added) 
Now the Court itself seemed to advocate the idea of proportion-
ality, albeit in a less offensive fashion. This position in effect sub-
stantially modified its earlier rejection of the German contentions. 
(One may argue alternatively that the Court did not reject this part 
of the German contentions in the first place.) The message, some-
what confusing, seems to be that while the apportionment of the con-
tinental shelf into "just and equitable shares" is repugnant as a goal, 
it would be acceptable if it is brought about acctdentally by delimita-
tion under equitable principles. This distinction, even if discernible 
in theory, makes little sense in practice. Even the theoretical distinc-
tion cannot escape criticism.205 
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, the Court's view is in accord 
with the ICJ's distinction between delimitation and apportion-
ment.206 But it specifically limited the effects of the latter's formula-
204. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52. 
205. Grise! (1970), supra note 157. 
206. Anglo-French Award, para. 78. 
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tion on the proportionality between the "coastal fro~t" and the 
continental shelf entitlement to the particular geographical facts of 
the North Sea Cases?01 It declared: 
In the present case, the role of proportionality in the delim-
itation of the continental shelf is, in the view of this Court, 
a broader one, not linked to any specific geographical fea-
ture. It is a factor to be taken into account in appreciating 
the effects of geographical features on the equitable or in-
equitable character of a delimitation, and in particular of a 
delimitation by application of the equidistance method.208 
The role of proportionality thus is redefined as a "criterion or 
factor," and not a "general principle" providing an independent 
source of rights to areas of continental shelf/09 and it is to be in-
voked only to check the presence of distortion.210 Thus, both Courts 
define the role of proportionality as a factor; yet the ICJ would use it 
more positively while the Anglo-French Court would employ it only 
negatively. 
In the Tunisian-Libyan Case, both parties stressed that the ele-
ment of proportionality must be taken into account.211 Finding itself 
in full agreement with the parties, the ICJ characterized that element 
as "a function [or aspect] of equity" and reiterated the relationship 
between it and the lengths of the coasts of states concemed.2 12 In 
demonstrating the practical methods of delimitation in the present 
case, the Court, after having designated as shelf boundary the 26° 
line in the first sector to be connected by the 52° line in the second 
sector, used the element of proportionality as a test to evaluate the 
equitability of the shelf areas appertaining to each of the parties as a 
result of the delimitation by this boundary.213 The Court first deter-
mined the area to be compared: the parallel of latitude passing 
through Ras Kaboudia and the meridian of longitude passing 
through Ras Tajoura.214 The shelf boundary as delimited by the 
Court divided the seabed of the above area into two parts with an 
areal ratio of 60:40 between Tunisia and Libya.215 The Court re-
207. Ibid., para. 99. 
208. Ibid. 
209. Ibid., para. 101. 
210. Ibid. 
211. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 43 and p. 75. 
212. Ibid., p. 76. 
213. Ibid., p. 91. 
214. Ibid. 
215. Ibid. 
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garded the ratio as comparable to the ratio of 69:31 in coastal lengths 
measured in the general direction of the two states' coasts and the 
ratio of 66:34 in coastal front measured by straight lines between the 
two states.216 In conclusion,the Court stated that, "This result, tak-
ing into account all the relevant circumstances, seems to the Court to 
meet the requirements of the test of proportionality as an aspect of 
equity. "217 
Thus, the Tunisian-Libyan Case clearly confirms earlier deci-
sions, particularly that of the Anglo-French Arbitration, that the ele-
ment of proportionality is employed to test the equitability of a given 
boundary rather than to be used as an independent principle of con-
tinental shelf delimitation. 
In sum, the notion of proportionality has been used in such a 
way that logically presupposes a general proportionality of the conti-
nental shelf entitlements between the parties in the delimitation area 
as the basis on which any distortion-a potential source of ineq-
uity-can be assessed accordingly. In the North Sea Cases, and the 
Tunisian-Libyan Case, the respective lengths of the coast of the three 
states serve as this basis of assessment, whereas in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration it was the broadly equal or comparable coastal geogra-
phies (including length and configuration) of the coasts of France 
and the United Kingdom. 
(b) Proportionality and the Length of Coastline 
Despite the slightly different forms of recognition accorded it, 
the proportionality concept in general seems to have been well rec-
ognized by international tribunals as well as by commentators.218 
The linkage between the coastal length and the continental shelf 
entitlement also finds su~port in the fundamental concept that the 
"land dominates the sea" 19 declared by the ICJ. The coast of a state 
is where the land meets the sea under which the continental shelf lies 
and prolongs. Its length seems to be the single most objective crite-
rion in measuring the continental shelf entitlement of a state. The 
216. Ibid. 
217. Ibid. 
218. Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke, Public Order of the Oceans: A Con· 
temporary International Law of the Sea, New Heaven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1962, p. 725; Shigeru Oda, "Proposals for Revising the Convention on the Conti· 
nental Shelf," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 7 (1979), pp. I, 27; Karl 
(1977), supra Chapter 4, note 36, pp. 665-72; Blecher (1979), supra note 200; Collins & 
Rogoff (1982), supra Introduction, note 23, p. 14. 
219. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50. 
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same has been true for the delimitation of other regimes of the seas 
for centuries. It would be unthinkable if a coastal state's maritime 
jurisdiction were determined by anything other than its coast. In its 
oft-cited quotation, which theAnglo-French Court endorsed, the ICJ 
opined: 
Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can 
never be any question of completely refashioning nature, 
and equity does not require that a State without access to 
the sea should be allotted an area of continental shelf, any 
more than there could be a question of rendering the situation 
of a Stale with an extensive coastline similar to that of a 
State with a restricted coastline.220 (emphasis added). 
There are, however, objections to this "coastal length" approach 
to continental shelf delimitation. Opponents point out that it is vul-
nerable to manipulation by states in order to reach desired results.221 
Like any formula based on arithmetic calculations, potential manip-
ulation of the factual input does exist; but this problem is not insur-
mountable. For instance, if the coastal length of a mainland is 
measured in the general direction of the coastline and islands by 
their maximum lengths, as was done earlier, rather than by following 
their sinuosities, the possibility of manipulation can be reduced sub-
stantially. The potential disagreement on the definition and equity 
of the "general direction" and the "maximum length" approaches is 
also possible, but it is certainly more manageable than requiring the 
parties to agree on the length of their coasts following all their sinu-
osities. Further, the coastal-length method does not requier a math-
ematically precise ratio of the length of coastline to the continental 
shelf entitlements, but rather requires a "reasonable proportional-
ity," as the ICJ suggested. The percentage figures arrived at from 
the calculations only would serve as an indicator of the range of pro-
portions for the parties. This clearly is demonstrated by the ICJ's 
computations in the Tunisian-Libyan Case discussed above. Finally, 
proportionality would and should operate always together with other 
delimitation principles since that notionper se semantically suggests 
no limits or boundaries. The chances of abuse thus further diminish. 
(c) Proportionality and the Sino-Japanese Delimitation 
in the South Region 
If the proportionality test as emodied by the coastal length ap-
220. Ibid., p. 49. 
221. Allen & Mitchell, supra Chapter 2, note 28, p. 812. 
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proach were applied to the South Region of the East China Sea, the 
resulting proportions of Chinese and Japanese continental shelves 
would look like those shown in Table 5.222 The measurement of the 
length of the Chinese mainland coast in its general direction, ignor-
ing the presence of minor protrusions and coastal islets, encounters 
little problem. But the shape of Taiwan poses a challenge to the 
equity of the "maximum length" approach to the coastal length of 
islands. Technically, Taiwan borders the East China Sea only at its 
northern and northeastern coasts with the rest of its coasts sur-
rounded by the Taiwan Strait (west), the South China Sea (south), 
and the Philippine Sea (east) (Map 1). The "maximum length" ap-
proach, if strictly applied, would give Taiwan a coastal length of ap-
proximately 202 miles, a figure grossly incompatible with its actual 
length (81 miles) bordering the East China Sea, measured in the gen-
eral direction of that part of its coast. Therefore, the "general direc-
tion" approach, which seems to fit better islands like Taiwan with 
sizes comparable to those of the mainland in some cases, is applied 
to Taiwan's northern and northeastern coasts as well as to the coast 
of K yushu facing the East China Sea. On the other hand, the "maxi-
mum length" approach applies perfectly to the R yukyus where the 
majority of the main islands are relatively small as compared to Tai-
wan, but long in shape. Their lengthy shape, unlike that of Taiwan, 
does not create problems, since they are mostly parallel to the gen-
eral configuration of the East China Sea (Map 1 ). 
The percentage figures in Table 5, 64 (or 65) percent for China 
and 36 (or 35) percent for Japan, are not intended to be mechani-
cally applied in a way that divides up the whole South Region in 
precise shares. Rather, it is to be used to evaluate the inequities that 
might result from the strict application of a particular delimitation 
principle, or to serve as a guideline to the range of proportions an 
equitable delimitation ought to bring about. 
4. Conclusion 
The geographical factor has been, and will continue to be, one 
of the most important circumstances affecting the delimitation of 
continental shelf between neighboring states. A macroanalysis of the 
geography of the East China Sea, under the assumption that the Oki-
222. Calculations of the coastal lengths in Table 5 are based on U.S. Army Map Ser-
vice, The World, Series 1106, Sheet 8, Topographic Map: Southeastern Asia (scale 
1:5,000,000). This map may be obtained from the Defense Mapping Agency in Washing-
ton, D.C. 
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nawa Trough is non-existent, leads to the imaginary division of the 
area into two regions separated by the 30°N parallel. The division is 
justified by the distinctive macrogeographies of the two regions. In 
the North Region, all three states have coastal fronts with relatively 
heavy concentration of their territories. The broad equality of oppo-
site coasts that exists in the Yellow Sea between China and Korea 
and in the Korea Strait between Korea and Japan continues south-
erly into the North Region. Consequently, the application of the 
equidistance principle, subject to the proportionality test, to the 
North Region seems to be broadly equitable and in general accord 
with international judicial decisions and state practice. On the other 
hand, the macrogeography of the South Region, where the Korea 
Peninsula and Japan proper largely cease to have any influence in 
boundary delimitation, calls for a markedly different treatment. The 
sharply incomparable coastal lengths of the Chinese mainland and 
Taiwan and the scattered Ryukyu Islands render a strict median-line 
solution prima facie inequitable. Although it may still be used as a 
reference line, it must again be subject to the proportionality test 
based on the length of the coast. The resulting ratio (China: 64 per-
cent; Japan: 36 percent) provides a general range of proportions 
which an equitable delimitation ought to bring about. Actual delim-
itation of the boundary, however, has to await the review below of 
the regional geology and geomorphology in the East China Sea. 
E. Geology and Geomorphology as Relevant Circumstances 
In the preceding section, the geological and geomorphological 
aspects deliberately were disregarded in order to concentrate on the 
geographical circumstances of the East China Sea. Here we shall 
largely ignore the geographical aspects and exclusively examine the 
legal significance of the regional geology and geomorphology. In 
relation to the law on continental shelf, the geology and geomor-
phology of the seabed have two aspects: one concerns the seaward 
delimitation of the continental shelf; the other relates to inter-state 
delimitation. We shall deal with each aspect in the context of the 
East China Sea before assessing their implications for the Sino-Japa-
nese seabed controversy. 
1. Geology, Geomorphology, and the Natural Prolongation 
Principle 
The definition (or seaward delimitation) of the continental shelf 
as adopted in Article 1 of the 1958 Shelf Convention contains two 
tests: depth (200 meters) and exploitability (wherever the superja-
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cent water admits of exploitation). Designed to accommodate the 
interests of both the narrow-margin and broad-margin states, this 
definition fails to reflect truly the geological reality of the seabed, 
however. The juxtaposition of two criteria plus the vague words 
"adjacent to the coasts" have given rise to much confusion and con-
troversy ever since 1958.223 As if to becloud the already puzzling 
picture further, the ICJ in 1969 injected in the North Sea Cases a 
new element-natural prolongation of land territories-into the defi-
nition of the legal continental shelf. The Court formulated this 
"most fundamental" doctrine of the continental shelf in these words 
(in addition to those quoted on p. 161 supra): 
What confers the ipso jure title which international law at-
tributes to the coastal State in respect of its continental 
shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be 
deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the 
coastal State already has dominion,-in the sense that, al-
though covered with water, they are a prolongation or con-
tinuation of that territory, an extension of it under the 
sea.224 
And the geological or geomorphological underpinnings of that doc-
trine are also evident as the Court further noted: 
The continental shelf is, by definition, an area physically 
extending the territory of most coastal States into a species 
ofplatform ... The appurtenance of the shelf to the coun-
tries in front of whose coastlines it lies, is therefore a fact, 
and it can be useful to consider the geology of that shelf in 
order to find out whether the direction taken by certain 
configurational features should influence delimitation be-
cause, in certain localities, they point-up the whole notion 
of appurtenance of the continental shelf to the State whose 
territory it does in fact prolong. 225 
223. The question of the continental shelfs outer limit has been treated extensively by 
commentators. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, "International Law and the Interest: The Law 
of the Seabed," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 504; Luke W. 
Finlay, "The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf: A Rejoinder to Professor Louis Hen-
kin," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64 (1970), p. 42; Louis Henkin, "A 
Reply to Mr. Finlay," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64 (1970), p. 62; 
L.F.E. Goldie, "A Lexicographical Controversy-the Word 'Adjacent' in Article I of the 
Continental Shelf Convention," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 66 (1972), p. 
829, and the references cited there. 
224. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 31. 
225. Ibid., p. 51. 
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It is worth noting that, thirteen years later, that "most funda-
mental" doctrine of the continental shelf was downplayed by the ICJ 
in the 1982 Tunisian-Libyan Case, primarily because ofthe geophysi-
cal circumstances involved. In that case both Tunisia and Libya 
were in agreement as to the degree of importance they attributed to 
this concept.226 They also regarded it as a major criterion for shelf 
delimitation, but they differed substantially in the definition and ap-
plication of that principle to the present case.227 At one point, Libya 
even went so far as to suggest that the natural prolongation was de-
terminable as a matter of scientific fact by the application of geologi-
cal criteria; equitable principles should therefore play no role in 
identifying the appurtenant continental shelf based upon the juridi-
cal concept of natural prolongation. 228 
Alarmed by the parties' excessive reliance on the literal inter-
pretation of the 1969 North Sea Cases and the confusion and misun-
derstanding that case may have created as a result of 
overemphasizing the natural prolongation principle, the Court de-
cided to place that principle in proper perspective by trimming its 
sweeping effect: 
The satisfaction of equitable principle is, in the delimita-
tion process, of cardinal importance,. . ., and identification 
of natural prolongation may, where the geographical circum-
stances are appropriate, have an important role to play, in 
defining an equitable delimitation, in view of its signifi-
cance as the justification of continental shelf rights in some 
cases; but the two considerations-the satisfying of equita-
ble principle and the identification of the natural prolonga-
tion-are not to be placed on a plane of equality. 229 
(emphasis added). 
As to the application of the natural prolongation principle to the 
present case, the Court stated that 
the area relevant for the delimitation constitutes a single 
continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land 
territory of both Parites, so that in the present case, no cri-
terion for delimitation of shelf areas can be derived from 
the principle of natural prolongation as such;230 
226. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 43. 
227. Ibid. 
228. Ibid., p. 44. 
229. Ibid., p. 47. 
230. Ibid., p. 92. 
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Thus, by attributing the irrelevance of the natural prolongation 
principle to the particular geophysical facts of the present case, the 
Court seemed to imply that if the relevant delimitation area does not 
constitute a single shelf, then certain criteria for delimitation may be 
derived from the principle of natural prolongation. The Court went 
further to point out that the geomorphological features present in the 
delimitation area were not sufficiently distinct to disrupt the geologi-
cal continuity of the shelf, although it still may be considered as one 
of the relevant circumstances in delimiting an equitable boundary.231 
The Tripolitanian Furrow, a minor submarine valley but the most 
distinct geomorphological feature in the area, on the presence of 
which Tunisia relied as the "natural submarine frontier" of Libya's 
natural prolongation, was thus taken by the Court into account as a 
geomorphologically relevant circumstance but was given no weight 
in influencing the ultimate boundary.232 
While the ICJ and commentators233 were struggling with the ex-
act meaning of the "natural prolongation" principle as it relates to 
the geology and geomorphology of the seabed, its impact was al-
ready deeply felt in a hitherto little noticed area-the East China 
Sea. The advent of that principle could not have been more timely 
for the ROK and ROC which, amid the euphoria brought about by 
the Emery Report, were eager to stake out their claims as far as pos-
sible into the East China Sea. The deep Okinawa Trough, which is 
situated closer to Japan than to the ROK or the ROC territories, was 
regarded by the latter two states as marking the outer limits of the 
continental shelf of the East China Sea under the natural prolonga-
tion principle. Both of them argued that the Japanese shelf as gener-
ated by K yushu and the R yukyus would prolong for a short distance 
and terminate in the vicinity of the Trough, whereas both Chinese 
and Korean shelves also would reach the Trough and the logical 
boundary would be a mid-channel line (Map 1). As discussed in 
Chapter 2 supra, the eastern limits of the ROC's claims (Map 9) and 
the ROK's concession area (Map 5), which largely follow the mid-
channel line, clearly demonstrate the two states' reliance on the natu-
ral prolongation principle. 
The way that principle was invoked seems to imply two possible 
231. Ibid., p. 58. 
232. Ibid., pp. 55-58. 
233. Robert Y. Jennings, "The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possi-
ble Implications of the North Sea Case Judgment," International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1969), p. 819; Brown (1971), supra Chapter 4, note 129, pp. 32-35; 
Wolfgang Friedman, The Future of the Oceans, New York: G. Braziller, 1971, pp. 41-43. 
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interpretations of it to the geological and geomorphological back-
ground of the East China Sea. The first is that the .natural prolo~g~­
tion of a coastal state's territory is co-terminous wtth the outer hm1t 
of the continental margin (the shelf, the slope, and the rise), or at 
least with the base of the continental slope; that the Okinawa Trough 
is just such an outer limit of East Asian continental margin, or base 
of slope, where the seabed abruptly drops off to a depth exceeding 
2,000 meters; and that the Okinawa Trough constitutes the boundary 
between the East Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean, with the 
shelf to its west being "continental" in crustal structure and the Ryu-
kyu Islands to its east being "oceanic" in origin-volcanic outcrop-
pings rising from the ocean floor. Under this interpretation, the 
natural prolongations of both the Chinese and Japanese territories in 
the East China Sea meet and end in the Okinawa Trough. 
A second interpretation places the continent-ocean boundary 
(or the base of the slope) not in the Okinawa Trough but in the Ryu-
kyu Trench in the Pacific Ocean east of the R yukyu Islands (Map 1 ). 
The shelf, the Trough, and the island arc in the East China Sea land-
ward of the R yukyu Trench are considered but constituent parts of a 
highly irregular continental margin. The whole seabed of the conti-
nental shelf, the Trough, and the insular shelf therefore is subject to 
national jurisdiction and to boundary delimitation. However, as this 
theory affirms, the Okinawa Trough is such a distinct geomorpholog-
ical feature that it marks the end of the natural prolongation of the 
territories of both China (and Korea) and Japan. 
The first interpretation emphasizes the geological implication of 
the natural prolongation principle and bases its whole theory on the 
assumption that the Okinawa Trough marks the natural boundary of 
the East Asian continental crust and the Pacific oceanic crust. The 
second interpretation stresses more the geomorphological import of 
the natural prolongation principle and disregards the underlying 
crustal structure of the East China Sea and beyond. 
The ICJ did not define specifically, in the North Sea Cases or 
the Tunisian-Libyan Case, how far or to what extent a coastal State's 
territory should or could prolong "naturally." One reason may be 
that the whole disputed areas were sitting on the geological shelf of 
the North Sea and the Pelagian Sea respectively and hence there was 
no need for the Court to elaborate on this question. But the Court's 
dicta seems to admit of both interpretations suggested above. 234 It 
234. When discussing the question of adjacency, the Court did refer to "localities 
'where, physically, the continental shelf begins to merge with the ocean depths" I.C.J. 
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seems that the application of the natural prolongation principle, with 
its geological and geomorphological underpinnings, really depends 
on how earth scientists characterize and classify certain submarine 
relief features such as the Okinawa Trough. 
Some geologists who have studied the area do not treat the Oki-
nawa Trough as part of the Asian continental shelf.235 Nor do they 
specify precisely the crustal structure underlying the Trough, though 
they tend to believe that it is underlain by oceanic crust. 236 Others237 
regard the Trough, on the basis of its remarkably high heat flow, as 
"an embryo of a marginal sea basin,"238 thus identifying it with more 
than 40 marginal ocean basins of the world.239 The crustal structures 
of these marginal basins are, however, far from uniform. Some are 
definitely continental, e.g., the North Sea and the Yellow Sea, or 
definitely oceanic, e.g., the Gulf of Mexico. Others belong to neither 
type, but have an intermediate character, e.g., the Sea of Japan.240 
Still other geologists think of the Trough simply as a continental bor-
Reports 1969, p. 30. Despite the obvious error in that the geological continental shelf 
does not "merge with the ocean depths" immediately (could it be that what the Court 
meant was the legal continental shelf?), the Court was certainly aware of the issue in 
general and might have intended to include the whole slope as part of the natural prolon-
gation of the coastal state. On the other hand, the Court did not make that point clear 
enough. And its reference to the Norwegian Trough, ibid., p. 32, strongly implied that 
natural prolongation of the coastal state would terminate at the edge of the geological 
shelf in its narrowest sense. Commentators are widely divided on this question. See 
supra note 233. 
235. See K.O. Emery et a!., supra Chapter I, note 7, pp. 13-38; John M. Wageman, 
W.C. Hilde & K.O. Emery, ibid., pp. 1611, 1612-40. 
236. Ibid. In a letter to this author dated April 30, 1980, Emery wrote [hereinafter 
cited as the Emery Letter]: 
So far as I know the structure of the crust beneath the Okinawa Trough is 
unproven, but I am reasonably sure that it will turn out to be oceanic, not conti-
nental. It is beyond the continental slope (generally the oceanward limit of the 
continental crust) and it is limited by volcanic islands of oceanic origin. Seis-
mic refraction is needed to prove the origin. (emphasis added) 
237. A. Sugimura and S. Uyeda, Island Arcs: Japan and Its Environs, Development in 
Geotectonics 3, Amsterdam-London-New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Com-
pany, 1973, p. 64. S. Uyeda "Northwest Pacific Trench Margins," in C. Burk and C.L. 
Drake ed., The Geology of Continental Margins, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1974, pp. 
477, 483. 
238. A. Sugimura and S. Uyeda, supra note 237, pp. 64-65; Uyeda, supra note 237, p. 
477. 
239. Hedberg (1970), supra Chapter I, note 10, pp. 27-28. 
240. H.W. Menard, "Transitional Types of Crust under Small Ocean Basins," Geo-
physical Research, Vol. 72 (1967), pp. 3061, 3063-64, 3071 [hereinafter cited as Menard 
(1967)]. 
SEABED BoUNDARY DELIMITATION 171 
derland, 241 a highly irregular relief feature in th~ continental ~argin 
with de~ths "well in excess of those typtcal of contmental 
shelves." 42 A textbook example exists off the southern California 
coast. 
All the above theories suffer from the same defect-they do not 
respond to the legally relevant question with certainty: what type of 
crust, continental or oceanic, does the Okinawa Trough overlie? But 
if the Pacific oceanic crust slides, as the plate-spreading theory pos-
tulates, under the Asian continental crust via the chain of trenches 
(including the Ryukyu Trench), then the Okinawa Trough could 
well overlie a crust of an intermediate character243 belonging to 
neither the continental or oceanic origin. 
The above discussion plainly shows that even the earth scientists 
do not speak with a certain voice on the proper classification of the 
Okinawa Trough. Still less can lawyers agree upon its legal status in 
seaward delimitation, for they have to base their opinion, at least in 
part, on geological and geomorphological findings under the natural 
prolongation principle. Indeed, nature does not lend itself to classifi-
cations and to definition of strict borderlines as desired by man. 
However inconclusive the geological answer to the question may be, 
international efforts to rewrite the law on continental shelf virtually 
may have made that question moot. The LOS Convention provides 
in Article 76, Paragraphs 1 and 10: 
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend 
241. Hollis D. Hedberg, "Political Boundaries and Economic Resources of the 
Oceans," in Marine Technology and Law: Developmenl of Hydrocarbon Resources and 
Offshore Structures, Proceedings of the 2nd International Ocean Symposium, Ocean As-
sociation of Japan, Tokyo, 1977, p. 39 (1978). Emery disagreed. He said: 
The Okinawa Trough is not part of the continent like the continental border-
land off California. The latter is landward of the continental slope and is 
known to be underlain by continental crust. 
Emery Letter, supra note 236. 
242. Scientific Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf, Memorandum by the 
Secretariat of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/2 and Add. I (20 September 1957), UNCLOS I, 
Official Records, Vol. I (Preparatory Documents) (1958), pp. 38, 39 [hereinafter cited as 
the UNESCO Memo (1957)). This memorandum is noted further in infra text accompa-
nying note 246. 
243. Northcutt Ely and Robert F. Pietrowski, "Boundary of Seabed Jurisdiction off 
the Pacific Coast of Asia," Natural Resources Lawyer, Vol. 8 (1975), pp. 622-23; Note, 
"Delimitation of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction Between States: The Effect of Physical 
Irregularities in the Natural Continental Shelf," Virginia Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 17 (1976), pp. 96-102 [hereinafter cited as Virginia Note (1976)). 
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beyond its territorial sea through the natural prolon-
gation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend to that distance. 
10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to 
the question of delimitation of the continental shelf be-
tween States with opposite or adjacent coasts.244 (em-
phasis added) 
The rest of that article deals at length with the technical delimitation 
of the outer limits of the continental margin. For our purpose, 
Paragraphs 1 and 10 are sufficient. The second sentence of Para-
graph 1 grants to a coastal state 200 miles of shelf jurisdiction irre-
spective of the submarine geology or geomorphology in the area. In 
other words, no matter where the real continental margin ends, the 
Ryukyu Islands would be entitled, at least theoretically, to 200 miles 
of continental shelf on each and every side of their coasts. As noted 
earlier, the width of the semi-enclosed East China Sea nowhere ex-
ceeds 400 miles; so that the Ryukyus could not possibly have a mari-
time zone of more than 200 miles (probably much less), given the 
need for delimitation under Paragraph 10. The issue thus changes 
from one of seaward delmitation under Article 76 ( 1) to one of inter-
state delimitation under Article 83. The pertinent question then be-
comes: how much weight should the Okinawa Trough, as a geologi-
cally or geomorphologically relevant circumstance, have in the Sino-
Japanese seabed delimitation? 
2. The Legal Status of Troughs in Continental She!f 
J)elimitation between Opposite States 
In ascertaining the legal status of troughs in shelf delimitation, 
we again shall look for guidance from various sources of interna-
tional law, including the Shelf Convention, state practices, the North 
Sea Cases, theAnglo-French Arbitration, the Tunisian-Libyan Case, 
and the LOS Convention. 
(a) The Shelf Convention 
The main travaux preparatoires of the Shelf Convention, 
namely, the deliberations at the United Nations International Law 
Commission, contain only casual references to submarine relief fea-
244. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, pp. 33-34. 
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tures similar to troughs. In the Comments on its 1953 Draft Artic~e 
on the Continental Shelf, the ILC stated, with respect to the defini-
tion of continental shelf: 
Thus, although the depth of two hundred meters as a limit 
of the continental shelf must be regarded as the general 
rule, it is a rule which is subject to equitable modifications 
in special cases in which submerged areas, of a depth less 
than two hundred meters, situated in a considerable prox-
imity to the coast are separated by a narrow channel deeper 
than two hundred meters from the part of the continental 
shelf adjacent to the coast. Such shallow areas must, in 
these cases, be considered as continuous to that part of the 
shelf. It would be for the State relying on this exception to 
the general rule to establish its claim to an equitable modi-
fication of the rule. In case of dispute, it must be a matter 
for arbitral determination whether a shallow submarine 
area falls within the rule as here formulated. 245 (emphasis 
added) 
Except for the fact that the word "must" was replaced by "could," 
virtually the same language appeared in the ILC's 1956 Commen-
tary246 to Draft Article 67, which later became Article I of the Shelf 
Convention. The ILC did not elaborate on the exact contents of 
such a formulation. Nor was this question seriously discussed in the 
Conference or addressed by the Shelf Convention. 
It is of interest to note that the ILC's comments were attached to 
the legal definition of the continental shelf rather than to the rules of 
delimitation between states. The fact that both the 1953 and 1956 
Comments suggested "arbitral determination" in case of dispute 
clearly indicates the ILC's awareness of this problem in both situa-
tions. In any case, given its sketchy formulation, the comment does 
not seem to be amenable to actual application, apart from the fact 
that it was but a weakly-worded comment to a draft article. 
It also may be noted that the problem of geomorphological ir-
regularities in the continental shelf was discussed in detail in a tech-
nical memorandum prepared by a group of geologists convened by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESC0)247 shortly before the Geneva Conference in 1958. 
245. YBILC (1953), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 12, p. 214. 
246. YBILC (1956), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 14, p. 297. 
247. Supra note 242, p. 39. 
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Three types of marked geological depressions, other than the shallow 
and small submarine valleys, were considered: 
(a) [T]he depressions that communicate with the deep sea 
beyond the ouer edge of the shelf only over a sill at the 
level, or nearly at the level of the shelf floor; (b) wide flat-
floor troughs lacking a sill in the outer part; and (c) the 
narrow canyon-like valley which slope out to the deep-sea 
floor.248 
The Norwegian Trough, cited as an example of the first type, was 
regarded as constituting a part of the geological shelf adjacent to it. 
The canyons off California, falling under the third type, were consid-
ered more controversial. But the geologists, interestingly enough, ar-
gued that "from the point of view of convenience for international 
legislation," it should be treated as part of the surrounding shelf. No 
mention was made of the Okinawa Trough which, on its merits, fits 
into none of the three types. 
(b) State Practice 
There have been very few cases in which distinct geomorpho-
logical features are present and capable of being used directly as a 
shelf boundary or influencing the potential boundary. The vast ma-
jority of shelf boundaries delimited to date are located in enclosed or 
semi-enclosed seas with relatively shallow waters and a single, con-
tinuous geological shelf, such as the Persian Gulf, the Baltic Sea, and 
the North Sea. Minor discontinuities sometimes exist (such as the 
Hurd Deep to be discussed in connection with the Anglo-French Ar-
bitration below), but they by no means disrupt the essential unity of 
the shelf of the respective seas as a whole. For those areas with more 
distinct features, such as submarine areas well in excess of 200 me-
ters, few have the necessary channel-like shape and parallel location 
even to be considered for a boundary. For instance, there are such 
large deeps exceeding 1,000 meters in the Adriatic Sea, yet they are 
so evenly distributed in relation to the Italian and Yugoslav coasts 
that their effects on the boundary, if any, are equalized.249 The same 
can be said of almost all the shelf boundaries involving Italy in the 
Mediterranean Sea250 and India in the Bay of Bengal, Gulf of Man-
248. Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
249. See supra Chapter 4, note 38. 
250. Italy-Yugoslavia shelf boundary, ibid.; Italy-Tunisia shelf boundary, supra Chap-
ter 4, note 40; Italy-Spain shelf boundary, supra note 173, Italy-Greece shelf boundary, 
Senato della Repubblica (vii Legislatura), No. 1443. [1977). 
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nar, and Arabian Sea251 as well as the Canadian-Danish shelf 
boundary in the Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland.252 
One possible exception may be the Northeast Channel in the 
Gulf of Maine that divides the Georges Bank on the U.S. side and 
the Browns Bank on the Canadian side. The delimitation of mari-
time boundary between the U.S. and Canada is now pending before 
a special chamber of the ICJ.253 The boundary claimed by the U.S. 
roughly follows the mid-channel line of the Northeast Channel.254 
The Northeast Channel extends 70 km. (38 miles) long and 40 
km. (22 miles) wide, with an average water depth of less than 300 
meters, as compared to 90 meters of average depth in waters over the 
Georges Bank and the Browns Bank.255 Geomorphologically, it 
connects the Georges Basin in the Gulf and the outer edge of the 
continental margin bordering the Atlantic ocean fl.oor. 256 Geologi-
cally, the Channel was formed by fluvial erosion effected by a well-
developed pre-Tertiary drainage system in the Gulf of Maine at the 
site of the Georges Basin and the Channel itself. 257 
Considered as a whole, the Northeast Channel, distinct as it is 
compared to nearby submarine relief features, is nevertheless a mi-
nor depression of the continental shelf not on the same plane as the 
Norwegian, Timor and Okinawa Troughs to be discussed infra. (See 
Table 6.) Moreover, there is as yet no boundary based on the pres-
ence of the Channel; it is only a claim by the United States. In his 
search for distinct belief features in state practice on shelf delimita-
251. E.g., India-Indonesia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 42; India-Sri Lanka 
historical water boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 44. Another maritime boundary was 
delimited in 1976. Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the 
Bay of Bengal and Related Matters, India-Sri Lanka, March 23, 1976. "Maritime 
Boundaries: India-Sri Lanka,'' Limits in the Seas, No. 77, February 16, 1978. In the 
same year India also delimited its maritime boundary with Maldives. Agreement on 
Maritime Boundary in the Arabia Sea and Related Matters, India-Maldives, 28 Decem-
ber 1976. See "Maritime Boundary: India-Maldives and Maldives' Claimed Economic 
Zone," Limits in the Seas, No. 78, July 24, 1978. 
252. "Continental Shelf Boundary: Canada-Greenland", Limits in the Seas, No. 72, 
August 4, 1976. 
253. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Ca-
nada), Order of 20 January 1982 Constituting the Chamber, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 3. 
254. United States Department of State, Maritime Boundaries between the United 
Stales and Canada, Public Notice 506, reprinted in Federal Register, VoL 41 (1976), pp. 
48,619. 
255. See J. Allan Ballard and F.H. Sorensen, "Preglacial Structure of Georges Basin 
and Northeast Channel, Gulf of Maine", AAPG Bulletin, VoL 52 (1968), p. 494. 
256. Ibid., p. 495 (figure). 
257. Ibid., pp. 498-99. 
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tion eligible for the present purpose, this author has been able to find 
only three boundaries and one joint development zone that lie near 
such eligible features: the Norway-United Kingdom258 and Den-
mark-Norway259 boundaries near the Norwegian Trough, the Aus-
tralia-Indonesia boundary260 near the Timor Trough, and the Japan-
ROK Joint Development Zone near the Okinawa Trough.261 
(1) The Norway-United Kingdom Shelf Boundary 
The North Sea262 (Map 13) has an area of 222,000 sq. miles. 
Other than the Norwegian Trough and a few small and isolated 
deeps, the water depths are less than 200 meters. The Norwegian 
Trough is a well-defined submarine depression lying 2 to 10 miles off 
the south and west coasts of Norway. It has a depth ranging from 
200 to 670 meters, a width from 20 to 81 miles, and a length of 
around 430 miles. Norway and the United Kingdom delimited their 
shelf boundary in 1965 by a true median line measured from their 
respective coasts. 
The boundary is a pioneer of its kind in several aspects. 263 The 
parties' disregard of the presence of the Norwegian Trough in draw-
ing the median line is but one of them. With respect to the reasons 
for ignoring the Trough, note the following: 
(a) Conclusive geological evidence264 has long established that 
the Trough, like numerous fjords along the Norwegian coasts, is but 
a result of deeper planning activities by glaciation during the Glacial 
Epoch when the sea level was much lower than it is today. So its 
geological continuity with the rest of the North Sea shelf has never 
258. Supra Chapter 4, note 34. 
259. Ibid., note 37. 
260. Supra note 127. 
261. "Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of 
Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977. 
262. The geography and geomorphology of the North Sea is based on the Encyclope-
dia of Oceanography, supra Chapter I, note 5, p. 543 (North Sea). 
263. The other important contribution of this agreement was its provision on unitiza-
tion of common mineral deposits (Article 4). For details, see Lagoni ( 1979), supra Chap-
ter 3, note 3, pp. 229-33. 
264. 0. Holtedahl, The Submarine Re/iif off the Norwegian Coast, (Oslo, 1940); Hans 
Holtedahl, On the Norwegian Continental Terrace, Primarily Outside More-Romsda/, Ber-
gen: John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1955, cited in the UNESCO Memo (1957), supra note 242, 
pp. 41, 43. See also Hedberg (1970), supra Chapter I, note 10, p. 28. It was stated: 
Some of these marginal semi-enclosed seas are definitely epicontinental, such as 
the North Sea, Persian Gulf, Irish Sea, Yellow Sea . .. These are underlain by 
continental crust and generally have thick sedimentary fillings. Most of them 
have water depths of no more than a few hundred meters. (emphasis added). 
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been changed, despite the fact that it is much deeper (up to 670 me-
ters) than the rest of the shelf (up to 200 meters). 
(b) The United Kingdom has always taken the view that the 
equidistance principle should apply in the North Sea, given the 
broad equality between its coast and that of Norway. The two states 
also had been in agreement on ignoring the presence of the N orwe-
gian Trough long before they negotiated the 1965 boundary agree-
ment. During the 1958 Geneva Conference, delegates from the two 
states specifically supported the geological finding that the Trough 
was a part of the North Sea shelf.265 When the United Kingdom 
unilaterally declared its continental shelf jurisdiction in 1964,266 the 
outer limits of the claim actually lay 2 to 12 miles west of the true 
median line267 (i.e., more landward to the British than to the Norwe-
gian coast). According to one publicist who has studied Britain's 
shelf law and policy: 
The British restraint arose from the pragmatic desire to 
proceed as quickly as possible and to avoid time-consum-
ing disputes, and an acknowledgment that equity would 
appear to be on the side of opposition to a greatly extended 
British claim reaching to the Norwegian Trench [sic].268 
In any event, the Anglo-Norwegian boundary was the result of 
a variety of legal and extra-legal considerations. But it seems fair to 
conclude that the conclusive geological evidence about the shelf and 
the Trough provides the primary justification and makes any con-
trary argument difficult. 
(2) The Denmark-Norway Shelf Boundary269 
Denmark and Norway face each other across the bay-like Skag-
265. See UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 6 (1958), pp. 41 (statement of Miss Gutter-
idge, delegate of the United Kingdom), 48 (statement of Mr. Stabell, the Norwegian 
delegate). 
266. Continental Shelf Act of 1964, UNLS/15, p. 445; Continental Shelf (designation 
of Areas) Order 1964 (12 May 1964), ibid., p. 447. 
267. Richard Young, "Offshore Claims and Problems in the North Sea," American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 59 (1965), pp. 505, 511. 
268. L.F.E. Goldie, "A Symposium on the Geneva Conventions and the Need for 
Future Codifications," in Lewis M. Alexander ed., The Law of the Sea: Offihore Bounda-
ries and Zones, Proceedings of the First Conference on the Law of the Sea sponsored by 
the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio 
State University Press, 1967, pp. 273, 277 [hereinafter cited as Goldie (1967)]. 
269. The geographical and bathymetrical descriptions of the Denmark-Norway shelf 
boundary is based on Europe: The North Sea (U.S. Naval Chart, H.O. 4840, 18th ed., 
Nov. 1945, rev. Mar. 1966) which is attached to "Continental Shelf Boundaries: The 
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errak with an average width of 60 miles (Map 13). In the northern 
half of the seabed, the Norwegian Trough closely follows the Norwe-
gian coastline and runs nearly throughout the Skagerrak for a dis-
tance of 100 miles. It then turns north at where the Skagerrak opens 
to the North Sea. The southern half of the seabed in the Skagerrak, 
with supeijacent water less than 200 meters in depth, is continuous 
from the vast North Sea continental shelf. 
Denmark and Norway delimited their shelf boundary in 1965 
by a true median line. The eastern terminal of the boundary begins 
in the Skagerrak where the Norwegian-Swedish shelf boundary 
ends, and extends all the way to the North Sea until it reaches the 
trijunction point of the Anglo-Norwegian and Anglo-Danish bound-
aries. Of the 255-mile boundary, 31 percent, or 80 miles, is in the 
Skagerrak where the Trough is present and 69 percent, or 175 miles, 
is in the North Sea where the seabed is relatively continuous. In the 
Skagerrak, the 200-meter isobath and the median line lie side by side 
and intersect nearly at the mid-point of the latter. 
A few observations are in order. Geologically, as noted in con-
nection with the Anglo-Norwegian shelf boundary, the Norwegian 
Trough is an integral part of the North Sea continental shelf. Geo-
logical continuity of the whole seabed in the North Sea renders irrel-
evant the Norwegian Trough qua geological circumstances in shelf 
boundary delimitation in the region. Geographically, the coasts of 
Denmark and Norway present a textbook case of opposite coasts. 
Broad equality of coasts in the Skagerrak is self-evident. In the 
North Sea where the shelf lies "off' rather than "between" the 
coasts, the basic opposite relationship and broad equality continue. 
An equidistant boundary seems, therefore, prima facie, equitable. 
Possible alternative boundaries based on geomorphological features 
such as the 200 meter isobath or the mid-channelline of the Trough 
are justified neither by any "special circumstances" nor by any other 
equitable consideration. 
In conclusion, the geological unity of the seabed in the Norway-
United Kingdom and Denmark-Norway cases seems to be a condi-
tion precedent to the application of the equidistance principle. A 
trough is, after all, a geological feature. Geographical factors may 
constitute a sufficient condition and make the median line boundary 
imperative. It is only natural that the three states involved disre-
North Sea," Limits in the Seas, No. 10, June 14, 1974. Unfortunately this chart is too big 
to be reproduced here. 
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garded the Norwegian Trough, which had become a neutral factor in 
light of conclusive scientific evidence. 
(3) The Australia-Indonesia Shelf Boundary270 
Australia fronts Indonesia across the Timor Sea in the west and 
the Arufura Sea in the east where vast shelves and deep trenches 
coexist (Map 18). The two seas are semi-enclosed, with Timor, 
Tanimbar, Aru, New Guinea, and other Indonesian islands forming 
a chain in the north and the Australian continent in the south. The 
shelves, known as the Sohul Shelf in the west and the Arufura Shelf 
in the east, slope gently north for a distance of roughly 170 and 350 
miles, respectively, from the northern coast of Australia. The super-
jacent water has a depth of 50 to 140 meters. The shelves abruptly 
decline to the Timor Trough and Arufura Trough with maximum 
depths of 3,200 and 3,650 meters, respectively. The Arufura Trough, 
which is surrounded by Indonesian islands, and the Timor Trough, 
which lies much closer to the Indonesian than Australian territories, 
intersect at an angle of about 120 degrees near the Indonesian island 
of Tanimbar. They are in fact part of the arc of deep troughs and 
trenches extending from the Ceram Sea in central Indonesia to the 
Java Trench in the Indian Ocean. Geologically, the Timor Trough 
is an elongate submarine basin of young age classified by geologists 
as a marginal deep. The whole Timor Sea and the southwestern part 
of the Arufura Sea will be the focus of the following analysis. 
In 1971 and 1972, two shelf boundary agreements271 were 
signed between Australia and Indonesia (not including the one in 
1973272 with Australia acting on behalf of the then dependent Papua 
New Guinea) in the area just described (Maps 19 and 20). At the 
time East Timor was still a Portuguese colony and disputes between 
Lisbon and Canberra on the legal character of the Timor Trough 
had prevented any shelf delimitation in that area. A "gap" thus ex-
ists. By 1978 East Timor had been incorporated by Indonesia and 
difficult negotiations between Canberra and Jakarta have been 
270. The descriptions of geography, geomorphology, and geology of the Australia-
Indonesia shelf boundary area are based on Encyclopedia of Oceanography, supra 
Chapter 1, note 5, pp. 44 (Arufura Sea), 755 (Sahul Shelf), 923 (Timor Sea), and Limits in 
the Seas, No. 87 supra note 171. 
271. Limits in the Seas, No. 87, supra note 171. 
272. Agreement Concerning Certain Boundaries between Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea, Indonesia-Australia, 26 January 1973, UNLS/18, p. 444. The text of this agree-
ment is reprinted nearly in full, and the boundary is analyzed, in Limits in the Seas, No. 
87, supra note 171, pp. 4, 11. 
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under way since then to delimit the gap area.273 Constructed with 25 
turning and terminal points, the existing boundary has two segments 
with 133°23'E longitude as the dividing line on which Pont Al2 is 
located. The segment of the boundary delimited by the 1971 agree-
ment (hereinafter referred to as the Eastern Segment) begins at Point 
A2 and ends at point Al2. Point A3 is the trijunction point of the 
median line boundaries of Australia, Indonesia, and Papua New 
Guinea (Map 19). 
The boundary delimited by the 1972 agreement (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Western Segment) begins at Point Al2 and ends at 
Point 25 (Map 20). The entire Eastern Segment lies in the Arufura 
Shelf (200 meter or less) whereas the Western Segment rests, with 
minor exceptions, either in the sill (1,400 meters or more) that sepa-
rates the Arufural Trough from the Timor Trough or in the Timor 
Trough (2,000 meters or more). The Eastern Segment, 378 miles 
long, is a true median line drawn between the normal baselines be-
tween the two coasts.274 Indonesia's straight baselines were ig-
nored. 275 The Western Segment was delimited in accordance with 
equitable principles, taking into account the existing Australian oil 
concession blocks and the submarine geomorphology.276 The West-
ern Segment, 551 miles long, is located from 20 to 80 miles north of 
the hypothetical true median line and 20 to 65 miles south of the 
deepest-water line between the two 200-meter isobaths contiguous 
from the respective coasts. 277 The boundary thus delimited is said to 
be negotiated between the true median line and the deepest-water 
line, resulting in unequal proportions appertaining to each state.278 
The ratio is roughly three to one or two to one in favor of Australia. 
A number of observations can be made with respect to the 
choice of delimitation principles, the weight given to regional geo-
morphology, and the macrogeography. First of all, Australia and 
Indonesia had applied the equidistance principle only to the Arufura 
Shelf which geologically is continuous from New Guinea and Aus-
tralian continent. In areas beyond the 200-meter isobath where the 
273. Limits in the Seas, No. 87, supra note 171, pp. 4, II. See also Ron Richardson, 
"Drawing the Seabed Line," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 10, 1978, p. 79; R.D. 
Lumb, "The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea," Australian Year-
book of International Law, Vol. 7 (1981), p. 72. 
274. Limits in the Seas, No. 87, supra note 171, p. 7. 
275. Ibid. 
276. Ibid. 
277. Ibid. 
278. Ibid. 
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deep Timor Trough separates the two geological shelves continu-
ously from the two parties' coasts, the equidistance principle w~s em-
ployed merely for reference in negotiating a boundary acco~dmg to 
equitable principles. An innovative combination of medtan and 
deep-water lines produced an intermediate boundary. Second, the 
geomorphology of the Timor Sea, particularly the presence .of the 
Timor Trough, appears to be the most important "relevant cucum-
stance" considered by the parties.279 The notion of a deepest-water 
line drawn between the two 200-meter isobaths clearly shows that 
the presence of the deep Timor Trough was taken fully into account 
and given considerable weight, although it was not the only decisive 
factor in the delimitation. Finally, the boundary seems, in terms of 
macrogeography, to have been delimited pursuant to the notions of 
broad equality of coasts and proportionality (Maps 18 and 19). The 
Eastern Segment lies between the coasts of New Guinea (the second 
largest island on earth) and the Aru Islands on the one hand, and the 
coast of northern Australia on the other. Each coast has large bays 
or bights as well as promontories facing each other (Map 18); the 
broad equality of coasts seems obvious. The Western Segment, how-
ever, is situated between the western part of the Australia coast and a 
chain of Indonesian islands interrupted by a number of water gaps 
ranging in distance from 10 to 50 miles. The delimitation of the 
Western Segment seems to have brought about a reasonable degree 
of proportionality between the lengths of the parties' respective 
coasts in the particular area (Australia: 751 miles (67 percent); Indo-
nesia; 365 miles (33 percent) and the continental shelf areas apper-
taining to them (Australia: 67-75 percent; Indonesia: 33-25 
279. The observation is in part supported by a statement of Australia's Foreign Minis-
ter, Mr. W. McMahon, made on October 30, 1970, in Australia's House of Representa-
tives. Australian Yearbook of International Law 1970-1973, (1975), pp. 145, 145-48. He 
first interpreted the natural prolongation concept, recently declared by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Cases, as a morphological one which, when applied to the seabed, would 
include the "lower edge of the (continental] margin". He then defended the Australian 
claim in the following words: 
(T]he rights cla~ed by Australia in the Timor Sea are based unmistakably on 
the morphological structure of the sea bed. (He then described the Timor 
Trough.] The Timor Trough thus breaks the continental she!( between Australia 
and Timor, so that there are two distinct shelves, and not one and the same shelf 
separating the two opposite coasts. The fall-back median line between the tw~ 
coasts, provided for in the Convention in the absence of agreement, would not 
apply for there 1s no common area to delimit. This Australian view is of course 
~ell known to Indonesia. There has in fact been recent exchange of views, still 
mcomplete, between Indonesian and Australian officials (emphasis added). 
Ibid., p. 146. 
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percent).280 The striking resemblance of physical conditions be-
tween the Timor Sea and the East China Sea will be analyzed fur-
ther below. 
(4) The Japan-ROK Joint Development Zone 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the JDZ falls entirely on 
the Japanese side of the Japan-ROK hypothetical median line. 
While the JDZ's northeastern rim largely follows this median line, 
its eastern rim actually coincides with the eastern rim of the ROK's 
Block K-7 (Maps 5 and 6), which is the easternmost limit of the 
ROK's continental shelf claim based on the natural prolongation 
principle. Approximately half of the JDZ's eastern rim lies right in 
the middle of the Okinawa Trough, roughly following the deepest-
water line (Map 1). 
Thus, the JDZ is located between the ROK's claimed shelf limit 
based on the natural prolongation principle and Japan's claimed 
shelf limit based on the equidistance principle. It is a typical com-
promise,281 with each party's claimed limit being given roughly half 
effect in delimiting the ultimate zone which, as suggested earlier in 
this Chapter, functions as a de facto shelf boundary zone. 
In this sense, the presence of the Okinawa Trough, as repre-
sented by the deepest-water line, did influence the delimitation of the 
JDZ. The fact that Japan was willing to recognize the presence of 
the Okinawa Trough as a relevant circumstance and to give it partial 
effect in shelf zone delimitation will have significant implications for 
Sino-Japanese shelf delimitation. 
(c) The North Sea Cases 
This case involved no question of distinct geological depression. 
When the tripartitie dispute was brought before the ICJ, the Norwe-
gian Trough had been dealt with satisfactorily, as discussed above. 
The Court nevertheless addressed the question of the Trough: 
Without attempting to pronounce on the status of that fea-
ture, the Court notes that the shelf areas in the North Sea 
280. The coastal length of Australia (902 miles) is measured in the general direction of 
the coastline whereas the lengths of the Indonesian islands (516) by their total maximum 
lengths. The maximum length of the coast of Portuguese Timor (151 miles) is subtracted 
from both figures since that part of the shelf remains undelimited. 
281. For a similar view, see Sang-Myon Rhee, "The Application of Equitable Princi-
ples to Resolve the United States-Canada Dispute Over East Coast Fishery Resources," 
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 21 (1980), p. 678, note 48. 
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separated from the Norwegian coast by the 80-100 kilometers 
of the Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be adja-
cent to it, nor to be its natural prolongation. They are never-
theless considered by the States parties to the relevant 
delimitations ... to appertain to Norway up to the median 
line [Map 12]. True these median lines are themselves 
drawn on equidistance principles; but it was only by first 
ignoring the existence of the Trough that these median 
lines fell to be drawn at all.282 (emphasis added) 
183 
The context of this passage was that the Court was then discuss-
ing notions of "proximity," "adjacency," "equidistance," and "natu-
ral prolongation."283 The Court indicated that notions of 
"proximity" or "adjacency" were not as fundamental to the conti-
nental shelf doctrine as the natural prolongation principle. By using 
the Norwegian Trough as an example, the Court was able to show 
that but for the parties' disregard of the Trough, a part of the shelf 
areas west of the Trough, although nearer to Norway than to the 
United Kingdom, could not have been properly appurtenant to Nor-
way because neither was it adjacent to, nor a natural prolongation 
of, the Norwegian coast. 
Having no direct bearing on the outcome of the case, this pas-
sage is clearly dictum. But because the doctrine of stare decisis is 
unknown in international law, the "distinction between the ratio of a 
judgment and obiter dicta is less important than it usually is in mu-
nicipal law,"284 and the weight of this passage cannot be dismissed 
lightly as such. 
(d) The Anglo-French Arbitration 
It was briefly noted earlier that apart from the general geologi-
cal continuity of the English Channel, an irregular relief feature was 
a source of a minor controversy. This was an alleged distinct fault or 
series of faults, known as the Hurd Deep. With a width of one to 
three miles, a depth of over 100 meters, and a length of 80 miles, it is 
situated in the middle of the Channel to the north of the Channel 
282. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 32. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Morelli also regarded 
the shelf in the North Sea west of the Trough as not appertaining to Norway. The Nor-
way-United Kingdom delimitation was said to have "transferred" certain shelf areas in 
favor of Norway which would not otherwise constitute a part of Norway's geological 
shelf. Ibid., p. 199. 
283. Ibid., pp. 29-32. 
284. See Brown (1971), supra Chapter 4, note 129, p. 32. 
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Islands285 (Map 14). In its alternative and final submissions,286 the 
United Kingdom considered it as major and persistent rifts, deserv-
ing the denomination of the "Hurd Deep Fault Zone" and marking 
the limits of the respective natural prolongations of the two states in 
the Channel. The United Kingdom further proposed that the axis of 
this fault zone be used as the shelf boundary, as an alternative to the 
median line, in the English Channel as well as in the Atlantic 
region.287 
The Court of Arbitration rejected the British proposal on two 
grounds. First, the Hurd Deep was but a minor fault(s), as com-
pared to the Norwegian Trough which the United Kingdom itself 
ignored in shelf delimitation with Norway, and could not disrupt the 
essential unity of the continental shelf in question.288 Second, given 
such a unity, discarding the equidistance or any other delimitation 
method in favor simply of a boundary along the axis of the Hurd 
Deep (or Hurd Deep Fault Zone) would find no legal justification 
either under the "special circumstances" exception of Article 6 of the 
Shelf Convention or under customary international law in order to 
remedy any particular inequity.289 
The Hurd Deep was in fact noted in the UNESCO memoran-
dum mentioned earlier as one of the "isolated deeps [forming] part 
ofthe shelf in which they are embedded"290 and should not have any 
limiting effect. In other words, there has been strong scientific evi-
dence to disregard the presence of these minor and isolated depres-
sions in an essentially continuous continental shelf. 
Two inferences may be drawn from a close examination of the 
Court's opinion. First, if the geological depression in question, be it 
a deep or a trough, is substantial enough to disrupt the essential geo-
logical unity or continuity of the continental shelf in question, then 
the deep or trough could be used as a basis for delimiting a shelf 
boundary. Thus, by emphasizing the physical character of the 
trough, the Court in fact threw the question back again to geologists 
who, however, do not always have the answer. Second, even if the 
trough constitutes no rift of the geological unity of the continental 
shelf, a shelf boundary based on the trough still could be justified if 
the presence of the trough constitutes a "special circumstance" under 
285. Anglo-French Award, paras. 9, 12. 
286. Ibid., para. 104. 
287. Ibid., para. 105. 
288. Ibid., para. 107. 
289. Ibid., paras. 108, 109. 
290. UNESCO Memo (1957), supra note 242, p. 43. 
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Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, or if a boundary following the 
trough is needed to redress an inequity in the delimitation area. ~his 
formulation places the role of the trough in its proper per~pective. 
But it appears too general to be of much help elsewhere, smce the 
controversy over the denotation of "special circumstances" and "in-
equity" is no less substantial than the legal status of troughs itself. 
To sum up, the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration went a step 
further than the ICJ in the North Sea Cases in laying down guide-
lines with respect to the legal status of troughs in shelf delimitation. 
Given the geologically insignificant nature of the Hurd Deep-Hurd 
Deep Fault Zone, the Court's dismissal of it clearly did not negate 
the relevance of troughs in general in shelf delimitation. Rather, a 
trough could be used as shelf boundary in cases where it separates 
two geological shelves, constitutes a special circumstance, or is 
needed to remedy a particular inequity. 
(e) The Tunisian-Libyan Case 
During the major debate over the natural prolongation princi-
ple mentioned earlier, Tunisia and Libya flooded the Court with ge-
ological facts and arguments concerning the delimitation area that 
nearly turned this battle of international lawyers to that of earth 
scientists.291 The Court, unimpressed, ended the debate by conclud-
ing that 
despite the confident assertions of the geologists on both 
sides that a given area is "an evident prolongation" or "the 
real prolongation" of the one or the other State, for legal 
purposes it is not possible to define the areas of continental 
shelf appertaining to Tunisia and to Libya by reference 
solely or mainly to geological considerations.292 
Again, the role of geological circumstances is set in proper 
perspective. 
The Court then turned to the parties' arguments based on geo-
morphology and bathymetry where submarine depressions, among 
other features, were examined and evaluated.293 Tunisia contended 
that the marine topography of the Pelagian Block, on which the pres-
ent delimitation area lies, showed the presence of three major fea-
291. I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 49-58; Continental Shelf, Separate Opinion of Jimenez 
de Arechaga, ibid., p. 110. 
292. Ibid., p. 53. 
293. Ibid., p. 54. 
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tures, one of which is of interest here.294 It is known as Tripolitanian 
Furrow, a submarine valley running roughly parallel to the Libyan 
coast between 13° and 15° east. Tunisia considered it a continuation 
under the sea of the Gulf of Gabes and contended that it was a "nat-
ural submarine frontier" of Libya's natural prolongation in the Pela-
gian Sea. 295 
Again unconvinced, the Court opined: 
As for the features relied on by Tunisia, the Court . . is 
unable to find that any of them involve such a marked dis-
ruption or discontinuance of the sea-bed as to constitute an 
indisputable indication of the limits of two separate continen-
tal shelves, or two separate natural prolongations. As was 
noted in argument, so substantial a feature as the Hurd 
Deep was not attributed such a significance in the Franco-
British Arbitration of 1977 concerning the Delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf. The only feature of any substantial 
relevance is the Tripolitanian Furrow; but that submarine 
valley does not display any really marked relief until it has 
run considerably further to the east than the area relevant 
to the delimitation .... 296 (emphasis added) 
Since the Hurd Deep discussed above is insubstantial as com-
pared to either the Norwegian Trough, the Okinawa Trough, or the 
Timor Trough (Table 6), the Tripolitanian Furrow rightly was given 
no weight. Like the Anglo-French Court of Arbirtration, the ICJ 
seems to imply that a genuinely substantial geomorphological fea-
ture which disrupts or discontinues the seabed to such an extent as to 
indicate indisputably two continental shelves may well serve as a ba-
sis for shelf boundary delimitation. Of course, the Court cannot be 
expected to come up with, in the abstract, any specific or quantitative 
criteria regarding the "substantiality" of a given geomorphological 
feature. Such a feature has to be identified individually on the mer-
its of each case. 
(f) The LOS Convention 
The legal continental shelf as defined in Article 76 of the LOS 
Convention was noted earlier, as was the article on shelf delimitation 
(Article 83). Other than those general references to geomorphology 
in UNCLOS Ill by delegates noted earlier, no specific reference is 
294. Ibid., p. 55. 
295. Ibid., p. 56. 
296. Ibid., p. 57. 
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made in the LOS Convention or its travaux preparatoires to the legal 
status of troughs or depressions. 
(g) Summary 
The above survey of various sources of conventional and cus-
tomary international law yields no definite rules on the legal status 
of troughs or depressions in regard to delimitation of continental 
shelf, due primarily to their diversity of physical characteristics (Ta-
ble 6). While the presence of the Hurd Deep and the Norwegian 
Trough was ignored, the presence of the Timor Trough and the Oki-
nawa Trough was given substantial weight. Although the small 
number of precedents to date permits one to make no final conclu-
sion, some general observations are possible. 
Geologically, the Norwegian Trough, the Hurd Deep and the 
Tripolitanian Furrow are underlain by the continental crust of the 
earth's surface with its geophysical properties (such as seismic veloc-
ity, density, thickness, and heat flow) distinctly discernible from 
those of the ocean crust underlying the oceans and some marginal 
ocean basins. Geomophologically, these depressions either are sur-
rounded by the adjacent shelf or separated from the ocean depths by 
a submarine sill comparable in level with the rest of the shelf. 
Bathymetrically, the water depths in these depressions are at the 
most a few hundred meters greater than those superjacent to the 
shelf. The physical circumstances thus overwhelmingly support the 
view that these depressions are part of the geological shelf around 
them. There appears to be little room for contrary scientific argu-
ment, despite the ICJ's legal arguments (on the Norwegian Trough) 
to the contrary. 
The Timor Trough presents an entirely different situation. Ge-
ologically, its origin is neither clearly continental nor oceanic. It 
may be in a transition from one to the other.297 Geomorphologi-
297. See generally Menard (1967), supra note 240, where he concluded: 
Small ocean basins are underlain by crustal types that are generally unlike 
those of typical continents or oceans. The basins can be considered to be in 
different stages of development. 
Ibid., p. 3072. There are two sequences of crustal development of those ocean basins: 
one is from continental crust to oceanic crust, e.g., the Japan Sea basin; the other is the 
reverse, e.g., the Gulf of Mexico. Menard also stated: 
[l]t appears that ~he crust in regions of complex island arcs has been changed in 
ways that cause 1t to have characteristics intermediate between normal oceanic 
and continental crust. Nevertheless, it is much more similar to an oceanic than to 
a continental crust (emphasis added). 
Ibid., p. 3064. 
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cally, it is connected with other deeper troughs or trenches by a sub-
marine sill more than 1,400 meters in depth, much deeper than the 
adjacent shelf. Bathymetrically, the water depth in the Trough is 15 
to 30 times that of the shelf, but about two-thirds or one-half of that 
of the nearby oceans (5,000 to 6,000 meters). The Trough, with its 
intermediary geophysical character, appears to have received corre-
spondingly intermediary legal treatment in the shelf delimitation. Its 
presence was not the only decisive factor, but it significantly influ-
enced the course of the boundary. 
Nearly the same comments made above can apply to the Oki-
nawa Trough except that it is slightly shorter, narrower, and shal-
lower, with slightly lower submarine sills, and situated in a slightly 
less open environment, than the Timor Trough (Table 6). But physi-
cal characteristics aside, it should not be forgotten that the presence 
of the Okinawa Trough was taken into account in delimiting a joint 
development zone and not a shelf boundary, as was the case with the 
Timor Trough. 
Given the imperfect (and by no means concurrent) understand-
ing of troughs by geologists, lawyers can only tentatively conclude 
that the legal status of troughs is determined primarily by their indi-
vidual physical characteristics. But the presence of some troughs 
with substantial length, width, and depth did get considerable weight 
in influencing the shelf boundary or de facto boundary zone. 
3. Concluding Remarks: The Okinawa Trough and the Sino-
Japanese Seabed Delimitation 
The above discussion demonstrates that there has been no con-
clusive scientific evidence either supporting or refuting the proposi-
tion that the Okinawa Trough marks the outer limits of the East 
Asian continental slope. Having neither continental nor oceanic ge-
ophysical properties, the Okinawa Trough, like the Timor Trough, 
could well be an intermediate feature. In any case, the consensus of 
the international community, as reflected by Article 76 of the LOS 
Convention, on the legal definition (or seaward delimitation) of the 
continental shelf has rendered the geological debate on the Okinawa 
Trough largely moot. Ceasing to be an "Article 76 problem" makes 
the Trough no less a problem under Article 83-inter-state delimita-
tions-that arises from its distinct geomorphological, if not geologi-
cal, features. The pertinent question, then, shifts to: should the 
presence of the Trough nevertheless be allowed to mark an inter-
state shelf boundary (and not just a joint development zone)? 
The foregoing search for guidance from various sources of in-
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temationallaw indicates that the answer to this question has to be 
sought by looking into the physical characteristics of a particular 
trough or depression involved. It seems useful, therefore, to com-
pare the physical characteristics of the Okinawa Trough to those of 
other troughs or depressions which have been addressed by interna-
tional tribunals or shelf boundaries treaties. 
A glance at Table 6 should quickly dismiss the relevance of the 
Hurd Deep for purposes of comparision. The distinction in physical 
dimensions between it and the rest is too obvious to deserve elabora-
tion. The Anglo-French Arbitral Court's correct disregard of it thus 
sheds little light on the legal significance of the Okinawa Trough. 
The Norwegian Trough presents, at least, a case where a com-
parison with the Okinawa Trough makes sense. Geographically, 
both are located in marginal, semi-enclosed seas. But in terms of 
length, width, and depth, they are quite distinct from each other, if 
one considers the distances between coasts and the average water 
depth in the surrounding shelves. Geologically, the whole North 
Sea, including the Norwegian Trough, is definitely underlain by con-
tinental crust whereas the nature of the underlying crust of the Oki-
nawa Trough is still disputed among geologists. 
Geomorphologically, the Norwegian Trough is connected with the 
Atlantic Ocean by a submarine sill (less than 300 meters in depth) 
nearly at the level of the adjacent shelf whereas the sill connecting 
the Okinawa Trough and the Pacific Ocean is 500 to 1,000 meters or 
more. In sum, the two troughs have more differences than similari-
ties. The observation is in accord with the consensus among com-
mentators who have compared the two troughs.298 
On the other hand, the Timor Trough bears striking resem-
blances to the Okinawa Trough, as Table 6 clearly shows, in geogra-
phy, physical dimensions (length, width, and depth), geological 
structure, and geomorphology. Even more striking are a few other 
aspects worthy of elaboration. First, both cases involve a mainland 
state (Australia and China (PRC and ROC)) and an island state (In-
donesia and Japan). The former has a vast shallow geological shelf 
continuous from its coast and the latter is fronted within a short dis-
tance seaward by a deep and substantial trough more than 2,000 me-
ters in depth. Second, both cases, in macrogeographical terms, have 
parallel coastal configurations with a mainland facing an island 
chain cut off by a number of water gaps. Third, both Australia and 
298. E.g., Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 34; Goldie (1973), supra Chapter 4, 
note 36, pp. 254-57. 
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China (at least the ROC) have unilaterally extended their shelf juris-
dictions to the middle of the trough, taking the regional geomorphol-
ogy as the only decisive factor in shelf delimitation. Meanwhile, 
both Indonesia and Japan have based their continental shelf claims 
on the equidistance principle and advocated the disregard of the 
trough in shelf delimitation. 
It is crystal-clear that the only precedent in shelf boundary de-
limitation comparable to the Okinawa Trough is that of the Timor 
Trough. Such a comparison exists, as just noted, in a much larger 
context as well. It is submitted that as a matter of law, the Austra-
lian-Indonesian treatment of the Timor Trough is not binding on 
third parties. Furthermore, a portion of the Timor Sea between the 
former Portuguese East Timor and Australia has yet to be delimited. 
None of these considerations, however, should preclude the Austra-
lian-Indonesian case from becoming the most relevant precedent for 
China (PRC and ROC) and Japan to consider or to follow. Besides, 
the notion of a "deepest-water line" adopted by Australia is not en-
tirely without foundation in international law. As used in delimiting 
boundaries in border rivers, the "thalweg" principle, 299 1: e., using the 
middle of a navigable channel instead of that of the whole river as 
the international boundary, long has been established in customary 
international law. That principle occasionally has been applied by 
analogy to international straits and to the oceans by 
commentators. 300 
On the other hand, the Okinawa Trough itself has played an 
important role in the delimitation of the Japan-ROK Joint Develop-
ment Zone. Although Japan always may distinguish a joint develop-
ment zone from a shelf boundary as such, the relevance of the 
Okinawa Trough as a distinct geomorphological feature appears to 
have been firmly established. 
In conclusion, the relevance of regional geology and geomor-
phology of the East China Sea consists in the presence of the Oki-
nawa Trough, which may be represented by a deepest~water line or a 
mid-channel line. This line per se should not be the only decisive 
299. For a discussion of the thalweg principle, see Justice Cardozo's opinion in New 
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); James W. Gamer, ''The Doctrine of the 
Thalweg as a Rule oflntemational Law,'· American Journal of International Law, Vol. 29 
(1935), p. 309; L. Oppenheim. International Law, Vol. I, 8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, p. 532; Daniel P. O'Connell, International 
Law, Vol. I, London: Sevens & Sons, 1970, p. 429. 
300. E.g., Daniel P. O'Connell, International Law, supra note 299, p. 496; Goldie 
(1967), supra note 268, p. 275. 
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factor in the Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation, b~t rather shou~d be 
considered as a relevant circumstance or as an rmportant bas1s or 
starting point in the course of negotiations. 
F. Summary and Suggestions 
1. Summary 
A summary of this chapter, in view of its length, is necessary 
before suggestions are presented. In the introduction of this chapter, 
the methodology for analyzing the delimitation problem was set out. 
Following the prevailing trend of customary international law in this 
regard, various sources of international law were scrutinized to as-
certain the specific denotation of the concept "relevant circum-
stances." Recognizing that according to equitable principles the 
choice of any delimitation principle is but a function or reflection of 
the "relevant circumstances" of the particular case, the chapter then 
identified them and determined their relevance and weight in the 
setting of the East China Sea. Some were dismissed as irrelevant 
while others appeared partially or potentially relevant. This exercise 
served to narrow the focus on a few vital circumstances, i.e., geogra-
phy, geology, and geomorphology. In order to isolate each circum-
stance for convenience of discussion, an assumption was made in the 
discussion on geography, whereas in the discussion on geology (and 
geomorphology) this geographical consideration generally was 
downplayed. 
As the equidistance principle is always identified with opposite-
state situations, we began the discussion on geography with the ap-
plicability ofthe equidistance principle. A detailed survey of various 
sources of international law, particularly dozens of existing bounda-
ries, suggested that the physical circumstances most amenable to the 
application of the equidistance principle were the presence of two 
geographical elements: comparable coastal configurations and broad 
equality of coasts. This seems to be the case in the North Region of 
the East China Sea, defined as the shelf areas north of the 30°N 
parallel, which is the trijunction area of the three states' claimed con-
tinental shelf. Absence of both of these circumstances in the South 
Region of the East China Sea led to the discussion of the proportion-
ality test, which, on the basis of the length of coastlines of China (the 
mainland and Taiwan) and Japan (the Ryukyus), produced a ratio 
of approximately 64 to 36. This ratio, as emphasized repeatedly, is 
intended to be a guideline, not a rule, for conducting negotiations. It 
represents a reasonable proportionality which an equitable delimita-
tion should bring about, as suggested by the ICJ in the North Sea 
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Cases and the Tunisian-Libyan Case, in the East China Sea. The 
equidistance principle, though rejected for the South Region, never-
theless could be used for reference purposes. 
The discussion on the geology (and geomorphology) of the East 
China Sea took a similar course. The natural prolongation principle, 
as expounded by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases and the Tunisian-
Libyan Case, seemed to imply a rather elastic seaward limit of the 
continental shelf depending on various legal and geological interpre-
tations of the seabed. While a more precise definition has emerged 
with the advent of the LOS Convention, the state practice and judi-
cial decisions to date, albeit at an embryonic stage, largely seemed to 
have followed the consensus of geologists with respect to the origin 
of distinct geological or geomorphological features. Simply stated, 
where the predominant geological view suggests that certain deeps or 
troughs are part of the surrounding geological shelf, they are allowed 
no influence on shelf delimitation; where the origin of these features 
is still unclear, they are allowed some effect on the shelf boundary. 
Since the Okinawa Trough falls into the latter category, it was sug-
gested that either the mid-channel line or the deepest-water line of 
the Trough be used as one of the bases for constructing the ultimate 
shelf boundary between China (PRC and ROC) and Japan, but not 
as an absolute factor. 
2. Suggestions 
If the geographical and geological (and geomorphological) 
dimensions are considered together, the division of the North and 
South Regions along the 30°N parallel still seems valid. Geographi-
cally, the North Region is dominated by the presence of substantial 
landmass of the three littoral states with comparable coastal lengths. 
Geomorphologically, the Okinawa Trough has its shallowest part in 
this region in which it nowhere exceeds 900 meters as compared to 
1,000 to 2,714 meters in the South Region. The geological structure 
of the Trough near K yushu also is different from that of the rest of 
the Trough (Map 3). In any case, if the geological and geomorpho-
logical evidences are not strong enough to warrant a separate treat-
ment, they and the geographical considerations are. Hence the 
strong justification for applying the equidistance principle in the 
North Region, to be adjusted, of course, by the proportionality ratio 
of 64:36. The significance of the Trough is subordinated, though it 
still should be considered. Admittedly, the North Region will be a 
troublesome area given the added complication of the Japan-ROK 
JDZ, the bulk of which is in that region. And considerations of real-
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politik could, as noted earlier, delay a final legal solution 
indefinitely. 
The addition of the geological (or geomorphological) dimension 
to the South Region means that the presence of the Okinawa Tro~gh 
would in some way affect the ultimate shelf boundary. A possible 
solution is for Japan and China (PRC and ROC) to negotiate a 
boundary on the basis of either the median line (Map 1) which is 
mid-way between the two coasts, or the mid-channel (or deepest-
water) line of the Okinawa Trough (Map 1 ), which is closer to the 
R yukyus than to mainland China or Taiwan, taking into account the 
reasonable proportions suggested. Adoption of one over the other 
would reflect the parties' emphasis on geographical or geological fac-
tors. The result, however, should be comparable insofar as the ulti-
mate division is concerned. Alternatively, they could use both the 
median line and the mid-channel line as a starting point and negoti-
ate an intermediary boundary as did Canberra and Jakarta in 1972. 
The boundary so delimited probably would lie somewhere along the 
200-meter isobath (Map 1), a result again similar to the Australia-
Indonesia shelf boundary in the Timor Sea. Exchanges of minor ar-
eas may be necessary for convenience, as is common in state 
practice. 
The solutions suggested reject the single-method or single-prin-
ciple approaches adopted by China (PRC and ROC) and Japan. Ja-
pan's insistence on applying the equidistance principle across-the-
board in the whole East China Sea regardless of the geophysical re-
ality clearly is not supported by either international law as intimated 
by international tribunals, state practice, or the emerging norms of 
the law of the sea. An equitability test for delimitation, t:e ., propor-
tionality, thus is applied to bring about an equitable result. On the 
other hand, the insistence of China (the PRC and ROC) on applying 
the natural prolongation principle does more to restate the problem 
than to offer a solution, since it is clear that one of the sticky issues 
here precisely is whether the seabed of the Okinawa Trough consti-
tutes a part of the natural prolongation of either state's coast. To 
treat the Okinawa Trough as an absolute limiting factor may derive 
support from findings of some geologists, as well as from the North 
Sea Cases. But subsequent developments, in particular the LOS 
Convention, have defined the legal continental shelf in a way that 
makes the submarine geomo~hological features within 200 miles 
from shore virtually irrelevant. 01 The implications for the legal sta-
301. For a related discussion, see Choon-Ho Park, "The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea 
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tus of geologically undetermined troughs is that in inter-state delimi-
tations it becomes not an absolute limit of national jurisdiction, 
barring conclusive geological evidence to the contrary, but a relevant 
circumstance to be considered in the course of negotiations. Simply 
stated, the suggested solutions modify the equidistance principle by 
the notion of proportionality and treat the presence of the Okinawa 
Trough as but one of the factors that influence the ultimate Sino-
Japanese shelf boundary. 
The East China Sea finds itself in a complex geographical, geo-
logical, and geomorphological setting. Equitable principles require 
that it be treated accordingly without "refashioning nature."302 The 
suggested differentiation of the regions and the multi-method or 
multi-principle approach simply are a reflection of this complex real-
ity of nature. 
Resources Controversy and the Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone," Harvard In· 
ternational Law Journal, Vol. 16 (1975), p. 27. The PRC and ROC might argue that their 
shelf claims are protected as "acquired rights" under the then prevailing customary inter-
nationa1law-the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, particularly the Court's opinions 
on the natural prolongation principle and on the legal character of the Norwegian 
Trough. This arguable position suffers from several difficulties. First, the interpretation 
of the North Sea Cases is not completely without controversy in respect of the seaward 
extent of the natural prolongation principle noted earlier. In other words, under another 
interpretation the whole seabed landward of the Ryukyu Trench could constitute the 
legal continental shelf and the Okinawa Trough therefore does not necessarily delimit 
the Japanese claims of shelf jurisdiction. Second, absent an agreement between China 
and Japan or a binding adjudication on the delimitation of their respective continental 
shelf in the East China Sea, unilateral claims of either the PRC or the ROC alone could 
hardly constitute any acquired rights when such claims, when made, were strongly ex-
cepted to by Japan as noted in Chapter 2. 
302. Supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
CHAPTER 6 RELEVANCE OF THE PEKING-TAIPEI 
RIVALRY: THE "DOMESTIC ASPECT" OF THE 
SEABED DISPUTE 
A. The Scope of Inquiry 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the potentially overlapping con-
cession areas of the PRC and the ROC (Map 11 ), primarily in the 
Taiwan Strait, could give rise to a host of questions: Which govern-
ment has the exclusive sovereign rights to exploit the seabed? Which 
concessionaire has the exclusive mining rights? If oil is found there, 
who has title to it? If the oil is shipped to a foreign country by the 
concessionaire of the PRC or ROC or its assignee, how successfully 
can the other side contest the title in the court of that country? If 
that country has switched recognition from Taipei to Peking, would 
the outcome of the litigation be different accordingly? Would the 
forum simply follow the foreign policy of the executive branch or 
take a more realistic view of the situation? In the absence of diplo-
matic recognition, to what extent would the legal acts of the ROC, 
particularly those dealing with seabed exploitation, receive judicial 
cognizance? Are they acts of state? Or nullities? Is the title question 
between two rival governments at all justiciable? 
These questions clearly are not matters of domestic law of the 
PRC or ROC. Nor can they be treated as purely questions of inter-
national law of, say, continental shelf delimitation. Objectively, 
each side has "a defined territory and population under the control 
of a government [engaging] in foreign relations." 1 But a subjective 
element, i.e., that each views the other as equal, is lacking entirely. 
Claiming that it alone represents China, each sees the relationship 
with the other not as one between states but as one between a legiti-
mate government and a rebel group engaging in an unfinished civil 
war. 
A third approach focuses on the attitude of foreign governments 
and courts toward the PRC or ROC qua recognized or unrecognized 
governments. This approach seems to be the most profitable one 
within the present context, for a foreign court is the only place where 
a legal battle possibly could take place. As long as the oil recovered 
from the overlapping zone remains in the hands of the ROC or PRC, 
I. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second· Foreign Relations Law 
of the Untied States, St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1965, § 4 (state 
defined). 
(195) 
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the title problem continues to be a "domestic" issue between Peking 
and Taipei. It is only susceptible of political or military solutions, 
ranging from a negotiated settlement to armed conflict. The former 
is out of the question, given Taipei's adamant refusal to negotiate 
with Peking on any issue. The latter is not impossible, but would 
occur only as part of the resumed civil war which is quite unlikely, as 
we shall discuss below. In any event, no law will play any important 
part at this stage. 
In contrast, if the oil found in the overlapping zone changes 
hands and reaches a foreign soil, the title issue could be litigated in 
the courts of that country, since considerable private interest would 
be at stake.2 Moreover, the courts in a number of states have had 
many occasions to adjudicate similar issues and to build up a solid 
body of case law.3 In most countries, recognition of foreign govern-
ments is a political question reserved for the executive branch of the 
government. But recognition has various legal consequences which 
fall within the exclusive domain of the judicial branch. 
In this chapter, the relevance of the Peking-Taipei rivalry is de-
fined along these lines. Based on a number of considerations,4 the 
United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States are chosen as forum 
states where a legal battle may be fought. Before plunging into the 
practices of these three states, we shall first review the state of ri-
valry, in both historical and contemporary perspectives, between Pe-
king and Taipei. 
B. The Peking-Taipei Rivalry: Two Aspects 
The Peking-Taipei rivalry involves various dimensions. For 
purposes of this study, we shall deal only with those that have direct 
bearing on the legal personality of the rivals and which affect their 
claim to the title to oil litigated in a foreign court; that means the 
2. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum 
Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196 (1978), cerl. denied, 
442 U.S. 928 (1979). This case is discussed infra in the text. 
3. See generally Daniel P. O'Connell, Inrernaliona/ Law, Vol. I, 2d ed. London: Ste-
vens & Sons, 1970, pp. 166-92. 
4. The considerations include the following: Oil companies from these three states 
are engaged by the ROC and PRC in their respective offshore programs. They are likely 
candidates for a legal battle. Secondly, all three states have held, and two are still hold-
ing, the position that the legal status of Taiwan is undetermined despite their recognition 
of the PRC. This position has material bearing on the question under consideration. 
Thirdly, the courts of all three states have dealt with cases involving Peking and Taipei 
or similar questions. These cases provide a reasonable basis for discussing the present 
question. 
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question of recognition and diplomatic relations. To appreciate the 
intensity of the rivalry, it is useful briefly to relate the military 
dimension: 
1. The Suspended Civil War 
The establishment of the PRC on the Chinese mainland and the 
retreat of the ROC to Taiwan in 1949 concluded the first phase of 
the Chinese Civil War which had raged on the mainland since 1946 
but had its origin dating back to the 1920s.5 From 1949 to 1979, 
tension remained between the forces of the two rivals but hosilities 
were erratic and largely confined to a few offshore islands off the 
Chinese mainland and their coastal waters and air space.6 The 
PRC's heavy bombardment of the Quemoy and Matsu Islands, 
which drew world attention in 1958, has subsided ever since with the 
inauguration of an "even-number-day" cease-fire.7 Exchanges of ar-
tillery barrages involved shells containing propaganda leaflets in-
stead of high explosives. Even this token reminder of the unfinished 
civil war was removed in 1979 when Washington and Peking estab-
lished diplomatic relations. 8 Technically the civil war continues, al-
though the resumption of hostilities seems unlikely, given the new 
political reality in East Asia. Having a local military superiority,9 
the ROC's navy and air force regularly patrol the Taiwan Strait; so 
do the PRC forces in coastal waters near the mainland. Both sides 
seem to have honored tacitly a de facto demarcation line in the 
Strait, though its precise location remains undefined. The ROC's oil 
concession blocks are presumably located on the ROC (east) side of 
that line (Map 9). 
Unlike the civil war in Spain 10 and Nigeria, 11 the Chinese civil 
5. See generally John K. Fairbank, United States and China, 4th ed., Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1979, and the references cited therein. 
6. See Hungdah Chiu, "China, the United States, and the Question of Taiwan," in 
China and the Question of Taiwan, edited by Hungdah Chiu, New York: Praeger Pub-
lishers, 1973, pp. 142-51. 
7. Ibid., p. 151. 
8. New York Times, January I, 1979, p. I. 
9. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 
99. 
10. See generally Norman J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Span-
ish Civ1l Strife, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. 
II. See generally John J. Stemlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 
1967-70, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 74-76 (dealing with the 
law of governmental succession and oil concessions). 
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war has given rise to few questions of internationallaw. 12 The estab-
lishment of the PRC in 1949 apparently prompted many states to 
conclude that the civil war was over and the relevant question was 
whether to extend recognition to the new regime in Peking. But the 
continued existence in Taiwan of another Chinese government, 
claiming to represent all China, a situation unprecedented in inter-
national relations, greatly complicated the question and posed a 
challenge to conventional rules of international law and practices of 
diplomatic intercourse. 
2. Competition for International Recognition 
This competition between Taipei and Peking consists in estab-
lishing diplomatic relations with pre-existing and emerging members 
of the international community, for diplomatic ties between two gov-
ernments imply mutual recognition. 13 Since neither Peking nor 
Taipei accepts a "two China" concept, no state has ever been able to 
maintain diplomatic relations with both. 14 There is presented below 
an overview of the diplomatic gains and losses of the two rivals, fol-
lowed by a descriptive analysis of the international community's atti-
tude towards Peking's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. 
(a) The Three-Decade Contest 
The Soviet Bloc and other communist states, some of which 
were themselves newly independent, promptly extended recognition 
to the PRC shortly after its establishment in October 1949.15 Four-
teen non-communist states (half were European) followed suit in six 
months. 16 By April 1950, the PRC had been recognized by 26 states 
12. One exception may be the ROC's proclaimed "closure" of Chinese mainland 
ports and territorial waters during 1949-1954. Over 70 foreign vessels were stopped, fired 
upon, turned away, or sunk. For a legal discussion, see Wu Tang, Chung-kuo Yu Kuo-
chija [China and International Law], Taipei: Committee on Chinese Cultural Enter-
prise Publishers, 1957, pp. 264-68. L.H. Woolsey, ''Closure of Ports by the Chinese Na-
tionalist Government," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44 (1950), p. 352. 
13. Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. I Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Offices, 1940, pp. 166-67. 
14. Nigeria before 1971 recognized both Peking and Taipei but was unable to have 
diplomatic ties with either. Senegal recognized the PRC but established diplomatic rela-
tions with the ROC. The PRC thus refused to recognize Senegal. See James C. Hsiung, 
Law and Policy of China's Foreign Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972, p. 223. 
15. Ibid., pp. 209, 391 note 29. 
16. Ibid. 
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and had diplomatic relations with all but Israel. 17 At the same time, 
the ROC still maintained relations with 53 states. 18 
The PRC's intervention in the Korean War in late 1950 and the 
subse~uent condemnation of it as an aggressor by the United Na-
tions1 arrested this trend in its favor unti11955. The following dec-
ade saw the emergence of many newly independent nations in 
Africa, which became subsequently a major diplomatic battleground 
for the PRC and ROC. As of 1966, the PRC almost doubled its 
diplomatic ties to 50, whereas the ROC's also climbed slightly to 
60.2° Out of 21 states having diplomatic ties with neither, six recog-
nized the PRC, two recognized both, and two had consular relations 
with the ROC.21 
The devastating Cultural Revolution (1966-69) on the Chinese 
mainland considerably disrupted the PRC's foreign relations. Dur-
ing that period, it gained only one state (51) while the ROC picked 
up ei~ht more (68).22 Canada's recognition of the PRC in October 
1970, 3 however, set in motion a new surge of diplomatic gains for 
Peking. The shift of the United States' China policy in 1971 and the 
PRC's admission to (and the ROC's expulsion from) the United Na-
tions in the same year made the momentum unstoppable. By Au-
gust, 1984, 132 states had recognized the PRC while the ROC's 
diplomatic ties had shrunk to 25.24 
The 1970's indeed witnessed the biggest diplomatic success for 
the PRC with more than half of its diplomatic ties established during 
that decade. Meanwhile, in addition to losses of bilateral diplomatic 
ties, the ROC also has been expelled from virtually all the important 
inter-governmental organizations.25 The wave of diplomatic set-
backs forces Taipei to adopt a variety of unorthodox ways of con-
17. Cohen & Chiu,supra Introduction, note II, Vol. I, p. 213. 
18. Ralph N. Clough, supra note 9, p. 153. 
19. General Assembly Resolution 498 (V), UNGAOR, Vol. 5, Supplement (No. 
20A), p. I, UN Doc. A/1775/Add.l (1951). 
20. Ralph N. Clough, supra note 9, p. 153. 
21. United Nations Association of the United States of America, China, the United 
Nations, and the United States Policy, New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., 1966, 
p. 54 (Appendix C). 
22. This is the author's count based on Ralph N. Cough, supra note 9, pp. 153-54. 
23. New York Times, October 14, 1970, p. I. 
24. This is the author's count based on various sources. Among the 132 states that 
have recognize the PRC, four (Bahrain, Bhutan, Indonesia, and Israel) have not yet es-
tablished diplomatic ties with Peking. 
25. Ralph N. Clough, supra note 9, pp. 155-60. The latest expulsions were from the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and its affiliated institutions. New York 
Times, April 18, 1980, p. Dl. 
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ducting its foreign relations with the rest of the world.26 Despite lack 
of formal diplomatic ties, the ROC now has "substantive" relations 
(trade, cultural exchange, etc.) with over 140 states, each having vari-
ous degrees of officiality. 
(b) Peking's Claim to Taiwan 
The recognition of the PRC by a state and the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with it are, as a rule, announced in a joint com-
munique issued simultaneously in Peking and the capital of the rec-
ognizing state. Prior to 1970, the joint communiques invariably 
restated, with few exceptions, the PRC's claim to be the sole legal 
government of China.27 This formulation does not commit necessar-
ily the recognizing state to the PRC's claim to Taiwan, however. 
Since 1970, the PRC has insisted that its sovereignty over Taiwan be 
recognized expressly as such.28 States desiring to establish relations 
with the PRC generally have been reluctant to do so at the possible 
expense of their informal ties with the ROC. Eventually six compro-
mise formulations dealing with this ~uestion were developed in 83 
joint communiques issued since 1970. 9 They are presented below in 
descending order according to the extent of commitment. 
Ten states, including PortugaP0 and Jordan,31 "recognize" that 
"Taiwan (or Taiwan Province) is an inalienable part of the PRC." 
These states seemed to have accepted unequivocally the PRC's 
position. 
In a second formulation, the PRC's position was "acknowl-
edged" by eight states, including the United Kingdom.32 
26. See generally Thomas J. Bellows, Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970's: A Case 
Study of Adaptation and Viability, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary 
Asian Studies, No.4, Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, 1977 (Hungdah 
Chiu ed.). 
27. James C. Hsiung, supra note 14, p. 223. The France-PRC joint communique was 
an important exception in which no mention was made of either the "sole Chinese gov-
ernment" question or the legal status of Taiwan. For the text, see Peking Review, Janu-
ary 31, 1964, p. 10. 
28. Canada was the first state to indicate its position, or lack of it, on the status of 
Taiwan. Ibid, October 16, 1970, p. 12. 
29. Lyushun Shen, "The Taiwan Issue in Peking's Foreign Relations in the 1970s: A 
Systematic Review," Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 1 (1981), 
pp. 77-78. Eight more joint communiques have been issued since then. 
30. Beijing Review [formerly Peking Review], February 16, 1979, p. 3. 
31. Peking Review, April 22, 1977, pp. 10-11. 
32. Ibid., March 17, 1972, p. 3. 
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Another three states including Japan33 "understand and re-
spect" or "respect" this PRC position. 
The fourth model, employed only by the United States,34 stipu-
lates that Washington "acknowledges" the "Chinese position" that 
"there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." 
In a neutral tone, Canada, Italy, 35 Belgium36 and twelve other 
European and South American states merely "take note of' the PRC 
position. 
Still another 46 states having diplomatic (or consular) relations 
with the PRC omitted the Taiwan question in the joint communi-
ques.37 Thirteen of them even failed to mention that the PRC was 
the "sole legal government of China. "38 
Two things merit attention. The first is the language used in 
reflecting the recognizing state's cognizance of the PRC's position. 
"Recognize" undoubtedly connotes "accept," but "understand and 
respect," "respect," or "acknowledge" seem to imply something 
short of acceptance, though certainly more than just awareness, 
which "take note of' reflects.39 The other variable is the object of 
cognizance. In most cases it was the PRC's position that was being 
considered. The object was, however, the Chinese position in a few 
other cases. Since it is well-known that the ROC also regards itself 
as the only Chinese government and Taiwan as its province, the ver-
bal nuance could be significant in different contexts. This semantic 
game of diplomacy admittedly tells only part of the recognizing 
states' intent. Much depends on their subsqeunt practice. 
As the ROC still maintains extensive commercial relations with 
those states that have recognized the PRC, their cognizance or ac-
ceptance of Peking's sovereignty over Taiwan could legally affect 
their "substantive" ties with Taipei. Supposedly, legal effects of rec-
ognition and non-recognition are to be determined by the courts. 
Yet in a number of countries the views of the executive branch have 
influenced heavily judicial decisions. An examination of the execu-
tive and judicial practices of the three countries chosen as forum 
33. Ibid., October 6, 1972, pp. 12-13. 
34. Ibid., December 22, 1978, p. 8. 
35. Ibid., November 13, 1970, p. 6. 
36. Ibid., October 29, 1971, p. 4. 
37. Lyushun Shen, supra note 29. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 
1976, pp. 17, 1934, 2490. 
202 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
states for our hypothetical legal battle, namely, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, and the United States, is therefore warranted. 
C. The Peking-Taipei Rivalry in Foreign Courts with Special 
References to the United Kingdom, Japan, and the 
United States 
1. Scenario of the Hypothetical Legal Battle 
Litigation between Taipei and Peking over title to undersea oil 
in foreign courts may be less conceivable as long as the oil remains 
under the seabed. But the intensity of the oil hunt offshore by Taipei 
and Peking in the past few years makes such an eventuality less and 
less hypothetical. It is helpful to envision the most likely scenario 
from which legal consequences flow. We first look into the possible 
plaintiff and defendant. 
The ROC has been a net oil importing country in the past de-
cades.40 By no stretch of imagination can one expect it to export oil, 
even if the ROC found a bonanza on the seabed. Domestic con-
sumption would eat up the bulk, if not the whole, of the oil find. 
Moreover, no marketing network can be set up overnight, even if 
there is surplus oil for export. One therefore can assume with confi-
dence that Chinese Petroleum Corporation (the state oil enterprise) 
itself would not market the oil abroad. It most likely would be dis-
tributed through the existing sales outlets of the CPC's foreign part-
ners or assignees. In fact, under the joint venture contract, the 
foreign partner may export its share of the oil production after com-
mercial discovery.41 The potential litigant therefore would be either 
CPC's foreign co-venturer or its assignee. 
To the extent of government control of the oil industry, the 
same is true with respect to the PRC. The administration of its oil 
production and export are vested in two state enterprises under the 
Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Eco-
nomic Relations and Trade, respectively.42 Since the latter has no 
marketing outlets of its own abroad, the potential party to the legal 
battle would be either the foreign concessionaire, who brings the oil 
40. See generally, Petroleum History of China, supra Chapter 2, note 85. 
41. E.g., the CPC/Conoco Contract, art. VII (right to export petroleum). The con-
tract is in the author's possession. 
42. Randall W. Hardym, China's Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations, Boul-
der, Colorado: Westview Press, !979, p. 101. It is unclear as of this writing in August 
1984 whether the newly established China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
may market oil directly abroad. It is assumed that it cannot. 
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into the forum state, or the assignee of the PRC's state enterprise in 
charge of oil export. So the legal battle would be fought by two f?r-
eign oil or trading companies rather than by two governmental m-
strumentalities of the PRC and the ROC. For convenience, the 
litigants hereafter are referred to as the "PRC's assignee" or the 
"ROC's assignee," respectively. Thus, questions of locus standi of 
unrecognized government and sovereign immunity would not 
arise.43 Also, the defendant would logically possess the oil in 
question. 
The central issue of the lawsuit would be the title to oil recov-
ered from the overlapping concession blocks. That either foreign as-
signee holds a valid title to the disputed oil can be assumed since 
transactions that effect the granting of concession or assignment 
would take place within the territory under the effective control of 
the PRC or the ROC and under their respective laws. The question 
posed to the foreign court is, rather, which title should be recognized 
under the law and policy of the forum state. This of course would 
lead to a host of other legal issues. 
Since all the three forum states chosen here have recognized the 
PRC, derecognized the ROC, and in varying degrees acknowledged 
the PRC's claim to Taiwan, the legal issues before the courts may be 
threefold. First, to what extent is the judiciary bound by the execu-
tive's recognition policy and practice? Second, to what extent would 
the courts take judicial cognizance of the legislative and administra-
tive acts of a recognized or unrecognized government? Third, if the 
legal acts of two rival governments are in conflict, are such conflicts 
justiciable? 
2. United Kingdom Practice 
(a) Practice of the British Government 
The United Kingdom was the first Western nation to recognize 
the PRC as the de jure government of China on January 6, 1950. 
Thereupon, it ceased to recognize the ROC as such. London contin-
ued to maintain, however, a consulate in Taiwan. This British prac-
tice, understandably offensive to the PRC, led to the latter's adamant 
refusal for 22 years to raise their bilateral relationship from the level 
of charge d'a.ffaires to that of ambassadors. Prompted by America's 
shift of China policy, London decided in March 1972 to exchange 
43. For a discussion of these questions, see generally Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 
3, pp. 166-83. 
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ambassadors with Peking.44 The joint communique announcing the 
move stated: 
The Government of the United Kingdom, acknowledging 
the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a 
province of the People's Republic of China, have decided 
to remove their official representation in Taiwan on 13th 
March 1972.45 (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the United Kingdom reversed its position on Taiwan's legal 
status, held for 22 years. Britain's acceptance of the PRC's position 
was further confirmed by the accompanying statement of Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the House of Com-
mons on the same day.46 
It is clear that the United Kingdom has, since March 13, 1972, 
acknowledged the de jure sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan. A 
question arises, however, as to the legal status of the ROC in the eyes 
of the British Government between January 6, 1950 and March 13, 
1972. The stationing of a British consul in Taiwan during that pe-
riod further complicates the question. Did the United Kingdom im-
plicitly recognize the ROC as the de facto government of Taiwan? 
The answer to this question will have material bearing on the ques-
tion of seabed rights because all the laws and regulations of the ROC 
dealing with seabed exploitation and all but one of CPC's joint ven-
ture contracts had become effective before 1972. If the ROC was 
recognized as the de facto government of Taiwan, the validity of its 
laws and regulations would be judicially recognized by English 
courts; otherwise, the courts are free, and in some cases bound, to 
declare them as nullities. We shall review below the British practice 
in search of the answer. 
In CiVIl Air Transport v. Central Air Transport Corporation ,47 the 
44. New York Times, March 14, 1972, p. I. 
45. Supra note 32. 
46. He said: 
Both the Government of the People's Republic of China and Taipeh [sic] main-
tain that Taiwan is part of China. We held the view both at Cairo and at Pots-
dam that Taiwan should be restored to China. That view has not changed. We 
think that the Taiwan question is China's internal affair to be settled by the 
Chinese people themselves. 
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Ser., Vol. 
833 (March 13-24, 1972), p. 32. 
47. [1953] A. C. 70; [1952] All E.R. 733; British lntemationa/ Law Cases, Vol. 7 (1969), 
p. 523. This case was discussed in F.A. Mann, "Recognition of Sovereignty," Modem 
Law Review, Vol. 16 (1953) p. 226; Comment, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 52 (1953), p. 
307; 'Aristerides', "The Chinese Aircraft in Hong Kong," lntemationa/ Law Quarterly. 
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British Foreign Office, in reply to questions put to it by the Hong 
Kong trial court respecting China, stated on February 11, 1950 that 
Britain had switched de facto as well as de jure recognition from the 
Nationalist Government to the Communist Government of China. 
It specifically drew the Court's attention to the fact that 
H.M. Government recognize that the Nationalist Govern-
ment has ceased to be the de facto government of the Re-
public of China. It ceased to be the de facto government of 
different parts of the territories of the Republic of China as 
from the dates on which it ceased to be in eff"ective control of 
those parts .48 (emphasis added.) 
With respect to the status of Taiwan, the Foreign Office continued: 
On October 25, 1945, as a result of an order issued on the 
basis of consultation and agreement between the Allied 
Powers concerned, the Japanese forces in Formosa [i.e., 
Taiwan] surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, with 
the consent of the Allied Powers, administration of For-
mosa [i.e., Taiwan] was undertaken by the Government of 
the Republic of China. At present [the governor of the is-
land] has not repudiated the superior authority of the Na-
tionalist Government. 49 
Britain's position on Taiwan's status further was clarified by 
Foreign Secretary Eden in the House of Commons on February 4, 
1955: 
Under the Peace Treaty [between Japan and the ROC] of 
April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and 
claim to Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] and the Pescadores; but 
again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sover-
eignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the 
Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] and 
the Pescadores are therefore, in view of Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is un-
certain or undetermined.50 (Emphasis added.) 
Vol. 4 (1951), p. 159; [Note), British Yearbook oflntemationa/ Law, Vol. 29 (1952), p. 
464. 
48. [1953) A.C. 87. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), 5th 
Ser., Vol. 536 (Jan. 25-Feb. II, 1955), pp. 159-60; Majorie M. Whiteman, Digest of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 3, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 565. 
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In Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co .,51 the Foreign Of-
fice certified in 1956 that " ... Her Majesty's Government did not 
recognize that any government was located in Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] 
in July and August, 1953."52 
In June 1964, London's relations with Taiwan were explained 
by Robert Mathew, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the 
House of Commons in the following terms: 
Our senior consular officer in Taiwan holds the rank of 
Consul. As he does not have diplomatic status, no question 
of accreditation arises. His relations are only with the local 
provincial authorities, and he has no contact with the Cen-
tral Nationalist authorities .... As we do not recognize 
any of the authorities in Taiwan as constituting a Govern-
ment, Her Majesty's Government do not consider that it 
would be appropriate to accept consular officers appointed 
by these authorities. 53 
Since no material political change has occurred in Taiwan since 
1949, the above British position vis-a-vis Taiwan remained valid un-
til March 13, 1972. 
Since 1972, the British Government has had only one occasion 
to summarize its position: that occurred in an executive certificate in 
Reel v. Holder and Another54 decided in 1979: 
HMG [Her Majesty's Government] do not, and have never 
regarded Taiwan as a state. Nor do we regard the Chinese 
Nationalist authorities in Taiwan as a Government and 
have not done so since 1950, when we ceased to recognize 
them as the Government of China. . . The Government of 
the United Kingdom acknowledge the position of the Chi-
nese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People's 
Republic of China. 55 
It is generally agreed that recognition, de jure or de facto, is a 
matter of intent on the part of the recognizing state. 56 Here the 
United Kingdom's intent in denying the ROC as the de jure or de 
51. [1956] 2 Q.B. 552; [1956] 2 All E.R. 769; British International Law Cases, Vol. 7 
(1969), p. 540. 
52. [1956] 2 Q.B. 553. 
53. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Ser., 
Vol. 696 (June 8-19, 1964), p. 908. 
54. [1979] 3 All E.R. 1041; (1979) 1 W.L.R. 1252. 
55. [1979] 3 All. E.R. 1050-51. 
56. Green H. Hackworth, supra note 13, Vol. 1, p. 166. 
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facto government of China (not including Taiwan) is beyo~d doubt. 
The British position on the undetermined legal status of Taiwan an~ 
the "military occupation" of it by the ROC also precludes the possi-
bility of a British recognition of ROC as the de jure government of 
Taiwan. But Britain's intent, or lack of it, in recognizing the ROC as 
the de facto government of Taiwan seems less clear as a result of 
continued British official representation on the island. Yet London's 
repeated denials of recognition of the authorities in Taiwan as a 
"government" should preclude any implication to the contrary, even 
though the kind of recognition (de jure or de facto) being denied was 
not specified. Actually, even if the British mission were accredited to 
the central government of the ROC, the circumstances probably 
would still have barred the implication of de facto recognition. Brit-
ish practice abounds in instances where British missions were sent to 
unrecognized states with express denial of recognition, de facto or de 
jure .57 Even in the absence of the excuse of a legally uncertain Tai-
wan, the United Kingdom still could have maintained a consul in 
Taiwan, as a part of China, without conferring recognition on the 
ROC as the de facto government of Taiwan. 
On the other hand, the existence of the ROC as a government 
exercising sovereignty in Taiwan is a fact Britain has not denied. Its 
non-recognition of the ROC, a policy not entirely consistent with its 
recognition practice based on the effectiveness of the government, 58 
obviously is dictated by its policy toward the PRC. 
(b) Practice of English Courts 
It has been an established practice of English courts to seek in-
formation from the Foreign Office regarding certain international 
facts, 59 such as whether a foreign state or government is recognized 
by Britain or whether a state of war exists. The information, issued 
in a statement known as the "executive certificate," is generally bind-
ing on the courts.60 But in cases where the Foreign Office feels reluc-
57. Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1947, pp. 346-47. 
58. Ibid., pp. 116-24. Britain may, however, argue that the State of China could not 
obtain sovereignty over Taiwan merely as a result of military occupation without a peace 
treaty with the defeated Japan which was still the de jure sovereign of that island. Since 
the 1951, 1952 peace treaties with Japan did not specify the new de jure sovereign of 
Taiwan, Britain was bound by its treaty obligation to withhold recognition to the ROC 
despite its effective control of the island. 
59. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, pp. 113-19. 
60. Ibid. Insofar as recognition of government is concerned, Britain decided in 1980 
to cease according recognition to government but only to reveal its dealings with regimes 
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tant to be conclusive in an uncertain or delicate situation, the 
certificate tends to be "temporizing" and the courts are at liberty to 
admit additional evidence in drawing their own conclusions.61 In 
recent decades, English courts have occasionally departed, in the 
name of justice, from the views of the Foreign Office in cases where 
the existence of an unrecognized government and its legal acts were 
at issue. It is useful to review a number of cases on recognition of 
states or governments in appreciating the prevailing trend in this 
regard. 
English courts traditionally have been hostile toward unrecog-
nized governments. 62 Believing that the King cannot speak with two 
voices,63 they invariably withheld judicial cognizance from govern-
ments unrecognized by the British government. In Luther v. Sagor,64 
a decree of the newly established Soviet government in Russia pur-
porting to nationalize the plaintiffs company was denied validity in 
the King's Bench for lack of recognition by Britain. Pending appeal, 
London extended de facto recognition to Moscow. Judgment was 
reversed on appeal.65 This case reinforced the long English tradition 
and demonstrated the sharp distinction in legal effects between rec-
ognition and non-recognition. 
The Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 gave rise to the coin-
cidence of two governments: one recognized by Britain as de jure 
government and the other as de facto. In a litigation over public 
funds abroad, the Ethiopian emperor, who had been recognized as 
the de jure sovereign of Ethiopia, lost when such recognition was 
withdrawn by the British government. The Court of Appeal in Haile 
Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Limited (No. 2)66 reasoned that since 
the British government had switched de jure recognition from the 
that come to power unconstitutionally. For details, see Clive R. Symmons, "United 
Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Government: A Rose by Another Name?" Public 
Law, 1981, p. 249. 
61. See A.B. Lyons, "Judicial Application of International Law and the 'Tempo-
rizing' Certificate of the Executive," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 29 
(1952), p. 227. 
62. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, pp. 167-72. 
63. Ibid., pp. 116-17. 
64. [1921] 3 K.B. 532; [1921] All E.R. 138; British International Law Cases, Vol. 2 
(1965), p. 97. 
65. Accord: White, Child and Beney Ltd. v. Eagle Star & British Dominions Insur-
ance Company, (1922) 38 T.L.R. 616; [1922] All E.R. 482; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz 
and Others, [1929]1 K.B. 718; [1928) All E.R. 513. 
66. [1939) 1 Ch. 182; [1938) 3 All E.R. 677; British International Law Cases, Vol. 2 
(1965), p. 171. 
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Ethiopian Emperor to the King of Italy, the latter, as Emperor of 
Abyssinia, "is entitled by succession to the public property of the 
State of Abyssinia, and the later Emperor of Abyssinia's title thereto 
is no longer recognized as existent."67 The Court stated that "it is 
not disputed that that right of succession is to be dated back at any 
rate to the date when the de facto recognition ... took place."68 
The right of succession to public property abroad will have impor-
tant bearing on the discussion below. 
In the Civil Air Transport case cited earlier the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council dealt squarely with the question of conflict-
ing claims of the two Chinese governments to public property in 
Hong Kong. The issue before the court was whether Britain's recog-
nition of the PRC on January 5, 1950 had the retroactive effect of 
invalidating the sale of government aircraft located in Hong Kong 
by the ROC to two Americans prior to that date. The Privy Council 
upheld the validity of the sale on the ground that recognition worked 
retroactively only to validate the acts of the erstwhile unrecognized 
government but not to invalidate those of the de jure government 
prior to de-recognition.69 No question, however, was raised as to 
either the succession rights of the PRC government or the status of 
the ROC and its legal acts after British de-recognition. 
The first case that dealt with the ROC's legal personality was 
Luigi Monta, referred to earlier. The issue was whether the ROC, 
which was regarded in the British Foreign Office's executive certifi-
cate as a nongovernment, nevertheless should be considered as a 
government for the purpose of construing a war risks clause in a 
charter party. The Court declared that the certificate neither was 
conclusive nor exclusive of other evidence.70 It went on to say that 
the "government" referred to in a war risks clause need not be a 
government recognized by Britain. Mr. Justice Seller, refuting the 
proposition that "if there is no recognition there is on government," 
opined: 
Apparently the government situated and functioning in 
Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] was at one time recognized by this 
country, and it does not follow because recognition has 
ceased that the government, once recognized, has in any 
way altered its activities or lost such powers or authority as 
67. [1939] I Ch. 182. 
68. Ibid. 
69. [1953] A.C. 93. 
70. [1956] 2 Q.B. 565. 
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it had been exercising.71 
The de-factoism of Luigi was absent in a 1965 patent case, the 
In Re Harshaw Chemical Company's Patent .12 The patentee applied 
for an extension of the term of his patent, relating to a chemical 
method using nickel, on the ground of war loss (including loss of 
opportunity) based on the difficulty of developing the invention over 
the period of nickel scarcity during the Korean War. Under the Pat-
ent Act of 1949, if such loss were occasioned by reason of hostilities 
between Britain and "any foreign state", extension may be granted. 
The Court, based on a brief and conclusive certificate from the For-
eign Office stating that North Korea was unrecognized as a sovereign 
state, took a restrictive view of the statutory language and rejected 
the application. 
But the de facto legal personality of another satellite state of the 
Soviet Union was recognized, in an unorthodox fashion, by the 
House of Lords in Carl Zeiss St!ftung v. Rayner and Kee/er.73 The 
12-year passing-off battle was initiated by the Carl Zeiss St!ftung 
(Foundation), an optical instrument firm in East Germany, to enjoin 
the use of its trade name by a West German firm, also known as Carl 
Zeiss St!ftung, and its British distributors. The Foreign Office certi-
fied that East Germany was unrecognized/4 but added: 
Her Majesty's Government have recognized the State and 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 
de jure entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of 
[East Germany].75 
Following this curious formulation, the House of Lords held that 
although the German Democratic Republic is not recog-
nized by Her Majesty's Government, its acts should be rec-
ognized by the courts as lawful, not as the acts of a 
sovereign state, but as acts done by a subordinate body 
which the U.S.S.R. set up to act on its behalf, since a de 
jure governing body cannot disclaim responsibility for the 
acts of subordinate bodies set up by it?6 
It seems that the House of Lords invented from the executive 
71. Ibid., p. 567. 
72. [1965] R.C.P. 97. Curiously, Luigi was not even mentioned in the opinion. 
73. (1967] A.C. 853; [1966] 2 All E.R. 536; British International Law Cases, Vol. 8 
(1971), p. 207. 
74. [1967] A.C. 854. 
75. Ibid., p. 855. 
76. Ibid. 
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certificate a theolf, under which East Germany acts as the agent of 
the Soviet Union. 7 The decision was, on its face, in full accord with 
the Luther v. Sagor rule, but the House of Lords (per Lord Wilber-
force) did express its doubts on the rigidity and sweeping effect of 
that rule. 78 In this sense, the reasoning of this decision could be 
viewed as an effort to by-pass the unpalatable effect of that rule. 
The de-factoism of Luigi was revived in a 1970 case with the 
same factual pattern as in Harshaw Chemical. In In ReAl-Fin Cor-
poration "S Patents 79 the Court, citing Luigi, construed the Patent Act 
in a way that North Korea was regarded as a "foreign state" within 
the meaning of the statute. It must be remembered that the Foreign 
Office, though denying British recognition of North Korea, did note 
in its certificate that North Korea controlled the area of Korea north 
of the 38th ParalleP0 The Foreign Office also advised the Court to 
draw its own conclusion oflaw. It may be said that given the Court's 
reliance on Luigi, even if the executive certificate had been intended 
to be conclusive, as in Harshaw Chemical, the case would have come 
out the same way. 
In a more recent case, Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean Turkish Holi-
days and Muftizade, 81 decided in 1978, all the issues that concern us: 
77. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, p. 170. 
78. Lord Wiberforce stated: 
In the United States some glimmerings can be found of the idea that non-recog-
nition cannot be pressed to its ultimate logical limit and that where private 
rights, or acts of everyday occurrence, or peifunctory acts of administration are 
concerned (the scope of these exceptions has never been precisely dtjined) the 
courts may, in the interest of justice and common sense, where no consideration 
of public policy to the contrary has to prevail, give recognition to the actual 
facts or realities found to exist in the territory in question. No trace of any 
such doctrine is yet to be found in English law, but equally in my opinion, there 
is nothing in those English decisions, in which recognition has been refused to 
particular acts of non-recognized governments, which would prevent its accept-
ance or which [would] prescribe the absolute and total invalidity of all laws and 
acts fiowing from unrecognized governments. . . I should wish to regard it as an 
open question, in English law . .. (emphasis added). 
[1967] A.C. 954. 
79. (1970] I Ch. 160; [1969] 3 All E.R. 396; British International Law Cases, Vol. 9 
91973), p. I. For a discussion on exceptions to traditional English law on recognition 
(including the AI-Fin case), see J.G. Merrills, "Recognition and Construction," Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1970), p. 476. 
80. [1970] I Ch. 160. 
81. (1978] 3 W.L.R. 378, H.L.; [1978] I All E.R. 277. This case was noted in British 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 49 (1978), p. 259; Cambridge Law Journal, 1978, p. 
48; Malcolm Shaw, "Legal Acts of an Unrecognized Entity," Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 
94 (1978), p. 500; J.G. Merrills, "Trespass to Foreign Land," International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly, Vol. 28 (1979), pp. 523-25; Zaim M. Nedjati, "Acts of Unrecognized 
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the conclusiveness of the executive certificate, judicial cognizance of 
an unrecognized government, and justiciability of the question in 
our hypothetical case, were squarely dealt with. Plaintiffs were 
Greek-Cypriot companies that owned hotels in Northern Cyprus, 
which were taken over by Turkish-Cypriots after the Turkish inva-
sion in 197 4 and were run by the latter under a lease from the new 
authorities calling themselves the "Turkish Federated State of Cy-
prus" (TFSC). Owners of the plaintiff companies fled to southern 
Cyprus where a Greek-Cypriot administration was in control. Plain-
tiffs sought to enjoin the defendants, an English Travel Agent and 
the London representative of TFSC, from promoting holidays in the 
plaintiffs' hotels. 
One of the issues before the Court was what law, as lex loci 
delicti, should apply to make the alleged trespass actionable in Eng-
land. In reply to an inquiry by the Court, the Foreign Office stated 
that Britain did not recognize the TFSC either as the de jure or de 
facto government of Cyprus and that the only lawful government 
recognized in Cyprus was the Republic of Cyprus set up by the Cy-
prus Act of 1960.82 
Lord Denning of the Court of Appeal, in response to the argu-
ment that the Court should follow the executive certificate and re-
gard as nullities the laws of TFSC that authorized the occupation of 
the premises, made an elaborate discussion of this issue. His views 
are worth quoting at length: 
That doctrine is said to be based on the need for the 
executive and the courts to speak with one voice. If the 
executive do not recognise the usurping government, nor 
should the courts: see The Arantzazu Mendi by Lord Atkin. 
But there are those who do not subscribe to that view. 
They say that there is no need for the executive and the 
judiciary to speak in unison. The executive is concerned 
with the external consequences of recognition, vis-a-vis 
other states. The courts are concerned with the internal 
Governments,'' ibid., Vol. 30 ( 1981 ), pp. 388, 391, 397. This issue of judicial cognizance 
was dealt with only in Lord Dennings' opinion in the Court of Appeal. The other two 
law judges, while expressing some sympathy with Lord Denning's views, focused on the 
question of trespass on foreign land. [1978] I All E.R. 277, 291, 293. On appeal to the 
House of Lords, their Lordships considered it unnecessary to decide this issue which was 
fully argued. [1978]3 W.L.R. 378, 382, 388. The House of Lords allowed the appeal in 
part to permit the action to continue as regards the chattels (contents of the two hotels) 
but not land or immovable property. Ibid., p. 387, 395. 
82. [1978] I All E.R. 281. 
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consequences of it, vis-a-vis private individuals. So far as 
the courts are concerned, there are many who hold that the 
courts are entitled to look at the state of affairs actually ex-
isting in a territory, to see what is the law which is in fact 
effective and enforced in that territory, and to give such ef-
fect to it in its impact on individuals as justice and common 
sense require, provided always that there are no considera-
tions of public policy against it.83 (original footnote 
omitted) 
If it were necessary to make a choice between these 
conflicting doctrines, I would unhesitatingly hold that the 
courts of this country can recognise the laws or acts of a body 
which is in effective control of a territory even though it has 
not been recognized by Her Majesty's Government de jure or 
de facto, at any rate in regard to the laws which regulate 
the day to day affairs of the people, such as their marriages, 
their divorces, their leases, their occupations and so forth; 
and furthermore that the courts can receive evidence of the 
state of affairs so as to see whether the body is in effective 
control or not. 84 (emphasis added) 
He then concluded on the question of justiciability: 
Although this case has involved much discussion on 
many points, I think it could be disposed of on a broad 
ground of public policy. Underlying this case is a diver-
gence of view between two autonomous administrations in 
Cyprus. The northern administration sets itself up as an 
administration entitled to pass laws requisitioning this 
property. The southern administration denies the claim 
and says that the requisitioning was unlawful. It is not the 
province of these courts to resolve such a dispute. It is a dis-
pute which should be settled by negotiation between the 
two administrations aided, we hope, by intermediaries of 
good will. It is indeed, we hope, being settled at this very 
moment by negotiations in Vienna. If a settlement is 
reached it should deal with all questions relating to the tak-
ing of property, compensation and so forth. But, whether it 
is settled or not, it is not for these courts to decide between 
these conflicting views. The dispute, in my view, is not justi-
83. Ibid., p. 282. 
84. Ibid., p. 283. 
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ciab/e here. The action should be struck out as not sustain-
able. I would allow the appeal accordingly.85 (emphasis 
added). 
In Reel v. Holder and Another86 decided in 1981, the English 
courts were faced with a direct confrontation between national ath-
letic bodies of the PRC and ROC regarding membership in the Eng-
land-based International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF). 
Under Rule 1(2) of the IAAF, membership is open to "national gov-
erning body" of any "country," and it is expressly provided that the 
jurisdiction of IAAF members is limited to the "political boundaries 
of the country they represent." In 1954, the IAAF accepted the ap-
plication for membership of the PRC body from the Chinese main-
land while it also extended an invitation to the ROC body from 
Taiwan to apply. The ROC applied in 1956 and was accepted as a 
member in due course. The PRC body then withdrew in protest in 
1958. Twenty years later, in the IAAF's 1978 meeting, a resolution 
was passed to re-admit the PRC body as the sole representative of 
the country "China" with jurisdiction covering Taiwan. This, in ef-
fect, amounted to excluding the ROC body from membership. The 
ROC body thereupon sued the IAAF in English courts to annul the 
resolution. 
Judge Forbes of the Queens Bench Division, finding no reason 
for equating "country" with "nation" and noting that neither the 
PRC body nor the ROC body had control of athletes in the other 
body's territory, found the resolution in violation of the IAAF Rule 
1(a) and thus void.87 On appeal, judgment was affirmed. Lord Den-
ning of the Court of Appeal opined: 
In the rule, "the jurisdiction of members of the Feder-
ation shall be limited to the political boundaries of the 
country they represent", the governing word is "country". 
One "country, is Taiwan. Another "country, is mainland 
China. The jurisdiction of the Athletic Association of Taiwan 
is limited to Taiwan. The jurisdiction of Athletic Association 
of mainland China is limited to mainland China.88 (empha-
sis added) 
And Law Judge Eveleigh concurred: 
85. Ibid., p. 286. 
86. Reel v. Holder and another, [1981] 3 All E.R.; [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1226, C.A. af-
firming [1979] 3 All E.R. 1041; 1 W.L.R. 1252. 
87. [1979] 3 All E.R. 1052. 
88. [1981] 3 All E.R. 325. 
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The word "country" has been used in the rules in order to 
delineate the area of authority. They do not use the word 
in the sense of sovereign state. 
That rule clearly contemplates that there may be an 
existing member of the IAAF which is a colony and not 
itself a sovereign state. I think that the word is used in the 
rules in the sense of an area or part of the world where the 
applicant has authority in relation to athletics and an area 
to which the word "country" is appropriate because the in-
habitants share the right to live there in common as one dis-
tinct people. This is a question to be answered broadly and 
not on a political basis alone. Political status may have 
some relevance. It may perhaps help to see the inhabitants 
as being one people, but is is not the decisive factor. 89 (em-
phasis added) 
215 
In restoring the ROC body's lost membership, both courts were 
carefully confining themselves to interpreting the rules of the IAAF, 
which are legally a contract among its members, without touching 
upon the sensitive issue of who represents the state of China in the 
IAAF. Yet it still is significant that the ROC and PRC were, for the 
purpose of contract interpretation, considered two distinct "coun-
tries," mutually exclusive of each other. In no cases other than colo-
nies has the word "country" ever been interpreted as something less 
than a sovereign state. Given the British Foreign and Common-
wealth Relation Office's certificate cited earlier, such a decision 
could not have been reached without a strong sense of de factoism 
on the part of the judges concerned. In fact, the Court of Appeal 
showed the same degree of de factoism earlier in solving a similar 
problem in relation to badminton in an unreported 1977 case Shen 
Fu Chang v. Ste//an Mohlin (July 5, 1977).90 In that case, Judge 
Robert Goff made a declaration that Taiwan could be a member of 
the International Badminton Federation.91 Although the question of 
judicial cognizance of an unrecognized government's legal acts was 
not involved in either cases, both cases will help the new trend of 
judicial realism take shape in England. 
In sum, the above cases show a gradual but definite departure 
by English courts from their traditional rigid position on unrecog-
89. Ibid., pp. 326-27. 
90. Ibid., p. 324. 
91. Ibid. 
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nized governments and their legal acts. As a result, English courts 
are less inclined to follow unreservedly the views of the Foreign Of-
fice and have become increasingly independent in these matters. Yet 
the old tradition remains strong.92 Although more judicial develop-
ment of the new de-factoism is needed before a definite rule could 
emerge, the view that a government, not recognized de jure or at 
least de facto by the British Government, should be regarded by 
English courts as non-existent, is being totally abandoned. 
(c) Implications for the Peking-Taipei Contest for Seabed 
Oil 
If the PRC's or ROC's assignee brings an action to contest the 
other's title to oil in question in an English court, how would the 
court decide? The court would, as usual, consult the Foreign Office, 
which can be expected to issue a certificate outlining the position of 
the British government. However conclusive that certificate might 
purport to be, the Court probably would not accept it blindly in ex-
clusion of other evidence, as a number of recent cases have shown. 
One therefore may assume with some confidence that the Court 
would consider the parties' arguments and the authorities on which 
they rely in reaching its own conclusion. It is thus useful to look into 
the potential contentions of the PRC's and ROC's assignees. 
(1) The "Public Property" Argument 
The PRC's assignee, either as plaintiff or defendant, would ar-
gue, citing Haile Selassie, that since Britain has recognized the PRC 
as the only de jure government of all China, including Taiwan, and 
since the oil in question is a public property belonging to the Chinese 
State, only the PRC has title to it. He further would contend that 
since Britain does not recognize the ROC as a government, the valid-
ity of all the ROC's legal acts, including those that effected the as-
signment of the oil to the ROC's assignee, should be denied by 
English courts. He would invoke a chain of authorities in his sup-
port prior to and after Luther v. Sagor. 
This argument deserves scrutiny. Transfer of public property, 
e.g., land, buildings, bank accounts, from a displaced government to 
its successor regime within the dispossessed territory occurs as a mat-
ter of course in cases of governmental succession effected either 
92. Lord Denning was criticized for having gone too far and for his alleged misun-
derstanding of Lord Wilberforce's dictum in Carl Zeiss which he quoted. Malcolm 
Shaw, supra note 81, p. 502. 
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through normal or revolutionary means. This is what actua~y h~p­
pened on the Chinese mainland after 1949. If the property 1s situ-
ated abroad and the title thereto is contested by the rival regimes, 
usually the court of the state in which the property is located will 
determine the rightful owner of it on the basis of recognition by that 
state. Haile Selassie and Civil Air Transport are precedents in 
point.93 But is the oil in dispute a "public property?" 
The oil is not property before it is recovered from the subsoil of 
the continental shelf. If the PRC recovers it, then the PRC has title 
to the oil because it, as a government recognized by Britain, has sov-
ereign rights under international law over resources in its continental 
shelf. The ROC's assignee would have little basis to claim the oil, 
regardless of whether the oil has been assigned by the PRC to a pri-
vate party. However, if the oil is recovered by the ROC and as-
signed to a private assignee, the "public property" argument seems 
questionable even though the oil is now under English jurisdiction. 
In this context, the date of Britain's acknowledgment of the PRC's de 
jure sovereignty over Taiwan, ie., March 13, 1972, becomes critical. 
Since Britain before that date did not consider Taiwan as part 
of China, the PRC may not claim any property in Taiwan owned by 
the ROC, including the oil in question, as public property belonging 
to the State of China. After the oil was assigned to a private party 
and shipped to England, it ceased to be public property. Moreover, 
neither the PRC nor its assignee can claim it under Haile Selassie. 
However, the PRC's assignee would assert that the PRC may 
claim title to all public property situated in Taiwan after March 13, 
1972, including the oil in question, on the ground that Britain has 
acknowledged the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan at that time. He 
further would assert that since the ROC long has been derecognized 
by Britain as a government of China, it has no authority to assign 
any public property of China in Taiwan after that date to a private 
party. As a result, the argument continues, the ROC's assignee holds 
no legal title to the oil in question. If the court accepts this line of 
argument, the impact on the ROC would be devastating. From then 
on, not only would the ROC be a non-entity in the eyes of English 
courts, but title to all properties owned or acquired by the ROC au-
tomatically would become vested in the PRC as far as English law is 
93. There are a number of American cases in this regard. Eg., The Rogdai, 278 F. 
294 (N.D. Cal. 1920); Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Company, 
104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 
230 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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concerned. The disruption of international transactions involving 
the ROC as a party would be eqormous and far-reaching. 
There seems to be no rule in English law that gives such sweep-
ing and unjust effect to recognition by the British government, espe-
cially when the property in question has been transferred to private 
hands. The rule of Haile Selassie, where the property remained in 
the hands of the derecognized government, does not apply here. 
More importantly, if the recent emergence of judicial de factoism 
toward unrecognized governments makes any sense, the English 
court would not be blind to the reality in Taiwan, as Reel v. Holder 
has shown, where the ROC continues to exercise de facto sover-
eignty. More likely than not, the court would look into additional 
evidence and determine to what extent it would recognize legal acts 
of the ROC which underlie the validity of the title of the ROC's 
assignee. 
(2) The De Facto Doctrine 
To determine whether the ROC's legal acts warrant judicial 
cognizance the court would have to consider whether such cogni-
zance would violate the public policy of the forum as well as the 
nature of the legal acts in question. It is clear that Britain's de-
recognition of the ROC did not result from any inherent illegality, as 
in the case of Rhodesia,94 or Britain's international obligation of 
non-recognition, as in the case of Transkei and Bophuthatswana in 
South Africa.95 This absence of objection on public policy grounds 
does not solve the problem, however. Difficult questions remain re-
94. Rhodesia's unilateral independence in 1965 was illegal in that it was ultra vires, 
since independence could only be granted by an act of the British Parliament. See J.E.S. 
Fawcett, "Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia," British Yearbook of International 
Law, Vol. 41 (1965-1966), pp. 103, 105. 
95. Transkei declared its independence from South Africa on October 26, 1976. New 
York Times, October 26, 1976, p. 1. Bophuthatswana, another one of the nine bantus-
tans, or tribal homelands, in South Africa, did so in December 1977. The United Na-
tions General Assembly passed, immediately after Transkei's declaration of 
independence, a resolution declaring that independence null and void because it consoli-
dated South Africa's Apartheid policies, and condemned the establishment of all bantus-
tans. General Assembly Resolution 31/6, UNGAOR, Vol. 31, Supplement (No. 39) p. 
10, UN Doc. A/31/39 (1977). The resolution was passed unanimously. Other than 
south Africa, no U.N. member state has granted recognition to Transkei. The interna-
tional obligation of non-recognition derives its authority from the U.N. Charter, custom-
ary international law of human rights, and multilateral treaties to which Britain is a party 
(e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). For a discussion on 
Transkei, see Merrie F. Witkin, "Transkei: An Analysis of the Practice of Recognition-
Political or Legal?" Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 18 (1977), p. 605. 
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specting whether to limit judicial cognizance to "perfunctory acts of 
administration," as stated by Carl Zeiss (per Lord Wilberforce),96 
such as certification of marriage or divorce, or to include other exer-
cises of governmental authority, as intimated in Hesperides (per 
Lord Denning in Court of Appeal),97 which presumably include the 
power to exploit seabed oil and dispose of it. 
On the other hand, the PRC, as a recognized government, 
should have little difficulty getting judicial cognizance of its law and 
decrees that validate the title of its assignee. 98 If the H esperides rule 
prevails, which is not unlikely in view of the new trend of realism in 
English cases, a real conflict would emerge before the court, namely, 
one between the legal acts of two rival governments of the same 
state. The situation bears considerable resemblance to that of Cy-
prus where two mutually independent administrations co-exist and 
effectively control their respective territories. More complicated 
than Hesperides is the fact that the Peking-Taipei rivalry involves oil 
recovered from an area of the seabed over which they both lack sov-
ereignty, stricto sensu, under customary intemationallaw.99 A fur-
ther attempt by the court to ascertain the respective de facto 
jurisdiction of the ROC and PRC practically would require a deter-
mination of the shelf boundary in the Taiwan Strait between the 
ROC and the PRC. At this point, even the most liberal judge would 
find the task formidable, since no law exists regarding the delimita-
tion of continental shelf between two rival governments of the same 
state. A logical step for the court to take would be to declare the 
dispute non-justiciable, as Lord Denning did in Hesperides. This 
means that the plaintiff's contest would fail and that the defendant 
would retain the oil which he must have had already in possession. 
If the Hesperides rule did not prevail, then the ROC's legal acts 
dealing with seabed exploitation would not be recognized. Regard-
less of who sues, the ROC's assignee would lose. 
In conclusion, the newly emerged de factoism on the part of 
English courts could benefit the ROC's assignee, but only if the as-
signment took place before March 13, 1972, and only if he has the oil 
and is sued as defendant. The best outcome he can hope for is a 
dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction under Hesperides. If he 
96. See his opinion quoted in supra note 78. 
97. See the quotation in text accompanying note 84 supra. 
98. On judicial cognizance of recognized governments, see Daniel P. O'Connell, 
supra note 3, p. 183. 
99. A state has, under Article 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention, only sovereign 
rights to the natural resources in the continental shelf, but not to the shelf itself. 
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sues as a plaintiff, his chances for winning in all circumstances are 
slim. 
3. Japanese Practice 
(a) Practice of the Japanese Government 
Japan's post-war China policy was influenced heavily by the 
United States. Having regained full sovereignty from the Allied 
Powers under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan in 1952 
signed a separate peace treaty with the ROC, 100 a country which 
was, like the PRC, not invited to the peace conference. 101 The 1952 
treaty terminated the state of war between China and Japan 102 and 
the Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan 103 and served as the basis for 
a host of other bilateral treaties. 104 Exchange of ambassadors in that 
year between Tokyo and Taipei marked the resumption of diplo-
matic relations. 
In the next two decades, Tokyo, following the American lead, 
continued to recognize Taipei and support the ROC's seat in the 
United Nations until the latter's expulsion in 1971. On the other 
hand, Japan managed to maintain unofficial economic relations with 
the PRC. The reversal of Washington's China policy in 1971 
shocked Tokyo and accelerated the process of "normalization of re-
lations" between Tokyo and Peking. In the joint communique of 
September 29, 1972, establishing diplomatic relations between them, 
it was declared: 
The government of Japan recognizes the government 
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal govern-
ment of China. 
The Government of the People's Republic of China 
reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory 
of the People's Republic of China. The government of Ja-
pan fully understands and respects this stand of the govern-
ment of China and adheres to its stand of complying with 
Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. 105 (emphasis 
100. Treaty of Peace, Republic of China-Japan, April28, 1952, UNTS, Vol. 138, p. 38. 
101. This was due to disagreement between the U.S., which recognized the ROC, and 
the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and other countries that had recognized the PRC, with respect to 
which government should represent China in the peace conference. The compromise 
reached was that neither would be invited. Hungdah Chiu, supra note 6, p. 125. 
102. ROC-Japan Peace Treaty, art. 1. 
103. Ibid., art. 2. 
104. Ibid., arts. 7, 8, 9. 
105. Peking Review, October 6, 1972, pp. 12-13. 
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added) 
In a subsequent press conference, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Ohira said: 
The Japanese government holds that as a result of the nor-
malization of Japan-China relations, the Japan-China 
peace treaty has lost the meaning of its existence and is de-
clared to be terminated, although this question is not men-
tioned in the joint statement. 106 (emphasis added) 
On the same day, Japan and the ROC severed diplomatic rela-
tions. 107 But Taipei and Tokyo soon set up functional substitutes of 
embassies in the capitals of each country to carry on trade and other 
unofficial relations. 108 
One important question left open is Japan's position on the 
legal status of Taiwan. While Peking regarded the joint communi-
que as committing Japan to the former's sovereignty over Taiwan, 
Tokyo held a different view. 109 The Japanese view that Taiwan's 
legal status remains undetermined is consistent with the peace trea-
106. Ibid., p. 15. 
107. Free China Weekly, October I, 1972, p. I. 
108. The Japanese embassy in Taipei was replaced by the branch office of a private 
entity known as Interchange Association (ICA) whereas the ROC's embassy in Tokyo 
was superseded by the branch office of the East Asia Relations Association (EARA), a 
similar entity. On December 26, 1972, an agreement was signed between ICA and 
EARA to provide for the continuance of extensive trade, cultural and other unofficial 
relations between the two countries. Most of the staff of ICA and EARA were drawn 
from the foreign ministries and other governmental agencies of the ROC and Japan. On 
the post-1972 Japan-ROC relations, see David N. Rowe, "Informal Diplomatic Rela-
tions: The Case of Japan and the Republic of China, 1972-1974," Hamden, Connecticut: 
Shoe String Press, 1975; James W. Morley, "The Japanese Formula for Normalization 
and Its Relevance for U.S. China Policy, in Hungdah Chiu ed. Normalizing Relations with 
the Peoples Republic oj China: Problems, Analysis and Documents, Occasional Papers/ 
Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 3, Baltimore: University of Mary-
land Law School, 1978 (Hungdah Chiu ed.), p. 121. 
109. According to Takakazu Kuriyama, the then Head of the Treaties Division, 
Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry of Japan, the Japanese government was, in the joint 
communique, addressing what the status of Taiwan should be rather than what it is. He 
said: 
[The Japanese Government] has consequently no objection to the islands be-
coming part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and has no inten-
tion whatsoever to support the independence of Taiwan. 
Takakazu Kuriyama, "Some Legal Aspects of the Japan-China Joint Communique," 
Japanese Annual oj International Law, Vol. 17 (1973), pp. 42, 45. 
Contrary to the popular impression that Japan had recognized Peking's claim to 
Taiwan, Tokyo denied that it was the Japanese position. New York Times, November 
6,1972, p. 22. 
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ties and its official statements prior to 1972.ll0 Moreover, the Japa-
nese government did not regard the joint communique as a treaty. 111 
It seems fair to say that by "fully understand[ing] and respect[ing]" 
the PRC's position, Japan neither opposed nor endorsed that posi-
tion, despite the contrary views of some Japanese publicists. 112 
Another question is the legal status of the ROC vis-a-vis Japan. 
Unlike the United Kingdom, Japan did not indicate expressly its 
withdrawal of recognition, but merely advised the ROC that Japan 
could no longer maintain diplomatic ties with it. Nevertheless, such 
an implication seems obvious. In addition to Japan's recognition of 
the PRC as the sole legal government of China, the termination of 
the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty, which was largely dispositive and de-
claratory in nature and could have survived a mere rupture of diplo-
matic relations, 113 was another indication. A third instance involved 
the embassy premises of the ROC in Tokyo. The Japanese govern-
ment, which had been asked by the ROC to take these premises into 
110. For the official pronouncements of Japan's position on the legal status of Taiwan, 
see the statement of the Director of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Af· 
fairs in the Japanese House of Representatives on February 2, 1961, Japanese Annual of 
International Law, Vol. 8 (1964), p. 101, and the statement of the same ministry on 
March 12, 1964 in the House of Councillors, ibid., Vol. 10, 64-65 (1966). Japan consid-
ered that only the Allied Powers who defeated Japan in World War II had the authority 
to determine Taiwan's status. 
Ill. Takakazu Kuriyama, supra note 101, p. 50. 
112. E.g., Keishiro Iriye, "The Joint Communique of Japan and the People's Republic 
of China and the Taiwan Issue," Japanese Annual of international Law, Vol. 17 (1973), 
pp. 52, 55-61. Mr. Iriye, professor of international law at Waseda University, argued that 
Taiwan was "tacitly recognized as having been returned to Chinese sovereignty" when 
the 1952 ROC-Japan peace treaty came into force. Therefore, when Japan recognized 
the PRC as the only legal government of China, sovereignty over Taiwan became vested 
in the PRC. He went so far as to conclude that all natural and juridical persons in 
Taiwan should be treated as nationals of the PRC. Ibid. 
113. The Japanese government considered that, as was obvious from Foreign Minister 
Ohira's statement quoted above, the termination of the Japan-ROC peace treaty was a 
result of derecognizing the ROC as the government of the State of China with which the 
treaty was concluded. Kuriyama, supra note 101, pp. 48-49. In fact, the declaratory and 
dispositive provisions, such as termination of the state of war between China and Japan 
and Japan's renunciation of its claim to Taiwan, were considered by the Japanese gov-
ernment to have survived de-recognition of the ROC. This was why Japan did not con-
clude a second peace treaty with the PRC in order to terminate the state of war. (The 
1978 Japan-PRC Peace and Friendship Treaty had nothing to do with the termination of 
the state of war.) But in order to accomodate the PRC's demand that Japan renounce the 
Japan-ROC peace treaty which the PRC regarded as null and void ab initio, the joint 
communique referred to the termination of "abnormal state of affairs" that had existed 
between Japan and the PRC. Peking Review, October 6, 1972, p. 12. 
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its custody, 114 handed over the properties to the PRC in March 1973 
on the ground that the PRC, as the sole legal government of China 
recognized by Japan, was entitled to any diplomatic property of the 
State of China. 115 
(b) Practice of Japanese Courts 
The emergence, right at Japan's doorstep, of two pairs of rival 
governments in China and Korea and the presence of large numbers 
of persons of Chinese and Korean origin in Japan have given Japa-
nese courts ample opportunity to deal with legal questions affiliated 
with unrecognized governments, notably the lex patriae of these 
aliens in matters of marriage, divorce, and other legal acts of domes-
tic relations. 116 Japanese courts generally follow the theory of "one 
state, two governments" or that of "two states" to apply the Japanese 
choice-of-law rules with largely similar results. 117 Of importance 
here is that despite the approaches employed, judicial cognizance of 
the validity of the laws of the PRC, which were not recognized by 
Japan until 1972, and of the DPRK (North Korea), which is still 
unrecognized, invariably has been granted. 118 That governmental 
recognition {public international law) and choice-of-law problems 
(private international law) should be kept separate is a generally ac-
cepted judicial belief. A typical formulation appeared in the opinion 
of the Patent Tribunal of the Japanese Patent Agency, in the Japa-
nese version of the Carl Zeiss case, in regard to the validity of East 
German law: 
But the capacity of a person is to be determined by lex pa-
triae under the principle of private international law, and it 
is widely recognized that the law in a territory of which the 
person in question has his origin can be designated as lex 
patriae as long as the territory possesses an effective legal 
order, [regardless of] whether it is not recognized as a State 
or whether its legal status is not yet finally determined in 
the eyes of Japan. 119 
114. Chung-yang Jih-pao, December 28, 1972, p. I. 
115. Mainichi Shimbun, March 15, 1973, p. 2. The ROC's Foreign Ministry protested 
the action, but did not challenge it in Japanese courts. Chung-yang Jih-pao, March 16, 
1973, p. I. 
116. See generally Yoshiro Hayata, "The Lex Patriae of Chinese and Koreans [sic]," 
Japanese Annual of International Law, Vol. 9 (1965), p. 57. 
117. Ibid., pp. 60-67. 
118. Ibid., p. 59, note 8. 
119. Award of July 17, 1963, The Patent Tribunal, translated in ibid., pp. 132, 134. 
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In a more recent case, 120 East Germany also was treated as a state 
and its laws recognized judicially for purposes of Japanese trade-
mark and patent laws. 
Since Japan's switch of recognition from Taipei to Peking in 
1972, there only have been two municipal cases that touched upon 
the question of recognition and its legal consequences. One, decided 
in 1975,121 related to the constitutionality of Japan's termination of 
the peace treaty with the ROC, and has no material bearing on the 
question under discussion. The other case, Republic of China v. Yu 
Ping-huan eta/., 122 decided in 1982, concerned the transfer of a Chi-
nese student dormitory acquired by the ROC in 1952 to the PRC as 
a result of Japan's recognition of the latter. Initially, the Kyoto Dis-
trict Court upheld the transfer, reasoning that 
[a]ccording to the facts found, the land and building 
thereon are public property for public use, considering the 
source of money alloted for the purchase thereof and the 
purpose of the use thereof, which China purchased in order 
to continuously use as a dormitory for Chinese students in 
Japan.123 
It also said that the PRC, recognized by Japan as the sole legal gov-
ernment of China, was entitled to the public property in question 
owned by the ROC since 1952 in the name of the State of China. 124 
The Court clearly relied on the theory of governmental succession in 
international law to justify the transfer. More interesting than the 
ratio decidendi was the fact that the ROC, as plaintiff and repre-
sented by its former ambassador Chen Chih-mai to Japan, was 
granted locus standi. The Court said: 
Furthermore, the plaintiff's capacity to be a party must be 
examined, since the Japanese government [has) recognized 
the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate Gov-
ernment in China; however, it is an unquestionable fact that 
the plaintiff still dominates {Taiwan} and the surrounding is-
lands and constitutes a de facto State, and such would en-
counter no problem in seeking settlement by the Japanese 
120. Decision of June 3, 1973, Tokyo High Court, ibid., Vol. 19 (1975), p. 187. 
121. Decision of September 11, 1975, Hiroshima High Court, ibid., Vol. 21 (1977), p. 
159. 
122. Decision of September 16, 1977, Kyoto District Court, ibid., Vol. 22 (1978), p. 
151. 
123. Ibid., p. 155. 
124. Ibid. 
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Court of disputes arising from international private trans-
actions and others, and thus it is not necessary to deny the 
capacity of the plaintiff to be a party. 125 (emphasis added) 
225 
On appeal to the Osaka High Court, the judgment upholding 
the transfer was reversed and remanded to the Kyoto District Court. 
However, Osaka High Court accepted the Kyoto District Court's 
view on the locus standi question, theorizing that 
whether the plaintiff has the capacity to sue depends on 
whether it is a de facto government and whether the litiga-
tion concerns private legal dispute. 126 
It went on to state that although Japanese courts must, like all 
government agencies, fully understand and respect the PRC's posi-
tion regarding Taiwan, that does not mean "Japan is obligated to 
ignore the existence of the plaintiff or to prevent Japanese national 
from entering into private legal relationships with the plaintiff." 127 
The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff actually ruled and domi-
nated Taiwan and the surrounding islands and the property in ques-
tion did not have direct state functions, the plaintiff had the capacity 
to sue. 
On the question of transfer of public property as a result of gov-
ernmental succession, the Court opined: 
The fact that the plaintiff still actually rules and dominates 
Taiwan and the surrounding islands as a de facto govern-
ment makes the succession of government from the plaintiff 
to the People's Republic of China as a result of Japan-
China normalization of relations an incomplete succession. 
The retroactive legal effect of Japan's switch of recognition 
to the People's Republic of China as the sole legal govern-
ment of China does not affect ownership of the property in 
question which, having no direct state functions, was ac-
quired by the plaintiff in 1952 when it was still the govern-
ment recognized by Japan. The People's Republic of 
China therefore cannot claim ownership of the property in 
question on the ground of governmental succession (which 
it has not done). Consequently, the plaintiff has not, as a 
matter of course, lost the ownership of the property in 
question after the Japan-China normalization of rela-
125. Ibid., p. 156. 
126. Decision of Aprill4, 1982, Osaka High Court, p. 10 (A copy of the decision and 
its Chinese translation are in the author's possession.). 
127. Ibid. 
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tions. 128 (emphasis added) 
The concept of "incomplete governmental succession" and the 
characterization of the property in question were both innovative 
and enlightening. Both points gave the Court enough leeway to by-
pass the unrealistic and undesirable effects of recognition of govern-
ment under traditional rules of international law. Of particular 
significance is the confirmation of the rule, long established in the 
United States and England, 129 that recognition works retroactively 
only to validate acts of the erstwhile unrecognized government but 
not to invalidate those acts of the de jure government prior to 
derecognition. 
Regardless of whether the ROC, if sued, would be able to claim 
sovereign immunity, the strong de factoism of Japanese courts to-
ward unrecognized governments and their legal acts seems obvious 
and consistent. 
(c) Implications for the Peking-Taipei Contest for Seabed 
Oil 
Ifthe legal battle between the assignees of the ROC and PRC is 
fought in a Japanese court, the scenario probably would be different 
from that in an English court. The Japanese court would not consult 
the Foreign Ministry, but merely take judicial notice of the switch of 
recognition and the attending developments, as did the two courts in 
the two cases noted above. The contentions of the parties would be 
similar but their reception by the Japanese courts may be quite 
different. 
Since Japan had recognized the ROC before September 29, 
1972, Japanese courts probably would not, under the act of state doc-
trine, sit in judgment on the validity of the ROC's legal acts (includ-
ing those relating to oil exploitation and sale) prior to that date 
unless they violate international law or the public policy of the fo-
rum.130 Japan's recognition of the PRC may not invalidate retroac-
128. /hid., pp. 14-15. 
129. E.g., Guaranty Trust Co., v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Gdynia Ameryka 
Linie v. Boguslawski, [1953) A.C. 11; Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport 
Corporation, [1953) A.C. 70. 
130. It is submitted that the act of state doctrine is not generally regarded as a rule of 
international law. L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, 8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, p. 267. Various considerations underlie the 
application of this doctrine in state practices, including constitutional requirements, com-
ity between nations, and municipal contlict of law rules. Under Article 98 of the 1946 
Japanese Constitution, Japan will abide by ''treaties concluded" by it and the "estab-
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tively any of them. 131 The fact that the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty 
was declared "terminated" rather than "null and void ab initio," as 
demanded by the PRC, is indicative of Japan's policy to minimize 
disruption of the legal relationship that existed between Toky? and 
Taipei between 1952 and 1972. If the ROC recovered the ml and 
assigned it to a private party before September 29, 1972, validity of 
the assignment hardly could be challenged. The PRC's assignee thus 
would not be able to claim the oil in question as public property. 
Ifthe above assignment took placetifier September 29, 1972, the 
PRC's assignee could argue that since title to the oil in question 
passed from the ROC to the PRC as a result of Japan's recognition 
of the latter, the assignment became invalid. This argument bases its 
strength on two possible propositions. First, Japan, through recogni-
tion of the PRC, has accepted its de jure sovereignty over Taiwan. 
Second, the PRC is entitled to whatever property belonged to the 
State of China, now represented by the PRC. The Japanese have, as 
noted earlier, made it clear that they did not accede to the first prop-
osition in 1972. The second proposition, based on the governmental 
succession theory in international law, seems acceptable to both the 
Japanese government and courts, which have actually employed it 
with respect to the ROC and PRC. Yet this theory does not seem to 
apply in the present case, as in the Yu Ping-huan case. The "public 
property" as conceived by the Japanese government and courts ap-
pears to include only that owned by the ROC in Japan for direct 
state functions, such as embassy premises. In the present case, 
before the oil in question left Taiwan, it was, regardless of whether 
the assignment had taken place, beyond the reach of the PRC for 
lack of de jure jurisdiction. After it reached Japanese soil, unless the 
assignment had not been effective, it had become private property on 
which the PRC could lay no claim. 
It is not impossible, however, that the Japanese Courts might 
construe the Japanese position in the joint communique of Septem-
ber 29, 1972 as accepting the PRC's de jure sovereignty over Tai-
wan, 132 a step the Japanese government refused to take. The 
situation then would be identical to that in the English court where 
lished law of nations" Japanese courts are thus free not to recognize foreign law, in this 
case, the ROC law. But Japanese judicial practice to date points to the contrary conclu-
sion, as discussed above. 
131. Supra note 129. This is the established rule in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
132. This seems to be a possible but unlikely scenario for two reasons: First, it is in 
contravention of the intention of the Japanese Government; second, the joint communi-
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the assignment of the oil from the ROC to a private party took place 
after Britain's acknowledgement of the PRC's de jure sovereignty 
over Taiwan, as discussed above. How would a Japanese court de-
cide? Unlike their English counterparts, Japanese courts have no 
tradition of animosity toward unrecognized governments. The fact 
that both the Kyoto District Court and the Osaka High Court treated 
the ROC as a "de facto State" and accorded it locus standi, which 
would have been unthinkable in an English court, 133 bespeaks the 
strong judicial realism. Moreover, an unreserved acceptance of the 
PRC's claim to Taiwan, construed literally, would lead to unjust and 
absurd results, as noted earlier. Therefore, even if a Japanese court 
should construe the Japanese position in the joint communique more 
strongly than it was intended, the court probably would not deter-
mine the resulting legal consequences as the PRC desires. But just 
how far a Japanese court would go in adjusting the conflicting claims 
of a de jure and a de facto government actually controlling separate 
territories is unclear, for there has been no judicial precedent similar 
to Hesperides. If the de facto doctrine in Yu Ping-huan is any guide, 
a declaration of nonjusticiability is not an unlikely result. 
In sum, it seems that the ROC's assignee would be in a stronger 
position vis-a-vis the PRC's assignee in a Japanese court than he 
would be in an English court. If he has the oil, and the assignment 
took place before 1972, he definitely would be able to keep it. If the 
assignment was effected after Tokyo had switched recognition from 
Taipei to Peking, in most cases he still would win, unless the Japa-
nese courts reverse their strong realist tradition. On the other hand, 
Japanese judicial realism would help the PRC's assignee as a de-
fendant if the oil was assigned to him before September 29, 1972, 
when the PRC was unrecognized. And after that date his likely suc-
cess of defense would be assured. In conclusion, whoever has the oil 
in his possession is likely to resist successfully the legal challenge 
from the other side. 
(4) United States Practice 
(a) Practice of the Executive Branch and Congress 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 dramatically 
que, in particular the statement on Taiwan, not being a treaty, cannot be applied as 
positive law by Japanese courts. See note 129 and accompanying text. 
133. The City of Berne v. The Bank of England, (1804) 9 Yes. Jun 347; (1804) 32 E.R. 
636; British International Law Cases, Vol. 2 (1965), p. I. See generally Daniel P. 
O'Connel, supra note 3, p. 168. 
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changed the United States' hands-off policy toward the Chinese 
Civil War. Washington immediately sent in the Seventh Fleet to 
"neutralize" the Taiwan Strait.134 In an accompanying statement, 
President Truman declared that the status of Taiwan was undeter-
mined, 135 a reversal of the American position held since 1945. 136 
The United States subsequently managed to bring Japan into line on 
this question137 in the San Francisco Peace Treaty in which Japan 
renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan in favor of no one. In 1954, a 
mutual defense treaty was signed between Taipei and Washington 138 
in which the ROC's "territories" were defined as Taiwan and the 
Pescadores. 139 In the following years the U.S. continued to recog-
nize the ROC and supported its seat in the United Nations until 
1971. 
President Nixon's trip to the PRC, announced in mid-1971, sig-
nified a fundamental change. At the end of his visit in February 
1972, President Nixon, along with the PRC's Premier Chou En-lai, 
issued a joint communique in Shanghai which stated: 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either 
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China 
and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Gov-
ernment does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by 
the Chinese themselves. 140 (emphasis added) 
The document admits of various interpretations. While the State 
134. Prior to that, the U.S. Government ceased all military assistance to the National-
ist Government and expected Taiwan to fall into communist hands. Hungdah Chiu, 
supra note 6, p. 2115. 
135. President Truman's Statement on the Mission of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the 
Formosa Area, June 27, 1950, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Vol. 2, Basic Docu-
ments, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, p. 2468, excerpted in Hungdah 
Chiu, supra note 6, p. 228. 
136. As late as January 5, 1950, President Truman still accepted the Chinese sover-
eignty over Taiwan, at least implicitly. Hungdah Chiu, supra note 6, p. 115. 
137. Ibid., pp. 122-27. 
138. Mutual Defense Treaty, United States-Republic of China, December 2, 1954, 
UST, Vol. 6, p. 433; TIAS No. 3178; UNTS, Vol. 248, p. 213. 
139. Art. 6. In a subsequent exchange of notes, however, the ROC's territory was 
understood to be "all territory now and hereafter under its control". UST, Vol. 6, p. 450; 
UNTS, Vol. 248, p. 226. 
140. Department State Bulletin, Vol. 66 (1972), pp. 435, 437-38. 
At the time of negotiating the Shanghai Communique, Secretary of State Kissinger 
reportedly intended to use the word "accepts" rather than "does not challenge" in the 
text. But he was rebuffed, possibly by President Nixon, in that attempt. Stanley Karnow, 
"Our Next Move on China," New York Times, August 14, 1977 (Magazine), p. 34, re-
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Department officials denied that it represented any change of the 
U.S. position on the status ofTaiwan, 141 held since the Korean War, 
Peking expectedly interpreted it as evidencing Wasington's recogni-
tion of Taiwan as part of China's territory. 142 
In Feburary 1973 the U.S. and the PRC set up a "liason office" 
in each other's capitals with full diplomatic privileges and immuni-
ties.143 On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that the 
U.S. and the PRC had agreed to establish diplomatic relations as of 
January 1, 1979.144 The joint communique issued at the time 
declared: 
The United States of America recognized the Government 
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Govern-
ment of China. Within this context, the people of the 
United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other 
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. 
The United States of America and the People's Republic of 
China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in 
the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again 
that. .. 
The Government of the United States of America acknowl-
edges the Chinese position that there is but one China and 
Taiwan is part of China. 145 (emphasis added) 
While the U.S. deliberately chose to use the word "acknowledge," as 
it did in the Shanghai Communique, the PRC's text146 used ch'eng-
jen ("recognize" in English). The linguistic disparity reflects their 
different positions on Taiwan's status. 
In a separate statement147 issued the next day, the United States 
declared that it would terminate diplomatic relations with the ROC 
as of Janua!I 1, 1979 and the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty a year 
from then. 14 Meanwhile, the Carter Administration submitted to 
ferred to in Hungdah Chiu, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic 
of China," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (1979), p. 409. 
141. "Transcript of ['Meet the Press'] TV Interview with [Marshall] Green" [in To-
kyo], Mainichi IJaily News, March 29, 1972, p. 2. Mr. Green was the then Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
142. Peking Review, March 9, 1973, p. 11. 
143. New York Times, February 23, 1973, p. 1; ibid., p. 14. 
144. Ibid., December 16, 1978, p. 1. 
145. Ibid., p. 8; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 79 (1979), p. 25. 
146. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 16, 1979, p. 1. 
147. New York Times, December 17, 1978, p. A22. 
148. Article X of the ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty provided that either party 
may terminate the treaty on one year's notice. 
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Congress a bill purporting to provide a le~al framework forma~­
taining unofficial relations with the ROC. 1 9 The bill underwent ~­
tensive debates in Congress before passing both Houses with 
substantial modifications that favored the ROC. 150 It was signed 
into law in early April. 151 The legislation, known as the Taiwan Re-
lations Act of 1979,152 keeps intact all but formal diplomatic ties with 
the ROC. Most existing diplomatic and consular establishments re-
main unchanged except their names; 153 so do several dozens of bilat-
eral treaties. 154 As one commentator amazingly noted, the Act in 
149. U.S. Congress, Senate, A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States 
through the Maintenance of Commercial, Cultural, and Other Relations with the People on 
Taiwan on An Unofficial Basis, and for Other Purposes, S.245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979. 
150. See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Taiwan, Hear-
ings, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate on S.245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1979. 
151. United States, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 15 (1979), pp. 
640-41. 
152. Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8; 93 Stat. 14 (1979); 22 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3301 (Supp. I 1979). 
153. A non-profit organization incorporated under the District of Columbia law, 
known as the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), set up branch offices in Taiwan to 
replace the former U.S. embassy and consulates. The AIT's counterpart, the Coordina-
tion Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), maintains more than half of the 
ROC's former diplomatic and consular establishments in the U.S. through its branch 
offices. Governmental business between the ROC and the U.S., such as sale of arms, is 
transacted via these two entities. For a political discussion on how the post-1978 rela-
tions between the ROC and the U.S. have been conducted, see Leonard Unger, "Der-
ecognition Worked", Foreign Policy, No. 36 (Fall 1979), p. 105. Mr. Unger was the last 
U.S. ambassador to the ROC. 
154. The Taiwan Relations Act allows all treaties between the U.S. and the ROC to 
continue "unless and until terminated in accordance with law" 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(c) 
(Supp. I 1979). A number of these existing treaties require updating or modification. If 
major changes are needed, then they may have to be renegotiated between AIT and 
CCNAA. For a discussion, seeR. Sean Randolph, "The Status of Agreements between 
the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American 
Affairs," International Lawyer, Vol. 15 (1981), p. 249. 
President Carter's authority to terminate the 1954 ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense 
Treaty was challenged in court by 24 members of Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court 
eventually ordered the trial court to dismiss the suit without oral argument. 48 U.S.L.W. 
3402 (S. Ct. 1979). The year-long litigation has spawn a body of legal literature. See, 
e.g., J. Terry Emerson, "The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation," Journal of Legisla-
tion, Vol. 5 (1978), p. 309; David J. Scheffer, "The Law of Treaty Termination as Ap-
plied to the United States Derecognition of the Republic of China,'' Harvard 
International Law Journal, vol. 19 (1978), p. 931; Michael Resiman and Myres S. 
McDouglas, "Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?" National Law Journal, 
May 21, 1979, p. 19; Edward M. Kennedy, "Normal Relations with China: Good Law, 
Good Policy," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 65 (1979), p. 194; Barry Goldwa-
ter, "Treaty Termination Is A Shared Power,'' ibid., p. 198; Herbert J. Hansell, "Memo-
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effect constituted a "legislative re-recognition" of the ROC after the 
Executive Branch's derecognition. 155 
On August 17, 1982, the U.S. and the PRC restated, in yet an-
other joint communique intended to settle the thorny question of 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, part of the 1979 joint communique re-
garding the recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of 
China and the acknowledgement of the Chinese position that there is 
but one China and Taiwan is part of China. 156 To the extent of the 
above two questions, this new document, known as the "August 17 
Communique", merely reiterates the U.S. position held since 1972 
and adds nothing new. 
(b) Implications for the Peking-Taipei Contest for 
Seabed Oil 
Although initially influenced by the English courts' rigid adher-
ence to the distinction between recognition and non-recognition of 
foreign governments, American courts have departed not infre-
quently from that doctrine since the Civil War. 157 In this century, 
the executive hostility, indifference, or friendliness toward an unrec-
ognized government in various circumstances also has played an im-
portant part, since American courts normally consult the State 
Department before making decisions in recognition cases. 158 It is 
difficult to generalize the American judicial practice, for it has not 
always been consistent. Nevertheless, the special circumstances sur-
rounding the situation of the ROC, which is unrecognized but 
friendly, should prompt the courts to take a realistic attitude toward 
its de facto existence and its legal acts. 
But the Taiwan Relations Act has made such legal inquiry un-
randum for the Secretary of State: President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of 
the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, reprinted in Hearings on S.254, supra note 150, p. 
189. 
155. Carl I. Gable, "Taiwan Relations Act: Legislative Re-recognition," Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 12 (1979), p. 511. 
156. U.S. Department of State, U.S.-China Joint Communique, Current Policy, No. 
413, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982. For a concise background 
analysis, see Lyushun Shen, "The Washington-Peking Controversy over U.S. Arms Sales 
to Taiwan: Diplomacy of Ambiguity and Escalation," Chinese Yearbook of International 
Law and Affairs, Vol. 2 (1982), p. 98. 
157. Daniel P. O'Connel, supra note 3, pp. 172, 175-76. The decisive case in the post-
Civil War era was Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
158. A.B. Lyons, "The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestions' and Certificate of the 
American State Department," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 24 (1947), p. 
116; Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, pp. 119-22. 
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necessary. Anticipating potential adverse legal _effects 159 _flo":'ing 
from the derecognition of the ROC, Congress has, m that leg1slat10n, 
taken care of nearly all the uncertainties. Insofar as the ROC and 
the U.S. are concerned, the Act supersedes the American case law 
respecting the effects of non-recognition. Consequently, we need 
only to consider the hypothetical case before us in the light of the 
executive practice and provisions of the Act. 
The first question one might ask is: Has the U.S. merely severed 
diplomatic relations with the ROC or has it withdrawn recognition 
from (or derecognized) it? Nowhere did the PRC-U.S. joint commu-
nique mention this. Nor does the Taiwan Relations Act make this 
point clear. 160 However, as we suggested earlier, recognition or non-
recognition in international law is essentially a matter of intent. On 
the political plane, the intent of the U.S. executive branch to de-
recognize the ROC as the government of China is obvious from its 
recognition of the PRC as such. In fact, derecognition may be ef-
fected implicitly, as the American Law Institute puts it: 
Ordinarily changes in recognition of a government occur 
only when another regime is recognized. Usually there is 
no declaration by the recognizing state, at the time it recog-
nizes the displacing government, that it withdraws its rec-
ognition from the government displaced. The withdrawal 
is assumed. 161 
The continuation of all existing treaties, except the Mutual Defense 
Treaty, between the U.S. and the ROC despite absence of recogni-
tion also is not without precedent in international relations. 162 Since 
virtually all the legal consequences of non-recognition have been in-
sulated effectively by Congress from the political act of derecognition 
of the ROC by the Executive Branch, the traditional distinction be-
tween recognition and non-recognition has lost much of its practical 
significance insofar as ROC-U.S. relations are concerned. 
159. These adverse effects have been dealt with in Victor H. Li, De-Recognizing Tai-
wan: The Legal Problems, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1977. 
160. In four out of five instances in which the Act characterizes the state of relations 
between Taipei and Washington as being "absence of diplomatic relations or recogni-
tion" (emphasis added). In the fifth instance "or" is replaced by "and". 22 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3303(a), (b)(3)(A), (b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(8). 
161. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States, St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1965, § 96, 
Comment c. 
162. See generally Bernard R. Bot, Nonrecognition and Treaty Relations, Leiden, the 
Netherlands: Sijtholf, 1968. 
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The second question concerns the PRC's sovereignty, or lack of 
it, over Taiwan. The U.S. did not accept the PRC's position in the 
Shanghai Communique, as was obvious from the language in that 
document, the negotiations leading to it, 163 and the subsequent deni-
als by American officials. The PRC-U.S. joint communique of Janu-
ary 1, 1979 employed slightly different wording, but since it was 
expressly intended to reaffirm the principles of the Shanghai Com-
munique, the Shanghai Communique should govern. The same can 
be said of the August 17 Communique of 1982. Therefore, the PRC 
hardly can invoke any of these documents in an American court as 
evidencing U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan. 
The Taiwan Relations Act leaves no doubt that the ROC will be 
protected fully by U.S. law in an American court in the absence of 
recognition: the ROC will be treated as a foreign state or govern-
ment, 164 for the purpose of American law, capable of suing or being 
sued in American courts. 165 More unequivocal is the provision on 
property rights: 
For all purposes under the laws of the United States, in-
cluding actions in any court in the United States, recogni-
tion of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in 
any way the ownership or other rights or interest in proper-
ties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, 
owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or there-
after acquired or earned by the governing authorities on 
Taiwan.r66 
This provision obviously covers properties which the PRC considers 
as belonging to the State of China and to which, accordingly, it has 
succession rights. Before this provision is tested in court, its validity 
should be assumed. 167 In any event, the accumulated effects of the 
163. See supra note 140. 
164. The Act provides: 
Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, 
nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and 
such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan. 
U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(l) (Supp. I 1979). 
165. Ibid., § 3303(b)(7). 
166. Ibid., § 3303(b)(3)(B). 
167. The position of the U.S. Government with respect to public property owned by 
the ROC in the U.S. was that real estate acquired by China prior to the establishment of 
the PRC (Oct. l, 1949) should be transferred to Peking whereas properties subsequently 
acquired by the ROC should remain in the hands of Taipei. Carl I. Gable, supra note 
155, p. 529 (interview with State Department officials). The ROC's embassy premises 
obviously fall within the first category. Shortly after President Carter's announcement of 
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Act amount to at least de facto recognition of the ROC as the gov-
ernment of Taiwan. What does this "most recognized unrecognized 
government" 168 status mean to the dispute over title to seabed oil? 
During the period between 1949 an 1979, the U.S. recognized 
the ROC as the de jure government of China, but on various occa-
sions the U.S. implied that it did not recognize the ROC's de jure 
sovereignty over the Chinese mainland not under ROC control. 169 
Meanwhile, Washington's dealings with Peking in the 1970s, includ-
ing the visits of U.S. presidents and high officials, the signing of joint 
communiques, and the exchange of quasi-diplomatic missions, 
clearly implied de facto recognition of the PRC as the government of 
the Chinese mainland. The legal status of Peking and Taipei in rela-
tion to Washington was switched after January 1, 1979. The only 
difference was that while the ROC's de facto status was guaranteed 
by the Taiwan Relations Act, the PRC's status prior to 1979 would 
have to depend largely on case law, the courts' judicial notice of 
events, and advice from the State Department. An American court 
may well regard them as two de facto sovereigns despite the "one 
China" concept held by them and, less whole-heartedly, by the U.S. 
Government. The implication for the seabed oil dispute is obvious: 
American courts will refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the 
U.S. recognition of the PRC but before it came into effect on January I, 1979, the ROC 
assigned these properties to an American organization known as Friends of Free China 
at a nominal price of ten dollars. Congressional Record, Vol. 125, (daily ed. March 12, 
1979), p. S2474. The State Department was said to have indicated that it regarded this 
transaction as invalid and would support the PRC's claim if the PRC chose to challenge 
the transaction in court. Ibid., p. S2473. This question was hotly debated in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. Ibid., p. S2472-84. By a vote of 49 to 36, the present 
provision was adopted. Ibid., p. S2484. Senator Hatch during the debate cited in sup-
port of the present provision the American and English cases referred to in note 129 
supra and the fact that Ottawa did not support Peking's claim to Taipei's embassy prem-
ises sold to friendly hands. Ibid., p. S2476. After the passage of the Act, the State De-
partment seemed to have quietly dropped the idea of supporting the claim of Peking 
which showed little interest in an uncertain legal battle. 
168. Words of Professor Detlev F. Vagts of Harvard Law School in a conversation 
with the author. 
169. The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, as noted earlier, defined the ROC's territory as 
"Taiwan and the Pescadores." All the existing treaties have limited their territorial ap-
plication in respect to the ROC to Taiwan. Victor H. Li, supra note 159, p. 32. In a joint 
communique issued on October 23, 1958 after the visit of Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles to Taiwan, it was stated that "(t]he United States recognizes that the Republic of 
China is the authentic spokesman for Free China and of the hopes and aspirations enter-
tained by the great mass of the Chinese people". (emphasis added) American Foreign 
Policy, Current Documents, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958, pp. 
1184-85, cited in Hungdah Chiu, supra note 6, p. 287. 
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dispute on the ground that it is a political, and thus non-justiciable, 
question. 
The legal situation is best illustrated in a 1978 case in which 
offshore oil concessionaires and assignees in two Persian Gulf coun-
tries fought over title to oil recovered from overlapping parts of their 
concessions. In Occidental of Umm a! Qaywayn v. A Certain Carfo of 
Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Coloctronis, 17 the 
Court of Appeals reasoned that the appellant's title to the oil in ques-
tion depended on his ownership of the concession block. Since the 
block was situated within the newly declared 12-mile territorial sea 
of an island the sovereignty of which was in dispute, the Court con-
sidered that a determination of the boundary between the claimants' 
concession blocks was impossible without first solving the territorial 
dispute and delimiting the adjacent continental shelf between these 
states. Relying in part on a State Department letter suggesting "un-
questionable U.S. neutrality"171 in the sensitive Middle East, the 
Court held that the issue sub judice was a political question with 
respect to which it had no jurisdiction. 172 
More recently, courts in the state of New York also had a 
chance to appreciate an intractable "Two-Chinas" case with a fact 
pattern similar to that of Reel v. Holder decided by the English court, 
discussed earlier. In the February 1980 Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake 
Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc. case, 173 the plaintiff, a skier from 
the ROC, sought a permanent injunction to stay the Winter Olympic 
Games at Lake Placid, New York unless the defendant, a non-profit 
operator of the games, allowed the plaintiff to use the flag, emblem, 
name, and anthem of the Republic of China. The Supreme Court 
(Special Term) granted the motion for injunction. On appeal, the 
Appellate Division allowed the United States Attorney to file a state-
ment of interest of the United States. In it, the Court was urged to 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction to resolve a dispute which has at 
its core the international "Two-Chinas" problem. The Appellate Di-
vision took the advice and denied the plaintiffs motion, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Behind the ratio decidendi again was the 
political question doctrine. 
In the present case, the State Department can be expected to 
discourage the courts from taking jurisdiction because of the sensi-
tivity of the issue. The court, faced with the formidable task of de-
170. 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979). 
171. 577 F.2d 1204. 
172. Ibid., p. 1204-05. 
173. 72 App. Div. 2d 439 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1980), ajf'd 49 N.Y.2d 771 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980). 
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termining the respective continental shelf jurisdictions of the R_OC 
and PRC, can also be expected to follow the Occidental rule, particu-
larly if the executive branch intervenes. Accordingly, whoever pos-
sesses the oil will remain the holder of title. 
D. Concluding Remarks 
The rivalry between Peking and Taipei has expressed itself in 
various forms: from civil war, to the contest for diplomatic relations 
and, potentially, to the title of seabed oil. No principle of interna-
tional law is capable of resolving the present conflict conceived by 
the parties as one between a legitimate government and a rebel 
group. Since each side has engaged a number of Western oil compa-
nies in its respective offshore oil program, the rivalry could well find 
its way into a foreign courtroom. 
If the legal battle is fought in an English court, the ROC's as-
signee probably would lose, either as plaintiff or defendant, in most 
cases, unless the recently developed judicial realism toward unrecog-
nized governments as shown in Hesperides is followed vigorously. 
In both Japanese and American courts, whichever assignee has the 
oil in his possession probably would be able to keep it essentially for 
the same reason-the court would find that the resolution of the dis-
pute entails handling judicially unmanageable issues. The ROC will 
be, however, better protected in U.S. courts under the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act, the equivalent of which is lacking in Japanese law. 
The analysis of the hypothetical legal battle incidentally reveals 
the fundamental inadequacy of traditional rules of international law 
of recognition in dealing with the China puzzle. The ROC became 
an unrecognized government as a result of derecognition. In all 
cases the move was not based on legal grounds such as loss of ele-
ments of statehood, but policy considerations of the derecognizing 
state. These policy considerations should be distinguished further 
from those that underlie the non-recognition of allegedly illegal re-
gimes such as Rhodesia and Transkei. Therefore, treating the China 
puzzle simply as a "representation" question, as in the case of 
China's U.N. seat, is most unsatisfactory because it disregards real-
ity. On the other hand, recognition of two governments representing 
the same state but ruling different parts of its territory remains a 
fantasy in political theory. A possible solution to the dilemma is a 
separation of executive and legislative (and likely judicial) recogni-
tions along the lines of the Taiwan Relations Act. This approach 
thus far has proved to be a workable middle ground between the 
238 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
rigidity of the one-state-one-government doctrine and the reality of 
international politics. 
How relevant is the Peking-Taipei rivalry to the East Asia oil 
dispute? We noted earlier that for all practical purposes the dispute 
exists only between China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan. It 
seems fair to say that the rivalry is legally irrelevant to Japan except 
that the legal battle may be fought in Japanese courts. A reconcilia-
tion between Taipei and Peking would not alter materially their 
largely common legal position on seabed issues vis-a-vis Japan; nor 
would the resumption of hostilities between them. As long as each 
side maintains its "one-China" policy and China in its foreign rela-
tions consistently is represented by one one government, the rivalry 
remains largely a domestic issue. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The East China Sea oil controversy has the most formidable 
possible elements of international conflicts in maritime bound~ries. 
Geographically, this semi-enclosed sea is surrounded by a contment 
with irregular coasts and islands of all possible sizes, locations, and 
economic utilities. Geomorphologically, the generally vast and flat 
seabed possesses, before it plunges into the Pacific ocean floor, multi-
farious relief features, including a deep, long undersea trough with 
controversial legal status. Geologically, the crustal origin of the Oki-
nawa Trough, which has crucial legal implications on the seaward 
limit of continental shelf, is still debated among geologists. As if the 
geophysical environment were not enough, there are five govern-
ments within the three coastal nations, two of which are the so-called 
"divided states". Most of these governments have laid claims toes-
sentially the same seabed. Confrontations between rival govern-
ments in the two divided states have made impossible any regional 
effort to bring about a pacific settlement of the seabed disputes. 
Vague rules of existing international law on seabed delimitation only 
aggravated the situation. 
Despite the multiplicity of claimants, the East China Sea oil 
controversy is basically a Sino-Japanese conflict. One reason is that 
Korea has the same geophysical environment as does China in rela-
tion to that of Japan. A more important factor is that the ROK and 
Japan have successfully delimited their seabed boundary in the Ko-
rea Strait and established a Joint Development Zone covering the 
whole area where their claims and concessions used to overlap. Ab-
sent future animosity between Seoul and Tokyo, the seabed dispute 
will be shelved indefinitely. 
The Sino-Japanese conflict has two dimensions: the territorial 
dispute over the Taio-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islands and the question of 
delimiting the vast continental shelf of the East China Sea. Many 
commentators have considered the issues inseparable; settlement of 
the first is seen as a conditio sine qua non to that of the second. This 
author has argued that this view is untenable in view of recent legal 
developments in state practice, international adjudications, and the 
UN CLOS III on the regime of islands. Various sources of the inter-
national law of the sea indicate that islands which have size, loca-
tion, economic utility, and legal status comparable to those of the 
Tiao-yu-t'ais have been invariably ignored in seabed boundary de-
limitations between opposite states. This suggests that regardless of 
(239). 
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their ultimate owner, the Tiao-yu-t'ais will only have a maximum 
12-mile territorial sea around them. They will not be permitted to 
generate their own continental shelf or exclusive economic zone be-
yond that limit. The implication of this conclusion to the Sino-Japa-
nese maritime conflict is obvious: the territorial and the seabed 
issues are separable; the latter may be dealt with before the former is 
finally resolved. 
Establishing the irrelevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dis-
pute to, and detaching it from, the Sino-Japanese seabed controversy 
makes the latter at last more manageable, if not any easier. The 
rules of international law on continental shelf delimitation have 
been in flux. Yet a discemable consensus among nations was been 
building up in the past decade through the North Sea Continental 
She!f Cases, the Anglo-French Continental She!f Arbitration, and the 
Tunisian-Libyan Continental She!f Case, the mounting state practice, 
and deliberations at UNCLOS III as crystallized in the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea. That consensus calls for 
delimitation of seabed boundaries by agreement between the disput-
ing parties according to equitable principles, taking into account all 
the relevant circumstances. 
In the context of the East China Sea, the applicable "equitable 
principle" for seabed delimitation could be the equidistance princi-
ple, as advocated by Japan, or the natural prolongation principle, as 
advocated by China (the ROC and the PRC), or a combination of 
both and/or other principles. In fact, the thrust of state practice, 
judicial decisions, and the LOS Convention is that the applicable 
principle is to be determined by the geophysical realities of the de-
limitation area rather the reverse. It is therefore necessary to first 
identify and assess the relevant circumstances of the East China Sea. 
This process reveals that they are circumstances relevant to other 
dispute settings but irrelevant here; there are also circumstances that 
are only partially or potentially relevant. The most relevant circum-
stances, the analysis shows, are macrogeography and geology (and 
geomorphology) of the region under study. 
The macrogeography of the East China Sea is underscored by 
the lack of broadly comparable coastlines of China (mainland and 
Taiwan) and Japan in terms of coastal configuration and length. It 
renders inequitable the application of the equidistance principle in 
areas south of the 30°N latitude. On the other hand, the proportion-
ality test, formulated by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases and the 
Tunisian-Libyan Case, provides a sensible approach. It calls for a 
boundary that brings about a reasonable proportionality between the 
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lengths of the coastal states' respective coastlines and their continen-
tal shelf entitlements in a given region. Though somewhat contro-
versial in delimitation theory among international jurists, the test 
offers a practical and equitable guideline. The percentage propor-
tions (64% for China (mainland and Taiwan) and 36% for Japan) 
resulting from applying that test in the East China Sea south of the 
30°N latitude set such a guideline (rather than a rule) for future 
Sino-Japanese seabed delimitations. 
Considerations of the geology and geomorphology of the East 
China Sea are centered on the natural prolongation principle and the 
legal status of the deep Okinawa Trough. Since the exact seaward 
extent of continental shelf allowable under the natural prolongation 
principle has been much debated among lawyers, the insistence of 
China (the ROC and the PRC) on applying this principle does no 
more than restate the problem. Moreover, the new definition of con-
tinental shelf in the 1982 LOS Convention in effect neutralizes that 
principle. Japan's insistence, on the other hand, on applying the 
equidistance principle across-the-board not only finds little support 
from the regional macrogeography but also ignores the submarine 
geophysical reality. The approach suggested by this author modifies 
the unpalatable effect of the equidistance principle by applying the 
proportionality test and treat the Okinawa Trough as but one of the 
important factors, rather than the only one, that influence the future 
course of the seabed boundary. This approach rejects the two ex-
tremes and puts the issue back in perspective. 
The expected product of this approach, with certain allowance 
for negotiation by the parties, is a boundary composed of two seg-
ments separated by the 30°N latitude (Map 1). North of the parallel 
in the North Region the application of the equidistance principle is 
justified by the presence of the broadly equal coastlines of China, 
Korea, and Japan. This result is in fact dictated by extensions of the 
two median lines, one existing and the other imaginary, in the Korea 
Strait between Japan and Korea and in the Yellow Sea between Ko-
rea and China. South of the 30°N latitude in the South Region 
neither the mid-channel line of the Okinawa Trough, as advocated 
by the ROC under the natural prolongation principle, nor the me-
dian line drawn between the Ryukyus (excluding the Taio-yu-t'ais) 
and China (mainland and Taiwan), as advocated by Japan under the 
equidista~ce principle, should_ be determinative of the boundary. 
R~ther, either o~e. of the two lines shou~d be u~ed only as a starting 
pomt for negotiatiOn between the part1es, taking into account the 
guideline for proportions (64:36). The final boundary would lie 
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somewhere between the above two lines, probably closer to the mid-
channel line of the Okinawa Trough than to the median line, so as to 
bring about the stated proportions. In this regard, the 1972 Austra-
lia-Indonesia seabed boundary in the Timor Sea, which is strikingly 
comparable geophysically to the East China Sea in almost every as-
pect, would shed much light on the delimitation process here. 
The Peking-Taipei rivalry injected an uncertain but interesting 
element into the seabed discussion which has hitherto proceeded on 
the basis of an one-China assumption. Politically, its relevance to 
the final seabed settlement is beyond doubt, since both sides are 
dead serious about their seabed claims. That Taipei keeps making 
claims of sovereignty over the Tiao-yu-t'ais and adjacent continental 
shelf every time it gets wind of a reported Peking-Tokyo negotiation 
on this matter is illustrative of the ROC's concern. The legal rele-
vance, if any, of the rivalry would probably find itself only in unu-
sual scenarios where a legal battle is fought over the ownership of oil 
produced from the disputed seabed. The question posed to the court 
would be which government is entitled to the oil under international 
and municipal laws of recognition and government succession. The 
survey of judicial practices and executive policies (to the extent they 
influenced judicial attitudes) of the United Kingdom, Japan, and the 
United States shows that the courts in all three states probably will 
disqualify themselves from passing judgment on what they consider 
essentially a political question. The practical result would be that 
whichever party has actual possession of the oil would be able to 
retain title. The analysis only confirms the foregone conclusion that 
the Peking-Taipei rivalry is politically crucial but legally irrelevant 
to the seabed delimitation in the East China Sea. 
This study has primarily focused on the legal aspects of the East 
China Sea oil controversy. It is, of course, not a pure legal problem; 
political and economic forces at work may be more important in 
shaping and resolving the conflict. This observation should not, 
however, deter lawyers from tackling the legal problems involved 
because a clear understanding of the legal issues helps to clarify 
them and facilitates political negotiations. 
Adoption by UNCLOS III of the LOS Convention in 1982 does 
not provide immediate answers to questions discussed here. But 
since both the two Chinese governments and Japan are likely to ac-
cept the LOS Convention,* it would at least have some impact on 
• The ROC will probably abide by the Convention although Taipei cannot for-
mally accede to it. For details, see text accompanying notes 81-91 in Chapter 4 supra. 
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the legal arguments they employ in making political and economic 
trade-offs. This study has in fact relied heavily on provisions of the 
LOS Convention as a basis for analysis. Arguments advanced in the 
analyses and suggestions could prove relevant for the parties to 
reach agreement. 
Admittedly, the Peking-Taipei rivalry remains a major stum-
bling block to any peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese seabed 
dispute. Cooperation between the two Chinese governments on sea-
bed issue vis-a-vis Japan will not come without overall rapproache-
ment between them in a much larger context. Predicting future 
development in this regard which will also determine the fate of the 
four remaining joint ventures CPC has with U.S. oil companies, is of 
course beyond the scope of this study. 
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Table 1 
Japan, the ROK and the ROC*: Overlapping 
Concession Blocks and the Japan-ROK Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ) in the 
East China Sea as of Dec. 31, 1983 
~ J-la J-Ib J-lc J-2 J-3a J-3b J-3c K c 
K-4 
K-5 
K-6 
K-7 
C-2 X X 
C-3 X X X 
C-4 
C-5 
l:%: K K-4 K-5 K-6 
J: Japan; K: ROK; C: ROC 
x: Overlaps 
0 
X 
X 
X 
K-7 
o: Blocks in the JDZ (formerly overlaps) 
0 
0 
0 
X 
oo: Blocks the dispute regarding which has been settled 
0 0 
J-4 
00 
0 
* The PRC's claims, vague but extensive, could overlap with most, if not all, of the 
concession blocks in the East China Sea. 
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Concession Holders 
ROC 
C-1 CPC 
Japan 
J-la 
J-Ib 
J-lc 
J-2 
J-3a 
J-3b 
J-3c 
J-4 
Uruma 
Japex 
Alaska 
Teikoku 
C-2 CPC, CPC/Gulf 
C-3 CPC, CPC/Oceanic 
C-4 CPC/Clinton 
ROK 
Japan-ROK JDZ & Nippon 
Japan-ROK JDZ & Teikoku 
Japan-ROK JDZ & New West Japan 
New West Japan & West Japan 
K-1 Open (formerly Caltex) 
K-2 Open (formerly Gulf) 
K-3 Open (formerly Shell) 
C-5 CPC/Texfel 
K-4 Zapata (southern comer) (formerly Gulf) 
K-5 Caltex & Japan-ROK JDZ (formerly Caltex) 
K-6 Open (formerly Shell) 
K-7 Japan-ROK JDZ (formerly Koam) 
Table 2 
Outline of Legal Positions of the Japan, ROK, the ROC, and the PRC on Key Issues of the 
East China Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation 
Issue 
I. Sovereignty of the 
Tiao-yu-t'ais 
2. Definition (seaward 
extent) of continental 
shelf 
3. Principle for inter-
state shelf delimitation 
4. Seabed rights for 
mid-ocean islets 
5. Limiting effect of 
Okinawa Trough 
ROK 
Not applicable 
Natural prolongation; 
minimum 200 n. miles 
Natural prolongation & 
equidistance principles 
No (beyond 12 n. 
miles)• 
Yes• 
• Implicit in official statement or related actions. 
Ja~an 
Claiming 
Maximum 200 n. miles 
Equidistance principle 
Same as continents 
No .. 
•• Japan was flexible in practice as shown in the Japan-ROK JDZ delimitation. 
ROC 
Claiming 
Natural prolongation; no 
fixed limit 
Natural prolongation 
principle 
No (in inter-state delim-
itation) 
Yes• 
PRC 
Claiming 
Natural prolongation; 
maximum limit deter-
mined by agreement; 
may exceed 200 n. miles 
Multi-state consultation 
under equitable princi-
ples 
Uncertain; inclined 
toward no rights 
Yes• 
N 
.J:>. 
00 
(") 
0 
z 
"'' ~ 
0 
~ 
~ 
> Ill 
~ 
~ 
0 
.... 
m 
t/.l 
t'l1 
~ 
tn 
Ill 
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Table 3 
Physical Geography of the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islets* 
Maximum 
Name (Chinese/ Area•• elevation 
Jaeanese} kJn2/mi2/acres {meters} Vegetation Remarks 
l. Tiao-yu 4.5 383 Palm Potable 
(Uotsuri) 1.7 trees, water 
1,088 prickly, available 
pear, and 
Statice 
arbuscu/a 
2. Huang-wei 1.1 117 Same as No pota-
(Kuba) 0.4 above ble water 
256 
3. Nan-hsiao 0.465 149 Little Nickname 
(Minami-kojima) 0.18 "Snake 
115 Island" 
4. Pei-hsiao 0.303 135 Little or Nickname 
(Kita-kojima) 0.12 none "Bird 
75 Island" 
5. Ch'ih-wei 0.15 84 None Barren 
(Taisho) 0.06 rock 
37 
6. Ch'ung-pei-yen 0.014 (est.) 28 None Barren 
(Okinokitawa) 0.005 rock 
3.5 
7. Ch'ung-nan-yen 0.005 (est.) 13 None Barren 
(Okinominamiiwa) 0.002 rock 
1.2 
8. Fei-1ai 0.0006 (est.) N.A. None Barren 
(Tobise) 0.0002 rock 
0.014 
Total Area: 6.5 sq. km 
2.5 sq. mi 
1,575 acres 
• Sources: See the references cited in Chapter 4, note 6. 
** I sq. mi=640 acres=2.59 sq. km; I sq km=247 acres=0.39 sq. mi. 
Table 4 
State Practice on Continental Shelf Delimitation between Opposite-Coast States 
Location & State 
Parties 
EUROPE 
North Sea 
Norway-UK 
Denmark-Norway 
Denmark-UK 
Netherlands-UK 
W. Germany-UK 
[France-UK) 
Baltic Sea 
Finland-USSR 
Year• 
1965 
1965 
1971 
1965 
1971 
1971 
1977 
I965 
1967 
1967 
1968 
Delimitation 
Principle .. 
E 
E 
E 
E 
Other 
SE 
E 
SE 
Broad Equality 
of Coastline• •• Remarks 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Norwegian Trough ignored. 
Norweigan Trough ignored. 
Boundary only 11 miles long. 
Continent v. large island. 
Boundary only 8 miles long. 
Delimited by arbitration. 
Adjacent and opposite coasts. 
Adjacent and opposite Norway-Sweden 
Finland-Sweden 1972 Other Yes Continent plus large coastal island v. continent. 
Mediterrenean Sea 
Italy-Yugoslavia 
Italy-Tunisia 
1968 
1971 
SE Yes 
SE Yes 
Islands specially treated. 
Islands specially treated. 
* 
.. 
••• 
(1978) 
Year of signature. Multiple years show subsequent amendment or extension of existing boundary. 
ratification beyond one year from date of signature. 
Abbreviations: £: Equidistance principle (true or simplified); S£: Selective equidistance; Other: 
excluding the equidistance principle; ?: Information unavailable; NIF: Not in force. 
See text of note 166 and accompanying text in Chapter 5 for details . 
Year in parenthesis is date of 
Other principle or principles 
N 
Vo 
0 
(") 
0 
~ 
~ 
~ 
s 
~ 
~ 
~ 
c::: 
0 
..... 
t'l1 
til 
00 
t'l1 
:;l:l 
iii 
til 
Location & State Delimitation Broad Equality 
Parties Year* Principle** of Coastline**• Remarks 
EUROPE (cont.) 
Italy-Tunisia 1971 SE Yes Islands specially treated. 
(1978) 
Italy-Spain 1974 E Yes Islands v. islands. 
Italy-Greece 1977 SE Arguably yes Peninsula and island v. Peninsula and island. 
Black Sea til 
Turkey-USSR 1978 ? Yes Continent v. continent. ~ ~ 
tr1 
ASIA 0 
Persian Gu(f C;j 0 
Bahrain-Saudi 1958 SE Yes Large island v. continent. c:: 
Arabia z 0 
Iran-Saudi Arabia 1968 SE Yes Islands specially treated. > )!:' 
Iran-Qatar 1969 E Arguably yes Continent v. peninsula. 
-< 
Bahrain-Iran 1971 SE Yes Boundary only 28 miles long. 0 
Iran-Oman 1974 SE Arguably yes Concave continent v. portuding peninsula. tr1 t""' 
.... 
Iran-United Arab 1974 Other Yes Various considerations. a:: 
Emirates (NIF) .... .., 
> 
Red Sea .., .... 
Saudi Arabia- 1974 Other Yes No single boundary delimited; a "Common Zone" established. 0 z 
Sudan 
Arabian Sea & Bay 
of Bengal 
India-Sri Lanka 1974 SE Yes Continent v. very large island. 
1976 
India-Indonesia 1974 SE Yes Islands v. islands. N 
1977 Vl 
-
Location & State Delimitation Broad Equality N 
Parties Year• PrinciEle•• of Coastline • • • Remarks Vl N 
ASIA (cont.) 
India-Maldives 1976 SE Arguably yes Continent and islands v. islands. 
Andaman Sea 
Indonesia-Thailand 1971 SE Yes Part of peninsula v. part of large island. 
1975 (') 
1978 0 z 
India-Thailand 1978 SE Arguably yes Large island v. continent. t-i t'!1 
South China Sea a:: "tt 
Indonesia-Malaysia 1969 Other Yes Large island v. peninsula. 0 ~ (Malacca Strait 1971 
included) :::c 
-< 
Korea Strait > 00 
Japan-Rep. of 1974 SE Yes Large islands v. peninsula (in the Korean Strait); Joint Development > 
Korea Zone in the East China Sea. z 
til 
Arufura & Timor t-i 
Seas c:: 0 
Australia- Indonesia 1971 SE Yes Continent v. large islands chain; Timor Trough taken into account. -t'!1 
1972 00 
Australia-Papua 1978 SE Yes Protruding peninsula v. very large island (the two meet at right angle). t/.l t'!1 
New Guinea :::c 
-t'!1 
THE AMERICAS 00 
Caribbean Sea 
Trinidad & 1942 Other No Continent v. large island. 
Tobago-
Venezuela 
Colombia-Panama 1976 Other Yes Adjacent and opposite coasts. 
Location & State Delimitation Broad Equality 
Parties Year• Principle•• of Coastline••• Remarks 
THE AMERICAS 
(cont.) 
Caribbean Sea 
(cont.) 
Colombia-Costa 1977 Other Arguably no 
Rica t/) 
Cuba-Haiti 1977 ? Arguably yes Island v. island with highly concave coast. ~ 
Netherlands 1978 Other Arguably no Islands v. continent with concave coast and islands. t:l:l m (Antilles) - 0 
Venezuela ttl 
Colombia- 1978 E Yes Large island v. continent. 0 c::: 
Dominican z 
Republic 0 > 
Colombia-Haiti 1978 E Yes Large island v. continent. :;g 
>< 
US (Puerto Rico) - 1978 E Yes Large island v. continent. 0 Venezuela (1980) m 
Dominican 1979 ? Yes Large island v. continent and small islands. t"' 
-Republic- ~ 
-Venezuela o-j > 
o-j 
Gu(f o.f Mexico -0 
US-Cuba (NIF) 1977 Other No Large island v. peninsula (the two meet at 120° angle). z 
US (Eastern Gulf)- 1978 E Yes Small Mexican islets taken into account. 
Mexico (NIF) 
Labrador Sea 
Canada v. 1973 SE Yes Very large island v. very large island. 
Denmark N (Greenland) Vl VJ 
Location & State 
Parties 
THE OCEANS 
Pacific Ocean 
US (American 
Somoa)-
Cook Islands (NIF) 
US (American 
Somoa)-
New Zealand 
(Tokelau) (NIF) 
Indian Ocean 
France (Reunion)-
Mauritius 
Year* 
1980 
1980 
1980 
Delimitation 
Principle** 
E 
E 
E 
Broad Equality 
of Coastline*** Remarks 
Yes Islands v. islands; all islands used as basepoints. 
Yes Islands v. islands; all islands used as basepoints. 
Yes Islands similarly shaped and sized. 
IV 
V'o 
~ 
() 
0 
z 
o-l 
~ 
<3 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
Vl 
o-l 
c:: 
C) 
rn 
Vl 
~ 
m 
1:11 
True/Simplified 
Equidistance 
Colombia-Dominican Rep. 
Colombia-Haiti 
Denmark-Norway 
Denmark-UK 
Finland-USSR 
France (Reunion)-Mauritius 
Iran-Qatar 
Italy-Spain 
Netherlands-UK 
Norway-UK 
US (Samoa)-Cook Islands 
US (eastern Guli)-Mexico 
US (Samoa)-New Zealand (Tokelau) 
US (Pueno Rico)-Venezuela 
Subtotal: 14 
Delimitation-Principle Index to Table 4 
Selective 
Equidistance 
Australia-Indonesia 
Australia-Pauper New Guinea 
Bahrain-Iran 
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia 
Canada-Denmark (Greenland) 
France-UK 
Greece-Italy 
India-Indonesia 
India-Maldives 
India-Sri Lanka 
India-Thailand 
Indonesia-Thailand 
Iran-Oman 
Iran-Saudi Arabia 
Italy-Tunisia 
Italy-Yugoslavia 
Japan-Rep. of Korea 
Norway-Sweden 
Subtotal: 18 
Other 
Colombia-Costa Rica 
Colombia-Panama 
Finland-Sweden 
German, W.-UK 
Indonesia-Malaysia 
Iran-United Arab Emirates 
Netherlands (Antilles)-Venezuela 
Saudi Arabia-Sudan 
Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela 
US-Cuba 
Subtotal: 10 
TOTAL: 45 
Unknown 
Cuba-Haiti 
Dominican Rep.-Venezuela 
Turkey-USSR 
Subtotal: 3 
tf.l 
~ 
t:l:l 
t'l1 
0 
= 0 
~ 
~ 
~ 
t;:j 
t'l1 
!"" 
~ 
8 
0 
z 
N 
VI 
VI 
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Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4 
Abbreviations 
AJIL: American Journal of International Law. 
ILM: International Legal Meterials. 
LIS: Limits in the Seas series (97 issues as of 1984) 
UNLS: United Nations Legislative Series (four related volumes as 
of 1984: UNLS/15 (1970), UNLS/16 (1974), UNLS/18 (1976), 
and UNLS/19 (1980)). 
NDLOS: New Directions in the Law of the Seas (11 volumes as of 
1984) 
Smith: Robert W. Smith, "The Maritime Boundaries of the United 
States," Geographical Review, Vol. 71 (1981), pp. 395-410. 
Feldman: Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, "The Maritime 
Boundaries of the United States," AJIL, Vol. 75 (1981), pp. 729-
63. 
Nweihed: Kaldone G. Nweihed, "EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the 
Semi-Enlcosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements Between 
Venezuela and Her Neighbors," Ocean Development and Inter-
national Law Journal, Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 1-33. 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all the sources cited below contain 
text of the shelf boundary agreements. All LIS issues have ex-
cellent charts attached. ILM and NDLOS sometimes have 
maps or sketches. UNLS have texts only. The other three pri-
vate sources have some maps and discussions. 
Australia-Indonesia: LIS, No. 87 (1979); UNLS/18, pp. 433, 441. 
Australia-Papua New Guinea: LIS, No. 87 (1979), NDLOS, Vol. 8 
(1980), p. 215. 
Bahrain-Iran: LIS, No. 58 (1974); UNLS/16, p. 428. 
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia: LIS, No. 12 (1970); UNLS/ 16, p. 409. 
Canada-Denmark (Greenland): LIS, No. 72 (1976); UNLS/18, p. 
447. 
Colombia-Costa Rica: LIS No. 84 (1979);NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 
93. 
Colombia-Dominican Republic: NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 78; 
Nweihed, p. 8 (Map) and p. 33, note 37. 
Colombia-Haiti: NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 76;Nweihed, p. 8 (Map). 
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Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4 (cont.) 
Colombia-Panama: LIS, No. 79 (1978); NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 
88. 
Cuba-Haiti: NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 69; Nweihed, p. 8 (Map). 
Denmark-Norway: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/15, p. 780. 
Denmark-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/15, p. 780. 
Dominican Republic-Venezuela, NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 80. 
Finland-Sweden: LIS, No. 71 (1975). 
Finland-USSR: LIS, Nos. 16 (1970), 56 (1973); UNLS/ 15, p. 777. 
France-UK: Anglo-French Arbitral Award, ILM, Vol. 18 (1979), p. 
397. 
France (Reunion)-Mauritius: LIS, No. 95 (1982). 
Germany, West-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/18, p. 
435. 
Greece-Italy: LIS, No. 96 (1982). 
India-Indoinesia: LIS Nos. 62 (1975), 93 (1981). 
India-Maldives: LIS, No. 78 (1978). 
India-Sri Lanka: LIS, Nos. 66 (1975) and 77 (1978); UNLS/19, pp. 
396, 402, 412-15. 
India-Thailand: LIS, No. 93 (1981). 
Indonesia-Malaysia: LIS No. 1 (1970); UNLS/16, p. 417. 
Indonesia-Thailand: LIS, Nos. 81 (1978), 93 (1981);NDLOS, Vol. 6 
(1977), p. 746. 
Iran-Oman: LIS, No. 67 (1976); UNLS/19, p. 450. 
Iran-Qatar: LIS, No. 25 (1970). 
Iran-Saudi Arabia: LIS, No. 24 (1970); UNLS/18, p. 433. 
Iran-United Arab Emirates: LIS, No. 63 (1975). 
Italy-Spain: NDLOS, Vol. 5 (1977), p. 261; LIS, No. 90 (1980). 
Italy-Tunisia: LIS, No. 89 (1980). 
Italy-Yugoslavia: LIS, No. 9 (1970). 
Japan-Republic of Korea: LIS, No. 75 (1977). 
Netherlands-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/15, p. 778; 
UNLS/16, p. 430. 
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Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4 (cont.) 
Netherlands (Antilles)-Venezuela: Nweihed, p. 5 (Map) and pp. 23-
29 (restatement of text and discussion). 
Norway-Sweden: LIS, No.2 (1970); UNLS/16, p. 413. 
Norway-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/16, p. 775. 
Saudi Arabia-Sudan: UNLS/18, p. 452. 
Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela: LIS, No. 11 (1970). 
Turkey-USSR: Rainer, Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits across Na-
tional Frontiers," AJIL, Vol. 73 (1979), p. 230, note 62 (no text 
included). 
US (Samoa)-Cook Islands: Text of treaty in Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States Transmitting the [Treaty between the 
U.S. and Cook Islands], Senate Executive Document P, 96th 
Congress, 2nd Session (1980); Map in Smith, p. 409. 
US-Cuba: ILM, Vol. 17 (1978), p. 110; NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 
66; Smith, pp. 401-402 (Map on p. 403); Feldman, p. 746. 
US (eastern Gulf)-Mexico: ILM, Vol. 17 (1978), p. 1073; NDLOS, 
Vol. 8 (1980), p. 63; Smith, pp. 402-405 (Map on p. 404); Feld-
man, pp. 743-45 (Map on p. 745). 
US (Samoa)- New Zealand (Tokelau): Department of State Bulletin, 
Vol. 81, No. 2049 (April 1981), p. 48 (no text included); Smith, 
pp. 407-10 (Map on p. 409); Feldman, pp. 748-49. 
US (Puerto Rico)-Venezuela: TIAS, No. 9890; NDLOS, Vol. 8 
(1980), p. 84; LIS, No. 91 (1980). 
I. 
II. 
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Table 5 
The Proportionality Test: The Lengths of Coastlinest of 
the Chinese and Japanese Territories in 
Relation to Their Continental Shelf 
Areas in the East China Sea 
(Lengths in nautical miles) 
Coastline Measured by Its General Direction 
China (PRC & ROC) Japan 
North Region (north of 30°N) 
Mainland2 383 Kyushus & Goto Retto 182 
Osumi Gunto 28 
South Region (south of 30°N) 
Mainland3 284 (R yukyu Islands) 
Taiwan4 81 Tokara Gunto 11 
Amami Gunto 64 
Okinawa Gunto 74 
Sakishima Gunto 56 
Total: 748 415 
259 
Ratio: 64.3(%) 35.7(%) 
South Region Only 
China (PRC & ROC): 365 Japan: 205 
Ratio: 64% 36% 
Coastline Measured by Straight Lines (Coastal Front) 
China (PRC & ROC): 680 Japan: 360 
Ratio: 65% 35% 
1 The coasts of the Chinese mainland are measured in the general direction of the coast-
line instead of following all their sinuosities. The coasts of islands are measured by their 
maximum lengths except those of Taiwan and Kyushu which are treated as mainlands 
for the present purposes. The PRC's straight baselines are disregarded. 
2. From 33°l7'N to 30°N latitude (approximately the headland of the Hangchow Bay). 
3. From 30°N latitude to Hai-t'an Island in the Fukien Province opposite Taiwan. 
4
· Measured in the general direction of its northern and northeastern coasts bordering 
the East China Sea. Those bordering the Philippines Sea and the South China Sea are 
excluded. See Map I. 
s. Measured in the general direction of its western coast facing the East China Sea. 
Those coasts of K yushu bordering the Korea Strait and the Pacific Ocean are excluded. 
N 
Table 6 0\ 0 
Physical Characteristics of the Hurd Deep, the Norwegian Trough, the Okinawa Trough, and 
the Timor Trough 
Hurd Deep Norwegian Trough Okinawa Trough Timor Trough () 
Location English Channel North Sea East China Sea Timor Sea 0 z 
Distance o-i t'l1 
beg. opp. coasts 50-90 60-300 60-280 175-300 ::: 
(n. miles) .., 0 
Length 80 470 620 625 ~ (n. miles) ~ 
-< 
Width 1-3 20-81 65-100 70-100 > (n. miles) en ;; 
102-167 200-670 500-2, 717 500-3, 200 z 
Depth Over I /2 of area Over 2/3 of area tl.l 
(meters) exceeds I ,000; over I /5 exceeds 1,000; Over 1/4 o-i c:: 
exceeds 2,000 exceeds 2,000. 0 
...... 
Average Depth of sur- t'l1 en 
rounding shelves 76 90 90 95 til (meters) t'l1 ~ 
Underlying crust struc- Oceanic or transitional Oceanic or transitional .... Continental Continental t'l1 
ture (?) (?) en 
Communicating with Communicating with ocean depths by sills much 
Geomorphology Isolated deep wholly ocean depths by a sill deeper than the adjacent shelves (Okinawa Trough: 
surrounded by shelves comparable in depth 500-1,000 meters; Timor Trough: 1,400 meters). 
with adjacent shelves 
Table 7 
Certain Data Relating to the Chinese Petroleum Corporation's Joint Ventures with Six U.S. Oil 
Companies 
Shortest and 
Longest Shortest Dis- Shortest Dis-
Contract Dates Location Distances tance from tance from Present Status 
Signature of Con- from Tai- Chmese Japan incl. of Contract til tT1 Approval tract wan mainland Ryukyus (as of > Expiration Area (n. miles) (n miles) (n. miles) Dec. 31. 1983) tl:' 
tT1 
7-27-70 Zone I 0 
Amoco 9-21-70 Taiwan Terminated CCI Strait 10-35 35 Sept. '78 0 c:: Sept. '78 (north) z 
3-37-71 Zone I 0 
Conoco 7-23-71 Taiwan Terminated > 
--- Strait 10-120 60 Sept. '78 ::c 
-< Sept. '78 (south) 
0 7-28-70 Zone II Suspended tT1 
Gulf 9-21-70 E. China 10-195 55 35 under .force t""' 
--- majeure 
-Sea ~ Mar. '80 clause ::j 
8-13-70 Zone III Suspended > 9-21-70 under .force >-! Oceanic E. China 110-280 70 85 
majeure 0 
Mar. '79 Sea clause z 
9-22-70 Zone IV Suspended 
Clinton 9-26-70 E. China 250-390 110 70 under .force 
Sea majeure Mar. '78 clause 
6-17-72 Zone V Suspended 
Texfei 8-29-72 E. China 290-415 120 80 under .force 
Sea majeure N Aug. '80 clause 0\ 
-- -- --·----· 
-
262 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
List of Maps 
Map 
1. East China Sea: Geography 
2. East China Sea: Geomorphology 
3. East China Sea: Geology 
4. East China Sea: Unilateral Claims and Concession Areas (as 
of 1971) 
5. Republic of Korea: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of Decem-
ber 31, 1982) 
6. Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Development Zone and 
Subzones 1-9 (as of December 31, 1979) 
7. Japan and the Republic of China: Offshore Oil Concessions 
8. Japan: Offshore Oil Concessions in the East China Sea (as of 
December 31, 1979) 
9. Republic of China: Five "Reserved Offshore Petroleum 
Zones" (delineated October 15, 1970) and Oil Concessions (as 
of mid-1977). 
10. Republic of China: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of Decem-
ber 31, 1982) 
11. People's Republic of China: Geophysical Survey and Off-
shore Oil Exploration Areas 
12. The Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islets 
13. North Sea Continental Shelf Boundaries 
14. Anglo-French Continental Shelf Boundaries 
15. Tunisian and Libyan Coasts Facing the Mediterranean Sea 
16. Tunisian and Libyan Unilateral Claims 
17. The Tunisian-Libyan Continental Shelf Boundary as Decided 
by the International Court of Justice 
18. Timor Sea and Arufura Sea 
19. The Australia-Indonesia Equidistant Shelf Boundary (the 
"Eastern Segment") as Delimited in the Agreement of May 
18, 1971 
20. The Australia-Indonesia Equitable Shelf Boundary (The 
"Western Segment") as Delimited in the Agreement of 
October 9, 1972 
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Note on Permission to Reproduce Certain Maps 
1. Permission to reproduce maps 6, 8 and 10 was kindly granted 
by American Association of Petroleum in a letter dated 
September 12, 1984. 
2. Permission to reproduce maps 7 and 9 was kindly granted by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a letter 
dated November 8, 1984. 
3. Permission to reproduce map 14 was kindly granted by 
Oxford University Press in a letter dated October 4, 1984 
(Reference no. A/BYBIL/ AMM). 
4. Permission to reproduce map 18 was kindly granted by 
International Hygrographic Bureau in a letter dated Septem-
ber 21, 1984. 
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Map 1: East China Sea: Geography 
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Map 2: East China Sea: Geomorphology 
(contours in fathoms) 
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Source: K.O. Emery et al.,"Geological Structure and 
Water Characteristics of the East China Sea 
and Yellow Sea~ UNECAFE/CCOP Technical 
Bulletin, Vol. 2(1969), pp. 3, 15 (Fig. 2). 
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Map 4: East China Sea: Unilateral Claims and 
Concession Areas (as of 1971) 
z 
l> 
• 
0 
PETROLEUM CONCESSION AREAS 
0 
-- Republic of Chii\G 
-- South Korea 
-- Ryukyu 
---Japan 
.t-1 -- SekJU~n Kalraot .. 
,HI- Tei~u ond Gulr 
.t-W- Nlhon.-,u ond TIIGCO 
.I-IV- Hi.,..,. hot! S•IIJU GniJ SP*I 
.. ILE:S 
Source: u.s. State Dep•t Map No. 267 7-71 (State RGE). 
Notes: 1. "SOCAL/TEXACO" is referred to elsewhere as "Caltex". 
2. "Sekiyu Shigen Kaihatsu" (J-I) means "Japan Petroleum 
Exploration company" or "Japex". 
3. "Teikoku" {J-II) means "Imperial". Some of Teikoku's 
concessions appear in Map 6 under Teseki, a Gulf-Teikoku 
joint-venture. 
4. "Nihonsekiyu" {J-III) means "i:Japan Oil".-
5. "Nishi Nihon Sekiyu" {J-IV) means "West Japan Oil" 
Block J-IV was assigned to New West Japan Oil, a subsi-
diary of West Japan Oil, in 1977. See Chapter 2, note 70 
and accompanying text. 
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~tap 3: East China Sea: Geology 
(Contours indicate thickness of sediment (hundreds 
of meters) beneath the East china Sea.) 
Source: K.O. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and 
Some Water Cliaracteristics of the East China 
Sea and Yellow Sea, UNECAFB/CCOP Technical 
Bulletin, Vol. 2 (1969), pp. 3, 40 (Fig. 17). 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
Ex-Texaco/Chevro~ 
I 
• AREA REUNO. IN 1982 
JAPAN-SOUTH I<OAEA 
JOINT DEVELOPME:NT AMA 
SOUTH KOREA 
...., .. 
Map 5: Republic of Korea: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of Decet'lber 
31, 1982) 
Source: G.L. Fletcher, .. Oil and Gas Developments in Far East 
in 1982: South Korea,'" AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), 
p. 1924 (Fig. 24). 
---- The ROK's 1952 continental shelf claim. See Chapter 2, note ll, 
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Map 6: Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Development Zone and 
Subzones 1-9 (as of December 31, 1979). (For new 
developments, see Map 5 ~.) 
Source: G.L. Fletcher,"Petromeum Developments in Far East, 
1979: South Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 64 (1980), 
p. 1955 (Fig. 30). 
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AG\JU6 
JAPAN AND TAIWAN 
Disputed Concession Areas 
~ Joponne cOftCeuions 
==:r- Pro1ected JaponeY canc~ilons [=:::J Pro1eded Gulf-Japan concnl!ons 
--- To1won COtlte-YoOM 
c=::J Gulf-Ta1won concewom 
Olunowo lfoYgh 
••••••••·•·· •• Conhnentol shelf 
r·---1 
: ... __: 
... 
... 
.... 
t"ELLOW SEA 
, ... 
.... 
... 
... 
PACIFIC OCEAI< 
100 200 JOO •OO .500 
II:ILOM!T!IS 
100 200 JOG 
¥1LU 
Map 7: Japan and the Republic of Ct~na: Offshore Oil Concessions 
Source: Selig S, Harrison, China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? 
(New York: Columbia university Press, 1977), p. 46 
et seq. (Fig. 6). 
Note: Compare this map to Maps 8 and 9 to get a clearer picture 
of Japan's claims and concessions. This map does not 
show colors in Harrison's original. For details of con-
cession holders and overlapping zones, see Table 1 supra. 
Map 8: 
Source: 
Note: 
.-'' 
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U.S.S.R . 
.... j ·· .... , .. 
,._, 
(\ .. ,.) 
/ 
.. r' 
, . .,n 
LUTI:It OF II'ITfNT AMA 
O .. EN Alt!AS IN S..II&OM:A WATE,., 
JAPAN -So JIQII'lA 
.IOINT D[YIELDPMENT All'ltA 
I FOR DETAIL SIEIE FIGURE 27) 
JAPAN- SOUTH KOREA 
PETROLEUM CONTRACTS 
MODIFIED AFTER PETROCONSUlTANT$ S.A 
Japan: Offshore Oil Concessions in the East China 
Sea (left bottom corner)(as of December 31, 1979) 
G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developments in Far East, 
1979: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 64 (1980), p. 
1941 (Fig. 16) 
For details about concession holders, see Table 1 
supra and Chapter 2 supra under "Japan". 
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TAIWAN 
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Map 9: Republic of China: Five "Reserved Offshore Petroleum 
Zones" (delineated October 15, 1970) and Oil Con-
cessions (as of mid-1977) 
Source: Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict 
Ahead? (New York: Columb~a un~vers~ty Press, 1977}, 
p. 46 et seg. (Fig. 5). 
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SHANGHAI 
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CHINA ZONE IV zoNE"m--;;-· 
Map 10: 
Source: 
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Republic of China: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of 
December 31, 1982) 
G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East 
in 1982: Taiwan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), p. 
1927 (Fig. 27), with updates supplied by this author. 
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People's Republic of Chinas Geophysical Survey and Offshore Oil Exploration Areas 
Statement of Davids. Holland, senior vice president of Pennzoil, to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on February 4, 1982, United States-China Economic 
Relationss A Reappraisal, (Washington, D.C.1 Government Pr1nt1ng Off1ce, Apr1l 
1982), pp. 87, 92. 
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~'tl 11fl & ~~ J wru ru~ ~ 
A SKETCH OF TIAO-YU-T'AIISLETS 
123'25' 6QO 650 lL4"00' 
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124'40' 
26'15' 
zs·zs· L_.l ___ ..c::::::==-----;~;n:-----------:l:-::----' 
123'25' 550 650 
0 1:750,000 50 100.>MKM 
E=~~==~~==~==r=~IE·-============~~-~d, F· 25 SOil J'l. ~Iiles 
Map 12: Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islets [Japanese names in pa-
renthesis] 
l.Tiao-yu (Uotsuri) 
2.Huang-wei (Kuba) 
3.Nan-hsiao (Minami-kojima) 
4.Pei-hsiao (Kita-kojima) 
5.Ch'ih-wei (Taisho) 
6.Ch'ung-pei-yen (Okinokitawa) 
7.Ch'ung-nan-yen (Okinominamiiw~) 
B.Fei-lai (Tobisej 
Source: Sha Hsueh-chun, Tiao-yu-t•ai Lieh-yu T'u [A Map of the 
Tiao-yu-t•ai Islets](Taipel 1972). Seei:hapter 4, note 6, 
This sketch is an integral part of that map. The 200-
meter and 1,000-meter contour lines are added by this 
author on the basis of T.Chase et al., Bathymetry of the 
North Pacific, Chart No. 5 (Scripps Institution of---
oceanography & Institute of ~arine ~esources, La Jolla, 
California,l970). See Chapter 1, note 6. 
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Map 13: North Sea Continental Shelf Boundaries 
Devil's 
C)Hole 
.· ' 
200 metres line ·······································• 
Median lines 
"Equitable 
boundary" Limits fixed by the --------1882 Convention 
Scale: 0!-----::!10~--:::_,:::---,~..,:--J~ .. n. miles 
Source: North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 15 (Map 1). 
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Map 1~ Anglo-French Continental Shelf Boundaries 
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Source; Derek w. Bowett, .. The Arbitration between the United 
Kingdom and France concerning the Continental 
Shelf Boundary in the English Channel and South-
Western Approaches, .. British Yearbook of International 
~·Vol. 49 (1978), p. 2. 
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Map 15: TUnisian and Libyan Coasts Facing the 
Mediterranean Sea 
Source: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
{Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 36 
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Map 16: Tunisian and Libyan Unilateral Claims. 
Source: 
Limit of te~ritorial waters claimed by each Party. 
Lme resultmg from Labyan method of delimitation. 
Sheaf of lanes resulting from Tunisian methods of dclimilalion. 
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiraya) 
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Map 17: 
Source: 
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The TUnisian-Libyan Continental Shelf Boundary' 
as Decided by the International Court of Justic 
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
{Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiraya) 
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 90. 
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Map 18: Timor Sea and Arafura Sea (Source: Special Publication 
No. 23""Limits of Oceans and Seas", 3rd Edition 1953, 
published by the International Hydrographic Bureau, 
Monaco, solely for hydrographic purposes. 
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Map 19: The Australia-Indonesia Equidistant Shelf Boundary (the "Eastern 
Segment") as Delimited in the Agreement of May 18, 1971. 
(Source: International Legal Materials, Vol. 10 (1971), p, 834) 
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(Source: International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), P• 3S7) 
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